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Abstract 
This thesis offers a reconstructive reading of Thomas’s doctrine of the divine ideas, and its 
contribution to his pedagogical efforts in the Summa Theologiae to train its readers in the habit of 
thinking theologically. I argue that through a series of primary and peripheral gestures, Thomas 
appropriates the doctrine of the divine ideas to help guide his readers from the confession of 
faith to the understanding of humanity’s creational and soteriological dependence on God. 
Accordingly, Thomas’s multilevel integration of the divine ideas into the Summa typifies the 
convergence of faith and reason that defines the nature of theological discourse in his exposition 
of sacra doctrina. More specifically, this integration reflects Thomas’s understanding of the 
theological task as the contemplative process of discerning the fittingness (convenientia) of God’s 
actions revealed in the mysteries of faith. Following the pedagogical structure of the Summa, then, 
Thomas uses the doctrine of the divine ideas to help discern the mysteries of creation and 
salvation. Corresponding to this pedagogical repurposing of the divine ideas, Thomas’s 
intimations and subtle references to the divine ideas throughout the Summa are designed to direct 
the reader’s attention to the goal of theological inquiry, which is the contemplative vision of God. 
He does this by utilizing the divine ideas both to prepare his readers for his theological 
exposition on God’s creational activity and providential oversight of all that exists and 
supplement their understanding of these issues. Thomas’s theological appropriation of the divine 
ideas is, therefore, grounded in the unity of his exposition on the trinitarian life of God, which 
demonstrates that his integration and elevation of the doctrine is rooted in his understanding of 
theological inquiry as a pedagogical response to God’s self-disclosure in scripture. This process 
of appropriating and elevating the doctrine of the divine ideas into dialogue with the mysteries of 
faith culminates when Thomas extends the grammar of the divine ideas into his theological 
reflections on Christ’s salvific work and humanity’s response.  
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 1. Introduction: Making a Case for Rereading Thomas’s  
Doctrine of the Divine Ideas 
 
Thomas is a challenging thinker who hides himself in the light, and he never reveals his  
entire thought all at once.1 
 
1.1 Problematic Methodologies: Interpreting Thomas’s Doctrine of the Divine Ideas  
 How should Thomas Aquinas’s doctrine of the divine ideas be read today? While the 
argument presented in this study has undergone many alterations and passed through many 
incarnations, this question has remained something of the impetus behind its development. 
Modern scholarship has had a long and complex reaction to Thomas’s inclusion of this doctrine 
within the canons of his theological and philosophical reflections. The nineteenth century saw a 
number of works arguing for the doctrine’s essential role in Thomas’s thought, but these positive 
evaluations eventually gave way to more harsh criticisms and dismissive interpretations of his 
doctrine of the divine ideas.2 In the early to mid-twentieth century, a general assumption 
emerged among scholars working on Thomas’s metaphysics and epistemology that the doctrine 
of the divine ideas was in fact superfluous to his thought, and that Thomas had only included it 
out of respect for tradition.3 Since the late twentieth century, however, a number of studies have 
been completed that attempt to overturn this scholarly conjecture by emphasizing aspects of 
Thomas’s discussions on the divine ideas that they believe confirm the genuinely Thomist 
character of the doctrine’s formulation in his works.4 Although many of these works offered 
                                                
1 Josef Pieper, Philosophia Negativa: Zwei Versuche Über Thomas von Aquin (München: Kösel-Verlag, 1953), 16: 
“Thomas ist ein schwieriger Denker, der sich im Licht verbirgt und niemals seinen ganzen Gedanken auf einmal 
sagt.” 
2 For examples of positive assessments of the doctrine from the nineteenth century, See, Engelbertus 
Antonius Josephus Vigener, De Ideis Divinis. Commentatio Philosophica Etc. (Münster: Ex typographia Iosephi Krick, 
1869); Constantius Van den Berg, O.P., De ideis divinis, seu de divina essentia, prout est omnium rerum idea et primum exemplar, 
juxta doctrinam doctoris Angelici, Divi Thomae Aquinatis, contra pantheismum praesertim idealisticum, aliosque errores modernos 
(Prostat Buscoduci, 1872); Alfonso Maria Vespignani, Dell’esemplatismo Divino. Saggio Teoretico Secondo i Principi Scientifici 
dell’Aquinate (Parma, 1887); Victor Lipperheide, Thomas von Aquino und die Platonische Ideenlehre. Eine Kritische 
Abhandlung von Dr. Victor Lipperheide (München: M.Riefer’sche Universitäts-Buchhandlung, 1890); Ern Dubois, De 
Exemplarismo Divino Seu Doctrina De Trino Ordine Exemplari Et De Trino Rerum Omnium Ordine Exemplato (Rome, 1897). 
3 A. G. Sertillanges, S. Thomas d’Aquin: Somme Théologique, traduction française, vol. 2 (Paris: Editions de la 
Revue des Jeunes, 1926), 403–5; Edgar de Bruyne, S. Thomas d’Aquin Le Milieu.-l’Homme.-La Vision Du Monde. (Paris: 
Gabriel Beauchesne, 1928), 158; Étienne Gilson, Introduction à La Philosophie Chrétienne (Paris: J. Vrin, 1960), 174–5; 
Étienne Gilson, Le Thomisme: Introduction à La Philosophie de Saint Thomas d’Aquin, 6th ed., Etudes de Philosophie 
Médiévale (Paris: J. Vrin, 1965), 146–8; Julius R. Weinberg, Short History of Mediaeval Philosophy (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1964), 206–7. 
4For examples of this turn in the scholarship on Thomas’s doctrine of the divine ideas, see L. -B. Geiger, 
“Les Idées Divines Dans L’oeuvre de S. Thomas,” in St. Thomas Aquinas, 1274-1974: Commemorative Studies, vol. 1 
(Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 1974), 175–209; Mark D. Jordan, “The Intelligibility of the 
World and the Divine Ideas in Aquinas,” The Review of Metaphysics 38 (1984): 17–32; Alice Ramos, “The Divine Ideas 
and the Intelligibility of Creation: A Way Toward Universal Signification in Aquinas,” Doctor Communis 43 (1991): 
250–65; J. F. Wippel, Thomas Aquinas on the Divine Ideas, The Étienne Gilson Series 16 (Toronto: Pontifical Institute 
of Mediaeval Studies, 1993); Vivian Boland, O.P., Ideas in God According to Saint Thomas Aquinas: Sources and Synthesis, 
Studies in the History of Christian Thought 69 (Leiden: Brill, 1996); Mark F. Johnson, “God’s Knowledge in Our 
  
2 
exceptional insight into Thomas’s understanding of the divine ideas, they also, perhaps 
inadvertently, revived a number of uncertainties about the arguments for the existence of eternal 
archetypal forms, which relate to a series of debates in Thomist studies that currently dominate 
the interpretive landscape of the doctrine in Thomas’s works. These debates are the result of 
questions over the theological and/or philosophical character of Thomas’s writings, the extent to 
which he is Aristotelian and/or Neoplatonic, and issues related to his understanding of natural 
and supernatural ends.  
 The majority of studies on Thomas’s doctrine of the divine ideas adopt an atomistic 
interpretive approach to the doctrine, enabled by modern hermeneutical beliefs that meaning can 
be derived from categorical systematization.5 In other words, these studies have tended to focus 
on either a single explicit account of the doctrine within one of Thomas’s many works, or they 
have examined every section on the doctrine in chronological order. Thomas devotes sections to 
the divine ideas in most of his major works: the earliest being his discussion on the doctrine in 
his commentary (1254-1256) on Lombard’s Scriptum super libros Sententiarum book 1, distinction 
36; followed by, Disputatae de Veritate 3 (1256-1257); Chapter 5, lect. 3 of In librum beati Dionysii De 
divinis nominibus expositio (1261-1265 or 1265-1268); and Summa theologiae 1a.15 and 1a.84.5 (1266-
1268).6 Vivian Boland notes that the tendency toward atomistic readings of the doctrine is 
marked by a failure “to explore the wider contexts in which the doctrine of the divine ideas is 
situated,” which makes it nearly impossible to avoid the trap created by those studies that 
                                                                                                                                                  
Frail Mind: The Thomistic Model of Theology,” Angelicum 76 (1999): 25–46; James Stone, “The Foundation of 
Universal and Necessary Propositions in Select Writings of St Thomas Aquinas” (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, 
Fordham University, 2008); Gregory T. Doolan, Aquinas on the Divine Ideas as Exemplar Causes (Washington: The 
Catholic University of America Press, 2008); John Hughes, “Creatio Ex Nihilo and the Divine Ideas in Aquinas: 
How Fair Is Bulgakov’s Critique?,” Modern Theology 29 (2013): 124–37. 
5 For more on the character of these hermeneutical practices in Thomist studies, see Fergus Kerr, O.P., 
“The Varieties of Interpreting Aquinas,” in Contemplating Aquinas: On the Varieties of Interpretation, ed. Fergus Kerr, 
O.P. (London: SCM Press, 2003), 27–40. On the general persistence and problems with these practices, see John 
Montag, S.J., “Revelation: The False Legacy of Suárez,” in Radical Orthodoxy: A New Theology, ed. John Milbank, 
Catherine Pickstock, and Graham Ward (London: Routledge, 1999), 39–41; Thomas G. Guarino, Foundations of 
Systematic Theology (London: T & T Clark, 2005), 2–37. The evolution of these practices is discussed by Stephen 
Toulmin in Cosmopolis: The Hidden Agenda of Modernity (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992), 1–44; and Louis 
Dupré in Passage to Modernity: An Essay in the Hermeneutics of Nature and Culture (New Haven: Yale University Press, 
1993). 
6 On the redacted section for the divine ideas in the Summa contra Gentiles, see Boland, Ideas in God, 214–25. 
Thomas also discusses the doctrine of the divine ideas in a number of other works, including: De pot. 3.16 ad.12, 7.1 
ad.8; Sent Metaph. I, lect. 15, no.233; Quodlibet 4, which is perhaps Thomas’s final explicit interaction with the 
doctrine. There are also numerous references to the divine ideas scattered throughout Thomas’s commentaries on 
scripture. For example, Expos. Isa. 38, §20-29; Expos. Iob 33, §28-32; Sup. Ps. 39, no.4; In Eph. 3, lect. 3, no.160; In Col. 
2, lect. 1, no.80, ch. 3, lect. 1, no.139; In Heb. 9, lect. 1, no.422, ch. 11, lect.2, no.564-5; Lect. Ioan. 1, lect. 1, no.34-65, 
ch. 1, lect. 2, no.77-90. Unless otherwise stated, the dating of Thomas’s works follows Jean-Pierre Torrell, O.P., 
Saint Thomas Aquinas: The Person and His Work, trans. R. Royal, Revised edition, vol. 1 (Washington: The Catholic 
University of America Press, 1996), 330–61; French original, L’Initiation à Saint Thomas d’Aquin: sa personne et son oeuvre 
(Paris: Editions du Cerf, 1993). 
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question whether the doctrine is even genuinely Thomist.7 Even Boland’s formidable study on 
the theological character of Thomas’s doctrine cannot escape the gravitational pull of this 
question as he stacks up explicit references to the divine ideas throughout Thomas’s theological 
and philosophical works in order to prove that the doctrine is authentically Thomist.8 Yet, it 
seems reasonable to ask whether this is even a legitimate question to pose in the first place. 
There is nothing in Thomas’s discussions on the doctrine that indicates what he says about the 
divine ideas is not to be read as a genuine expression of his thought. Instead, the suspicions that 
surround the doctrine arise not from what Thomas actually says about the divine ideas, but from 
interpretive assumptions about the nature of his overall project.9 
Moreover, these assumptions are principally limited to philosophical concerns related to 
either particular metaphysical questions about the existence of nonexistent possibles, universals, 
and the ontological status of the divine ideas as exemplar causes, or to epistemological issues 
dealing with humanity’s knowledge of truth in the world.10 While all of these issues are certainly 
                                                
7 Boland, Ideas in God, 7. 
8 It seems that this question of whether the doctrine of divine ideas is genuinely Thomist might have been 
what actually prompted Boland’s whole study. In an article published sometime after his monograph on the divine 
ideas, Boland recounts a lecture he heard by Herbert McCabe in which McCabe remarked about ST 1a.15, “It must 
have been written by Saint Thomas on a platonic off day.” He says in response to this remark that it was “a 
comment that remained with the present writer to stimulate research in directions that might not have overly 
pleased Herbert.” For Boland’s account of this exchange, see “Thinking About Good—Thomas Aquinas on 
Nicomachean Ethics I, Divine Names IV-V and de Ebdomadibus,” New Blackfriars 83 (2002): 384. 
9 The persistence of this question exposes a tendency in contemporary receptions of Thomas to exclude or 
isolate aspects of his thought that do not fit within constructed interpretive frameworks, rather than to question the 
validity of these frameworks, which intentionally devalue facets of his thought that do not conform. Doolan 
identifies a number of the authors and interpretive assertions that first created doubts about the authenticity of 
Thomas’s doctrine of the divine ideas, although he appears to overlook the possibility that there is, in fact, no real 
basis for even asking the question. See his, “Is Thomas’s Doctrine of the Ideas Thomistic?” in Aquinas on the Divine 
Ideas, 111–7. 
10 On the metaphysical qualities of the doctrine, see Vincent P. Branick, “The Unity of the Divine Ideas,” 
The New Scholasticism 42 (1968): 171–201; W. Norris Clarke, “The Problem of the Reality and Multiplicity of Divine 
Ideas in Christian Neoplatonism,” in Neoplatonism and Christian Thought, ed. Dominic J. O’Meara (Albany: State 
University of New York Press, 1982), 109–127; Jeffrey. Coombs, “John Poinsot on How To Be, Know, and Love a 
Non-Existent Possible,” American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly 68 (1994): 321–335; Lawrence Dewan, “St. Thomas 
and the Possibles,” The New Scholasticism 53 (1979): 76–85; Lawrence Dewan, “St. Thomas, James Ross, and 
Exemplarism: A Reply,” American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly 65 (1991): 221–34; Antoine Dondaine, “Exemplars 
De La Summa Contra Gentiles,” in Miscellanea Codicologica F Masai Dicata, 2 (Ghent, Belgium: E Story-Scientia, 1979), 
287–299; Gregory T. Doolan, Aquinas on the Divine Ideas as Exemplar Causes (Washington: The Catholic University of 
America Press, 2008); John Lee Farthing, “The Problem of Divine Exemplarity in St. Thomas,” The Thomist 49 
(1985): 183–222; Geiger, “Les Idées Divines”; Roger Miller Jones, “The Ideas as the Thoughts of God,” Classical 
Philology 21 (October 1, 1926): 317–326; Theodore J. Kondoleon, “Exemplary Causality in the Philosophy of St. 
Thomas Aquinas” (Unpublished PhD Dissertation, The Catholic University of America, 1967); Aaron Martin, 
“Reckoning with Ross: Possibles, Divine Ideas, and Virtual Practical Knowledge.,” Proceedings of the American Catholic 
Philosophical Association (2004): 193–208; Armand A. Maurer, “James Ross on the Divine Ideas: A Reply,” American 
Catholic Philosophical Quarterly 65 (1991): 213–20; James F. Ross, “God, Creator of Kinds and Possibilities,” in 
Rationality, Religious Belief and Moral Commitment, ed. Robert Audi and William J. Wainwright (Ithaca: Cornell 
University Press, 1986), 315–34; James F. Ross, “Aquinas’s Exemplarism; Aquinas’s Voluntarism,” American Catholic 
Philosophical Quarterly 64 (1990): 171–198; James F. Ross, “Response to Maurer and Dewan,” American Catholic 
Philosophical Quarterly 65 (1991): 213–20; John F. Wippel, “The Reality of Nonexisting Possibles According to 
Thomas Aquinas, Henry of Ghent, and Godfrey of Fontaines,” The Review of Metaphysics 34 (June 1, 1981): 729–758; 
John F. Wippel, Thomas Aquinas on the Divine Ideas, The Étienne Gilson Series 16 (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of 
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relevant to Thomas’s doctrine of the divine ideas, their limited scope also means studies that are 
concerned with them are less likely to see the doctrine’s place in, as Josef Pieper says, “those 
basic assumptions, which, remaining unexpressed, nevertheless permeate all that is actually 
stated.”11 In other words the standard pattern of atomistic readings and philosophical inquiries in 
studies on Thomas’s doctrine of the divine ideas might find ways to satisfy contemporary 
questions or concerns about the divine ideas, but it is harder for them to both identify and 
explain the contribution of the doctrine’s more subtle gestures to Thomas’s works. What has 
been too often overlooked or, at least, unacknowledged, then, is that the current state of the 
doctrine’s interpretation in Thomist studies is largely determined by a distinctly modern tradition 
of the divine ideas, which is significantly different from what Thomas inherited, and it is this 
more recent tradition that has conditioned the contemporary reaction to the doctrine of the 
divine ideas in its historical contexts.12    
In an effort to offer a hermeneutical framework for Thomas’s doctrine of the divine 
ideas wherein, as Boland states, “he becomes accessible beyond his natural constituency and yet 
in a way that is faithful to the intention of his work,” this study will follow primary and 
peripheral gestures of the doctrine at key points of reciprocal exchange between the micro- and 
macro-arguments of Thomas’s Summa Theologiae.13 There are a number of reasons for adopting 
this approach, chief among them being that it gives us the opportunity to reflect upon the 
                                                                                                                                                  
Mediaeval Studies, 1993); B. Zedler, “Why Are the Possibles Possible?,” New Scholasticism 55 (1981): 113–131. On 
the epistemological qualities of the doctrine, see Wendy Petersen Boring, “Revising Our Approach to ‘Augustinian 
Illumination’: A Reconsideration of Bonaventure’s Quaestiones Disputatae De Scientia Christi IV, Aquinas’s Summa 
Theologiae Ia.84, 1-8, and Henry of Ghent’s, Summa Quaestionum Ordinarum, Q. 2, Art. 1, 2,” Franciscan Studies 68 
(2010): 39–81; Lawrence Dewan, “St. Thomas, Ideas, and Immediate Knowledge,” Dialogue 18 (1979): 392–404; 
Mark F. Johnson, “God’s Knowledge in Our Frail Mind: The Thomistic Model of Theology,” Angelicum 76 (1999): 
25–46; Mark D. Jordan, “The Intelligibility of the World and the Divine Ideas in Aquinas,” The Review of Metaphysics 
38 (1984): 17–32; John Milbank and Catherine Pickstock, Truth in Aquinas, Radical Orthodoxy (London: Routledge, 
2000); Robert Pasnau, “Henry of Ghent and the Twilight of Divine Illumination,” The Review of Metaphysics 49 (1995): 
49–75; Robert Pasnau, Thomas Aquinas on Human Nature: A Philosophical Study of Summa Theologiae, 1a 75-89 
(Cambridge University Press, 2001), 302–9; Lydia Schumacher, Divine Illumination: The History and Future of Augustine’s 
Theory of Knowledge (Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, 2011), 154–80; James Stone, “The Foundation of Universal and 
Necessary Propositions in select writings of St Thomas Aquinas” (Unpublished PhD Dissertation, Fordham 
University, 2008). 
11 Josef Pieper, “The Negative Element in the Philosophy of St. Thomas Aquinas,” in The Silence of St. 
Thomas: Three Essays, trans. John Murray, S.J. and Daniel O’Connor, 3rd Revised ed. (South Bend: St. Augustine’s 
Press, 1999), 45; German original, Philosophia Negativa: Zawei Versuche Über Thomas von Aquin (München: Kösel-Verlag, 
1953); Later published, with minor alterations, as Unaustrinkbares Licht: Das Negative Element in Der Weltansicht Des 
Thomas von Aquin (München: Kösel-Verlag, 1963). 
12 For more on this modern tradition of the divine ideas, see §7.1.  
13 Vivian Boland, O.P., St. Thomas Aquinas (London: Bloomsbury, 2007), 130. For a discussion on the 
interpretive importance of maintaining an eye on both the micro- and macro-arguments of a text, see David 
Kelsey’s stimulating work on the reception of scripture in modern theology Proving Doctrine: The Uses of Scripture in 
Modern Theology (Harrisburg: Trinity Press International, 1999; the revised edition of his 1975 work Uses of Scripture in 
Modern Theology), 130–44. Kelsey remarks, citing a fairly well-known passage from Stephen Toulmin’s The Uses of 
Argument (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1958), 94, that macro-arguments provide a “gross anatomical 
structure” for theological proposals, which are comprised of more specific “physiological” micro-arguments” (130). 
I am grateful to Robbie Griggs for alerting me to this proposal.  
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methods of reception and reading of texts from epochs quite distant from our own. With the 
changing tides in the tradition of the divine ideas from premodern favor to modern distrust 
juxtaposed by the recent growth of interest in Patristic and Medieval formulations of the 
doctrine, Thomas’s doctrine of the divine ideas provides a unique context for theologians to 
reconsider the way historical texts are received and read today.14  
Furthermore, our interest in the subtle or peripheral gestures of the doctrine within the 
Summa will hopefully highlight new lines of inquiry, which future studies on the doctrine of the 
divine ideas can explore. The divine ideas have a long and prominent history within the 
theological and philosophical works of premodern figures, and even with the increased interest 
in the doctrine, a considerable amount of work still remains to be done before scholars have a 
good grasp of its overall significance in premodern thought. Additionally, by situating Thomas’s 
doctrine of the divine ideas within the pedagogical vision of the Summa’s theological project, our 
approach will confront some aspects of the modern stigma still attached to the divine ideas. 
Because the modern position on the divine ideas is drastically different than its premodern 
predecessor, the doctrine will remain elusive to contemporary thought until the assumptions that 
inform the modern tradition are addressed. In order to reach these goals, however, it is necessary 
to clarify further the argument that guides the structure of this study. 
 
1.2 An Argument for the Fitting Gestures of the Divine Ideas in the Summa Theologiae 
 The basis for this study, as indicated above, is Thomas’s pedagogical efforts in the Summa 
to guide his readers toward the contemplative vision of God, with our final goal being to locate 
the place of the doctrine of the divine ideas in Thomas’s theological instruction on the relation 
                                                
14 For examples of the growing interest in premodern formulations of the doctrine of the divine ideas, see 
T. Kondoleon, “Divine Exemplarism in Augustine,” Augustinian Studies 1 (1970): 181–95; Ignatius Brady, “St. 
Bonaventure’s Doctrine of Illumination: Reactions Medieval and Modern,” Southwestern Journal of Philosophy 5 (1974): 
27–37; Leonard J. Bowman, “Cosmic Exemplarism of Bonaventure,” Journal of Religion 55 (1975): 181–98; M. J. F. M. 
Hoenen, Marsilius of Inghen: Divine Knowledge in Late Medieval Thought (Leiden: Brill, 1993), 121–56; Joost van Rossum, 
“The Lógoi of Creation and the Divine ‘Energies’ in Maximus the Confessor and Gregory Palamas,” in Studia 
Patristica, vol. 27 (Louvain: Peeters, 1993), 213–17; Rega Wood, “Distinct Ideas and Perfect Solicitude: Alexander of 
Hales, Richard Rufus, and Odo Rigaldus,” Franciscan Studies 53 (1993): 7–31; Katherin A. Rogers, The Neoplatonic 
Metaphysics and Epistemology of Anselm of Canterbury (Edwin Mellen Press Ltd, 1997); Timothy V. Noone, “Scotus on 
Divine Ideas: The Order of Intelligibles,” in Society for Medieval and Renaissance Philosophy, 1998; Timothy B. Noone, 
“Scotus on Divine Ideas: Rep. Paris. I-A, D. 36,” Medioevo: Rivista Di Storia Della Filosofia 24 (1998): 359–453; 
Alessandro D. Conti, “Divine Ideas and Exemplar Causality in Auriol,” Vivarium 38 (2000): 99–116; Gábor 
Kendeffy, “Augustine on Divine Ideas as Epistemological Criteria,” Acta Antiqua 42 (2002): 181–93; Wendy 
Petersen Boring, “Seeking Ecstasy: St. Bonaventure’s Epistemology” (Unpublished Ph.D. Dissertation, Yale 
University, 2004); Torstein Tollefsen, The Christocentric Cosmology of St Maximus the Confessor (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2008), 21–137; Christina Van Dyke, “An Aristotelian Theory of Divine Illumination: Robert 
Grosseteste’s Commentary on the Posterior Analytics,” British Journal for the History of Philosophy 17 (2009): 685–704; 
Andrew Louth, “St Maximos’ Doctrine of the Logoi of Creation,” in Studia Patristica, vol. 48 (Leuven: Peeters 
Publishers, 2010), 77–84; Schumacher, Divine Illumination; Mark McIntosh, “The Maker’s Meaning: Divine Ideas and 
Salvation,” Modern Theology 28 (2012): 365–84. 
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between the Trinitarian life of God and human existence.15 The benefit of positioning our study 
at these points is that it places us at the center of the Summa’s macro-arguments, as indicated by, 
first, Thomas’s insistence that the fullness of theological wisdom culminates in teaching, which is 
expressed in a remark about the superiority of the mixed life, “For just as it is better to illumine 
than merely to shine, so it is better to give to others the things contemplated than simply to 
contemplate.”16 Second, Gilles Emery notes, “Reflecting on the Trinitarian faith is the 
theologian’s primary task and this is where the heart of St. Thomas’ teaching rests.”17 Third, in 
his study on Thomas’s anthropology, Reinhard Hütter asserts, “[T]he fulcrum on which theology 
is balanced is an answer to the question . . . What is the human being?”18 However, because it 
would be nearly impossible for a single study to encompass Thomas’s thought on the Trinitarian 
character of theology and his understanding of human existence, successfully identifying the 
intersection of Thomas’s doctrine of the divine ideas with the Summa’s macro-arguments will rely 
on locating various micro-arguments within the Summa where the gestures of the doctrine clearly 
contribute to Thomas’s pedagogical efforts.  
It is therefore the intention of this study to argue that the primary and peripheral 
movements of the divine ideas within the Summa are gestures of contemplative fittingness 
(speculativa convenientia) designed to support Thomas’s theological exposition of humanity’s 
creational and soteriological dependence on God. Accordingly, the doctrine of the divine ideas 
will be read primarily as a type of grammar that Thomas theologically codifies to serve the 
Summa’s pedagogical efforts to guide readers from the confession of faith to the wisdom of sacra 
doctrina.  
 To secure our direction in this argument, the notion of convenientia (fittingness) requires 
further attention since it is, for Thomas, a technical term integral to the economy of his 
theological project in the Summa.19 Gilbert Narcisse aptly identifies the theological function of 
                                                
15 Cf. A. N. Williams, “Mystical Theology Redux: The Pattern of Aquinas’ Summa Theologiae,” Modern 
Theology 13 (1997): 56. 
16 ST 2a2ae.188.6: “Sicut enim majus est illuminare quam lucere solum, ita majus est contemplata aliis 
tradere quam solum contemplari.” The pedagogical fruition of theology is, for Thomas, an expression of humanity’s 
creational formation after the image of God: ST 1a.103.6; 1a.106.4. For a good overview of the traditions, substance, 
and motivations informing Thomas’s pedagogical concerns, see Boland, St. Thomas Aquinas, 75–101. On the 
superiority of the mixed life, in which contemplation culminates in teaching and preaching, see Thomas S. Hibbs, 
Virtue’s Splendor: Wisdom, Prudence, and the Human Good (New York: Fordham University Press, 2001), 22–4 and 199–
200. 
17 Gilles Emery, O.P., The Trinitarian Theology of Saint Thomas Aquinas, trans. Francesca Aran Murphy 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 2; French original, La Théologie Trinitaire de Saint Thomas d’Aquin (Paris: 
Éditions du Cerf, 2004). 
18 Reinhard Hütter, Dust Bound for Heaven: Explorations in the Theology of Thomas Aquinas (Grand Rapids: 
Eerdmans Publishing Company, 2012), 209. 
19 Gilbert Narcisse’s statistical analysis of Thomas’s corpus reveals that there are nearly nine thousand uses 
of convenientia vocabulary in his works (Les Raisons de Dieu: Argument de Convenance et Esthétique Théologique Selon Saint 
Thomas d’Aquin et Hans Urs von Balthasar [Fribourg: Éditions Universitaires, 1997], 24–35). Aidan Nicholas remarks 
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convenientia in his observation, “Fittingness denotes, among various possibilities, the significance 
of the chosen means, and the best reasons by which God, in his wisdom, has actually realized 
and revealed, gratuitously, through his love, the mystery of salvation and human glorification . . . 
[which] is a reality, a way of being, characteristic of the relationship between God and 
humanity.”20 Convenientia signifies, for Thomas, the aesthetic harmony in the orderliness of 
creation and salvation.21 Arguments from fittingness (ex convenientia), then, follow a type of 
aesthetic logic that searches for the best way to explain the convenientia of God’s decisions and 
actions in creation and salvation, or, as Nicholas Healy describes it, “One is to show the 
convenientia of things in relation to their exemplary source.”22 
 Consequently, convenientia is both a type of reasoning and a subject in theological 
reflection, which means, given the argument laid out above, that the gestures of the divine ideas 
throughout the Summa are being thought of as fitting movements in the aesthetic logic of 
Thomas’s theological exposition of the fittingness in the mysteries of faith revealed by God. 
There is, in fact, a twofold benefit to reading the divine ideas and convenientia as mutually 
reinforcing concepts. First, as Healy’s comment demonstrates, the fittingness of things in 
creation is the result of imitating the exemplary causes, i.e. the divine ideas.23 The second relates 
                                                                                                                                                  
that, “These computations establish that Narcisse is surely correct to say that appeal to convenientia constitutes for 
Thomas an intrinsic aspect of the ‘habit’ of theology” (Redeeming Beauty: Soundings in Sacral Aesthetics [Aldershot: 
Ashgate Publishing, 2007], 15). Convenientia, however, was not only vital to the thought of Thomas, but also the 
whole Medieval period, and the failure to properly appreciate its significance, as Michael Waddell notes, “risks 
distorting our understanding of medieval thought” (“Wisdom, Fittingness and the Relational Transcendentals,” in 
Was Ist Philosophie Im Mittelalter? Qu’est-Ce Que La Philosophie Au Moyen Âge? What Is Philosophy in the Middle Ages?, ed. 
Jan A. Aertsen and Andreas Speer, Miscellanea Mediaevalia 26 [Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1998], 538). 
20 Narcisse, Les Raisons de Dieu, 572 (translation mine): “La convenance désigne, parmi les possibles, la 
signification des moyens et des raisons les meilleurs, par lesquels Dieu, en sa sagesse, a effectivement réalisé et révélé, 
gratuitement et par amour, le mystère de salut et de la glorification de l’homme . . . [qui] est une réalité, un mode 
d’être, caractéristique de la relation entre Dieu et l’homme.” The important role of convenientia in Thomas’s thought 
has also been discussed in, Milbank and Pickstock, Truth in Aquinas, 60–72; Gregory P. Rocca, Speaking the 
Incomprehensible God: Thomas Aquinas on the Interplay of Positive and Negative Theology (Washington: Catholic University of 
America Press, 2004), 144–6; Nicholas M. Healy, Thomas Aquinas: Theologian of the Christian Life (Aldershot: Ashgate 
Publishing, 2003), 36–40; Adam Johnson, “A Fuller Account: The Role of ‘Fittingness’ in Thomas Aquinas’ 
Development of the Doctrine of the Atonement,” International Journal of Systematic Theology 12 (2010): 302–18.  
21 ST 1a.25.6 ad.2; 1a.39.8; 1a.43.7; 1a.46.1 ad.6; 1a.61.4; 1a96.3 ad.3; 1a.108.5 ad.5. While, comparatively, 
Thomas rarely refers directly to beauty (pulchrum), its connection with convenientia suggests that there is an aesthetic 
characteristic to his thought that is suffused throughout his entire corpus. See Nichols, Redeeming Beauty, 11. 
22 Healy, Thomas Aquinas: Theologian, 39. See ST 2a2ae.1.5 ad.2. Kevin Vanhoozer once remarked that 
Nicholas Wolterstorff’s description of the artist as a “worker in fittingness” “is a fine description of the theologian 
too,” which is an apt summary of what is being suggested here. See Kevin J. Vanhoozer, The Drama of Doctrine: A 
Canonical-Linguistic Approach to Christian Theology (Louisville: Westminster John Knox Press, 2005), 257. Cf. Frederick 
Christian Bauerschmidt, Thomas Aquinas: Faith, Reason, and Following Christ (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), 
161. 
23 Thomas also makes these connections in his remarks on Dionysius’s account of creation’s ontological 
illumination by God’s “divine rays,” which is one way that Dionysius refers to the divine ideas. In DDN IV, lect. 5, 
Thomas says: “Quomodo autem Deus sit causa claritatis, ostendit subdens, quod Deus immittit omnibus creaturis, 
cum quodam fulgore, traditionem sui radii luminosi, qui est fons omnis luminis; quae quidem traditiones fulgidae 
divini radii, secundum participationem similitudinis sunt intelligendae et istae traditiones sunt pulchrificae, idest 
facientes pulchritudinem in rebus.” For the connection in Dionysius’s writings between the divine rays and the 
divine ideas, see Dermot Moran, The Philosophy of John Scottus Eriugena: A Study of Idealism in the Middle Ages 
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to Marie-Dominique Chenu’s claim, “[The] fullness of intelligibility leads us actually to the realm 
of the divine ideas, the real spiritual and scientific home of theology . . . This doctrine, in fact, is 
both the principle of the architecture of the Summa and the unqualified reason for the oneness of 
theological science.”24 In short the fittingness of all that we experience and know in creation and 
salvation is a reflection of the means chosen by God in his wisdom to reveal himself, and the 
doctrine of the divine ideas gives us a grammar to describe the individual and communal 
realization of this fittingness. Theology, it may be said, is a search for fittingness, and the 
doctrine of the divine ideas is, in the Summa, vital to the intelligibility of this fittingness; yet the 
apparent importance of the divine ideas depicted here does not jibe with the anxieties 
represented by W. Norris Clarke’s claim, that there is one doctrine of Neoplatonism “that 
stubbornly resists coherent assimilation (into Christian thought): this is the doctrine of the 
realism of ideas,” or R. J. Henle’s comment, related specifically to Thomas, that there is an 
“awkwardness” in how the doctrine fits within his thought.25 These anxieties strain the prospect 
of resourcing the doctrine for contemporary theology and highlight the tensions in the process 
of ressourcement itself, which requires us to say more about the method, audience, and scope of 
this project.  
 
1.3 Notes on Method, Audience, and Scope 
 Interpreting the Summa Theologiae is a difficult task. Upon finding a way into the world 
created within its pages, one discovers a theological edifice too great to be comprehended, or as 
Turner playfully describes it, in his recent introduction to Thomas’s thought, “The main danger 
(in writing on Thomas) is that of supposing that the thing to do is get a mind on the scale of 
Thomas’s into your head, a task of compression that will be achieved only at your head’s peril . . . 
The only safe thing to do is to find a way of getting your mind into his, wherein yours has room 
to expand and grow, and explore the worlds his contains.”26 While this clever anecdote is 
certainly an accurate depiction of reading the Summa, it also exposes the likelihood, in the current 
                                                                                                                                                  
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 118; Benjamin DeSpain, “Seeing One’s Own Face in the Face of 
God: The Doctrine of the Divine Ideas in the Mystical Theologies of Dionysius the Areopagite and Nicholas of 
Cusa,” in Christian Mysticism and Incarnational Theology: Between Transcendence and Immanence, ed. Louise Nelstrop and 
Simon D. Podmore (Surrey: Ashgate Publishing, 2013), 38–9. 
24 M.-D. Chenu, Toward Understanding Saint Thomas, trans. M.-D. Landry, O.P. and D. Hughes, O.P. 
(Chicago: Henry Regnery, 1964), 312; French original, Introduction à l’étude de saint Thomas d’Aquin (Paris: Vrin, 1950). 
25 Clarke, “The Problem of Reality and Multiplicity,” 126; Robert John Henle, Saint Thomas and Platonism. A 
Study of the Plato and Platonici Texts in the Writings of Saint Thomas (The Hague: M. Nijhoff, 1956), 360. 
26 Denys Turner, Thomas Aquinas: A Portrait (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2013), 2. John Milbank 
makes a similar point when he asserts, “One discovers (in writings of Thomas) . . . the intense light of Naples and 
Paris which is ultimately invisible in its very radiance – rendering the wisest of us, for Aquinas after Aristotle, like 
owls blinking in the noonday” (Truth in Aquinas, 20). Cf. Rudi A. te Velde, Participation and Substantiality in Thomas 
Aquinas, Studien Und Texte Zur Geistesgeschichte Des Mittelalters 46 (Leiden: Brill, 1995), ix–xiv. 
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age of consumption and production, that our reading practices will stifle the growth or 
development of our interpretations of Thomas, since the model of reading typically encouraged 
nowadays resembles the method that, as Turner warns, we embark on only at our own peril.27  
With the Summa, this danger is further exacerbated because the literary format of 
Thomas’s scholastic method lends itself to atomistic or compartmentalized interpretations, 
which tend to stagnate the development of our readings by rehearsing the same questions and 
addressing the same problems. This can be seen in the successions of studies on Thomas’s 
doctrine of the divine ideas published, particularly in English, over the last fifty or so years. Yet, 
as the second chapter of this project demonstrates, the pedagogical design of the Summa 
encourages a different model of reading altogether, a model which is used to guide the evolution 
of our argument. Consequently, while questions of authenticity, multiplicity, universals, and the 
existence of possibles are addressed, it is not our primary purpose to bring definitive resolution 
to these problems. Instead, it will be assumed that everything Thomas says about the divine ideas 
in the Summa is intended for the pedagogical formation of his readers in the habit of thinking 
theologically, but by taking this step, we are obligated to be transparent about the stance taken 
on the doctrine’s role in his thought. 
Although the doctrine of the divine ideas takes center stage in this study, it is not the 
focal point of Thomas’s work. Too often, our methods of reception are dictated by attempts to 
discover the hidden or overlooked ideas or doctrines that entire theological or intellectual 
edifices hang from, but, in most cases, these things work like pieces in a puzzle, which is 
certainly the case with Thomas’s doctrine of the divine ideas. One of the dangers, then, with the 
systematization of ideas and doctrines from historical texts is the possibility of elevating them to 
places where they lose touch with their context in the author’s work. Yet it is difficult to escape 
this practice in the process of interpretation and composition, which is why we have opted to 
                                                
27 Paul Griffiths discusses the problems with contemporary models of reading in his stimulating study on 
the practices on religious reading. He writes:  
[There is] a widespread tendency, especially evident among professional readers in western 
institutions of higher education, to assimilate all forms of reading to a single standard model, 
which is through and through consumerist . . . Consumers treat what they read only as objects 
for consumption . . . Consider, as an illustration of this attitude, the consumerist reading done 
by professional academics in Europe and America at the end of the twentieth century: the 
attitude toward works implied in their practice is based on metaphors of production, 
consumption, use, and control. Academic readers consume the works of others and produce 
their own; they are defined and given status by the body of literature they control and upon 
which they are accredited to give authoritative voice for proper reward; they cite and mention, 
and are in turn judged largely by the extent to which the works they produce are cited and 
mentioned. Religious Reading: The Place of Reading in the Practice of Religion (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1999), 40 and 42. 
There is an irony here in noting Griffiths’s criticism of current reading practices that should be acknowledged 
because it inversely condemns many of the standards that have determined the shape this project; however, these 
are the very parameters of composition we are trying to be mindful of at the outset of this study. 
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categorize Thomas’s discussions on, and use of, the divine ideas as a series of gestures that 
belong to a larger argument.  
Thus, while it is argued that the doctrine is vital to the theological vision of the Summa, 
the divine ideas have what could be called ‘a peripheral centrality’ in Thomas’s theological 
argumentation, by which I mean that the doctrine typically sits at the edges of his arguments in 
various sections, questions, and articles of the Summa helping to direct the reader’s attention to 
the focal point of the work in these areas. Just like the piece of a puzzle, then, identifying the 
movements of the divine ideas as gestures contributing to Thomas’s theological vision shows 
that this doctrine fits within the Summa in such a way that its place only becomes clear once the 
focal point actually comes into focus while, without it, the vision itself would remain incomplete. 
In this way we should be able to open up new lines of reasoning on Thomas’s doctrine of the 
divine ideas as well as, and perhaps more importantly, offering some direction on ways to 
reconsider our methods of reception. These implications nevertheless raise the question of who 
this study is intended to help. 
Though mindful of those few scholars that have a special interest in the divine ideas, this 
study is primarily intended for, first, those working in the fields of historical and constructive 
theology, and, second, Thomists, or, to be more specific, those with a special interest in the 
reception and interpretation of Thomas’s works. With the cacophony of Thomisms that exist, 
each vying for interpretive accuracy, this prioritization might appear strange, since the literary 
world of Thomist studies can often feel like it is being steadily restricted to ever more specialized 
readers;28 nevertheless, it is important to remember that Thomas’s presence can be seen 
throughout western intellectual history and thus belongs to the received traditions of both 
Catholics and Protestants alike although in notably different ways.29 Despite the, at times, 
staggering differences in reception, Thomas’s work has something valuable to say about how we 
read and do theology that crosses ecclesial traditions and theological party lines, and with the 
                                                
28 For surveys of the multitude of Thomisms that exist, see Alasdair MacIntyre, Three Rival Versions of Moral 
Enquiry: Encyclopaedia, Genealogy and Tradition (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1990), 58–81; Thomas 
F O’Meara, Thomas Aquinas: Theologian (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1997), 152–200; Wayne J. 
Hankey, “Denys and Aquinas: Antimodern Cold and Postmodern Hot,” in Christian Origins: Theology, Rhetoric and 
Community, ed. Lewis Ayres and Gareth Jones (London: Routledge, 1998), 139–84; Brian J. Shanley, The Thomist 
Tradition, Handbook of Contemporary Philosophy of Religion (Dordrecht: Springer Netherlands, 2002), 1–20. 
29 While the prominence of Thomas in Catholic theology is obviously expected, there is a growing 
appreciation for his presence in or compatibility with the thought of various Reformation and Post-Reformation 
Protestants. For examples, see Christopher Cleveland, Thomism in John Owen (Farnham: Ashgate Publishing, 2013); 
Charles Raith II, Aquinas and Calvin on Romans: God’s Justification and Our Participation (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2014); Nathaniel A. Warne, “The Call to Happiness: An Investigation of Happiness, Virtues, Commands and 
the Common Good in the Doctrine of Calling, through the Work of Aristotle, Thomas Aquinas and Sixteenth and 
Seventeenth Century English Puritans” (Unpublished Dissertation, Durham University, 2015). Marcus Plested has 
also shown the unique ways in which Eastern Orthodoxy has interacted with Thomas’s works in his book Orthodox 
Readings of Aquinas (Oxford: Oxford university press, 2012).  
  
11 
increasing pressure on theology both in England and in North America to verify its academic 
qualifications, there has hardly been a time when it was more important for theologians to pay 
attention to what the authors that helped form our field are doing and the ways in which their 
works are read today.30  
As for the Thomists that might have an interest in another study on Thomas’s doctrine 
of the divine ideas, this project is designed to reflect how some recent trends in English-speaking 
Thomist studies have set the stage for a more thorough rethinking of Thomas’s theological 
application of the divine ideas. If one reviews a bibliography of works published on Thomas’s 
doctrine of the divine ideas beginning around the time of L.-B. Geiger’s pivotal essay from 1974, 
there is a distinct rise in the number of studies in English, which coincides with the increased 
philosophical fascination with Thomas both in England and in North America.31 This correlation 
is represented in studies on Thomas’s doctrine of the divine ideas by the distinctly philosophical 
questions, outlined above, that have engulfed the doctrine’s reception; yet, the absence of any 
clear consensus in these studies, and the persistence of the same entrenched responses, is 
consistent with Serge-Thomas Bonino’s observation that there is a “hermeneutic conflict” in 
Thomist studies that has gone generally unnoticed by most interpreters of Thomas.32 Through 
the work of scholars such as Fergus Kerr, David Burrell, and others, however, the English-
                                                
30 There is ample evidence in the growing body of literature on Thomas by Protestants that his works 
might serve as a point for ecumenical dialogue, as seen in the essays from Bruce L. McCormack and Thomas Joseph 
White's Thomas Aquinas and Karl Barth: An Unofficial Catholic-Protestant Dialogue (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans Publishing, 
2013). Hans Boersma outlines the value of Thomas’s ecclesiology for ecumenical dialogue in “Ressourcement of 
Mystery: The Ecclesiology of Thomas Aquinas and the Letter to the Romans,” in Reading Romans with St. Thomas 
Aquinas, ed. Matthew Levering and Michael Dauphinais (Washington: The Catholic University of America Press, 
2012), 52–74. John Bowlin outlines the growth of Protestant interest in Thomas in, “Contemporary Protestant 
Thomism,” in Aquinas as Authority, ed. Paul van Geest, Harm Goris, and Carlo Leget (Leuven: Peeters, 2002), 235–
52. For discussions on the pressures that theology is currently facing in academic circles, see the essays in Darlene L. 
Bird and Simon G. Smith, eds., Theology and Religious Studies in Higher Education: Global Perspectives (London: 
Continuum Publishing, 2009); Christopher Craig Brittain and Francesca Aran Murphy, eds., Theology, University, 
Humanities: Initium Sapientiae Timor Domini (Eugene: Wipf and Stock Publishers, 2011). It is worth making clear at this 
point that as an Anglican educated in both England and North America the issues of reception, reading, and 
theological methodology that I am concerned with are related to this context. This is not to say that theologians and 
scholars from other backgrounds will not find anything of value here, but to help the reader understand the 
audiences I had in mind while composing this work. 
31 Many of these studies are noted above in n.10, but for a more thorough description, see Vivian Boland, 
O.P., “Does God Think? Recent Work on Aquinas’ Doctrine of Divine Ideas,” in Thomas Aquinas: Teacher and Scholar, 
ed. James McEvoy, Michael Dunne, and Julia Hynes, vol. 2, The Aquinas Lectures at Maynooth, 2002-2010 (Dublin: 
Four Courts Press, 2012), 120–34. On the evolution of institutional preoccupation with philosophical questions 
about Thomas’s metaphysics, theistic proofs, and ethics in England and North America, about which John Haldane 
wrote, “The greatest institutional contributions to Catholic philosophy in the modern English-speaking world have 
been made in the United States” (“Thomistic Ethics in America,” Logos: A Journal of Catholic Thought and Culture 3 
[2000]: 150), see Wayne J. Hankey, “From Metaphysics to History, From Exodus to Neoplatonism, From 
Scholasticism to Pluralism: The Fate of Gilsonian Thomism in English-Speaking North America,” Dionysius 16 
(1998): 157–88; Fergus Kerr, O.P., “Thomas Aquinas: Conflicting Interpretations in Recent Anglophone Literature,” 
in Aquinas as Authority, ed. Paul van Geest, Harm Goris, and Carlo Leget (Leuven: Peeters, 2002), 165–81; Robert 
Miner, “Recent Work on St Thomas in North America: Language, Anthropology, Christology,” in Contemplating 
Aquinas: On the Varieties of Interpretation, ed. Fergus Kerr, O.P. (London: SCM Press, 2003), 137–56. 
32 Serge-Thomas Bonino, O.P., “Thomistica,” Revue Thomiste 97 (1997): 563.  
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speaking world has been alerted to the fundamental disagreements in interpretive approaches to 
Thomas, and there are signs that a more stable interpretive framework is emerging in English 
Thomist studies, which offers the opportunity to ask different questions and explore new 
answers to a variety of topics in Thomas’s corpus, including the divine ideas. In England these 
developments can be seen in the works of, for example, Kerr, Anna Williams, Lydia Schumacher, 
and those scholars affiliated with Radical Orthodoxy while, in North America, Thomist studies 
have been deeply impacted by the works of Burrell, Eugene Rogers, Stanley Hauerwas, and those 
identified with what has been dubbed ‘biblical Thomism.’33 These authors and movements have 
created an atmosphere in Thomist studies that is primed for a theological retrieval of Thomas’s 
doctrine of the divine ideas, but before we can proceed, there are a couple of questions about the 
scope of this project that must be addressed. 
There are two questions that emerge about the scope of this study because of the 
methodological practices outlined above, which, to restate briefly, essentially consist of close 
textual analyses of certain primary and peripheral gestures of the divine ideas in the Summa 
Theologiae that demonstrate how the doctrine functions within Thomas’s pedagogical efforts to 
train his readers in the habit of thinking theologically. First, why focus primarily on the Summa? 
Second, why are we concentrating on Thomas given that the theological heritage of the divine 
ideas remains relatively unexamined?34 To answer the second question first, the primary reason 
for not focusing on situating Thomas’s doctrine within the history of his theological tradition is 
that it would require an entirely different style of study altogether, and while this project certainly 
                                                
33 For examples of these developments, see A. N. Williams, The Ground of Union: Deification in Aquinas and 
Palamas (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999). Although Lydia Schumacher is American, her work has been 
primarily carried out in England and reflects that context. See her Divine Illumination, 154–80. On the interpretation 
of Thomas in Radical Orthodoxy, see Milbank and Pickstock, Truth in Aquinas; and Adrian Pabst’s more recent, 
Metaphysics: The Creation of Hierarchy (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans Publishing, 2012), 201–71. Good examples of these 
developments from David Burrell’s rather extensive body of work are, Aquinas: God & Action (Routledge & Kegan, 
London, 1979); Freedom and Creation in Three Traditions (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1993). For 
Eugene Rogers, see Thomas Aquinas and Karl Barth: Sacred Doctrine and the Natural Knowledge of God, New edition (Notre 
Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1999). Stanley Hauerwas, With the Grain of the Universe: The Church’s Witness 
and Natural Theology (Grand Rapids: Baker Academic, 2001). As for biblical Thomism, it was Thomas O’Meara who 
coined this term in his description of Servais Pinckaers Thomistic ethics (Thomas F. O’Meara, O.P., “Interpreting 
Thomas Aquinas: Aspects of the Dominican School of Moral Theology in the Twentieth Century,” in The Ethics of 
Aquinas, ed. Stephen J. Pope [Washington: Georgetown University Press, 2002], 363–6). Biblical Thomism, which is 
broadly described by Tracey Rowland as “not a ‘Thomism of strict observance,’ since the study of scripture and the 
early Church Fathers sets the tone . . . It does not try to synthesize Aquinas with Kant, Locke, Hegel, Heidegger, or 
Adam Smith, and it involves an insistent critique of the nominalist shift in Scotus and Ockham” (Ratzinger’s Faith: 
The Theology of Pope Benedict XVI [Oxford University Press, 2008], 27), is largely represented by an ever-expanding 
collection of works by English-speaking Thomists, with Matthew Levering’s already immense corpus leading the way. 
For discussions on the concerns and prospects of biblical Thomism, see the essays in Piotr Roszak and Jörgen 
Vijgen, eds., Reading Sacred Scripture with Thomas Aquinas: Hermeneutical Tools, Theological Questions and New Perspectives 
(Barcelona - Madrid: Brepols, 2015). 
34 In his original introduction to the fourth volume of the Blackfriars translation of the Summa, Thomas 
Gornall wrote about the divine ideas, “The full history of the doctrine remains to be written” (Knowledge in God (1a, 
14-18) [London and New York, 1964], xxii), and in many respect this observation is still true. 
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needs to be done, there are some reasons for arguing that the type of work we are doing here 
should be completed beforehand.  
The traditions of the divine ideas have a complex history of interaction because there is a 
great deal of variation and flexibility in the doctrine’s reception and application by a multitude of 
authors found throughout both the East and West, and situating Thomas’s reflections on the 
divine ideas within this doctrinal lineage is further complicated by his general place in the 
development of Western intellectual history.35 Henri de Lubac describes Thomas as “a 
transitional writer,” whose works remain faithful to the past while anticipating the future, and the 
interpretive tension created by his historical position between epochs is keenly exhibited in his 
doctrine of the divine ideas.36 Kerr identifies this tension in his remark, “In the end, there will 
always be room for disagreement, depending on whether one sees his (Thomas’s) theological 
terminology in continuity with his inheritance or as a new departure, anticipating developments 
to come centuries later.”37  
Consequently, although Thomas clearly upholds the traditions of the divine ideas handed 
down by Augustine, Dionysius, and others, in certain ways he also anticipates the more radical 
                                                
35 It is perhaps better to speak of a plurality of traditions for the doctrine of the divine ideas than of one 
monolithic theory because the variations in interpretation and application of the divine ideas often developed 
independent of other formulations. For examples of these variations and, at times, unexpected applications of the 
doctrine in premodern theology, see the works of Maximus the Confessor, Ambigua 7, and John Damascene, De Fide 
Orthodoxa 2.2, who, following Dionysius, speak of the divine ideas as God’s “volitional thoughts” (θελητικαὶ 
ἔννοιαι), which deeply influences later Eastern Orthodox formulations of the doctrine. On this point, see Paul L. 
Gavrilyuk, “Georges Florovsky’s Reading of Maximus: Anti-Bulgakov or Pro-Bulgakov?,” in Knowing the Purpose of 
Creation through the Resurrection: Proceeding of the Symposium on St. Maximus the Confessor, ed. M. Vasiljević (Alhambra: 
Sabastian Press and University of Belgrade Press, 2013), 407–15. There is also the work of Eustratius of Nicaea, 
who, in his In Ethica Nicomachea commentaria, equates Aristotle’s universals with Plato’s theory of the Forms, which 
Thomas may have been, at least, indirectly aware of since Albert the Great draws on this work in his second 
commentary on the Ethics. Maarten Hoenen discusses this connection in Marsilius of Inghen, 149. For more on 
Eustratius’s doctrine of the divine ideas, see Kimon Giocarinis, “Eustratius of Nicaea’s Defense of the Doctrine of 
Ideas,” Franciscan Studies 24 (1964): 159–204. In the West John Wyclif utilizes the divine ideas in his De Ideis ch. 5 to 
answer questions about the insolubles and God’s knowledge of sin. See Stephen Lahey, “Of Divine Ideas and 
Insolubles: Wyclif’s Explanation of God’s Understanding of Sin,” The Modern Schoolman 86 (2008/2009): 211–32. 
There is also Peter Martyr Vermigli’s commentary on Aristotle’s Ethica Nicomachea Bk. 1, ch.6, which associates the 
divine ideas with the doctrine of double predestination. 
36 Henri de Lubac, Surnaturel: Études Historiques (Paris: Aubier, 1946), 435: “un auteur de transition.” While 
it is still lamentable that there is no complete translation of this work into English, de Lubac’s argument is 
substantially represented in: The Mystery of The Supernatural, trans. Sheed Rosemary (New York: Herder & Herder, 
1967); Augustinianism and Modern Theology, trans. Lancelot Sheppard (New York: Herder & Herder, 1969). The 
importance of de Lubac’s description of Thomas as a “transitional writer” should not be underestimated because it 
is directly related to the debate he provoked over Thomas’s thought on the “natural desire for God,” about which 
Kerr says, “In retrospect, the controversy set off by de Lubac did more than anything else to reveal how deeply 
readers of Thomas could differ” (“The Varieties of Interpreting Aquinas,” 29). The details of this controversy and 
its impact on Thomist studies are discussed in Serge-Thomas Bonino, O.P., ed., Surnaturel: A Controversy at the Heart 
of Twentieth-Century Thomistic Thought, trans. Robert Williams rev. by Matthew Levering (Naples: Sapientia Press, 
2009); French original, Actes du colloque organisé par l’Institute Saint-Thomas d’Aquin les 26-27 mai 2000 à Toulouse 
(Toulouse: Revue thomiste, 2001). For a briefer, albeit somewhat overly Bulgakovian, introduction to de Lubac’s 
work and influence, see John Milbank, The Suspended Middle: Henri de Lubac and the Debate Concerning the Supernatural 
(London: SCM Press, 2005). 
37 Fergus Kerr, O.P., After Aquinas: Versions of Thomism (Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, 2002), 46. 
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articulations of the doctrine in the work of figures such as Nicholas of Cusa.38 Situating 
Thomas’s doctrine of the divine ideas on this path consequently involves more than simply 
comparing what various authors say about the divine ideas, but understanding the theological 
and philosophical concerns, questions, and debates that shape not only Thomas’s, but each 
author’s formulation of the doctrine. This type of approach requires having more points of 
connection for analyzing the lines of convergence and divergence in the history of the divine 
ideas before, in, and after Thomas than the standard questions about metaphysics and 
epistemology offer. Thus, while being aware of the various formulations of the doctrine before 
and after Thomas is certainly necessary, by focusing on his work, our assessment can avoid being 
unduly influenced by variations in the doctrine produced by others that could easily distract us 
from what Thomas is doing with the divine ideas in the Summa, which leads us back to the first 
question we asked about the scope of this project.  
In his article on Thomas’s apophaticism, Kevin Hector makes an excellent point, which I 
alter slightly to emphasize its relevance to this project, about the reason for concentrating on the 
Summa. He writes, “If the following argument is correct, then Thomas’s use of [the divine ideas] 
can only be properly understood within the context of the particular argument that Thomas is 
developing. A thematic approach would accordingly have to follow upon strict attention to the 
strategy employed in each of the individual texts.”39 Since our objective is to determine how the 
divine ideas fit within Thomas’s pedagogical commitments, there is good reason to focus on the 
Summa, where his educational system is most thoroughly worked out, and, as Boland notes, for 
Thomas, “questions of pedagogy cannot be separated from doctrinal positions.”40 There will be 
recourse throughout this study to interact with a number of Thomas’s other works, but, typically, 
only in as much as they offer clarification or support for what we find in the Summa. The 
collection of works outside the Summa that we engage with more substantively is Thomas’s 
                                                
38 Boland discusses Thomas’s adherence to and synthesis of the traditions he inherited in Ideas in God, 274–
314. Mark Jordan notes that Thomas’s doctrine of the divine ideas anticipates Cusanus’s formulation of the doctrine, 
which diverges in some significant ways from earlier articulations (“The Intelligibility of the World,” 30). For more 
on Cusanus’s doctrine of the divine ideas, see my essay “Seeing One’s Own Face,” 33–44. 
39 Kevin W. Hector, “Apophaticism in Thomas Aquinas: A Re-Reformulation and Recommendation,” 
Scottish Journal of Theology 60 (2007): 380 n.12. 
40 Boland, St. Thomas Aquinas, 67. John Jenkins recounts Tolomeo of Lucca’s description of the occasion 
that led Thomas to compose the Summa. He notes, “Aquinas began the Summa after beginning a revision of his 
commentary on the Sentences of Peter Lombard. If this is so, then it is likely that he began the Summa after becoming 
dissatisfied with the limitations a commentary on the Sentences imposed” (Knowledge and Faith in Thomas Aquinas 
[Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997], 87). A copy of the work on the Sentences that Thomas began while 
he was in Rome (1265-1266) is held in Lincoln College, Oxford manuscript 95. For evaluations and comparison of 
this text with the Summa, see Leonard E. Boyle, “Alia lectura fratris Thome,” Mediaeval Studies 42 (1983): 418–29; 
Mark D. Jordan, Rewritten Theology: Aquinas After His Readers (Oxford: Blackwell, 2005), 116–25. Thomas’s decision to 
break with the pedagogical model of the Sentences is the primary reason that we will not often deal with his Scriptum 
super libros Sententiarum. Hugh of Saint Victor’s Didascalicon is one medieval resource that offers a pedagogical vision 
worth comparing with Thomas’s pedagogical efforts in the Summa. See Thomas C. O’Brien, “‘Sacra Doctrina’ 
Revisited: The Context of Medieval Education,” The Thomist 41 (1977): 480–1 n.19.  
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commentaries on scripture. Thomas asserts in the opening question of the Summa that 
theological inquiry is a matter of the best way to read scripture (ST 1.1.8), so it is, as Daniel 
Keating argues, in keeping with “Aquinas’s own pedagogy” to read the Summa alongside or in 
conjunction with his biblical commentaries.41 With these guidelines now in place, we may 
proceed to a discussion of the outline for this project. 
 
1.4 Outline 
  The chapters of this study are organized around a selection of the primary and 
peripheral gestures of the divine ideas that demonstrate some of the ways the doctrine 
contributes to Thomas’s pedagogical efforts in the Summa, but in order to properly ground our 
work in these pedagogical efforts, it is necessary to examine, in more detail, what Thomas is 
doing in the Summa and how it affects our reception of this work. Chapter Two, therefore, 
evaluates the pedagogical design of the Summa, and its relation to Thomas’s understanding of 
sacra doctrina. In the chapter we consider the audience and structure of the Summa. Particular 
attention is given to the nature of faith and the role of theological discourse in humanity’s 
knowledge of God. The discussions on Thomas’s doctrine of the divine ideas offered in the 
subsequent chapters are rooted in the argument of this chapter, and, therefore, it serves, in many 
respects, as the frame of reference for our analysis of Thomas’s doctrine of the divine ideas. 
Because many of the gestures that we examine are subtle references to the divine ideas, 
identifying the patterns in Thomas’s theologically informed pedagogical design of the Summa 
helps keep the later chapters on track. 
 Chapter Three makes a case for the theological validity of the divine ideas. The chapter 
opens with an examination of the theological gestures in Thomas’s formal or ex professo remarks 
on the doctrine of the divine ideas in the Summa, which position the divine ideas within the 
pedagogical framework of his theological vision within this work. In addition to providing a 
summary of ST 1a.15, where Thomas formally introduces the divine ideas in the Summa, this 
chapter includes some thoughts on why the doctrine’s development in the Summa can be difficult 
to follow. It also considers how Thomas explicitly reorders the doctrine of the divine ideas to fit 
                                                
41 Daniel A. Keating, “Justification, Sanctification and Divinization in Thomas Aquinas,” in Aquinas on 
Doctrine: A Critical Introduction, ed. Thomas Weinandy, Daniel Keating, and John Yocum (London: T & T Clark, 
2004), 139. Keating proceeds to say, “The Summa is often incorrectly depicted as a largely philosophical treatise 
which touches only lightly (and incidentally) on biblical revelation for its conclusions. Commentators often miss the 
profound biblical basis of his systematic presentation in the Summa.” Anna Williams offers a similar observation 
when she writes, “Thomas seek[s] to write theology. This apparently banal point is important because it has so often 
been overlooked, or even obscured, in the secondary literature. Even today, Thomas is frequently treated essentially 
as a philosopher, not only on the basis of the works that are clearly philosophical . . . but also on the basis of the 
Summa theologiae itself” (The Ground of Union, 167). 
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within his theological vision of sacra doctrina given the doctrine’s philosophical origin and 
development. Lastly, Chapter Three responds to the criticism that the divine ideas distort the 
distinction between God and the world, by examining Thomas’s application of the divine ideas 
in his argument for creation’s twofold sense of existence.  
In Chapter Four we explore grounds for a trinitarian rereading of Thomas’s doctrine of 
the divine ideas, and, more specifically, how he utilizes the doctrine’s grammar to fittingly 
delineate between God’s inter-trinitarian self-communication and the Father’s knowledge of the 
different ways the eternal trinitarian relations can be imitated. Since, however, this chapter marks 
the beginning of a prolonged period of engagement with various peripheral gestures of the 
divine ideas in the Summa, we first examine the distinctions between Thomas’s formal and 
applied grammars for the divine ideas.42 Following this discussion, we elaborate on Thomas’s 
understanding of theological fittingness and its methodological significance in the Summa. Finally, 
before turning to a discussion on the fittingness of Thomas’s claim that the eternal processions 
are exemplars for creation, we examine the unity of the Summa’s consideratio de Deo. The purpose 
of this chapter is to show that Thomas’s theological appropriation of the divine ideas adheres to 
the pedagogical development of the Summa because the doctrine finds fuller expression in his 
exposition on the trinitarian act of creation. 
 Chapter Five explicitly challenges the hermeneutical conjecture that Thomas’s thought 
on the doctrine of the divine ideas can be split along the distinction between the scientiae of 
philosophy and theology, and that from this division an exclusively philosophical doctrine can be 
extracted from the theological context of the Summa and used in the reconstruction of Thomas’s 
metaphysical thought. In an effort to establish that this pattern of hermeneutical bifurcation 
exists in the interpretation of Thomas’s doctrine of the divine ideas, this chapter opens with an 
analysis of this pattern in various scholarly responses to Thomas’s dual affirmations that there is 
only one divine exemplar and that a plurality of exemplar forms exist in the divine mind. The 
majority of the chapter is, however, devoted to an evaluation of Thomas’s fourth and fifth 
proofs for the existence of God in ST 1a.2.3 because they provide examples of what the doctrine 
should look like if this type of reconstructive partitioning was consistently worked out. These 
assessments deal with the question how the intimations to the divine ideas in the Five Ways fit 
within Thomas’s depiction of theological discourse, and the limitations placed on the doctrine if 
it is restricted to a purely philosophical notion. After identifying the subtle gestures of the divine 
ideas in the five ways, this chapter argues that these gestures are intended to prepare the reader 
                                                
42 By this distinction I have in mind the differences between Thomas’s lexical descriptions for the divine 
ideas in his formal discussion on the doctrine and his use of the same terms, as wells others, in ways that do not 
follow the formal locutions. 
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for the theological shift to the doctrine of divine providence and the theological reformulation of 
the divine ideas in Thomas’s discussion on the eternal law. This transition further substantiates 
the peripheral pattern in Thomas’s broader application of the doctrine, and the need to approach 
the doctrine of the divine ideas within the context of his pedagogical efforts in the Summa.  
 Chapter Six rounds out our study on the peripheral gestures of the divine ideas by 
analyzing the presence of the divine ideas in Thomas’s reflections on the theological virtue of 
hope and its contrary vice, spiritual despair. Thomas’s treatise on hope (ST 2a2ae.17-22) provides 
one of the clearest examples of Thomas’s peripheral integration of the divine ideas into his 
theological vision. This chapter argues that the peripheral presence of the divine ideas in 
Thomas’s treatise on hope is an example of the doctrine serving as a theologically codified 
grammar for the language implicit in the experience of the christian life. This chapter also relies 
more on the dialogical exchange between Thomas’s work in the Summa and his exegetical efforts 
to clarify humanity’s eschatological fulfillment, christological orientation, and existential 
encounter with God. By identifying the subtle gestures of the divine ideas that sit at the edges of 
Thomas’s reflections on the theological virtue of hope and the vice of spiritual despair, this 
chapter demonstrates that Thomas’s doctrine of the divine ideas supplement his theological 
efforts to provide a fitting account of personal experience in the life of faith.  
  Since this study will not only highlight various avenues for future research into 
Thomas’s doctrine of the divine ideas, but also expose some of the ways his theological 
appropriation of the divine ideas might open up doors for contemporary theologians and 
scholars to reclaim the doctrine in ongoing theological discussions, the final chapter discusses 
some of the challenges we face in the process of theological ressourcement. After reflecting on 
the positive and negative implications of inquires into intellectual history, we will bring this study 
to a close with some final remarks on why reclaiming the doctrine of the divine ideas is 
theologically important. 
 
  
18 
2. The Habit of Thinking Theologically: Faith seeking Understanding  
in the Summa Theologiae 
 
If we really think of God as a Who and not a What – in other words, if we think of him as a Someone 
capable of speech, then there is no “security” against revelation. And man’s only meaningful response to 
revelation is faith!1 
 
Introduction 
 Sergei Bulgakov’s critique of Thomas’s approach to the doctrine of the divine ideas in ST 
1a.15 – a critique that is, incidentally, reinforced by many of the standard interpretations of the 
doctrine – aptly expresses many of the problems that contemporary theologians have with the 
divine ideas. In a couple of rather forthright passages, Bulgakov comments:  
[Thomas] first expounds this doctrine [of the divine ideas] in the context of the 
general doctrine of God, after the doctrine of scientia Dei, as its development. 
The doctrine of ideas is therefore not brought into a connection with the 
doctrine of the Holy Trinity, does not belong to the trinitarian doctrine, but 
refers, so to speak, to the pre-trinitarian or extra-trinitarian (more Aristotelian 
than Christian) doctrine of God as mind, noesis . . . [T]he world that is created 
by God is understood here not as unique in its design and perfect . . . Rather, it 
is understood as imperfect, as only one of many possible types of worlds, so to 
speak. This supposition not only shakes the principles of healthy cosmology 
and anthropology (including christology) but also introduces an element of 
irrational accident and arbitrariness in the relation of the Creator to creation. In 
any case, we get a quantitative noncorrespondence of ideas and things. The 
domain of ideas is larger than the domain of things . . . In Aquinas we have a 
Platonism that is supplemented by Aristotelianism, and this combination is 
mechanically, inorganically, brought into Christian theology.2 
Putting aside Bulgakov’s rather sophisticated sophiological approach to these issues, this 
paragraph highlights at least three common criticisms of Thomas’s doctrine of the divine ideas. 
First, Bulgakov criticizes Thomas’s doctrine for relying on a Hellenistic metaphysic that is 
irreconcilable with theological discourse because it is insufficiently trinitarian.3 Second, the overly 
metaphysical character of the doctrine imposes an apparent “arbitrariness in the relation of 
Creator to creation” that is implicitly contrasted with a doctrine of creation that, in Thomist 
                                                
1 Josef Pieper, “The Problem of Faith Today,” in Problems of Modern Faith: Essays and Addresses, trans. Jan 
van Heurck (Chicago: Franciscan Herald Press, 1985), 7–8; translated from the German, Über die Schwierigkeit Heute 
zu Glauben (Munich: Kösel-Verlag, 1974). 
2 Sergius Bulgakov, The Bride of the Lamb, trans. Boris Jakim (Edinburgh: T & T Clark, 2002), 24 and 26; 
Russian original, posthumously published, Nevesta Agntsa (Paris: YMCA Press, 1945). This work is the final volume 
of Bulgakov’s great trilogy On Divine Humanity (O bogoschelovechestve), which also includes The Lamb of God (1933) and 
The Comforter (1936). My understanding of Bulgakov’s critique is greatly indebted to John Hughes, “Creatio Ex Nihilo 
and the Divine Ideas in Aquinas: How Fair Is Bulgakov’s Critique?,” Modern Theology 29 (2013): 124–37. 
3 It is worth mentioning that Bulgakov’s interpretation here rests on Théodore de Régnon’s outdated 
theory of Western trinitarianism (Bulgakov, The Lamb of God, 27), which has been definitively demolished by Michel 
René Barnes, “De Régnon Reconsidered,” Augustinian Studies 26 (1995): 51–79. For more on de Régnon, see §4.3.2. 
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terms, identifies the realm of the divine ideas with God’s practical knowledge.4 Third, because 
the Thomist approach supposedly prioritizes the philosophical origins of the divine ideas over 
the doctrine of creation, the doctrine of the divine ideas is divorced from humanity’s existential 
relationship to God as the personal triune Creator.5  
Each of these critiques raises important questions about Thomas’s doctrine of the divine 
ideas, which the following chapters will address in more detail, but they also expose a more basic 
problem with the reception of the doctrine in later interpretations of Thomas that must be dealt 
with first. The argument presented here, therefore, is that the interpretation of Thomas’s 
doctrine of the divine ideas in the Summa Theologiae should be determined by the work’s 
theological pedagogy, which we will define according to the pattern of faith seeking 
understanding, because this is the context in which Thomas intended the whole work to be read. 
In other words this chapter proposes that Thomas’s doctrine of the divine ideas should be read 
within the paradigm of theological discourse outlined in ST 1a.1.8 ad.2, where he writes: 
Sacra doctrina also uses human reasoning, not indeed to prove the faith, for that 
would take away from the merit of believing, but to make manifest some 
implications of its message. Since grace does not scrap nature but brings it to 
perfection, so also natural reason should assist faith as the natural loving bent 
of the will yields to charity. St Paul speaks of bringing into captivity every 
understanding unto the service of Christ.6 
Moreover, I will suggest, in keeping with the insights of this passage, the theological formation 
Thomas describes in the Summa indicates that the doctrine’s contact with the principles of faith, 
                                                
4 This concern over the possibility of the divine ideas supporting a form of arbitrariness in creation is the 
direct result of debates over Thomas’s thought on the existence of possibles. Hughes concludes that Thomas's 
doctrine may indeed open the door for just this type of arbitrariness to enter his exposition of creation ("Creatio Ex 
Nihilo and the Divine Ideas, 137). However, David Burrell is certain that Thomas was aware of this danger and 
corrected for it, albeit insufficiently. See David B. Burrell, C.S.C., Freedom and Creation in Three Traditions (Notre 
Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1993), 34–5 and 63–4; “Book Review of Gregory Doolan's Aquinas on the 
Divine Ideas as Exemplar Causes,” Nova et Vetera (English) 7 (2009): 753.  
5 Furthermore, in his comments on the doctrine of creation presented in the Summa, Thomas Gilby worries 
that if the divine ideas are taken to seriously, the doctrine will diminish the existential character of Thomas’s thought. 
See, Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, vol. 8 (Cambridge: Cambridge University, 2006), xxv.  
6 “Utitur sacra doctrina etiam ratione humana, non quidem ad probandum fidem, quia per hoc tolleretur 
meritum fidei; sed ad manifestandum aliqua alia quae traduntur in hac doctrina. Cum enim gratia non tollat naturam, 
sed perficiat, oportet quod naturalis ratio subserviat fidei; sicut et naturalis inclinatio voluntatis obsequitur caritati. 
Unde et apostolus dicit, II ad Cor. 10, in captivitatem redigentes omnem intellectum in obsequium Christi.” While 
Thomas’s Latin is relatively simple, some of his key terms and phrases are notoriously difficult to translate because 
of changes in the semantic range of certain words. His use of sacra doctrine is an example of a phrase that can prove 
challenging to convey its meaning accurately in translation. Because of sacra doctrina’s importance for the current 
discussion, I will typically retain the Latin in references and translations although, at times, I will refer to it as “holy 
teaching,” which I believe best captures Thomas’s intention behind the phrase. For a fuller discussion on sacra 
doctrina’s range of meaning, see Jean-Pierre Torrell, O.P., Saint Thomas Aquinas: Spiritual Master, trans. Robert Royal, 
Revised edition, vol. 2 (Washington: Catholic University of America Press, 2003), 1-4; French original, Saint Thomas 
d’Aquin, Maître Spirituel (Paris: Cerf, 1996). 
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as in other cases where he utilizes philosophically born concepts, alters its frame of reference in 
the light of God’s self-disclosure through scripture.7  
The previous chapter has already discussed how the common atomistic approach to 
Thomas’s doctrine of the divine ideas perpetuates many of the interpretive problems we still face 
(§1.1). Consequently, in order to develop a more contextually conditioned portrait of the 
doctrine’s function in the Summa, we must first establish some parameters that will guide us 
through this complex work. However, since it seems best not to arbitrarily define our parameters 
but draw them directly from Thomas himself, the majority of this chapter is devoted to 
identifying the pattern of Thomas’s theological pedagogy as it is expressed in his description of 
sacra doctrina. By taking the time to properly set off on the pedagogical journey that Thomas 
constructs in the Summa, the parallels will emerge between the form of his theological discourse 
and the pattern of theological education that both informs and reforms his doctrine of the divine 
ideas.  
  With this in mind, the present chapter is divided into four sections. The first section 
considers how Thomas instills the habit of theological thinking in his readers through the form 
of theological inquiry adopted by the Summa. In addition to reflections on the Summa’s pattern of 
theological discourse, this section includes discussions on the trinitarian basis for Thomas’s 
theological pedagogy and the possibility of rupturing the relation between reception and 
intention by ignoring the Summa’s grounding in sacra doctrina. The second and fourth sections 
address some of the Summa’s formal characteristics, such as its audience and structure. Section 
three addresses Thomas’s description of humanity’s knowledge of God in sacra doctrina. While 
this section includes a discussion on a shift in recent Thomist studies on this topic, the primary 
focus is Thomas’s thought on the nature and role of faith in the science of sacra doctrina. This 
chapter will serve as a type of backbone for the rest the study and, as we branch off of it and 
examine in the subsequent chapters some of the primary and peripheral gestures of the divine 
ideas throughout the Summa, the principles of sacra doctrina and characteristics of the Summa 
discussed below will guide our analysis of Thomas’s doctrine of the divine ideas.  
 
2.1 There and back again: from Pedagogy to Reception  
  In the opening of the Summa, Thomas describes the responsibility of the Christian 
teacher and his approach to the task of fulfilling it. He writes, “Since the teacher of Catholic 
truth has not only to build up those who are advanced but also to shape those who are 
                                                
7 For more on God’s self-disclosure in and through sacra doctrina, see Brian J. Shanley, O.P., “Sacra 
Doctrina and the Theology of Disclosure,” The Thomist 61 (1997): 163–87; Anthony J. Kelly, C.Ss.R., “A 
Multidimensional Disclosure: Aspects of Aquinas’s Theological Intentionality,” The Thomist 67 (2003): 335–74.  
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beginning . . . the purpose we have set before us in this work is to convey the things which 
belong to the Christian religion in a style serviceable for the training of beginners.”8 Many 
scholars have noted and discussed the importance of Thomas’s pedagogical convictions, which 
are aptly summarized by Vivian Boland’s observation, “[P]edagogy is at the heart of Aquinas’s 
writing projects; he always has his readers in mind, and his intention is to persuade them to 
certain convictions about the truth and about the best ways to search for it.”9 Thomas explains 
the nature of this pedagogical persuasion when, in response to the objection that one man 
cannot teach another, he says: “[The teacher] moves the learner by his teaching so that the latter 
forms intelligible concepts by the power of his own mind, when the signs of these concepts are 
put before him from outside.”10 We will follow this description of the pedagogical task as the 
pattern for theological discourse in the form of faith seeking understanding. 
 
2.1.1 Setting up the Pedagogical Parameters: The Pattern of Theological Discourse 
In keeping with this assessment of teaching, Thomas’s description of the Summa’s 
purpose in the opening prologue reveals that his goal is to communicate the truth of sacra doctrina 
to his readers in such a way that, through the cumulative progression of the work itself, they are 
taught how to inhabit the noetic journey from faith to wisdom – faith seeking understanding – 
so that they may discover its truth for themselves.11 He accomplishes this goal, following Patrick 
Quinn’s insightful observation that “communicating how to think constitutes for Aquinas the 
essence of what is taught,” by instilling in his readers, through each question of the Summa, the 
full journey of faith seeking understanding as a certain habit of thought .12 Each question, then, 
                                                
8 ST 1a.1, prol.: “Quia catholicae veritatis doctor non solum provectos debet instruere sed ad eum pertinet 
etiam incipientes erudire . . . propositum nostrae intentionis in hoc opera est ea quae ad christianam religionem 
pertinent eo modo tradere secundum quod congruity ad eruditionem incipientium.” 
9 Vivian Boland, O.P., “Truth, Knowledge and Communication: Thomas Aquinas on the Mystery of 
Teaching,” Studies in Christian Ethics 19 (2006): 296. 
10 ST 1a.117.1 ad.3: “Sed movet discipulum per suam doctrinam ad hoc, quod ipse per virtutem sui 
intellectus formet intelligibiles conceptions, quarum signa sibi proponit exterius.” Pieper beautifully captures the 
importance of teaching for Thomas when he writes: “To lead a man from error to truth – this he considered the 
greatest service which one man can render another . . . Teaching, for Thomas, is something other and greater than 
to impart by one method or another the ‘findings of research’; something other and greater than the report of a 
thinker on the results of his inquiry, not to mention the ways and by-ways of his search.” He continues, “Teaching is 
a process that goes on between living men. The teacher looks not only at the truth of things; at the same time he 
looks at the faces of living men who desire to know this truth. Love of truth and love of men – only the two 
together constitute a teacher.” Josef Pieper, “On Thomas Aquinas,” in The Silence of St. Thomas: Three Essays, trans. 
John Murray, S.J. and Daniel O’Connor, 3rd Revised ed. (South Bend: St. Augustine’s Press, 1999), 23. 
11 Peter Candler’s work provides an excellent analysis on the theological character of being lead to truth. 
See Theology, Rhetoric, Manuduction, Or Reading Scripture Together on the Path to God (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans Publishing, 
2006), 90–107. In this way the Summa becomes a contemplative journey for the reader. On this point, see A. N. 
Williams, “Mystical Theology Redux: The Pattern of Aquinas’ Summa Theologiae,” Modern Theology 13 (1997): 53–
74; Anselm K. Min, Paths to the Triune God: An Encounter Between Aquinas and Recent Theologies (Notre Dame: University 
of Notre Dame Press, 2005), 144–57.  
12 Patrick Quinn, “Aquinas’s Views on Teaching,” New Blackfriars 82 (2001): 110. 
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recreates the pedagogical movement of the whole work through an isomorphic recursive pattern 
that takes the readers from the confession of faith to an understanding of that confession only to 
conclude by returning them to the position of faith so that the process may begin again in the 
following question, but now from a place of understanding what has come before; thus, moving 
the reader ever closer to the contemplative vision of God.  
Since Thomas’s theological praxis is educationally orientated, he intentionally leaves gaps 
in the unfolding of his discourse so that as his readers are taught the proper habit of theological 
thinking they can begin to see the truth for themselves and fill in the holes he leaves behind.13 
Thus, while the Summa does not present a closed system, it does posses a pedagogical unity as 
each element of the work is directed to a common end, which some might easily confuse for a 
stable system.14 As Josef Pieper states on this matter, “This surely indicates that its fragmentary 
character belongs to the total implication of the Summa Theologiae,” and in a comment on 
Thomas’s affirmation that “the essential principles of things are concealed from us,” he 
continues this earlier reflection by saying, “Such a proposition is not only far removed from the 
neat, well-rounded perfection of a rationalistic system, it also paraphrases a notion of philosophy 
that formally excludes the idea of a closed system.”15  
Even though it lies well beyond the scope of this study to trace the formation of the 
habit of theological thinking in the mind of the reader step-by-step, it will be helpful to locate 
the source of Thomas’s pedagogical pattern for sacra doctrina. Thomas provides a clue to this 
source in one of his main pedagogical principles: “Now the truth of knowledge is the same in 
disciple as in master. The disciple’s knowledge is, in effect, a reproduction of that in the 
master.”16 Not only does this passage reveal Thomas’s intention, as a teacher, to guide his 
                                                
13 We return to the intentionally fragmented character of the Summa in §3.1 and §3.2. 
14 The myth that Thomas offered a grand unified system has long been dead. Nevertheless, some have 
attempted to resurrect it under different conditions. This shift away from reading the Summa as a stable system is 
documented in Fergus Kerr, O.P., “The Varieties of Interpreting Aquinas,” in Contemplating Aquinas: On the Varieties 
of Interpretation, ed. Fergus Kerr, O.P. (London: SCM Press, 2003), 30. Robert Pasnau covertly attempts to resuscitate 
this idea in his Thomas Aquinas on Human Nature: A Philosophical Study of Summa Theologiae, 1a 75-89 (Cambridge 
University Press, 2001), 6. For other examples, see Paul J. DeHart, Aquinas and Radical Orthodoxy: A Critical Inquiry 
(London: Routledge, 2012), 126, 197ff; Lawrence Feingold, The Natural Desire to See God According to St. Thomas and 
His Interpreters, 2nd ed., Faith and Reason: Studies in Catholic Theology and Philosophy (Florida: Sapientia Press of 
Ave Maria University, 2010); Reinhard Hütter, Dust Bound for Heaven: Explorations in the Theology of Thomas Aquinas 
(Grand Rapids: Eerdmans Publishing Company, 2012), 44–71, 80–99; Steven A. Long, “On the Possibility of a 
Purely Natural End for Man,” The Thomist 64 (2000): 211–37; Ralph McInerny, Praeambula Fidei: Thomism and the God 
of the Philosophers (Washington: Catholic University of America Press, 2006), 175 ff. 
15 Josef Pieper, “The Timeliness of Thomism,” in The Silence of St. Thomas: Three Essays, trans. John Murray, 
S.J. and Daniel O’Connor, 3rd Revised ed. (South Bend: St. Augustine’s Press, 1999), 89; German original, 
Actualidad del Tomismo, ed. Florentino Perez Embid, Colección “O Crece O Muere” (Madrid: Ateneo, 1952). 
Reference is to Thomas’s Sent. de Anima I.1.15: “Principia essentialia rerum sunt nobis ignota.” Cf. De spir. creat. 11 ad.3; De 
pot. 7.5 ad.14; De Ver. 4.1 ad.8; 10.1; SCG Bk. 4, ch.1. 
16 ST 2a2ae.171.6: “Veritas autem est eadem cognitionis in discipulo et in docente, quia cognitio addiscentis 
est similitude cognitionis docentis.” Cf. Otto Bird, “How to Read an Article of the Summa:,” New Scholasticism 27 
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readers in reproducing his knowledge in their own minds, but the correspondence between his 
description of the educational relation between teachers and students and the content of sacra 
doctrina described in ST 1.1.3 ad.2, where it says, “sacra doctrina is like an imprint on us of God’s 
own knowledge, which is the single and simple vision of everything,” also discloses the divine 
reality after which his pedagogical vision is patterned.17 
In the first lecture from his Commentary on the Gospel of John, Thomas situates sacra doctrina’s 
pedagogical reality within creation’s hierarchical imitation of the divine life in itself and as it is 
expressed in the incarnation. There he states:  
Since the word principium implies a certain order of one thing to another, one 
can find a principium in all those things which have an order . . . [O]rder is 
found in learning; and this in two ways: as to nature, and as to ourselves . . . As 
to nature, in Christian doctrine the beginning and principle of our wisdom is 
Christ, inasmuch as he is the Wisdom and Word of God., i.e., in his divinity. 
But as to ourselves, the beginning is Christ himself inasmuch as the Word has 
become flesh, i.e., by his Incarnation.18 
For Thomas, then, the relational subsistence of God’s sapiential self-knowledge and the 
expression of that knowledge in the incarnation form the providential pattern of knowledge in 
creation and salvation. This pattern is, consequently, expressed in the intersection between 
master and disciple in the pedagogy of sacra doctrina such that what disciples encounter through 
the natural correspondence of knowledge and love from their master is the disclosure of 
salvation’s reality in the inter-personal relations of the Trinity.19 
 
2.1.2 The Trinitarian Basis for Thomas’s Pedagogical Paradigm 
God’s sapiential self-knowledge, according to Thomas, is eternally expressed in the 
generation of the Son as he says: “[T]he notion of generation does apply to the procession of the 
Word in God . . . since what the intellect conceives is the likeness of what is understood; and it 
                                                                                                                                                  
(1953): 150. For more on the pedagogical importance of this passage, see David Whidden, “The Theology of Light 
in Thomas Aquinas” (Dissertation, Southern Methodist University, 2011), 19. 
17 ST 1a.1.3 ad.2: “sacra doctrina sit velut quaedam impressio divinae scientiae, quae est una et simplex 
omnium.” 
18 Lect. Ioan. 1, lect. 1, no.34: “Cum enim principium importet ordinem quemdam ad alia, necesse est 
invenire principium in omnibus, in quibus est ordo . . . Invenitur ordo in disciplinis, et hic est duplex: secundum 
naturam, et quoad nos . . . Et hoc modo, secundum naturam quidem, in disciplina Christiana initium et principium 
sapientiae nostrae est Christus, inquantum est sapientia et verbum Dei, idest secundum divinitatem. Quoad nos vero 
principium est ipse Christus, inquantum verbum caro factum est, idest secundum eius incarnationem.”  
19 ST 1a.16.1; 1a.27.4; 1a.62.7; 1a.82.3; 1a.108.6 ad.3. Although it is not discussed in the following section, 
the master’s love for the disciple, which is what entices the master to teach, imitates the Holy Spirit’s activity in the 
relational exchange between the Father and the Son, and is reflected in the description of the Holy Spirit as the 
internal teacher. See ST 1a.36.2; 1a.37.1 ad.2; 1a.38.1; 1a.38.2; 1a.43.2; 1a.43.5 ad.2; 1a-2ae.68.4; Lect. Ioan. 14, lect. 6. 
Cf. Kieran Conley, O.S.B, A Theology of Wisdom: A Study in St. Thomas (Dubuque: The Priory Press, 1963), 137–8; 
Michael Sherwin, O.P., “Christ the Teacher in Commentary on the Gospel of John,” in Reading John with St. Thomas 
Aquinas: Theological Exegesis and Speculative Theology, ed. Michael Dauphinais and Matthew Levering (Washington: 
Catholic University Press of America, 2005), 188–90.  
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exists in the same nature, because to be and to understand are identical in God. Hence the 
procession of the Word in God is called ‘generation,’ and the Word itself proceeding is called 
‘Son’.”20 Thus, the eternal reality of the divine mind is realized in God’s perfect understanding of 
himself, which is the Word of God. However, in God’s perfect understanding of himself, he not 
only knows himself but all of creation, as Thomas writes, “The name ‘Word’ connotes a 
reference to creatures. The reason: in knowing himself God knows every creature . . . Because 
with God by the one act he understands both himself and all else, his single Word expresses not 
only the Father but creatures as well.”21 Since Thomas proposes that the pedagogical structure of 
sacra doctrina is grounded on the inter-trinitarian reality of the Son’s eternal generation, the 
theological affirmation of the Word as God’s sapiential self-understanding depicts the Father in 
the role of the divine educator and the Son as the substantive reality of divine pedagogy, which 
establishes the unity of sacra doctrina in the revelation of the Word through the incarnation of 
Christ.22 
Consequently, when Thomas claims, “The different classes of objects separately treated 
by the diverse philosophical sciences can be combined by sacra doctrina,” or “Whereas some 
among the philosophical sciences are theoretical and others are practical, sacra doctrina takes over 
both functions,” or, again, “Now all things are dealt with in sacra doctrina in terms of God,” he is 
simply reiterating that the wisdom of sacra doctrina flows directly from God; however, now it 
should be clear that this unity in the pedagogical vision of sacra doctrina is rooted in the Word of 
God as the subsisting sapiential expression of the Father’s self-knowledge.23 By fashioning his 
description of sacra doctrina’s unity after the pattern of God’s sapiential self-knowledge, Thomas 
attaches sacra doctrina’s unitary structure to the originating source of theological reflection in the 
trinitarian life of God, which suggests that Thomas is attempting to emphasize that this unitive 
quality is essential to the task of faith seeking understanding and, therefore, crucial for the 
reader’s understanding of the text. In other words if a reader fails to identify, in the reading of 
                                                
20 ST 1a.27.2: “[P]rocessio verbi in divinis habet rationem generationis . . . secundum rationem similitudinis, 
quia conceptio intellectus est similitudo rei intellectae; et in eadem natura existens, quia in Deo idem est intelligere et 
esse. Unde processio verbi in divinis dicitur generatio et ipsum verbum procedens dicitur Filius.” 
21 ST 1a.34.3: “Dicendum quod in Verbo importatur respectus ad creaturam. Deus enim cognoscendo se, 
cognoscit omnem creaturam . . . quia Deus uno actu et se et omnia intelligit, unicum verbum ejus est expressivum 
non solum Patris, sed etiam creaturarum.” 
22 For more on the relation between the pedagogical pattern of sacra doctrina and Thomas’s understanding 
of God’s pedagogical expression through the Son, see the excellent dissertation by Michael A. Dauphinais, “Christ 
the Teacher: The Pedagogy of the Incarnation According to Saint Thomas Aquinas” (Unpublished Ph.D. 
Dissertation, University of Notre Dame, 2000), esp. 33–49. 
23 ST 1a.1.3 ad.2: “Ea quae in diversis scientiis philosophicis tractantur potest sacra doctrina”; ST 1a.1.4: 
“Unde licet in scientiis philosophicis alia sit speculative et alia practica, sacra tamen doctrina comprehendit sub se 
utramque”; ST 1a.1.7: “Omnia autem tractantur in sacra doctrina sub ratione Dei.” 
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the whole work or a particular loci, sacra doctrina’s pedagogical imitation of the trinitarian life, 
there will inevitably be a fundamental rupture between the reception and intention of the text. 
 
2.1.3 Rupture in the Reception of Thomas’s Summa Theologiae 
Mark Jordan explains that this rupture between reception and intention occurred in the 
earliest reception of the Summa by Thomas’s own Dominican order. Jordan writes, “How 
interesting to note, then, that the medieval Dominican reception of the Summa repeatedly ignores 
the work’s structure by rewriting it.”24 He continues, through an examination of the Summa’s 
manuscript tradition, to show how early Dominicans stripped Thomas’s moral thought from its 
theological context by only copying the prima secundae and the secunda secundae while also seriously 
altering the structure and complexity of these sections.25 Although Jordan believes that 
contemporary readings of the Summa are not liable to make the same errors that the early 
Dominicans did, he, nevertheless, worries that “the modern regime of Thomistic authority 
[might] produce more bizarre misreadings.”26 Jordan suggests that contemporary readers are 
likely to “miss the Summa’s immanent pedagogical program” because of a modern inclination to 
read the Summa “as a foundational encyclopedia of Catholic philosophy and theology.”27 What 
Jordan’s examination of the Summa’s reception persuasively demonstrates is that, from its earliest 
readings until today, serious misunderstandings of the work have occurred because of a failure to 
adequately grasp Thomas’s pedagogical achievement. To avoid this pitfall, it will be helpful to fill 
out our picture of Thomas’s pedagogical objective by examining in more detail the nature of 
sacra doctrina’s knowledge, but first it will be beneficial to discuss the Summa’s audience. 
 
2.2 The First question, the Oldest Question . . . A Note on the Summa’s Audience 
If one accepts the premise that Thomas’s theological project is expressed through the 
Summa’s pedagogical formation, it would be quite natural to ask the ever-present question of 
Thomas’s intended audience since this might bear directly on the work’s applicability for today. 
                                                
24 Mark D. Jordan, Rewritten Theology: Aquinas after His Readers (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 2006), 8. 
25 Jordan’s discussions on this topic can be found in Rewritten Theology, 7-12. For more discussions on the 
number, character, and redactions of the Summa, see Leonard E. Boyle, “The Summa Confessorum of John of Freiburg 
and the Popularization of the Moral Teaching of St. Thomas and of Some of His Contemporaries,” in St. Thomas 
Aquinas, 1274-1974: Commemorative Studies, vol. 2 (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 1974), esp. 
258ff.; James A. Weisheipl, O.P., Friar Thomas D’Aquino: His Life, Thought, and Works, Augmented (Washington: 
Catholic University of America Press, 1984), 260–1; Thomas Kaeppeli, Scriptores Ordinis Praedicatorum Medii Aevi, vol. 
1 (Louvain-la-neuve: Fédération Internationale des Instituts d’Études Médiévales, 2000). 
26 Mark D. Jordan, “The Summa’s Reform of Moral Teaching – and Its Failure,” in Contemplating Aquinas: 
On the Varieties of Interpretation, ed. Fergus Kerr, O.P. (London: SCM Press, 2003), 52. 
27 Jordan, “The Summa’s Reform of Moral Teaching,” 52 and 53. In a similar vein, Pieper writes, “The 
majestic elaboration of thought manifested in St. Thomas’s work is . . . a structure of the highest intellectual order, 
but not in any way a closed system of school propositions” (“The Timeliness of Thomism,” 82). 
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Thomas’s somewhat ambiguous reference to beginners (novitii) in the opening prologue (ST 1a.1, 
prol.) has generated a fair number of attempts to identify the audience he had in mind while 
composing the Summa. There are currently three or four major arguments, depending on how 
one divides them, circulating in contemporary scholarship, and while it could be profitable to 
examine how each explanation might influence the reading of Thomas’s doctrine of the divine 
ideas, this would be an unnecessary diversion. Instead, it is enough to note that while there are 
variances in the details, the arguments generally propose that Thomas wrote the Summa for 
students or as an aid for teachers.28 Regardless of the specific position one adopts, then, the 
common consensus is that the Summa was written to educate students, either directly or 
indirectly, and this broad level of agreement guides the search for the basis of Thomas’s 
theological synthesis to his pedagogical purposes in the Summa. Even though the variety of 
positions on Thomas’s audience all point in the same general direction, Mark Jordan’s research 
into Thomas’s audience is quickly gaining favor. His reflections on the audience provide a 
compelling explanation for the unique character of the Summa in comparison with other 
thirteenth-century texts as well as providing helpful insights into how it may be received by 
today’s reader.  
 Thomas readily admits that he composed the Summa to overcome what he believed to be 
deficiencies in thirteenth-century pedagogical practices; as he explains, “newcomers to this 
teaching are greatly hindered by various writings on the subject” because they do not teach 
according to “a sound educational method” ordered by the subject matter of sacra doctrina itself.29 
Yet the identity of Thomas’s audience remains somewhat nebulous. Jordan has, however, 
convincingly argued that the structure of the Summa suggests that it is “Thomas’s remedy for a 
defect of Dominican education.”30 According to Jordan, Thomas’s unique integration of moral 
teaching into the structure of his theological vision is an attempt “to reform the Dominican 
tendency to separate moral manuals from theological or scriptural treatises.”31 In an effort to 
overturn the tendencies in his own order to dissociate from each other the moral/mystical, the 
theological/speculative, and the biblical dimensions of sacra doctrina, Thomas conceives of a 
                                                
28 For an overview of the explanations, see John I. Jenkins, Knowledge and Faith in Thomas Aquinas 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 79–85. Jenkins proceeds to offer his own suggestion that Thomas 
wrote the Summa for students “aspiring to be a Magister in sacra pagina, or for someone at a comparable level” (p. 85). 
The standard argument that the Summa was intended for beginners to theological education can be found in 
Leonard E. Boyle, The Setting of the “Summa Theologiae” of Saint Thomas (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval 
Studies, 1982). Mark Johnson attempts to construct a via media between Boyle and Jenkins by arguing that the Summa 
was written  “for the teachers of beginners” in his, “Aquinas’s Summa Theologiae as Pedagogy,” in Medieval Education, 
ed. Joseph W. Koterski, S.J. and Ronald Begley (Bronx: Fordham University Press, 2005), 140. 
29 ST 1a.1, prol.: “. . . huius doctrinae novitios in his quae a diversis conscripta sunt plurimum impediri . . . 
non traduntur secundum ordinem disciplinae.” 
30 Mark D. Jordan, Rewritten Theology: Aquinas After His Readers (Oxford: Blackwell, 2005), 118. 
31 Jordan, “The Summa’s Reform of Moral Teaching,” 43. 
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theological synthesis designed to reform their educational practices, by inviting readers “to study 
morals through a clarifying reminder of arguments about God as creator and governor.”32  
With the evidence culled by Jordan, which indicates that Thomas designed the Summa to 
encourage educational reform in his own order, the lack of specific details on or references to 
Dominicans might simply be described as a curious omission; however, Jordan identifies some 
trends in Thomas’s works that offer another reason for this absence. It appears that Thomas 
decided to be less direct about the audience that prompted him to write the Summa because he 
did not want it to be limited to his own order, and this decision is important for the reception of 
the Summa today. Jordan argues that, “Thomas had a habit of conceiving occasions for writing in 
the widest terms.”33 Thus, while the defects in Dominican educational practices prompted him to 
write the Summa, he, nevertheless, designs it, as Jordan says, “with a kind of universality to all 
‘beginners’ in ‘Christian religion’,” which explains “why Thomas chose not to be more explicitly 
Dominican in his prologue, his rhetoric, and his acknowledged sources.”34  
What this all means for the contemporary reception of the Summa is, as Jordan proposes, 
that Thomas “invented it [the Summa] as a curricular ideal” that could be received and 
pedagogically enacted by any community, regardless of time and location, as “a single, 
continuous solicitation to acquire and exercise the habit of theology in all of its parts.”35 Whether 
or not today’s theologians and scholars accept Thomas’s pedagogical schema is another matter, 
which does not detract from his intention to formulate an ideal theological pedagogy that could 
be received for generations by anyone and everyone that desired to be taught the habit of 
theological thinking. Even though modern scholars may profitably seek answers to a variety of 
questions that Thomas never considered asking in the Summa or apply an array of approaches 
designed to improve our understanding of his historical, political, social, and intellectual contexts, 
there is, nevertheless, something fitting, and in keeping with Thomas’s own purposes, to 
approach the Summa as a work that treats even the modern reader as its disciple in theology. The 
Summa’s applicability to readers regardless of generation or century is rooted in its 
communication of knowledge through faith seeking understanding, which is the timeless form of 
theological inquiry, but it employs distinct practices to complete this task, to which we turn now. 
                                                
32 Jordan, Rewritten Theology, 120. Jordan’s argument that Thomas’s pedagogical vision for the Summa 
encompasses the speculative, scriptural, and mystical/moral dimensions reflects, following Torrell, the inclusive 
character of sacra doctrina, which encompasses all forms of Christian education. See, Torrell, Spiritual Master, 2–3; 
Jean-Pierre Torrell, O.P., “St. Thomas Aquinas: Theologian and Mystic,” in Christ and Spirituality in St. Thomas 
Aquinas, trans. Bernhard Blankenhorn, O.P. (Washington: The Catholic University of America Press, 2011), 3–4; 
French original, “Théologien et Mystique: Le Cas de Thomas d’Aquin,” Revue Des Sciences Religieuses 77 (2003): 350–
65. 
33 Jordan, Rewritten Theology, 118. 
34 Jordan, Rewritten Theology, 119–20. 
35 Jordan, Rewritten Theology, 120. 
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2.3 Knowing the Unknown God through Faith 
 Recently, there has been a shift in Thomist studies away from the overtly rationalistic 
approach to Thomas’s thought on the knowledge of God that once governed the interpretation 
of these issues in the Summa. It was, at one time, commonly held that the early part of the prima 
pars, specifically questions 2-26, provided a type of natural or pre-theological description of the 
knowledge humanity could obtain of God independent of grace and scripture.36 This way of 
reading the early part of the Summa, coincidently, follows the same problematic division between 
metaphysics and theology found in Bulgakov’s criticism of Thomas’s doctrine of the divine ideas. 
While there were a number of works produced in the early twentieth century that pressed against 
the traditional reading of these questions, it was not until the publication of Henri de Lubac’s 
groundbreaking works that the door was finally pushed open for substantial reformulations of 
Thomas’s thought on humanity’s knowledge of God to take root in Thomist studies.37 One of 
the more significant examples of this development is the apophatic turn in Thomist 
interpretation, which emphasizes Thomas’s statements on the radical incomprehensibility of the 
divine essence and stands in direct opposition to the earlier rationalistic formulation of 
humanity’s ability to know God.  
 
2.3.1 The Apophatic Turn in Thomist Studies and the Question of Real Knowledge 
Victor Preller offers such a reformulation when he argues that, for Thomas, “In this life 
God is and remains ignotum – the Unknown God whom we cannot grasp or control in terms of 
the forms of intelligibility created by our intellects.”38 Preller’s reasoning here is based on certain 
claims found throughout Thomas’s works, which are similar to the argument he presents in his 
commentary on Boethius’s De Trinitate, where he states, “We are said to know God as unknown 
                                                
36 Kerr documents the various manifestations of this interpretive position in his After Aquinas, 35–96. A 
classic example of this approach is Reginald Garrigou-Lagrange's Dieu, Son Existence et Sa Nature. Solution Thomiste Des 
Antinomies Agnostiques, which was first published in 1915, but went through eighteen editions in three decades; thus, 
confirming its enormous influence on later generations. While this type of reading is not nearly as prominent as it 
once was, its methods and principles are still alive today. For examples, see Leo Elders, The Philosophical Theology of St. 
Thomas Aquinas (Leiden: Brill Archive, 1990); Feingold, The Natural Desire to See God; Hütter, Dust Bound for Heaven. 
37 For a description of de Lubac’s work and the controversy it sparked, see §1.3 n.36. Examples of others 
that challenged, to varying degrees, the traditional readings of Thomas prior to the publication of de Lubac's 
Surnaturel are: Pierre Rousselot, L’intellectualisme de Saint Thomas, 1st ed. (Paris, 1908); A.D. Sertillanges, Agnosticisme 
Ou Anthropomorphisme (Paris: Bloud, 1908); Martin Grabmann, Thomas von Aquin: eine Einführung in seine Persönlichkeit 
und Gedankenwelt (Kempten: Kösel, 1912); Joseph Maréchal, Le Point de Départ de La Métaphysique. Leçons Sur Le 
Développement Historique et Théorique Du Problème de La Connaissance. (Paris: Desclée, 1926). 
38 Victor Preller, Divine Science and The Science of God: A Reformulation of Thomas Aquinas. (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1967), 265. Despite this work being one of only a few things Preller ever published, it has had a 
tremendous impact on English Thomist studies. See, for examples of this influence, the essays in Jeffrey Stout and 
Robert Macswain, eds., Grammar and Grace: Reformulations of Aquinas and Wittgenstein (London: SCM Press, 2004). Sr. 
Louise-Marie Antoniotti provides a critical but, nonetheless, charitable review of Preller's book in Revue Thomiste 69 
(1969): 651–56. 
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at the highest point of our knowledge because we find that the mind has made the greatest 
advance in knowledge when it knows that his essence transcends everything it can apprehend in 
the present life. Thus, although what he is remains unknown, that he is nonetheless known.”39 
Many scholars, like Preller, have chosen to dwell in the apophatic space created by Thomas’s 
commitment to the incomprehensibility of the divine essence described in this passage and 
substantiated throughout his corpus.40 A. D. Sertillanges provides, in an early expression of this 
position, an astute summary of the conviction that lies at the heart of the apophatic reading: “We 
do not know God in any way, in any thing, in any degree”?41 
Others are, however, convinced that Thomas’s apophaticism supplies us with only one 
chapter in his story on humanity’s knowledge of God.42 Although Thomas is quite clear that in 
this life it is impossible for the human intellect to obtain quidditative knowledge of the divine, he 
does, nevertheless, appear to leave room, contrary to a strict apophaticism, for the possibility of 
a real knowledge of God (ST 2a2ae.1.2 ad.2). In his response to the objection that we cannot use 
words to signify the divine essence because we do not have knowledge of God’s essence, he 
states quite emphatically, “In this life we cannot understand the essence of God as he is in 
himself, we can however understand it as it is represented by the perfections of his creatures; and 
this is how the words we use can signify it.”43 While Thomas, again, repeats his conviction 
concerning our knowledge of the divine essence, his argument does not conclude with this 
negation. Instead, he suggests that the perfections we find in creatures form the created space 
                                                
39 BDT 1.2 ad.1: “Secundum hoc dicimur in fine nostrae cognitionis Deum tamquam ignotum cognoscere, 
quia tunc maxime mens in cognitione profecisse invenitur, quando cognoscit eius essentiam esse supra omne quod 
apprehendere potest in statu viae, et sic quamvis maneat ignotum quid est, scitur tamen quia est.” For Preller’s 
comments on this passage, see Divine Science and The Science of God, 28. Cf. ST 2a2ae.8.7. 
40 Other scholars that have exhibited in their works a similar commitment to an apophatic reading of 
Thomas are: Sertillanges, Agnosticisme Ou Anthropomorphisme; Victor White, God the Unknown (London: Harvill Press, 
1956); David B. Burrell, C.S.C., Aquinas: God & Action (London: Routledge & Kegan, 1979); Knowing the Unknowable 
God: Ibn-Sina, Maimonides, Aquinas (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1986); Brian Davies, “Aquinas on 
What God Is Not,” in Thomas Aquinas: Contemporary Philosophical Perspectives, ed. Brian Davies (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2002), 227–42; Karen Kilby, “Perichoresis and Projection: Problems with Social Doctrines of the 
Trinity,” New Blackfriars 81 (2000): 432–45; “Aquinas, the Trinity and the Limits of Understanding,” International 
Journal of Systematic Theology 7 (2005): 414–27; “Is an Apophatic Trinitarianism Possible?,” International Journal of 
Systematic Theology 12 (2010): 65–77. 
41 Sertillanges, Agnosticisme Ou Anthropomorphisme, 60; cited in Fergus Kerr, O.P., “‘Real Knowledge’ or 
‘Enlightened Ignorance’: Eric Mascall on the Apophatic Thomisms of Victor Preller and Victor White,” in Grammar 
and Grace: Reformulation in Aquinas and Wittgenstein, ed. Jeffrey Stout and Robert MacSwain (London: SCM Press, 
2004), 116.  
42 See, for instance, the works of Eric L. Mascall, He Who Is: A Study in Traditional Theism (London: 
Longmans, Green, 1943); Torrell, Spiritual Master, 34–45; Gregory P. Rocca, Speaking the Incomprehensible God: Thomas 
Aquinas on the Interplay of Positive and Negative Theology (Washington: Catholic University of America Press, 2004); Te 
Velde, Aquinas on God, 72–7; Kevin W. Hector, “Apophaticism in Thomas Aquinas: A Re-Reformulation and 
Recommendation,” Scottish Journal of Theology 60 (2007): 377–93; Matthew Levering, “Friendship and Trinitarian 
Theology: Response to Karen Kilby,” International Journal of Systematic Theology 9 (2007): 39–54. 
43 ST 1a.13.2 ad.3: “Essentiam Dei in hac vita cognoscere non possumus secundum quod in se est, sed 
cognoscimus eam secundum quod repraesentatur in perfectionibus creaturarum; et sic nomina a nobis imposita eam 
significant.” Cf. ST 2a2ae.8.2. 
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where, what Rudi te Velde calls, “the metaphysical continuity-in-difference between the world 
and God”44 encounters the intelligibility of God in the divine act of self-disclosure as a fitting 
knowledge of God’s incomprehensibility finally expressed in our, as David Burrell notes, 
theological “grammar of divinity.”45 To start parsing out the substance of Thomas’s argument in 
this passage, and how it inevitably affects his formulation of the divine ideas, we need to begin 
our analysis here with a discussion on the type of knowledge that belongs to sacra doctrina. 
 
2.3.2 The Character of Knowledge in Sacra Doctrina 
Thomas opens his discussion on the knowledge of sacra doctrina by noting that there are 
two types of sciences.46 The first type of science, as te Velde usefully summarizes, “may proceed 
from principles immediately known as true in the natural light of the intellect.”47 In contrast the 
second type, according to Thomas, “works from premises recognized in the light of a higher 
science.”48 Thus, a higher science provides the basis for a lower one’s principles and everything 
that may be rightly concluded from them. Thomas proposes that it is according to this second 
type or subaltern science that sacra doctrina may be considered a scientia because, as he says: “Sacra 
doctrina . . . flows from the founts recognized in the light of a higher science, namely God’s very 
own which he shares with the blessed . . . so sacra doctrina takes on faith its principles revealed by 
God.”49 It is important to take note that Thomas uses the Aristotelian category of subaltern 
science to formally clarify what he finds intrinsic to the nature of theological inquiry as a 
pedagogical response to God’s self-revelation, rather than to forge a space for the notion of 
                                                
44 Te Velde, Aquinas on God, 97. Te Velde is here discussing the function of the analogia entis in Thomas’s 
thought. He proceeds to say, “the theory of analogy – especially the so-called analogia entis . . . is largely a product of 
the Thomistic school, which, by its baroque and proliferated interpretations of analogy, has contributed much to 
obscuring what seems to be a less theory-loaded, more contextual and intuitive way in which Thomas himself 
employs the notion of analogy.” Cf. Wayne J. Hankey, God in Himself: Aquinas’ Doctrine of God as Expounded in the 
Summa Theologiae (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1987), 86–88; D. Stephen Long, Speaking of God: Theology, 
Language, and Truth (Grand Rapids: Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing, 2009), 212–3. 
45 Burrell, Knowing the Unknowable God, 2. Burrell elaborates on this point in many of his other works. See 
God & Action, 86–89; Freedom and Creation in Three Traditions (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1993), 
31–3; Friendship and Ways to Truth (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 2000), 53–4; Faith and Freedom: An 
Interfaith Perspective, Challenges in Contemporary Theology (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 2004), 31–2. 
46 Cf. Aristotle Post. An. 71b8-72a8 and 75b16. See, The Complete Works of Aristotle, trans. Jonathan Barnes, 
vol. 1 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984), 115–6 and 122. 
47 Te Velde, Aquinas on God, 25. 
48 ST 1a.1.2: “. . . procedit ex principiis notis lumine superioris scientiae.” 
49 ST 1a.1.2: “Sacra doctrina . . . procedit ex principiis notis lumine superioris scientiae, quae scilicet est Dei 
et beatorum . . . ita sacra doctrina credit principia revelata sibi a Deo.” Scientia is another word whose meaning can 
be tricky to satisfactorily convey in English because of a narrowing in the semantic range of its cognate “science.” 
Since the etymological structure of “science” still supports the larger cognitive framework Thomas has in mind 
when using scientia, I will often retain this more direct translation; however, I will, at times, either leave scientia 
untranslated or refer to it as “knowledge.” For more on the meaning and translation of scientia, see Eleonore Stump, 
Aquinas (London: Routledge, 2003), 241-2. 
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theological reflection on the spectrum of scientiae. 50 With that, let us direct our attention to two 
points on this matter that warrant further consideration.  
First, while Thomas clearly identifies the higher science that grounds and guarantees the 
science of sacra doctrina with God’s own knowledge, it is not the case that this is God’s “perfectly 
comprehensive knowledge of himself,” since elsewhere in the Summa, he writes, “No created 
mind can attain the perfect sort of understanding that is intrinsically possible of God’s 
essence.”51 Thus, Thomas’s qualification that the science of sacra doctrina is not only grounded in 
God’s knowledge, but also in the knowledge that the blessed have of him through the beatific 
vision, situates the awareness of him in this life within the context of God as creator since the 
relation between God and the blessed expresses a mutual affirmation of creation’s existence.52  
Accordingly, the correlation between Thomas’s statement that sacra doctrina is like an 
imprint of God’s own knowledge and his argument in ST 1a.1.7, which claims that sacra doctrina 
addresses God and everything else in relation to him, is not simply creating space for theologians 
to discuss things like bees; rather, he is making the far more pivotal claim that the knowledge 
shared by God and the blessed, which directs the science of sacra doctrina, is specifically a 
knowledge of God and everything in relation to him.53 The difference, therefore, between the 
knowledge of God possessed by the blessed in heaven and those who remain in this life is not 
one of kind or substance but one of relation and transmission. While the blessed in heaven 
receive this knowledge of God and everything else by directly gazing upon the divine essence 
(ST 1a.12.2), in this life it is learned through revelation, transmitted through teaching, and 
accepted by faith (ST 2a2ae.1.1), which leads to our second point of consideration. 
 
                                                
50 Many studies on Thomas have been preoccupied with the question of whether or not sacra doctrina 
actually qualifies as an Aristotelian subaltern scientia. While much has been gleaned about the nature of sacra doctrina 
from these studies, especially from the thoughtful analysis of Jenkins (Knowledge and Faith, 51-77) we do not need to 
be overly distracted by this question for a number of reasons; the chief among them being that we are not 
particularly concerned with how faithful Thomas was to Aristotle. For an argument that departs from Jenkins 
conclusions, see Richard A. Lee, Jr, Science, the Singular, and the Question of Theology (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 
2002), 33–57. Mark Jordan has an excellent discussion on why scholars should not be overly preoccupied with 
Thomas’s faithfulness to Aristotle in Chapter Four of Rewritten Theology. Also see Pieper’s discussion on this point in 
Josef Pieper, Guide to Thomas Aquinas, trans. Richard Winston and Clara Winston (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 
1991), 43–5; German original, Hinführung Zu Thomas von Aquin (Munich: Kösel-Verlag, 1986). Cf. Conley, A Theology 
of Wisdom, 74–5.  
51 ST 1a.14.3: “. . . perfecte comprehendit seipsum.” ST 1a.12.7: “Nullus autem intellectus creates pertingere 
potest ad illum perfectm modum cognitionis divinae essentiae quo cognoscibilis est.” Cf. ST 1a.13.7; DDN I, lect.1. 
52 For a discussion on the nature of our knowledge of God being rooted in him as creator, see Burrell, 
Freedom and Creation, 111–8; Burrell, “The Act of Creation with Its Theological Consequences,” in Creation and the 
God of Abraham (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 44. 
53 Cf. ST 2a2ae.9.4 ad.3; 2a2a3.26.1 ad.2. Also see the brilliant study by A. N. Williams, “What Is 
Systematic Theology?,” International Journal of Systematic Theology 11 (2009): 40–55. 
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2.3.3 The Knowledge of Faith in Sacra Doctrina 
The science of sacra doctrina begins, as every scientia does, with its principles; however, as 
Thomas repeats in various ways throughout the Summa, the principles of sacra doctrina are not 
self-evident to the human mind because they surpass the natural reach of human reasoning. 
Thus, sacra doctrina “takes its principles directly from God through revelation.”54 Although these 
principles do not appear self-evident to us in this life, they are, according to Thomas, 
nevertheless, objectively speaking, more certain than the principles of other sciences.55 They only 
escape our grasp because of the human intellect’s weakness, which explains why, in the passage 
cited above, Thomas insists that these principles are accepted by faith.56 Since the certainty of 
these principles is beyond the grasp of natural reasoning, the practice of sacra doctrina must begin 
with humanity’s faith in God. Faith is, therefore, as Thomas explains, “a sort of knowledge in 
that it makes the mind assent to something. The assent is not due to what is seen by the believer 
but to what is seen by him who is believed. In that it lacks the element of seeing, faith fails to be 
genuine knowledge.”57 What the human intellect fails to see, even in the light of faith (lumen fidei), 
is the essence of God. Thomas is, nonetheless, quite clear that even though the human intellect 
is bound to knowledge gained from the corporeal world (ST 1a.1.9; 1a.12.11; 1a.84.7; 1a.88.1), 
faith reaches through the sensible to touch realities beyond the natural order such that, as te 
Velde concludes, “it is an inchoate beginning of the final and perfect knowledge which consists 
in the vision of God.”58 Faith reaches these heights not directly but by encountering them in 
God’s act of self-disclosure, which bears the incomprehensible reality of the beatific vision into 
the world of sense and image; therefore, as Thomas says, “No one can attain to this vision of 
God except by being a learner with God as his teacher . . . Thus in order that a person come to 
the full, beatific vision, the first requisite is that he believe God, as a learner believing the master 
teaching him.”59 
In ST. 1a.111.1 ad.1 Thomas explains that since faith cannot assent to the 
incomprehensible realities of God directly, no one is convinced of these realities through rational 
proofs; hence, faith accepts them through an orientation of the human will to believe the truths 
                                                
54 ST 1a.1.5 ad.2: “Accipit sua principia . . . immediate a Deo per revelationem.” 
55 On the certainty of faith over the other sciences, see ST 2a2ae.4.8; 2a2ae.6.1; Lect. Ioan. 4, lect. 5, no.662. 
56 ST 1a.1.5 ad.1; 2a2ae.7.2 ad.3.  
57 ST 1a.12.13 ad.3: “Fides cognitio quaedam est, in quantum intellectus determinatur per fidem ad aliquod 
cognoscibile. Sed haec determinatio ad unum non procedit ex visione credentis, sed a visione ejus cui creditur. Et sic 
in quantum deest visio deficit a ratione cognitionis quae est in scientia.” 
58 Te Velde, Aquinas on God, 21. See, for instance, ST 2a2ae.1.8, where Thomas writes: “Illa per se pertinent 
ad fidem quorum visione in vita aeterna perfruemur, et per quae ducemur ad vitam aeternam.” Cf. ST 2a2ae.1.6 ad.1. 
59 ST 2a2ae.2.3: “Ad quam quidem visionem homo pertingere non potest nisi per modum addiscentis a 
Deo doctore . . . Unde ad hoc quod homo perveniat ad perfectam visionem beatitudinis praeexigitur quod credat 
Deo tanquam disciplus magistro docenti.” Cf. ST 1a.18.3. 
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revealed by God. Still, the assent of faith is an intellectual act – one of cogitatio rather than 
intellectus or scientia – that may be described, following Thomas, as “the mind searching before 
reaching its term in the full vision of truth.”60 Yet, for faith to be able to search or think with 
assent (cogitare assensu) it is necessary for, as Thomas says, “the objects of faith to be made known 
to the believer,” which is accomplished through the articles of faith.61 For Thomas the articles of 
faith are the principles of sacra doctrina since they guide and govern the unfolding of humanity’s 
teaching on God.62  
What Thomas specifically has in mind while discussing the articles of faith are the 
fourteen articles of the Apostle’s Creed, but the articles may also, more broadly, pertain to the 
totality of God’s self-disclosure in scripture.63 He also adds, in a fascinating comment on 
Hebrews 11.6, that all of the articles, as Mark Johnson helpfully summarizes, “can be ordered in 
such a way that their collective intelligibility is reducible to two things: God’s existence, and his 
having providence.”64 It is notable that Thomas specifically acknowledges in the common use of 
the name “God” what people mean is a being that exists and has providence over creation; yet, 
according to him, what is signified in this common use and in faith do not mean the same thing 
because in the case of the former these assertions are not made “under the conditions 
determined by faith.”65 Before the face of God, then, the human intellect, even in the light of 
faith, falls silent because it cannot extend beyond itself to see God directly; however, under the 
conditions of faith, God exposes, through his use of sense and image to reveal himself and the 
reality that all things are related to him as their creator, how the knowledge we have gathered 
from the world around us relates to who and what he is.66 In other words, faith is humanity’s 
acknowledgment that in his revelation God speaks about himself meaningfully by augmenting 
our knowledge of his presence within creation despite the fact that the reality he discloses 
surpasses our understanding.67 
Moreover, it is following this awareness, that by faith God augments our knowledge of 
him through revelation, that the science of sacra doctrina begins its search for understanding. 
                                                
60 ST 2a2ae.2.1: “Motus animi deliberantis nondum perfecti per plenam visionem veritatis.” Cf. James F. 
Ross, “Aquinas on Belief and Knowledge,” in Essays Honoring Allan B. Wolter, ed. W. A. Rank and G. J. Etzkorn (St. 
Bonaventure: Franciscan Institute, 1985), 245–69. 
61 ST 1a.111.1 ad.1: “. . . quod credibilia proponantur credenti.” 
62 ST 2a2ae.1.2 ad.2 and 2a2ae.1.9. 
63 ST 2a2ae.1.8. Cf. Conley, A Theology Of Wisdom, 95; Frederick Christian Bauerschmidt, Thomas Aquinas: 
Faith, Reason, and Following Christ (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), 149. 
64 ST 2a2ae.1.7. Mark F. Johnson, “God’s Knowledge in Our Frail Mind: The Thomistic Model of 
Theology,” Angelicum 76 (1999): 41–2. The passage from Hebrews reads: “Credere enim oportet accedentem ad 
Deum quia est et inquirentibus se remunerator fit.” Cf. 2a2ae.1.6 ad.2. 
65 ST 2a2ae.2.2 ad.3: “. . . sub his conditionibus quas fides determinant.” Also see ST 1a.13.8; 2a2ae.1.8 ad.1. 
Cf. Kerr, After Aquinas, 67–8. 
66 ST 1a.1.9 ad.2 
67 Cf. Preller, Divine Science and the Science of God, 188. 
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Again, to emphasize what has just been said, in the Summa Thomas is not attempting to convey 
the knowledge of God as he will be known in the beatific vision since this would require the 
human intellect to stretch beyond itself, which it is simply incapable of doing and runs contrary 
to the very nature of God’s revelation.68 Instead, since God’s revelation meets us where we are, 
the pedagogical character of sacra doctrina is deeply rooted in creation.69 Under the light of 
revelation, sacra doctrina examines what God’s self-disclosure tells humanity it can know of him in 
and through creation. Thomas’s insistence that God’s revelation directs sacra doctrina to 
knowledge of the divine culminates in his claim that, “Sacra doctrina should be declared to be 
wisdom highest above all human wisdoms.”70 According to Thomas, wisdom means being able 
to judge and govern things properly, and for sacra doctrina this means being able to properly judge 
or discern divine things. While sacra doctrina never transcends faith, Thomas’s intention in the 
Summa, as we have seen, is to guide his readers to its wisdom through the pedagogical pattern of 
faith seeking understanding, and it is this pattern that guides the plan of the Summa itself, which 
is what we turn to next.71  
 
2.4 Hold Tight and Pretend it’s a Plan: The Structure of the Summa 
As the discussion above indicated, the structure of the Summa contributes to the 
pedagogical identity of the work; nevertheless, the structure of the Summa is a complex issue, and 
the current debates on this topic ensure that this question yields no easy answers.72 Although 
Jordan’s work has made it clear that the space Thomas devotes to the moral development of the 
reader in the prima secundae and the secunda secundae indicates that moral education is integral to the 
structure of the Summa, Thomas doubtlessly formulates this educational reform because of a 
much larger theological vision that shapes and directs his pedagogical agenda.73 In other words if 
the pedagogical end of the Summa was simply moral education, Thomas would have created a 
work more like the traditional Dominican moral handbook, which, as we have learned, he 
                                                
68 ST 1a.88.3. Cf. Preller, Divine Science and the Science of God, 192–4; Eugene F. Rogers, Aquinas on the Supreme 
Court: Race Gender, Ethnicity, and Failure of Natural Law in Thomas’s Biblical Commentaries (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 
2013), 251. 
69 ST 1a.1.9 and 1a.88.1. 
70 ST 1a.1.6: “Haec doctrina maxime sapientia est inter omnes sapientias humanas.” 
71 ST 1a.1.6 ad.3. Cf. 2a2ae.1.5 ad.4. On the sapiential character of sacra doctrina, see Conley, A Theology Of 
Wisdom, 59–66 and 94–105; Johnson, “God’s Knowledge in Our Frail Mind,” 26 and 36–9; Matthew Levering, 
Scripture and Metaphysics: Aquinas and the Renewal of Trinitarian Theology (Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, 2004), 23–46; Paul 
Morrissey, “The Sapiential Dimension of Theology according to St. Thomas,” New Blackfriars 92 (2011): 1–15. 
72 For a summary of the debates over the structure of the Summa, see Brian Johnstone, “The Debate on the 
Structure of the Summa Theologiae of St. Thomas Aquinas: From Chenu (1939) to Metz (1998),” in Aquinas as 
Authority, ed. Paul Van Geest, Harm Goris, and Carlo Leget (Leuven: Peeters, 1998), 187–200. Candler arrives at a 
number of conclusions about the structure of the Summa that are similar to those outlined in this section. See his 
detailed analysis in Theology, Rhetoric, Manuduction, 90–106. 
73 Jordan, Rewritten Theology, 10.  
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desperately opposes. Instead, Thomas produces a work that envisions moral maturity as a 
fundamental aspect of a much larger pedagogical project that is designed to inculcate the habit of 
thinking theologically in the reader, but in order to follow the trajectory of this design in the 
interpretation of the divine ideas, the broader structural patterns of the work must be 
identified.74 
 Since Thomas’s intention to organize the Summa according to the subject of sacra doctrina 
(ordo disciplinae) has already been mentioned, his response to ST 1a.1.7, where the subject of sacra 
doctrina is discussed, is an early sign of the Summa’s structural orientation. There he writes: “What 
a science discusses is its subject. In this case the discussion is about God; for it is called theology, 
as it were, talk about God. Therefore he is the subject of this science.”75 Yet, on its own this 
assertion does not tell the reader much about how the work will be organized, nor does 
Thomas’s further qualification in the prologue to ST 1a.2 help much: “The fundamental aim of 
holy teaching is to make God known, not only as he is in himself, but as the beginning and end 
of all things and of reasoning creatures especially.”76 These passages do, however, alert the reader 
to the governing principles of sacra doctrina that, in retrospect, should now remind us of the 
articles of faith. Viewed from a distance, the Summa clearly follows the great creedal forms of the 
Church’s confession with, as Jordan observes, moral teaching embedded into its heart.77 It 
should not be too surprising that Thomas utilizes the creedal form to structure the Summa, since 
the articles of faith provide the basis for sacra doctrina’s pedagogical development of faith seeking 
understanding.  
 The divine origination of sacra doctrina through God’s self-disclosure is brought into focus 
by structuring the Summa after the articles, which immediately directs the reader’s attention to the 
soteriological telos of the work itself, as Thomas points out when he says, “We have to recognize 
an end before we can stretch out and exert ourselves for it. Hence it was necessary for our 
welfare (salus) that divine truths surpassing reason should be signified to us through divine 
revelation.”78 Just as God gave scripture to teach humanity about salvation, so Thomas 
                                                
74 On the epistemological importance of the good life, see Janet E. Smith, “‘Come and See,’” in Reading 
John with St. Thomas Aquinas: Theological Exegesis and Speculative Theology, ed. Michael Dauphinais and Matthew Levering 
(Washington: The Catholic University of America Press, 2010), 194–211. 
75 ST 1a.1.7 s.c.: “Illud est subjectum scientiae de quo est sermo in scientia. Sed in hac scientia fit sermo de 
Deo; dicitur enim theologia, quasi sermo de Deo. Ergo Deus est subjectum hujus scientiae.” Thomas’s distinction 
between sacra doctrina and metaphysics is discussed in §5.1 and §5.2. 
76 ST 1a.2, prol: “Qui igitur principalis intentio huius sacrae doctrinae est Dei cognitionem tradere, et non 
solum secundum quod in se est, sed etiam secundum quod est principium rerum et finis earum, et specialiter 
rationalis creaturae.” Anna Williams identifies this principle as the key characteristic of theology. See, “What Is 
Systematic Theology?,” 47. Cf. ST 1a.1.3 ad.1. 
77 Jordan, Rewritten Theology, 13. 
78 ST 1a.1.1: “Finem autem oportet esse praecognitum hominibus qui suas intentiones et actiones debent 
ordinare in finem. Unde necessarium fuit homini ad salutem quod ei nota fiernt quaedam per revelationem divinam 
quae rationem humanam excedunt.” 
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structurally orients sacra doctrina’s expression in the Summa to the same soteriological end.79 While 
the Summa’s structural parallel to the creedal form fortifies the pedagogical correspondence 
between the cumulative identity of the work and its individual parts, this is certainly not the only 
structural organization of the Summa that has been proposed. The many competing accounts of 
the Summa’s structure suggest that, with such a complex work, it might be misguided to search 
for only one organizing theme; rather, it might be best to think of the work as expressing a 
multi-layered harmony between varying organizing principles that engage the reader at various 
levels in the reoccurring pattern of faith seeking understanding.80 It might therefore be useful to 
discuss a couple of the arguments that can be brought together to support our reading of the 
divine ideas in the remaining chapters. 
 First, contemporary debates over the structure of the Summa began with an article 
published by M. -D. Chenu in 1939.81 Chenu posited that the Summa was patterned after the 
Neoplatonic exitus-reditus schema. According to Chenu, creation’s emanation from God and its 
return to him are depicted through the prima pars and secunda pars.82 There have, however, been 
significant criticisms of Chenu’s argument not least because it appears to relegate the tertia pars, 
as Chenu himself acknowledges, “[to] no more than a part added to the whole as an 
afterthought.”83 Many scholars have agreed that while the exitus-reditus motif may not be an 
acceptable explanation of the Summa’s overall structure, it does, nevertheless, appear in the 
structural patterns of the work.84 It may therefore be said that the exitus-reditus motif appears 
                                                
79 Cf. Max Seckler, Le Salut et L’histoire. La Pensée de Saint Thomas d’Aquin Sur La Théologie de L’histoire, 
Cogitatio Fidei 21 (Paris: Editions du Cerf, 1967), 30–1. 
80 The notion that the Summa has a multi-layered harmony that supports various organizing patterns is 
taken from Nicholas Wolterstorff’s thoughtful reflections on the nature of written works. See his, “The Unity 
Behind the Canon,” in Oxford Readings in Philosophical Theology: Providence, Scripture, and Resurrection, ed. Michael Rea, vol. 
2 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), 235–6. 
81 M.-D. Chenu, “Le Plan de La Somme Théologique de Saint Thomas,” Revue Thomiste 47 (1939): 93–107. 
Later modified and republished in Introduction à l’étude de saint Thomas d’Aquin (Paris: Vrin, 1950), 255–76. This work 
was translated into English as Toward Understanding Saint Thomas, trans. M.-D. Landry, O.P. and D. Hughes, O.P. 
(Chicago: Henry Regnery, 1964). References will be to the English translation. 
82 Chenu proposes a direct connection between the exitus-reditus pattern and the divine ideas when he 
states: “[The doctrine of the divine ideas] simultaneously combines a rational explanation of things, which is drawn 
precisely from their natures, with a religious explanation since these natures in themselves and in their destiny are 
the realization of a divine idea,” and after noting the instability of pantheistic Neoplatonism, he concludes, “Saint 
Thomas, without sacrificing anything of the transcendent personality of God, principle and end of all things, will 
extract all the advantages and all the truth present in the doctrine of emanation and return” (Toward Understanding 
Saint Thomas, 312). 
83 Chenu, Toward Understanding Saint Thomas, 312. For a wonderful counterbalance to the many criticisms of 
Chenu's argument, see Paul Rorem's thoughtful article, “‘Procession and Return’ in Thomas Aquinas and His 
Predecessors,” Princeton Seminary Bulletin 13 (1992): 147–63. In his revision of Chenu's exitus-reditus model, Michel 
Corbin, Le Chemin de La Théologie Chez Thomas d’Aquin (Paris: Beauchesne, 1974), 801–2, proposes a way to read tertia 
pars that approaches it not as an afterthought, but as the culmination of Thomas's soteriologically orientated 
pedagogical program. For a thorough critique of Chenu's position, see te Velde, Aquinas on God, 11–8.  
84 The exitus-reditus motif is a common theme in Thomist studies. See, for instance, the discussions in: M.-V. 
Leroy, “Review of Saint Thomas d’Aquin. Les Clés D’une Théologie by A.-M. Patfoort,” Revue Thomiste 84 (1984): 298–
303; Wayne J. Hankey, God in Himself: Aquinas’ Doctrine of God as Expounded in the Summa Theologiae (Oxford: Oxford 
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throughout the Summa as a type of reoccurring internal movement through which the reader is, 
at various points and through diverse ways, taken on the voyage of creation’s emanation from 
and return to God.85  
Another important organizing motif was identified by Eugene Rogers, who perceptively 
locates a key christoform structural arc in the relation between ST 1a.1 and the opening prologue 
to the tertia pars.86 In the first question of the Summa, Thomas asserts, in keeping with what we 
have discussed above, that humanity “stood in need of being instructed by divine revelation.”87 
Following this claim, Thomas utilizes a distinctly Aristotelian concept to clarify the substantive 
relation between divine revelation and the speculative/theological dimension of sacra doctrina. He 
writes: “Now the subject of a science’s first principles and of its entire development is identical, 
since the whole of a science is virtually contained in its principles.”88 While Rogers claims that 
the christoform character of this passage would have been clear to Thomas’s readers, it is not 
explicitly disclosed until the prologue of the tertia pars, where Thomas writes, “[W]e must bring 
the entire theological discourse to completion by considering the Savior himself and his benefits 
to the human race.”89 Here, according to Rogers, Thomas finally identifies the totus scientia of 
divine revelation from ST 1a.1.7 with the incarnate Christ, and, as he concludes, “It is Jesus 
Christ who stands tacitly as the new light or form that gives rise to this new scientia, a scientia 
praeter philosophicas disciplinas.”90  
The pedagogical pattern of sacra doctrina, then, does not just culminate in its discussion on 
Christ but, through a kind of reverse motion, it originates in him as well, as Thomas says, “Our 
Savior, the Lord Jesus Christ, as he was, according to the angel’s witness, saving his people from their 
sins (Mat. 1.21), showed in his own person that path of truth which, in rising again, we can follow 
                                                                                                                                                  
University Press, 1987), 139; Gilbert Narcisse, Les Raisons de Dieu: Argument de Convenance et Esthétique Théologique Selon 
Saint Thomas d’Aquin et Hans Urs von Balthasar (Fribourg: Editions universitaires, 1997), 89–90; Torrell, Spiritual Master, 
55–8; Healy, Thomas Aquinas: Theologian, 82–3; te Velde, Aquinas on God, 11–2. 
85 Cf. ST 1a.2, prol.; 1a.14.2 ad.1; 1a.44, prol.; 1a.103, prol.; 3a.6.1 ad.1. A. Patfoort, in his critique of 
Chenu’s original argument, actually substantiates this claim by noting that Thomas begins to depict creation’s return 
in the latter half of the prima pars. See his “L’unité de La La Pars et Le Mouvement Interne de La Somme 
Théologique de S. Thomas d’Aquinas,” Revue Des Sciences Philosophiques et Théologiques 47 (1963): 513–44. Later 
republished in Saint Thomas d’Aquin. Les Clés D’une Théologie (Paris: FAC-éditions, 1983), 49–70. 
86 Eugene F. Rogers, Thomas Aquinas and Karl Barth: Sacred Doctrine and the Natural Knowledge of God, New 
edition (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1999), 57. 
87 ST 1a.1.1: “. . . necessarium fuit hominem instrui revelation divina.” Cf. SCG Bk. 1, chs. 4 and 5. 
88 ST 1a.1.7: “Idem autem est subiectum principiorum et totius scientiae, cum tota scientia virtute 
contineatur in principiis.” Cf. Aristotle, Meta. II, 1. 993b24. 
89 ST 3a.1, prol.: “. . . necesse est ut ad consummationem totius theologici negotii . . . de ipso omnium 
Salvatore et beneficiss ejus humano generi praestitis nostra consideratio subsequatur.” 
90 Rogers, Thomas Aquinas and Karl Barth, 57. It is worth noting that what is being suggested here is not that 
the whole of sacra doctrina is about the totus Christus, which Thomas explicitly denies in ST 1a.1.7; instead, it is being 
argued that in the revelation of Christ the whole of sacra doctrina is revealed. There is some discussion over who 
Thomas has in mind in his reference to the totus Christus in ST 1a.1.7. On this discussion see James Ginther, Master of 
the Sacred Page: A Study of the Theology of Robert Grosseteste (Aldershot: Ashgate Publishing Limited, 2004), 49 n.24. 
  
38 
to the blessedness of eternal life.”91 Christ, consequently, not only reveals the path followed by 
sacra doctrina in the progressive rehabilitation of humanity through faith’s pursuit of wisdom, but 
he is also the path on which this rehabilitation occurs. This should alter our understanding of the 
Summa’s structure and purpose in two important ways.92 First, since Thomas waits until the end 
of the Summa to explicitly state that sacra doctrina originates and is sustained by Christ, he does not 
formally order the work after the conditions necessary “for understanding salvation history,” as 
many have conjectured, but instead according to the ontological structures that substantiate the 
reality of salvation history itself.93 Second, the revelation in the tertia pars that the pedagogical 
pattern of the Summa derives from Christ and returns to him in the journey toward the beatific 
vision intelligibly grounds the cyclical movement suggested by the exitus-reditus motif in the 
historical revelation of Christ’s redemptive work.94 We will close this section by noting that the 
reading of the Summa prompted by the structural importance of the tertia pars suggests, somewhat 
paradoxically, as Brian Johnstone has brilliantly argued, that the Summa should be read, or at least 
conceptually approached, in reverse, since what comes later in the Summa secures our 
understanding of what has come before, and this insight holds important implications for our 
study as we turn to a more focused analysis of Thomas’s doctrine of the divine ideas in the next 
chapter.95 
 
2.5 Conclusion: Thomas Aquinas as Teacher of the Divine Ideas 
 Early in his critique of Thomas’s doctrine of the divine ideas, Bulgakov writes, “Various 
themes are united and intertwined in Thomas’s theology: Aristotelianism and Platonism, 
Augustinian and scholastic dogmatics. Therefore, a precise characterization of this complex 
doctrine is scarcely possible. Depending upon which of these elements is emphasized, the system 
of Thomism is seen in one primary color or another.”96 Unfortunately, it appears that Bulgakov 
overlooked the most direct answer to this problem, which is that one should not attempt to 
interpret Thomas’s doctrine of the divine ideas by prioritizing one aspect or source above the 
rest. It seems rather obvious that if one reads Thomas’s account of the doctrine in the Summa as 
an encyclopedic statement on the divine ideas, where its meaning can be derived by parsing the 
various sources influencing his thought, the resulting interpretation will inevitably conclude that 
                                                
91 ST 3a.1, prol.: “Quia salvator noster dominus Iesus Christus, teste angelo, populum suum salvum faciens a 
peccatis eorum, viam veritatis nobis in seipso demonstravit, per quam ad beatitudinem immortalis vitae resurgendo 
pervenire possimus.” Cf. ST 1a.2, prol. 
92 For an overview of contemporary discussions on Christ’s place in the Summa, see Kerr, After Aquinas, 
162–80. 
93 Johnstone, “Debate on the Structure,” 191. Cf. ST 1a.1.2; 1a.21.2; 1a2ae.57.2; 2a2ae.27.4. 
94 Seckler, Das Heil in der Geschichte, 43. Cf. Johnstone, “The Debate on the Structure of the Summa,” 192. 
95 Johnstone, “Debate on the Structure,” 200. 
96 Bulgakov, The Bride of the Lamb, 19. 
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the divine ideas are incompatible with some aspect of his thought – whether that be his 
trinitarianism, epistemology, Christology, doctrine of creation, or any number of other possible 
options – because it attempts to categorize his thought according to a set of standards located 
outside his goal for the Summa.97 The divine ideas appear in a very different light, as the next 
chapter demonstrates, if one approaches Thomas as a theologian attempting to communicate his 
vision of the theological journey; as Jordan thoughtfully says, “Thomas’s decision to write as a 
theologian when he wrote in his own voice was chiefly the result of his view that no Christian 
should be satisfied to speak only as a philosopher.”98  
Instead, if the reader accepts that in the Summa Thomas has taken on the task of leading 
his readers from the simple confession of faith to the wisdom of sacra doctrina, then the divine 
ideas must be read as aiding in someway the reader’s understanding of God’s revelation. As 
Matthew Levering poignantly states, “[T]he task of appropriating Thomas’s theology does not 
consist in balancing criticism and praise of Thomas, but in employing creatively those portions 
of Thomas’s thought with which one can see more deeply into the realities revealed in scripture 
and taught in the church.”99 By outlining the pedagogical design of the Summa here, this chapter 
has prepared the way for our assessment of Thomas’s inclusion of the divine ideas in the Summa 
as a theologically motivated doctrinal exposition pedagogically intended to enhance the reader’s 
movement toward the contemplative vision of God. With this evaluation of Thomas’s 
pedagogical efforts in the Summa in mind, the next chapter will consider the theological structure 
of his formal discussion on the divine ideas in ST 1a.15, and how it might affect the 
interpretation of his argument for a plurality of ideas.  
                                                
97 Jordan, Rewritten Theology, 87–8. 
98 Jordan, Rewritten Theology, 155. 
99 Levering, “Friendship and Trinitarian Theology,” 40. 
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3. A Case for the Theological Validity of the Divine Ideas 
 
The reality and character of things consist in their being creatively thought by the Creator.1 
 
Introduction 
Dietrich Bonhoeffer astutely describes, in his commentary on Genesis 1.1 (“In the 
beginning when God created the heavens and the earth”), an acute danger latent in the 
intersection between God and creation presented in the doctrine of the divine ideas. He remarks 
that “[W]e can know nothing at all of this God except as the Creator of our world.”2 He proceeds 
to say that this passage of scripture “rules out every application of causal categories for an 
understanding of the creation. The relation between Creator and creature can never be 
interpreted in terms of cause and effect, because between the Creator and the creature there 
stands no law of thought or law of effect or anything else,” and that, consequently, “[Genesis 
1.1] declares not that in the beginning God had this or that idea about the purpose of the world, 
ideas that we must now try to discover, but that in the beginning God created. No question can go 
back behind the creating God, because one cannot go back behind the beginning.”3 In this rather 
forceful rejection of the doctrine, Bonhoeffer identifies the potential of the divine ideas to 
undermine the distinction between God and the world, which lies at the heart not only of 
Thomas’s thought but also of orthodox theology in both the East and West.4  
                                                
1 Josef Pieper, “The Negative Element in the Philosophy of St. Thomas Aquinas,” in The Silence of St. 
Thomas: Three Essays, trans. John Murray, S.J. and Daniel O’Connor, 3rd Revised ed. (South Bend: St. Augustine’s 
Press, 1999), 61. 
2 Dietrich Bonhoeffer, Creation and Fall: A Theological Exposition of Genesis 1-3, ed. John W. de Gruchy, trans. 
Doublas Stephen Bax, vol. 3, Dietrich Bonhoeffer Works (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1997), 31; German original, 
Schöpfung Und Fall. Theologische Auslegung von Genesis 1–3 (München: Evanelischer Verlag A. Lempp, 1937). 
3 Bonhoeffer, Creation and Fall, 31-2. 
4 In Thomist circles David Burrell popularized the description of the gulf that distinguishes, but does not 
separate, God and creation as “the distinction” or “the christian distinction,” which he borrows from Robert 
Sokolowski’s work The God of Faith and Reason: Foundations of Christian Theology (Washington: Catholic University of 
America Press, 1995). While Burrell often comments on Sokolowski’s work, he offers a more elaborate discussion 
on the significance of Sokolowski’s distinction between God and the world in Faith and Freedom: An Interfaith 
Perspective, Challenges in Contemporary Theology (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 2004), 217–33. Rudi te Velde 
correctly, in my opinion, observes that Thomas would probably not agree with Sokolowski’s description of God as 
“possibly being all that there is, with no diminution of goodness or greatness” (Sokolowski, p.23) because, for 
Thomas, according to Te Velde, “[T]he ‘absoluteness’ does not characterize God prior to and apart from the 
relationship of creation, but rather the mode of his causality in the relationship of all things to him. In Thomas’s 
view there is no way of thinking about God prior to or beyond the causality of creation” (Aquinas on God: The Divine 
Science of the Summa Theologiae [Aldershot: Ashgate Publishing, 2006], 91–2 fn.24). Te Velde is not attempting to 
diminish God’s aseity; rather, he is emphasizing that, for Thomas, humanity’s knowledge of God is always rooted in 
him as Creator (cf. §2.1.3). For a discussion on the centrality of the distinction between God and the world in the 
development of orthodox theology in both the East and West, see Andrew Louth, The Origins of the Christian Mystical 
Tradition: From Plato to Denys, 2nd ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), chap. 5. 
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Thomas summarizes the distinction, which Sarah Grant fittingly calls a “non-reciprocal 
relation of dependence,”5 in ST 1a.13.7, where he says, “since God is altogether outside the 
order of creatures, since they are ordered to him but not he to them, it is clear that being related 
to God is a reality in creatures, but being related to creatures is not a reality in God, we say it 
about him because of the real relation in creatures.”6 Although this passage indirectly reveals a 
general agreement between Thomas and Bonhoeffer on the creational boundedness of 
humanity’s knowledge of God (ST 1a.1.1 ad.1; cf. §2.1.3), Bonhoeffer, unlike the angelic doctor, 
rejects the doctrine of the divine ideas because, according to him, the divine ideas lock God into 
a metaphysical order of causality that he believes to be contrary to the revelation of creation. 
This fear that the divine ideas threaten to muddle the theological account of creation with a 
metaphysics that subverts the creational distinction between divine freedom and the world’s 
contingency is not entirely unfounded.7 Various incarnations of the doctrine have long been 
accused or, at least, suspected of contributing to theologically murky accounts of the distinction 
between God and the world.8 The persistence of these worries has, however, left an indelible 
                                                
5 Sara Grant, Toward an Alternative Theology: Confessions of a Non-Dualist Christian (Notre Dame: University of 
Notre Dame Press, 2002), 40. 
6 “Cum igitur Deus sit extra totum ordinem creaturae, et omnes creaturae ordinentur ad ipsum, et non e 
converso, manifestum est quod creaturae realiter referuntur ad ipsum Deum; sed in Deo non est aliqua realis relatio 
eius ad creaturas, sed secundum rationem tantum, inquantum creaturae referuntur ad ipsum.”  
7 It may even be the case that such a reading of the divine ideas could find a home in the interpretation of 
the Summa contra Gentiles offered by Norman Kretzmann, who writes, “Aquinas’s own presentation of God’s willing 
of other things . . . and his acceptance of the Dionysian principle (‘Goodness is by its very nature diffusive of itself 
and [thereby] of being’) commit him to a necessitarian explanation of God’s willing things other than himself” (The 
Metaphysics of Creation: Aquinas’s Natural Theology in Summa Contra Gentiles, II, vol. 2 [Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2001], 
126). Although it appears that one could make a case for the doctrine of the divine ideas following Kretzmann, 
there are a number of factors complicating this move, including the apparent absence of the divine ideas from the 
SCG (cf. ch.1 n.6), the debates over the accuracy of Kretzmann's interpretation, and his preemptive dismissal of a 
trinitarian argument for divine freedom (p.135, fn.254), that make such an association untenable for this project. For 
those interested in more on Kretzmann's reading of Thomas's doctrine of creation, see Bernhard-Thomas 
Blankenhorn, “The Good as Self-Diffusive in Thomas Aquinas,” Angelicum 79 (2002): 803–37; John F. Wippel, 
“Norman Kretzmann on Aquinas’s Attribution of Will and of Freedom to Create to God,” Religious Studies 39 
(2003): 287–98; Gregory P. Rocca, Speaking the Incomprehensible God: Thomas Aquinas on the Interplay of Positive and 
Negative Theology (Washington: Catholic University of America Press, 2004), 271 fn.54; Thomas S. Hibbs, Aquinas, 
Ethics, and Philosophy of Religion: Metaphysics and Practice (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2007), 164–6.  
8 Perhaps the most well known case of the divine ideas being accused of distorting the distinction between 
God and the world is found in the works of the Carolingian theologian John Scottus Eriugena and their reception 
by later thinkers. In Lect. Ioan. 1, lect. 2, no.86 and 90, Thomas reveals that he is aware of Eriugena’s account of the 
divine ideas in his homily on the prologue to the Gospel of John although the homily is wrongly attributed to 
Origen. While we cannot be concerned in this essay with whether or not this criticism of Eriugena is accurate, its 
persistence demonstrates that certain variations in the account of the divine ideas are prone to being read in ways 
that muddle the distinction between the Creator and creation. For examples of this interpretation of Eriugena and 
attempts to reappraise his thought, see W. Norris Clarke, “The Problem of the Reality and Multiplicity of Divine 
Ideas in Christian Neoplatonism,” in Neoplatonism and Christian Thought, ed. Dominic J. O’Meara (Albany: State 
University of New York Press, 1982), 115–20; Dermot Moran, “Pantheism from John Scotus Eriugena to Nicholas 
of Cusa,” American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly (1990): 131–52; Dermot Moran, The Philosophy of John Scottus Eriugena: 
A Study of Idealism in the Middle Ages (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 84–8; Cyril O’Regan, Gnostic 
Apocalypse: Jacob Boehme’s Haunted Narrative (New York: SUNY Press, 2002), 256 n.29; Hans Urs von Balthasar, Cosmic 
Liturgy: The Universe According to Maximus the Confessor, trans. Brian E. Daley, S.J. (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 2003), 
117. Many early modern and modern accounts of the doctrine have also been read as exhibiting similar theologically 
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mark on the interpretation of Thomas’s doctrine of the divine ideas, and raised serious doubts 
about the theological validity of the divine ideas.9  
The purpose of this chapter is, therefore, to defend the theological validity of Thomas’s 
doctrine of the divine ideas by identifying some of the gestures that indicate his theological 
restructuring of the doctrine. This chapter is divided into three primary sections that deal chiefly 
with questions of hermeneutical approach to the doctrine and the theological gestures of the 
divine ideas in the Summa. The first section addresses the theological intelligibility of the divine 
ideas in Thomas’s formal or ex professo discussion on the doctrine in ST 1a.15. In the second 
section, we examine Josef Pieper’s claim that creation is the hidden key in Thomas’s thought. 
While this proposition has become quite well known in Thomist studies, the integral role of 
Thomas’s doctrine of the divine ideas in Pieper’s argument warrants closer analysis for its 
penetrating insights into the function of the doctrine in Thomas’s thought. Following the 
hermeneutical principles we gather from Pieper, the third and final section of this chapter 
considers the role of the divine ideas in Thomas’s argument for creation’s twofold sense of truer 
existence through which he upholds the distinction between God and the world.  
 
3.1 The Theological Intelligibility of the Divine Ideas 
 In his response to the claims that the doctrine of the divine ideas is irrelevant for 
Thomas’s mature thought, Boland makes the off-handed remark that it seems unlikely so early in 
a work aimed at educating his readers by avoiding useless questions that Thomas would include 
just that in the divine ideas.10 Thomas’s pedagogical motivations in the Summa, however, suggest 
that the divine ideas are not only relevant to his thought but also that an accurate reading of the 
doctrine depends on approaching it through this pedagogical paradigm. While the common 
atomistic approach to Thomas’s formal discussions on the divine ideas has provided a number 
of important insights to his understanding of the doctrine, this approach will never yield a 
complete picture of its contribution to his theological project for a couple of reasons.11 First, 
                                                                                                                                                  
problematic formulations of the creational distinction; see, for examples, the discussions on Jacob Boehme, Peter 
Sterry, Nicolas Malebranche, G. W. F. Hegel and others in Cyril O’Regan, The Heterodox Hegel, Suny Series in 
Hegelian Studies (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1994), 91; O’Regan, Gnostic Apocalypse, 104–15; Marc 
A. Hight, Idea and Ontology: An Essay in Early Modern Metaphysics of Ideas (University Park: Pennsylvania State 
University Press, 2008), 177–217; W. J. Mander, The Philosophy of John Norris (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), 
58–9; Dewey D. Wallace, Shapers of English Calvinism, 1660-1714: Variety, Persistence, and Transformation (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2011), 51–85; Gary Dorrien, Kantian Reason and Hegelian Spirit: The Idealistic Logic of Modern 
Theology (Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, 2012), 381; Lucinda Martin, “Jacob Boehme and the Anthropology of German 
Pietism,” in An Introduction to Jacob Boehme: Four Centuries of Thought and Reception, ed. Ariel Hessayon and Sarah Apetrei 
(London: Routledge, 2013), 120–41.  
9 For examples of this mark on the interpretation of Thomas’s doctrine of the divine ideas, see §3.3 below. 
10 Vivian Boland, O.P., Ideas in God According to Saint Thomas Aquinas: Sources and Synthesis, Studies in the 
History of Christian Thought 69 (Leiden: Brill, 1996), 213. 
11 For more on the common atomistic approach to Thomas’s doctrine of divine ideas, see §1.1. 
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since atomistic readings typically work across various texts, they encourage the interpreter to 
secure, independent of each particular text, an interpretive vantage point that will support one’s 
comparative analysis; however, this approach creates artificial parameters for each text, which 
inevitably restrict the interpretation of doctrine in each instance, and, in most studies on the 
divine ideas, a distinctly philosophical stance has been adopted. Second, and potentially more 
problematic, this approach tends to treat each instance as a stable representation of the whole 
doctrine.12  
Yet, as Jordan has noted, the Summa’s pedagogical design “invites particular extensions or 
applications” of Thomas’s thought and doctrinal reflections, and, in the case of the divine ideas, 
this intention is reflected in the particularly fragmented way he presents the doctrine (§2.1.1).13 It 
is notable that in the Summa Thomas leaves many of his discussions on various issues, including 
the divine ideas, considerably shorter than their parallel treatments in other works.14 The brevity 
of the discussion on the divine ideas in ST 1a.15 only magnifies its fragmentary quality, which 
Thomas utilizes to demonstrate the very practice he encourages in the Summa’s pedagogical 
design by returning again and again to the divine ideas in order to, as will be seen here and in the 
following chapters, expand and apply the doctrine in various ways and in new directions.15 In this 
way, the doctrine of the divine ideas provides Thomas’s readers with an example of the way in 
which the material of sacra doctrina may be expanded, reordered, and variously applied as each 
reader develops the habit of thinking theologically through which the knowledge of sacra doctrina 
becomes their own. Thus, it seems best to think of Thomas’s discussion in ST 1a.15 as a prelude 
to the doctrine’s development and application later in the Summa, but since it is often best to 
begin with the prelude, that is where we will start. 
 
                                                
12 Duns Scotus’s critical evaluation of Thomas’s doctrine of the divine ideas in his Reportatio Parisiensis 
examinata I-A, In I Sent. d. 36, q.1-4 is an early example of the problems associated with approaching elements of 
Thomas’s works as closed or stable systems. For more on Scotus’s interpretation of Thomas, see Timothy B. Noone, 
“Aquinas on Divine Ideas: Scotus’s Evaluation,” Franciscan Studies 56 (1998): 307–24; Timothy B. Noone, “Scotus on 
Divine Ideas: Rep. Paris. I-A, D. 36,” Medioevo: Rivista Di Storia Della Filosofia 24 (1998): 359–453. 
13 Jordan, “The Summa’s Reform of Moral Teaching,” 45. Repeated in Rewritten Theology, 119. Robert Henle 
overlooks the implications of the Summa’s fragmentary character when he concludes that the doctrine is irrelevant to 
Thomas’s interests because “no new development in the substance of the doctrine appears within” the formal 
discussions on the divine ideas (Saint Thomas and Platonism. A Study of the Plato and Platonici Texts in the Writings of Saint 
Thomas [The Hague: M. Nijhoff, 1956], 359). 
14 Thomas’s reflections on the divine ideas in both the Sent. I, d.36 and, especially, De ver. 3 are more 
detailed than his account in ST 1a.15. Both Jenkins and Pasnau note, although for vastly different reasons, the 
importance of Thomas’s arguments in the Summa being shorter than elsewhere in his corpus; however, both seem 
generally amenable to the notion that Thomas does this so that his readers can begin the process of extending and 
applying the work in different ways. See, John I. Jenkins, Knowledge and Faith in Thomas Aquinas (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1997), 82–3; Robert Pasnau, Thomas Aquinas on Human Nature: A Philosophical Study of 
Summa Theologiae, 1a 75-89 (Cambridge University Press, 2001), 6–7. 
15 Pieper has claimed that this fragmentary quality of doctrine is essential to Thomas’s understanding and 
application of the divine ideas. See, Pieper, “The Negative Element,” 46 and 62–3. Cf. §2.1.1 and §3.2 below.  
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3.1.1 Prelude: A Summary of Summa Theologiae 1a.1516 
 Before proceeding to his discussion on God’s knowledge, Thomas explains, in the 
prologue to ST 1a.14, that after considering the divine substance (divina substantia), it is necessary 
to examine God’s activities. Agents have, according to Thomas, two types of activity, immanent 
and external, and he concludes that it is best to consider God’s immanent activities of knowing 
and willing prior to the principle of divine power. Thomas closes this prologue by pointing out 
that because the divine mind knows the “intelligible natures of things” (rationes autem rerum) as 
objects of divine knowledge, it is necessary to include a discussion on the divine ideas in the 
reflections on God’s immanent activity of knowing. It is, however, not insignificant that Thomas 
includes the divine ideas, along with his reflections on the divine life and the qualities of truth 
and falsity, in between his formal discussions on God’s knowledge and will because, much like 
his creative placement of ethics at the heart of the Summa to emphasize the necessary correlation 
between ethical and theological reflection, he situates the divine ideas here to ensure that they 
cannot be dismissed as an afterthought in the assessment of God’s immanent activities.  
 Thomas opens his discussion on the divine ideas with the simple affirmation that, “We 
must hold that there are ideas in the divine mind,” by which he means the forms of things in the 
divine mind existing separate from the things themselves.17 He proceeds to explain that such 
forms may refer to two things: the ontological exemplar of a thing or the principle of knowing 
that thing. To support this claim, he observes that, with the exception of things produced by 
chance, when something is generated, the form is its intended end. There is, however, a 
distinction between agents operating according to nature (esse natura), where the form of the 
thing produced exists in the agent naturally, and agents acting through the intellect (esse 
intelligibile), where the likeness (similitudo) of the thing generated must preexist in the agent’s mind. 
At this point Thomas reinforces his argument with the common analogy of the architect (artifex), 
which notes that prior to the building of a house a likeness of it must preexist in the mind of the 
architect.18 Since the world, as Thomas states, was not formed by chance, “there must be in the 
                                                
16 For summaries of ST 1a.15 that follow the parallels between Thomas’s various treatments of the 
doctrine, see L. -B. Geiger, “Les Idées Divines Dans L’oeuvre de S. Thomas,” in St. Thomas Aquinas, 1274-1974: 
Commemorative Studies, vol. 1 (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 1974), 175–209; John F. Wippel, 
“Thomas Aquinas on the Divine Ideas,” in The Gilson Lectures on Thomas Aquinas, Etienne Gilson Series 30 (Toronto: 
Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 2008 [Originally published, 1993]), 147–55; Boland, Ideas in God, 210–4; 
Gregory T. Doolan, Aquinas on the Divine Ideas as Exemplar Causes (Washington: The Catholic University of America 
Press, 2008), 14–20. 
17 ST 1a.15.1: “Necesse est ponere in mente divina ideas.” 
18 Thomas had previous employed the analogy of the artifex in ST 1a.9.1 ad.2; 1a.14.8; 1a.14.11; 1a.14.12 
ad.3. The artisan (architect/craftsman) analogy is certainly the longest standing metaphor for the divine ideas. For 
examples of its use by Patristic and other Medieval authors, see Origen, De prin. Bk.1, 3-4; Augustine, De Gen. ad litt. 
VIII 12.28; De civ. dei XI.10; Tract. in Io. I.17; John Scotus Eriugena, Periphy. 560B-C, 1; Hom. in prol. Io. 7; Anselm, 
Monol. 34; Bonaventure, Coll. in Hex 20.5; Comm. in Evang. S. Io. I, n.13. The analogy was adapted by Christian 
Theologians from Plato’s Timaeus 27c-29d, which was one of few works by Plato made available to Latin speakers in 
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divine mind a form, to the likeness of which the world is made; and that is what we mean by an 
idea.”19 After establishing that it is necessary to posit the existence of ideas in the divine mind for 
both ontological and cognitive reasons, he concludes the article by briefly responding to its three 
objections. First, he rejects Plato’s theory that the Forms exist autonomously or per se by 
appealing to Aristotle’s argument that the Forms must exist in an intellect (ad.1).20 Next, he notes 
that God does not know himself through an idea even though he knows both himself and 
everything else through his essence because his essence is the principle of generation (principium 
operativum) for everything that exists but not for himself (ad.2). Finally, he reinforces the whole 
argument in article 1 with the crucial point that, “God in his essence is the likeness of all things. 
Hence an idea in God is simply the divine essence.”21 
 In the second article, Thomas considers whether or not there is a plurality of ideas 
existing in the divine mind.22 He opens his reply, much like in article 1, by emphatically asserting 
that, “we must postulate a plurality of ideas.”23 The first half of his reply is devoted to 
demonstrating why this is necessary, and he does so by focusing on the implications of creation’s 
order. Thomas rejects the notion, attributed to Avicenna and others, that the ordered multitude 
of creation is the incidental byproduct of the successive progression of agents from God in 
which the divine mind has only one idea, which is of the first created creature. It appears that his 
problem with this position is that if it were true, God’s providential care for creation would be 
restricted to the first creature alone, which might seem like a rather peripheral detail in light of 
his whole argument. In fact, it is quite the opposite. In his reply Thomas writes: 
 Now that which is best of all in creation is the good which consists in the 
order of the universe as a whole, as Aristotle shows. Therefore the order of the 
universe as a whole is the special object of God’s intention . . . If however the 
order of the whole universe is the direct object of his creation, and intended by 
him, he must have an Idea of the order of the whole universe. Now a plan 
governing a whole necessarily involves knowing what is special to the parts 
                                                                                                                                                  
the Middle Ages by Calcidius (Raymond Klibansky, The Continuity of the Platonic Tradition during the Middle Ages, reprint 
with a new preface and four supplementary chapters [London: Kraus International Publishing, 1982], 27–8; John 
Dillon, The Middle Platonists [Gerald Duckworth & Co Ltd, 1996], 401–8). It is, however, still unclear whether 
Thomas ever read the Timaeus (Henle, Saint Thomas and Platonism, xxi n.41). Thomas’s use of and relation to Moses 
Maimonides on the analogy of the artisan is discussed by Burrell in Freedom and Creation in Three Traditions (Notre 
Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1993), 105–19; Faith and Freedom, 34–42.  
19 ST 1a.15.1: “Necesse est quod in mente divina sit forma, ad cujus similitudienem mundus est factus; et in 
hoc consistit ratio ideae.”  
20 For a discussion on Aristotle’s criticism of Plato’s theory of the Forms, see Boland, Ideas in God, 148–53. 
For Aristotle’s criticism of Plato, see Meta. III, 2. 997b6; VII, 6. 1031a28, and for Thomas’s reflections on Aristotle’s 
argument in this work, see his commentary in Sent. Metaph. XII, n.231-34, 407-09. 
21 ST 1a.15.1 ad.3: “Deus secundum essentiam suam est similitudo rerum omnium. Unde idea in Deo nihil 
aliud est quam ejus essential.” 
22 As Jordan correctly notes, Thomas prefers to speak of a “plurality of ideas” rather than of “many ideas” 
because he is concerned with maintaining God’s simplicity in his discussions on the divine ideas (“The Intelligibility 
of the World and the Divine Ideas in Aquinas,” The Review of Metaphysics 38 [1984]: 21). Cf. Sent. I, d.36, q.2, ad.2. 
23 ST 1a.15.2: “Necesse est ponere plures ideas.” 
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which make up the whole; just as an architect cannot plan a house without 
knowing what is special to each part of it. Thus, then, there must be in the 
divine mind the natures of all things in what is proper to each.24 
The argument here elaborates on Thomas’s claim in the previous article, which associates the 
existence of the ideas with God’s intention to create, by arguing that this intention encompasses 
the totality of creation. Unlike Neoplatonic theories, which considered multiplicity to be a defect 
resulting from an ‘ontological fall,’ Thomas augments the language of the divine ideas to express 
the revelation that God’s providential design contains the distinction (distinctio) of each thing 
within creation, which again reminds us of the importance behind his decision to situate the 
divine ideas between his reflections on God’s knowledge and will.25  
 The second half of this reply is concerned with demonstrating that the plurality of divine 
ideas does not threaten to uproot the doctrine of divine simplicity. For evidence that the plurality 
of ideas does not undermine simplicity, Thomas, fairly straightforwardly, makes the point that an 
idea is in the mind as an object of knowledge (quod intelligitur) and not as a principle of knowledge 
(qua intelligitur), with the latter being, as he says, “the form which makes the intellect actually 
knowing.”26 Thomas concludes by saying that it would be contrary to divine simplicity if the 
divine mind was informed by the plurality of likenesses (plures species) as principles of knowledge, 
but divine simplicity is not opposed to God knowing many things as objects of knowledge. 
Although Thomas clearly thinks that it should be quite obvious to everyone why the plurality of 
ideas does not jeopardize divine simplicity, many of his contemporaries and successors did not 
find this claim quite as convincing and instead rejected the plurality of ideas in an attempt to 
preserve divine simplicity.27 In contrast to the various medieval figures who maintained the 
irreconcilability of divine simplicity and the plurality of ideas, many contemporary commentators 
                                                
24 ST 1a.15.2: “Id autem quod est optimum in rebus existens, est bonum ordinis universi, ut patet per 
Philosoophum. Ordo igitur universi est proprie a Deo intentus . . . Sed si ipse ordo universi est per se creatus ab eo, 
et intentus ab ipso, necesse est quod habeat Ideam ordinis universi. Ratio autem alicujus totius haberi non potest, 
nisi habeantur propriae rationes eorum ex quidbus totum constituitur; sicut aedificator speciem domus concipere 
non potest, nisi apud ipsum esset propria ratio cujuslibet partium ejus. Sic igitus oportet quod in mente divina sint 
propriae rationes omnium rerum.” 
25 Rudi A. te Velde, Participation and Substantiality in Thomas Aquinas, Studien Und Texte Zur 
Geistesgeschichte Des Mittelalters 46 (Leiden: Brill, 1995), 105. 
26 ST 1a.15.2: “Quae est forma faciens intellectum in actu.” 
27 For analyses of various contemporaries and successors of Thomas that rejected or were highly reticent to 
accept the plurality of ideas under the auspices of protecting simplicity, see Armand A. Maurer, “Role of Divine 
Ideas in the Theology of William of Ockham,” in Studies Honoring Ignatius Charles Brady, Friar Minor, ed. Romano 
Stephen Almagno and Conrad L. Harkins, Franciscan Institute Publications Theology Series (St Bonaventure: 
Franciscan Institute, 1976), 357–77; M. J. F. M. Hoenen, Marsilius of Inghen: Divine Knowledge in Late Medieval Thought 
(Leiden: Brill, 1993), 121–56; Rega Wood, “Distinct Ideas and Perfect Solicitude: Alexander of Hales, Richard Rufus, 
and Odo Rigaldus,” Franciscan Studies 53 (1993): 7–31; Alessandro D. Conti, “Divine Ideas and Exemplar Causality 
in Auriol,” Vivarium 38 (2000): 99–116; Benjamin DeSpain, “Seeing One’s Own Face in the Face of God: The 
Doctrine of the Divine Ideas in the Mystical Theologies of Dionysius the Areopagite and Nicholas of Cusa,” in 
Christian Mysticism and Incarnational Theology: Between Transcendence and Immanence, ed. Louise Nelstrop and Simon D. 
Podmore (Surrey: Ashgate Publishing, 2013), 43–4. 
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on Thomas, following L. –B. Geiger’s insightful work, now claim that the primary benefit he 
culls from the doctrine of the divine ideas is a way to reconcile the multiplicity of creation with 
the doctrine of divine simplicity, which has helped broaden the recognition of the doctrine’s 
contribution to Thomist studies.28  
 After concluding that there is a plurality of ideas and that this plurality is compatible with 
the doctrine of divine simplicity, Thomas closes his reply with one of the more interesting 
aspects of the doctrine’s development in question 15. He writes, “God knows his essence 
perfectly; he knows it therefore in all the ways in which it is knowable. Now the divine essence 
can be known not only as it is in itself, but as it can be participated in some degree of likeness by 
creatures . . . God, in knowing his essence as imitable in this particular way by this particular 
creature, knows his essence as the nature and idea proper to that creature”29 This argument 
significantly clarifies Thomas’s position on the referent for the divine ideas. As article 1 claimed, 
a divine idea is nothing other than the divine essence, but here it is noted, as Gregory Doolan 
has summarized, “[A] divine idea consists in God knowing his essence as imitable in these diverse 
ways. It is this knowledge that constitutes an idea.”30 Accordingly, each thing has its own 
substantial form in so far as it imitates God’s idea of its participation in the divine essence. 
Thomas concludes the article by adding a few more remarks in his responses to the objections. 
First, he notes that God not only knows the multitude of things in creation through his essence 
but that he also knows that he knows them through his essence (ad.2). Next, he explains that the 
plurality of ideas is not caused by the multitude of things “but by the divine intellect setting its 
essence to things.”31 In his last response, Thomas highlights that while the multitude of ideas 
may be logically distinguishable, they are not ontologically distinct from each other because the 
relations between them may be reduced to the divine essence (ad.4). 
 The final article in question 15 addresses the controversial issue of whether or not God 
has ideas for everything he knows, including things he will never create. Thomas opens the reply 
by acknowledging that Plato postulated that Forms had both cognitive and ontological functions, 
                                                
28 Geiger, “Les Idées Divines,” 179. Cf. L. -B. Geiger, “Les Rédactions Successives de Contra Gentiles 1, 
53 D’après L’autographe,” in Saint Thomas d’Aquin Aujourd’hui, ed. J. Y. Jolif and et al. (Paris, 1963), 221–40. For 
other endorsements of this position, see Vincent P. Branick, “The Unity of the Divine Ideas,” The New Scholasticism 
42 (1968): 171–2; Gianni Baget-Bozzo, “La Teologia Delle Idee Divine in San Tommaso,” Rivista Di Filosofia Neo 
Scolastica 66 (1974): 305; John Lee Farthing, “The Problem of Divine Exemplarity in St. Thomas,” The Thomist 49 
(1985): 215; Boland, Ideas in God, 8; Harm Goris, “Theology and Theory of the Word in Aquinas: Understanding 
Augustine by Innovating Aristotle,” in Aquinas the Augustinian, ed. Michael Dauphinais, Barry David, and Matthew 
Levering (Washington: The Catholic University of America Press, 2007), 64.  
29 ST 1a.15.2: “Ipse enim essentiam suam perfecte cognoscit; unde cognoscit eam secundum omnem 
modum quo cognoscibilis est. Potest autem cognosci non solum secundum quod in se est, sed secundum quod est 
participabilis secundum aliquem modum similitudinis a creaturis . . . Deus cognoscit essentiam suam ut sic 
imitabilem a tali creatura, cognoscit eam ut propriam rationem et ideam hujus creaturae.” 
30 Doolan, Aquinas on the Divine Ideas, 116. 
31 ST 1a.15.2 ad.3: “Sed ab intellectu divino comparante essential suam res.” 
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which he then parallels with his own position by asserting, again, that ideas in the divine mind 
have both these functions as well. From there, he proceeds to distinguish between God’s 
practical and speculative knowledge, based on the distinction between the ontological and 
cognitive functions of ideas. He states, “As a principle of the production of things it may be 
called an exemplar, and belongs to practical knowledge; as a principle of knowing, it is properly 
called an intelligible nature, and can belong also to speculative knowledge.”32 According to this 
distinction, everything God creates corresponds to an exemplar while, as principles of 
knowledge, ideas (rationes) are related to God’s speculative knowledge, which includes things that 
will never come into existence.  
Subsequently, Thomas adds that there is no idea of evil because God knows evil through 
the nature of good (rationem boni);33 however, he argues, contrary to Plato’s theory that Form and 
matter concurrently cause (concausa) a thing’s existence, that there is a divine idea of matter 
because matter, like form, is created by God, but this idea is “not distinct from the idea of the 
composite of matter and form.”34 The article closes with a critique of Plato’s theory that there 
are no ideas for individuals other than that of species. He writes, “But divine providence extends 
not only to species but also to individuals.”35 In this statement Thomas counters Plato’s claim by 
appealing again to divine providence, which serves as another instance in his discussion on the 
divine ideas that anticipates his doctrine of divine providence. With this Thomas brings his 
discussion on the divine ideas to a close, which provides us with a basis from which we can 
identify and examine the distinctly theological character of his doctrine of the divine ideas.  
 
                                                
32 ST 1a.15.3: “Et secundum quidem quod est principium factionis rerum, exemplar dici potest, et ad 
practicam cognitionem pertinet; secundum autem quod principium cognoscitivum est, proprie dicitur ratio, et potest 
etiam ad speculativam scientiam pertinere.” 
33 On the absence of a divine idea for evil, Thomas writes in ST 1a.15.3 ad.1: “Malum cognoscitur a Deo 
non per propriam rationem, sed per rationem boni.” 
34 ST 1a.15.3 ad.3: “. . . non aliam ab idea compositi.” Thomas concludes this passage by noting, “Nam 
materia secundum se neque esse habet, neque cognoscibilis est.” Eleonore Stump aptly summarizes Thomas’s 
understanding of prime matter in her discussion on Thomas’s theory of matter and form, where she says, “[P]rime 
matter is the component of the configured composite which makes it the case that the configured thing can be 
extended in three dimensions and can occupy a particular place at a particular time. But by itself, apart from form, 
prime matter exists just potentially” (Aquinas [London: Routledge, 2003], 37). For a survey of Thomas’s various 
discussions on prime matter throughout his corpus, see John F. Wippel, The Metaphysical Thought of Thomas Aquinas: 
From Finite Being to Uncreated Being (Washington: Catholic University of America Press, 2000), 312–8. Wippel also 
provides a discussion on Thomas’s parallel passages in Sent. I, d.36, q.2, a.3 ad.2 and De ver. 3.5 on the divine idea of 
prime matter (p. 321). Boland and Doolan, likewise, discuss Thomas’s argument for the existence of a divine idea 
for prime matter in Ideas in God, 227–9 and Aquinas on the Divine Ideas, 133–5. While Thomas refers to prime matter 
throughout the Summa, in ST 1a.44.2 he lays out his position on the divine causality of prime matter. On the 
metaphysical implications of Thomas’s theory of prime matter for his doctrine of creation, see Velde, Participation 
and Substantiality, 122–3 and 134–6. For those interested in a comparison of Thomas’s position with Aristotle’s 
theory, see David P. Lang, “The Thomistic Doctrine of Prime Matter,” Laval Théologique et Philosophique 54 (1998): 
367–85. 
35 ST 1a.15.3 ad.4: “Sed providentia divina non solum se extendit ad species, sed ad singularia.” 
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3.1.2 Peering Beneath the Surface of Things: Thomas’s Silence in ST 1a.15 
 Although other contemporary commentators on Thomas have found the most direct 
way to balance the reception of ST 1a.15 is by assessing its triumphs and failures in subverting 
unacceptable philosophical contours in the language of the divine ideas, this approach can easily 
and often does lose sight of the doctrine’s theological orientation because it appropriates the 
doctrine through an external point of contact.36 Instead, the pedagogical design of the work 
encourages the reader to adopt an internal vantage point that follows the transformation of faith 
into the wisdom of sacra doctrina, which suggests that Thomas’s intention in question 15 is to 
enhance the reader’s understanding of the realities revealed by God. If the pedagogical 
motivations behind the Summa dictate its unfolding, then it is crucial that one address how 
philosophically born concepts, like the divine ideas, contribute to the teaching of sacra doctrina.  
For an answer to this question, let us return to Thomas’s discussion at the beginning of 
the Summa, where he is reflecting on the superiority of sacra doctrina above the other sciences (ST 
1a.1.5). There he claims that sacra doctrina utilizes insights from other sciences not because of an 
insufficiency in the science of sacra doctrina itself but because the human intellect is weak; thus, as 
he writes, human understanding is “more readily guided into the world above reason, set forth in 
holy teaching, through the world of natural reason.”37 We could say, then, that Thomas 
appropriates the doctrine of the divine ideas to elaborate on an element of sacra doctrina that is 
held by faith but remains obscure to the human intellect because of its inability to apprehend 
immediately the full scope of the truth revealed by God. In order to identify the doctrine’s place 
in the pedagogical pattern of the Summa, we will attempt to answer three questions in this 
section: First, what does the doctrine provide Thomas? Second, what are the conditions or 
parameters he establishes in the doctrine? Third, what does the doctrine anticipate? 
As for the first question, what Thomas draws from the philosophical origins of the 
divine ideas is predicated upon his conviction that certain truths about divine things are revealed 
through creation because God discloses in scripture that everything he has made imitates him 
(§2.3). In other words, for Thomas, scripture first reveals that God intentionally communicates 
his likeness to all things in the act of creation, and also provides human beings, through faith, 
with the ability to discern the knowledge of this likeness in the principles of the other sciences. 
                                                
36 See, for instance, W. Norris Clarke, “The Problem of the Reality and Multiplicity of Divine Ideas in 
Christian Neoplatonism,” in Neoplatonism and Christian Thought, ed. Dominic J. O’Meara (Albany: State University of 
New York Press, 1982), 109–27; “The Meaning of Participation in St. Thomas,” in Explorations in Metaphysics: Being, 
God, and Person (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1994), 97; John Milbank and Catherine Pickstock, 
Truth in Aquinas, Radical Orthodoxy (London: Routledge, 2001), 40; Alice Ramos, Dynamic Transcendentals: Truth, 
Goodness and Beauty from a Thomistic Perspective (Washington: The Catholic University of America Press, 2012), 27–46; 
Hughes, “Creatio Ex Nihilo and the Divine Ideas,” 124-37. 
37 ST 1a.1.5 ad.2: “Qui ex his quae per naturalem rationem . . . facilius manuducitur in ea quae sunt supra 
rationem, quae in hac scientia traduntur.” 
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When Thomas notes, as we have just seen, that Plato theorized both the cognitive and 
ontological functions of the ideas, he is identifying, from the perspective of faith, the interplay 
between the knowledge of divine things disclosed in creation and the reordering of that 
knowledge in light of God’s self-disclosure through scripture.38 Thus, in contrast to both Plato, 
who holds that the Forms exist per se, which, Thomas says elsewhere, “seems alien to the faith,” 
and Aristotle, who only asserts that they must exist in intellectu, Thomas maintains that the ideas 
belong to the divine mind itself, which effectively identifies both the cognitive and the 
ontological functions of the ideas with God’s single act of knowing.39 The unity of the 
ontological and cognitive in the divine mind helps highlight Thomas’s association of the divine 
ideas with his theory of exemplarism (art.3) and the order of creation (art.2), which displays his 
interest in the ontological dimension of the doctrine. What Thomas finds in the doctrine of the 
divine ideas is a grammar that addresses, and is well suited for discussing, the deep structures of 
creation; yet he qualifies his position in such a way as to reorder the conditions for the doctrine 
in the exchange between faith and understanding. 
Contrary to the worry asserted by some contemporary theologians that integrating 
platonic concepts, such as the divine ideas, into theological discourse necessarily imposes a 
creational dissonance between the personal dimension of life and its deeper structural reality, 
Thomas reorders the language of the divine ideas to avoid such a pitfall by appropriating the 
doctrine through the conditions of faith seeking understanding, which his silence on the human 
mind’s cognitive relation to the divine ideas aptly exhibits.40 Despite opening his discussion on 
the divine ideas in question 15 with a quotation from Augustine that claims one cannot be wise 
without knowing the divine ideas, Thomas remains reticent throughout his discussion to say 
anything about the divine ideas as objects of human knowledge. Even in ST 1a.84.5, where 
Thomas directly addresses the question of whether or not humans know everything in the divine 
ideas, he distances himself from the platonic notion that the knowledge of a thing in the human 
intellect derives from direct participation in the archetypal form of the thing known. He 
                                                
38 Thomas’s relation to Plato is a complex issue. It is generally accepted that Thomas did not read the 
limited number of Plato’s dialogues that had been translated into Latin. Instead, the body of his knowledge of Plato 
derives from other sources he read. His familiarity, or lack thereof, with Plato does not impede our current inquiry, 
however, since we are interested in what Thomas says and not with what he knew. For detailed analyses of 
Thomas’s knowledge and relation to Plato, see Henle, Saint Thomas and Platonism; Wayne J. Hankey, “Aquinas and 
the Platonists,” in The Platonic Tradition in the Middle Ages: A Doxographic Approach, ed. Stephen Gersh and Maarten J.F 
M. Hoenen (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 2002), 279–324. 
39 ST 1a.84.5: “Videtur esse alienum a fide.” Cf. ST 1a.14.8. 
40 See the discussions on the potential danger of integrating Neoplatonic concepts into theological 
discourse in, Denys Turner, The Darkness of God: Negativity in Christian Mysticism (Cambridge University Press, 1998), 
118; Sergius Bulgakov, The Bride of the Lamb, trans. Boris Jakim (Edinburgh: T & T Clark, 2002), 26; W. Norris 
Clarke, The Creative Retrieval of Saint Thomas Aquinas: Essays in Thomistic Philosophy, New and Old (New York: Fordham 
University Press, 2009), 78; Tina Beattie, Theology after Postmodernity: Divining the Void—a Lacanian Reading of Thomas 
Aquinas. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), 341. 
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proceeds to state that only the blessed in heaven see everything in the divine ideas (in rationibus 
aeternis) while in this life the divine ideas function only as principles of knowledge.41 It appears 
that the closest Thomas comes to saying that human beings in this life have knowledge of the 
divine ideas directly is in ST 2a2ae.8.3 ad.3, where he considers the Holy Spirit’s gift of 
understanding, which elevates the human intellect beyond the reach of natural reasoning.  
Because God’s self-disclosure through scripture reveals that the divine essence remains 
beyond our comprehension in this life (§2.3), Thomas reorders the language and knowledge of 
the divine ideas to correspond to the conditions of faith.42 Since, as stated in article 1 of question 
15, the ideas in the divine mind are nothing other than the divine essence, the divine ideas must 
also remain, in this life, beyond the grasp of the human intellect (ST 1a.14.8 ad.3).43 Thus, he 
arrives at the doctrine of the divine ideas not by way of his formal epistemology, but through the 
correlation between the revelation of God’s creative act and humanity’s reflections on the natural 
order, which mutually affirm that creation has a deeper ontological structure than what the 
human intellect apprehends directly through the senses. That Thomas’s interest in the divine 
ideas derives principally from the doctrine’s ontological function is confirmed, as Wippel, 
Farthing, and Doolan have all said, by his focus on the ideas’ relation to the order of creation 
and their capacity as exemplars.44 It is from his silence, then, that the reader initially discovers the 
movement of faith in the doctrine of the divine ideas. By refusing to venture beyond the reach of 
the human intellect, Thomas directs the reader away from the fabled pursuit of cognitively 
comprehending the ideas, which Bonhoeffer worried was unavoidable, to what the doctrine 
anticipates in the development of sacra doctrina. 
In a remark on the nature of the Summa, te Velde once wrote: “[Thomas] is engaged in 
an ontological depth inquiry into how that very reality must be understood in relation to which 
                                                
41 Paul J. DeHart, Aquinas and Radical Orthodoxy: A Critical Inquiry (London: Routledge, 2012), 132. 
42 It is worth mentioning, at this point, that I generally agree with the position that Thomas upholds the 
doctrine of the divine ideas in conjunction with an Aristotelian understanding of the cognitive act. However, I 
would want to emphasize that he arrives at the position in response to the conditions of faith and not because he is 
first an Aristotelian. See, for instance, Harm Goris, “Theology and Theory of the Word,” 63. It seems that John 
Milbank and Catherine Pickstock's interpretation of Thomas's position on the divine ideas is incomplete when they 
claim that all knowledge is somehow intuitively derived from the ideas (Truth in Aquinas, Radical Orthodoxy 
[London: Routledge, 2001], 9–12, 126 n.103). Also see Paul DeHart's critical analysis of Milbank and Pickstock on 
this point in Aquinas and Radical Orthodoxy, 119–21, 135-7.  
43 Pieper aptly summarizes this same point when he argues, “This relation on which the truth of things is 
fundamentally based—the relation between natural reality and the archetypal creative thought of God—cannot, I 
insist, be known formally by us. We can of course know things; we cannot formally know their truth. We know the 
copy, but not the relation of the copy to the archetype, the correspondence between what has been designed and its 
first design” (“The Negative Element,” 58–9). Cf. Josef Pieper, An Anthology (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 2000), 
98–9; German original, Josef Pieper: Lesebuch (Munich: Kösel-Verlag, 1981). Pieper’s decision to include this section of 
Unaustrinkbares Licht in the anthology of his works he produced near the end of his career reinforces the importance 
he sees in this argument. For more on this point, see §3.2.2 below.  
44 Farthing, “The Problem of Divine Exemplarity,” 214; Wippel, “Thomas Aquinas on the Divine Ideas,” 
150; Doolan, Aquinas on the Divine Ideas, 15. 
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the statements of faith about God have their truth.”45 Te Velde’s comment is helpful for a 
number of reasons, not least of which is that it pinpoints at the heart of the Summa’s theological 
motivations the very relation that emerges in the doctrine of the divine ideas. If we take a 
moment to recall that Thomas concludes in his discussion on the articles of faith with a note that 
all of them could be reduced to the two principle articles of God’s existence and his providence 
(§2.1.3), then the theological intentions behind his doctrine of the divine ideas will move into 
focus more easily, especially in light of te Velde’s remark. In the summary of ST 1a.15.2 above, 
the plurality of the divine ideas secured that God’s providential order in creation extended to the 
distinctions between all creatures, and, as we have now been reminded, divine providence is a 
fundamental statement of faith; thus, following the logic of te Velde’s claim, it would seem 
appropriate to say that the divine ideas belong to the reality in which the statements of faith have 
their truth.46 
Furthermore, because some may still doubt that this connection to divine providence 
substantiates the theological character of Thomas’s discussion on the divine ideas, let us consider 
what he says in ST 2a2ae.1.8 ad.1. There he writes, “By faith we hold to many truths about God 
that philosophers could not fathom, for example the truths about his providence, omnipotence 
and sole right to adoration. All such points are included in this article, ‘I believe in one God.’”47 
Here he not only identifies divine providence as a distinctly theological doctrine, but he also 
limits it to the purview of theology; thus, Thomas’s appropriation of the divine ideas to support 
the revelation of God’s providential ordering of creation confirms the theological validity of the 
divine ideas. Question 15, however, does not provide a detailed exposition of divine providence. 
The discussion on the divine ideas therefore provides preliminary insight into the conditions 
necessary for understanding the doctrine of divine providence, and so Thomas concludes his 
discussion on the divine ideas by directing his reader’s attention to divine providence in 
anticipation of what will be developed.    
Thomas’s reference to divine providence in the final sentence effectively brings the 
isomorphic pattern of faith seeking understanding (§2.1.1) in question 15 to a close. The 
movement from the simple affirmation that the divine ideas must exist to the elaboration on 
their contribution to understanding the reality in which the articles of faith are true is brought to 
a close by returning the reader to the position of faith in anticipation of the discussion on divine 
providence. By approaching the divine ideas through the conditions of faith, Thomas is able to 
                                                
45 Te Velde, Aquinas on God, 2. 
46 Cf. Boland, Ideas in God, 262–4. 
47 “Quod multa per fidem tenemus de Deo quae naturali ratione investigare philosophi non potuerunt, 
puta circa providentiam ejus et omnipotentiam, et quod ipse solus sit colendus. Quae omnia continentur sub articulo 
unitatis Dei.” Cf. Sent. IV, d.1, q.1, a.3 ad.4; Compend. Theol. 2.246. 
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validate the philosophically conceived language of the doctrine in theological discourse; however, 
through its contact with the principles of faith, the doctrine is reordered in the light of God’s 
revelation that he is the Creator who providentially sustains (qui conservat) and governs (qui 
gubernat) his creation. Thus, he advances through the language of the divine ideas a theological 
grammar for the deep ontological structure of creation, which he locates in the very essence of 
God. In discussions on creation’s actual existence, this grammar enables Thomas to distinguish 
logically between talk about creation’s structure and talk about the divine creative essence per se, 
which he will utilize to address creation’s, and in particular humanity’s, orientation to its origin 
and end. Question 15 still only provides the groundwork for this grammar, which awaits 
elaboration and application as the logical gestures of the doctrine are, time and again, revisited 
throughout the Summa, but Thoma’s execution of this doctrinal development can be difficult to 
follow as the divine ideas move into the peripheral space of his unfolding theological vision. 
Fortunately, Josef Pieper supplies us with some hermeneutical guidelines that uncover, first, why 
the subtle gestures of Thomas’s doctrine of the divine ideas can be easily overlooked, and, 
second, where those gestures might reside in Thomas’s argumentation.  
 
3.2 Revisiting Josef Pieper’s Hidden Key 
 There are perhaps few scholars that have faithfully cited a single notion more than David 
Burrell has Pieper’s penetrating argument that creation is the “hidden element in the philosophy 
of St. Thomas.”48 According to Burrell, what Pieper achieves in this observation is a blurring of 
                                                
48 Pieper, “The Negative Element,” 47–67. Burrell finds ways to quote this exact statement in studies 
ranging from ethics to interfaith dialogues. For examples of Burrell’s application of Pieper’s argument, see Knowing 
the Unknowable God: Ibn-Sina, Maimonides, Aquinas (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1986), 34; Freedom 
and Creation, 11; “God’s Knowledge of Future Contingents: A Reply to William Lane Craig,” The Thomist 58 (1994): 
2; “Reflections on ‘Negative Theology’ in the Light of a Recent Venture to Speak of “God Without Being,” in 
Postmodernism and Christian Philosoophy, ed. R. T. Ciapolo (Washington: Catholic University Press of America, 1997), 
60; Faith and Freedom, 116 and 177; “Religious Life and Understanding: Grammar Exercised in Practice,” in Grammar 
and Grace: Reformulation in Aquinas and Wittgenstein, ed. Jeffrey Stout and Robert MacSwain (London: SCM Press, 
2004), 132; “The Act of Creation with Its Theological Consequences,” in Creation and the God of Abraham 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 49; “Creation in Super Evangelium S. Joannis Lectura,” in Reading John 
with St. Thomas Aquinas: Theological Exegesis and Speculative Theology, ed. Michael Dauphinais and Matthew Levering 
(Washington: The Catholic University of America Press, 2010), 118–9; “Creatio Ex Nihilo Recovered,” Modern 
Theology 29 (2013): 1, 3, and 15; “In Search of a Universal Ethics: A New Look at the Natural Law by the International 
Theological Commission,” in Searching for a Universal Ethic: Multidisciplinary, Ecumenical, and Interfaith Responses to the 
Catholic Natural Law Traditions, ed. John Berkman and William C. Mattison III (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans Publishing, 
2014), 191 and 194. Otto Pesch also adopts and develops Pieper’s argument in Thomas von Aquin: Grenze und Größe 
mittelalterlicher Theologie (Mainz: Verlag, 1988). Cf. Otto-Hermann Pesch, “Thomas Aquinas and Contemporary 
Theology,” in Contemplating Aquinas: On the Varieties of Interpretation, ed. Fergus Kerr, O.P. (London: SCM Press, 
2003), 185–216. For others that positively cite Pieper’s claim, see Carlo Leget, Living with God: Thomas Aquinas on the 
Relation between Life on Earth and “Life” after Death (Louvain: Peeters, 1997), 31; Christopher Stephen Lutz, Tradition in 
the Ethics of Alasdair MacIntyre: Relativism, Thomism, and Philosophy (Lexington Books, 2004), 138; Velde, Aquinas on God, 
142 n.1; Guy Masini, O.S.B. et al., “‘Without Me You Can Do Nothing’: St. Thomas with and without St. Augustine 
on John 15:5,” in Aquinas the Augustinian (Washington: Catholic University Press of America, 2007), 170; John 
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the boundary between theology and philosophy that was imposed by modernity.49 What regularly 
goes unstated in these references, however, is that as Pieper defends his claim that, “[T]here is a 
fundamental idea by which almost all the basic concepts of [Thomas’s] vision of the world are 
determined: the ideas of creation, or more precisely, the notion that nothing exists which is not 
creatura, except the Creator Himself,” he has a great deal to say about the nature of Thomas’s 
doctrine of the divine ideas and its peripheral role in his work. Thus, before proceeding to our 
discussions on some of the more subtle applications of the doctrine in the Summa, it will be 
profitable to examine Pieper’s hermeneutical recommendations on how to approach Thomas in 
light of our assessment on the formal treatment of the divine ideas in ST 1a.15. Taking the time 
here to consider Pieper’s argument will help us flesh out the peripheral centrality of Thomas’s 
doctrine of the divine ideas addressed elsewhere in this study (§1.3). It will also give us the 
opportunity to reflect on the creational orientation of Thomas’s theological vision, which will 
serve as the beginnings of an intellectual therapy for Thomas’s understanding of the divine ideas.  
 
3.2.1 A Discussion on Pieper’s Hermeneutical Precepts 
 Citing Martin Heidegger’s argument that, “the doctrine of a thinker is precisely ‘das im 
Sagen Ungesagte’ (the unexpressed in what is expressed),” Pieper begins his assessment of 
Thomas’s work by situating his reflections under the notion “that an interpretation which does 
not reach the unspoken assumptions underlying the actual text must remain, in essence, a 
misinterpretation, even if in other respects the letter of the text be commented upon with 
considerable learning; this latter fact may, indeed, make matters worse.”50 What Pieper is 
articulating here is that readings of Thomas, or any author for that matter, that fail to search for 
the assumptions that sit at the edges of his arguments and expositions are hindered by their own 
interpretive presuppositions, and, more disastrously, they can easily distort Thomas’s thought 
because they have overlooked the boundaries and parameters established by these unspoken 
assumptions. In response to the interpretive quagmire this creates, Pieper asks, “Is there a way to 
                                                                                                                                                  
D’arcy May, “Faith, Ethics, and Communication: Some Recent Writing in Philosophical Theology,” Journal of 
Religious History 31 (2007): 458. 
49 David B. Burrell, C.S.C., Deconstructing Theodicy: Why Job Has Nothing to Say to the Puzzle of Suffering (Brazos 
Press, 2008), 111. For superb introductions to Pieper’s polymath work, see the essays in Bernard N. Schumacher, 
ed., A Cosmopolitan Hermit Modernity and Tradition in the Philosophy of Josef Pieper (Washington: Catholic University of 
America Press, 2009). I most heartily agree with Denys Turner’s remark that “Pieper’s The Silence of St. Thomas . . . 
did for me what Hume did for Kant, in that it ‘awoke me from my dogmatic slumber’ and disclosed for me a living 
mind hidden behind versions of Thomas’s thought that amounted to but dead dogma”(Thomas Aquinas: A Portrait 
[New Haven: Yale University Press, 2013], 288). 
50 Pieper, “The Negative Element,” 46. The quotation comes from Martin Heidegger’s Platons Lehre von Der 
Wahrheit (Berne, 1947), 5.  
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get on to the track of such underlying and therefore unformulated assumptions?” to which he 
answers:  
I think there exist several such deciphering keys. One, which I have frequently 
verified, is certainly this. It occasionally happens that what is unexpressed 
shows itself, as though through a “hole”, through a “gap” in the pattern, in a 
certain “jump” in the development of the thought, a kind of inconsequence in 
the argument. (This at least is how it appears to us, who interpret and start out 
with other assumptions which are just as implicit and perhaps never once 
explicitly formulated.) What matters is that, whenever one of these seeming 
illogicalities is encountered, we avoid passing over it carelessly.51 
The point that Pieper is making here is not that Thomas remains entirely silent about creation, 
which would be a baseless claim since he devotes a great deal of space to this topic throughout 
his corpus, but that even where it is not explicitly acknowledged, Thomas’s commitment to the 
idea that reality only exists, or is true, because it is “creatively thought by God” permeates 
everything he writes.52 
At this point in the work, Pieper entices his readers to ask about what examples there are 
of this “jump” or “unevenness” in Thomas’s reasoning that might allow us a glimpse of this 
unspoken means of development. To answer this question, Pieper subsequently turns to 
Thomas’s discussion on the truth of natural things in article two of De veritate 1; yet, before 
considering the example he provides, let us get a general sense of Pieper’s approach to this article 
because it reveals a great deal about what, in his judgment, lies at the heart of Thomas’s doctrine 
of creation. Much has been written about the first question of De veritate since there Thomas 
provides his most well-known description of the transcendentals as well as an elaborate 
discussion on the various definitions given to truth, including his preferred formulation as the 
“adequation of thing and mind” (adaequatio rei et intellectus).53 Pieper is, however, particularly 
interested in Thomas’s claim, in the second article, that, “A natural thing being placed between 
                                                
51 Pieper, “The Negative Element,” 46. 
52 Pieper, “The Negative Element,” 55. Cf. Josef Pieper, Faith, Hope, Love, trans. Richard Winston, Clara 
Winston, and Mary Frances McCarthy, S.N.D. (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 1997), 176–86; Josef Pieper, “A Plea 
for Philosophy,” in For the Love of Wisdom: Essays on the Nature of Philosophy, ed. Berthold Wald, trans. Roger 
Wasserman (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 2006), 125.  
53 On the historical context, conceptual innovation, and the structure of Thomas’s argument in De ver. 1, 
see Jan A. Aertsen, Medieval Reflections on Truth: “Adaequatio rei et intellectus” (Amsterdam: VU Boekhandel, 1984); Jan 
A. Aertsen, Medieval Philosophy and the Transcendentals: The Case of Thomas Aquinas (Leiden: Brill, 1996), 243–89; Jan A. 
Aertsen, Medieval Philosophy as Transcendental Thought: From Philip the Chancellor (ca. 1225) to Francisco Suárez (Leiden: Brill, 
2012), 211–27. Harm Goris discusses some of the apparent irregularities in Thomas’s discussion on truth in De ver. 
In Free Creatures of an Eternal God: Thomas Aquinas on God’s Infallible Foreknowledge and Irresistible Will (Leuven: Peeters 
Publishers, 1996), 160–2. It is also notable that while Thomas attributes the definition of truth as adaequatio rei et 
intellectus to Isaac Israel, which he does again in ST 1a.16.2 obj.2, no one has, it seems, been able to locate the actual 
source. See, Joseph T. Muckle, “Isaac Istaeli’s Definition of Truth,” Archives D’histoire Doctrinale et Litteraire Du Moyen 
Age 8 (1933): 5–8; John F. Wippel, Metaphysical Themes in Thomas Aquinas II (Washington: Catholic University Press 
of America, 2007), 79 n.35. 
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two intellects [the divine and the human minds] is called true in so far as it conforms to either.”54 
Elsewhere, he insists that this “dryly conceptual proposition” resonates with the same meaning 
expressed in Augustine’s “hymnlike exhortation,” “We see these things you have made, because 
they exist, but for you it is different: they exist because you see them.”55 The conceptual 
congruity that Pieper proposes between Augustine and Thomas at this point prepares us for the 
direction he will take in his interpretation of Thomas, which is further indicated in his remark on 
the passage from Augustine that, “We are not simply declaring here, strictly speaking, that God 
has created everything out of nothing. Rather, we intend to say, using an image from ancient 
Egyptian ontology, that everything has sprung from God’s eye. And this means that the 
primordial forms of all things reside in the creative mind of God.”56 Thus, it is clear that Pieper’s 
declaration about the hermeneutical permeation of creation in Thomas’s philosophy does not 
simply refer to creatio ex nihilo in general, but that, more specifically, it concerns how the 
createdness of the world is rooted in the “creative knowledge of God,” and, for the purposes of 
this study, it is also evident that the grammar of the divine ideas is, for Pieper, a suitable 
expression for the ontological structure of the world’s createdness.57 
Consequently, we should not be surprised when Pieper concludes, in his reflections on 
De ver. 1.2, that, “In this ‘localization’ of existing things between the absolutely creative 
knowledge of God and the non-creative, reality-conformed knowledge of man is found the 
                                                
54 De ver. 1.2: “Res ergo naturalis inter duos intellectus [intellectus divinus et intellectus humanus] constituta, 
secundum adaequationem ad utrumque vera dicitur.” See Pieper, “The Negative Element,” 53–4. While Thomas 
does not reproduce this notion verbatim in the Summa, its substance is maintained in ST 1a.16.1 and 2. For a 
description of Thomas’s argument in De ver. 1.2, see Jan A. Aertsen, “Truth in the Middle Ages: Its Essence and 
Power in Christian Thought,” in Truth: Studies of a Robust Presence, ed. Kurt Pritzl, O.P. (Washington: Catholic 
University Press of America, 2010), 138–40. 
55 Josef Pieper, “What Is Interpretation?,” in For the Love of Wisdom: Essays on the Nature of Philosophy, ed. 
Berthold Wald, trans. Roger Wasserman (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 2006), 217; translated from the German, 
Schriften zum Philosophiebegriff, ed. Berthold Wald (Hambrug: Meiner, 1995). Augustine, Conf. XIII, 38: “. . . nos ista 
quae fecisti uidemus, quia sunt, tu autem quia uides ea, sunt.” Cf. Pieper, “The Negative Element,” 61; John J. 
Navone, Toward a Theology of Beauty (Collegeville: Liturgical Press, 1996), 2–3.  
56 Josef Pieper, “The Truth of All Things,” in Living the Truth, trans. Lothar Krauth (San Francisco: Ignatius 
Press, 1989), 44; German original, Wahrheit Der Dinge (Munich: Kösel-Verlag, 1966). Cf. Pieper, “The Negative 
Element,” 55. Thomas provides a comparable argument in ST 1a.105.3, where he says, “Similiter cum ipse sit 
primum ens et omnia entia praeexistant in ipso sicut in prima causa, oportet quod sint in eo intelligibiliter secundum 
modum ejus. Sicut enim omnes rationes rerum intelligibiles primo existrunt in Deo et ab eo derivantur in alios 
intellectus ut actu intelligant, sic etiam derivantur in creaturas ut subsistant.” Christina Van Dyke argues that Robert 
Grosseteste develops, quite independent of Thomas, a similar epistemological framework for the divine ideas. See 
“The Truth, the Whole Truth, and Nothing but the Truth: Robert Grosseteste on Universals (and the Posterior 
Analytics),” Journal of the History of Philosophy 48 (2010): 153–70. Pieper’s emphasis here on the conformity of truth 
both to the divine and to the human mind also has significant implications for the dichotomy cast between the 
divine or the natural origin of necessary truths in a great deal of secondary literature on the question of the grounds 
for propositional knowledge, but that is a subject for another study. For an example of this dichotomy as well as an 
introduction to the relevant literature on this question, see Gloria Ruth Frost, “Thomas Aquinas on Necessary 
Truths about Contingent Beings” (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Notre Dame, 2009), 145–56.    
57 Pieper, “The Negative Element,” 55; Josef Pieper, “The Timeliness of Thomism,” in The Silence of St. 
Thomas: Three Essays, trans. John Murray, S.J. and Daniel O’Connor, 3rd Revised ed. (South Bend: St. Augustine’s 
Press, 1999), 96. 
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structure of all reality as a system in which the archetypes and the copies are both embraced.”58 
Although Thomas does not utilize the formal grammar of the divine ideas in De ver. 1.2, Pieper’s 
interpretive move is not contextually unwarranted. Prior to his duos intellectus proposition, 
Thomas asserts, “[T]hings are themselves measured by the divine intellect, in which are all 
created things – just as all works of art find their origin in the intellect of an artist.”59 Here 
Thomas alludes to the principle claim of the doctrine of the divine ideas identified in ST 1a.15 
(§3.1.1), and his application of the artisan analogy solidifies this connection.60 It may also be said 
that Thomas’s reference to chapter thirty-one of Augustine’s De vera religione in De ver. 1.2 justifies 
the conclusion that the divine ideas are at least present in the landscape of Thomas’s argument 
since there Augustine states, “Nor can there be any hesitation in identifying the unchanging 
nature which is above the rational soul with God and in asserting that primary life and primary 
being are one with primary Wisdom. This, you see, is that unchanging Truth which is rightly said 
to be the law of all arts and crafts, itself the art of the almighty craftsman.”61 Despite the absence 
of direct reference to the divine ideas, Pieper’s hermeneutical turn to the divine ideas in De ver. 
1.2 is not out of context, since we have just identified ways to see the doctrine working in the 
background of Thomas’s thought on the truth of natural things, but for an explanation of why 
the divine ideas do not surface here, let us now examine the example Pieper gives from De ver. 
1.2 of the rift in Thomas’s reasoning. 
 
3.2.2 Filling the Void: Situating Thomas’s Doctrine of the Divine Ideas  
On the adequation of a natural thing to the divine mind, Thomas argues, “A natural 
thing . . . is said to be true with respect to its conformity with the divine intellect in so far as it 
                                                
58 Pieper, “The Negative Element,” 54. 
59 De ver. 1.2: “Sunt mensuratae ab intellectu divino, in quo sunt omnia sicut omnia artificiata in intellectu 
artificis.” 
60 In the succession of questions in De veritate, we can also see how the propositions from q.1 a.2 anticipate 
Thomas’s statement on the doctrine of divine ideas in De ver. 3.1 s.c. 7 that, “Omnes creaturae sunt in mente divina, 
sicut arca in mente artificis. Sed arca in mente artificis est per suam similitudinem et ideam. Ergo omnium rerum 
ideae sunt in Deo.” For further discussion on the relevance of the language of “measure” in Thomas’s doctrine of 
the divine ideas, see §5.2.1 and §5.3. 
61 Augustine, De ver. rel. 31: “Nec iam illud ambigendum est incommutabilem naturam, quae supra 
rationalem animam sit, deum esse et ibi esse primam vitam et primam essentiam, ubi est prima sapientia. Nam haec 
est illa incommutabilis veritas, quae lex omnium artium recte dicitur et ars omnipotentis artificis.” Whether 
Augustine had the doctrine of the divine ideas in mind while he composed this section of his work is a question for 
another time, but we can establish why Thomas would have likely seen the doctrine in this statement on the eternal 
law since in ST 1a2ae.93.1 he argues: “Unde sicut ratio divinae sapientiae inquantum per eam cuncta sunt creata, 
rationem habet artis vel exemplaris vel ideae; ita ratio divinae sapientiae moventis omnia ad debitum finem, obtinet 
rationem legis. Et secundum hoc, lex aeterna nihil aliud est quam ratio divinae sapientiae.” Cf. De ver. 14.2 The 
relation between divine wisdom and the divine ideas is discussed further in §4.2 and §4.3, and the connection to the 
eternal law is addressed in §5.3. 
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fulfills the end to which it was ordained by the divine intellect.”62 In other words, as Pieper states, 
“[A]n existing thing is true to the extent that it reproduces the pattern of divine knowledge.”63 
Pieper notes that Thomas reinforces this claim with Avicenna’s definition of truth, in which it is 
said, “The truth of every individual thing is the property of being which has been established for 
it.”64 Yet, according to Pieper, there is nothing in Avicenna’s definition that would cause “us to 
notice any connection between the two statements,” or, to be more specific, it is not clear how 
Avicenna’s remark substantiates Thomas’s insistence “that the truth of things consists in their 
being creatively thought by God.”65 To formulate this “rift in the texture” of Thomas’s argument 
another way: why does Thomas think that Avicenna’s definition ratifies his argument in De ver. 
1.2 or in, for instance, ST 1a.16.1, where he again cites this definition along side the same 
sections of Augustine’s De vera religione to support his conclusion that, “[E]verything is said to be 
true in the absolute sense because of its relation to a mind on which it depends. Thus man-made 
things are called true in relation to our mind; a house, for instance, is ‘true’ if it turns out like the 
plan in the architect’s mind . . . Similarly natural things are called true when they bear a likeness 
to the types in the divine mind”?66 Pieper replies that, “This evident ‘gap’ in his line of argument 
can only mean that St. Thomas was unable to separate the idea that things have an essence – a 
‘what’ – from the other idea that this essence of things is the fruit of a designing and creative 
knowledge,”67 or, to put this another way, the fruit of “the createdness of things, i.e., the truth 
that the designs, the archetypal patterns of things, dwell within the Divine Logos.”68  
For Pieper, the doctrine of the divine ideas, then, belongs to the unspoken horizon of 
the world’s createdness, which, as already noted, permeates Thomas’s entire corpus, and it 
accordingly fills the void of certain rifts in Thomas’s discussions on the distinction between God 
and the world. If we also, momentarily, return to the question of God’s incomprehensibility 
                                                
62 De Ver. 2.1: “Res naturalis . . . adaequationem ad intellectum divinum dicitur vera, in quantum implet 
hoc ad quod est ordinata per intellectum divinum.” 
63 Pieper, “The Negative Element,” 62. 
64 De Ver. 2.1: “Veritas cuiusque rei est proprietas sui esse quod stabilitum est ei.” Thomas also cites this 
definition in De Ver. 1.1; SCG Bk. 1, ch.60; ST 1a.16.1. For Avicenna’s argument, see the critical edition of his Liber 
de Philosophia Prima Sive Scientia Divina VIII, c.6, ed. S. Van Riet, vol. 2 (Louvain: Peters, 1980), 413. On Thomas’s use 
of Avicenna, see Wippel, Metaphysical Themes II, 31–64 and 79. For Avicenna’s general influence on Medieval thought, 
see A.-M. Goichon, La Philosophie d’Avicenne et Son Influence En Europe Médiévale (Paris: Adrienne-Maisonneuve, 1944). 
Avicenna’s argument in this section of his work is discussed by Hoenen in Marsilius of Inghen, 66–70. 
65 Pieper, “The Negative Element,” 62. 
66 “Unaquaeque res dicitur vera absolute, secundum ordinem ad intellectum a quo dependet. Et inde est 
quod res artificiales dicuntur verae per ordinem ad intellectum nostrum, dicitur enim domus vera, quae assequitur 
similitudinem formae quae est in mente artificis . . . Et similiter res naturales dicuntur esse verae, secundum quod 
assequuntur similitudinem specierum quae sunt in mente divina.” 
67 Pieper, “The Negative Element,” 62–3.  
68 Pieper, “Timeliness of Thomism,” 96. For more on Thomas’s arguments that the divine ideas dwell in 
the Word of God referenced here, see §4.3 and §4.4. James Stone also argues that Thomas’s reference to Avicenna 
in De Ver. 1.2 directs the reader to the doctrine of the divine ideas; however, he appears to be unaware of Pieper’s 
reflections on this passage. See “The Foundation of Universal and Necessary Propositions in Select Writings of St 
Thomas Aquinas” (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Fordham University, 2008), 253.  
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(§2.3.1), we may yet be able to catch a glimpse, in Pieper’s thoughts on Thomas’s silence, of 
another way in which the divine ideas silently sit in the space that distinguishes God and world. 
Following his discussion on the jump of reasoning in De ver. 1.2, Pieper considers 
Thomas’s emphatically apophatic statements about humanity’s noetic limitations, such as, “This 
is the highest point in human knowledge of God: to know that we do not know God.”69 In his 
discussion on what he calls the “negative element” of Thomas’s thought, Pieper is particularly 
interested in Thomas’s remark from De ver. 5.2, where he says that the human intellect fails to 
arrive at a perfect knowledge of God in this life “on account of the weakness of our intellect, 
which cannot assimilate all the evidence of God that is to be found in creatures.”70 While Pieper 
does not identify a jump in Thomas’s reasoning here, he, nevertheless, concludes that, according 
to Thomas, the reason the human intellect cannot fully comprehend God’s self-disclosure 
through creation is because, “[T]he ultimate reality of things is something to which we can never 
finally penetrate, because we can never fully grasp these likenesses of the Divine Ideas precisely 
as likeness.”71 Since the divine essence, then, remains ultimately veiled behind the mystery of the 
impenetrable relation between a copy and its exemplar, it could be said that God is intelligible in 
this life for precisely the same reason that he is incomprehensible – the human mind’s ability to 
know, yet not comprehend the truth, of material things.72 Thus, for Pieper, the question of 
God’s incomprehensibility cannot be adequately answered “without formally bringing into play 
the concept of creation, i.e., the structure of things precisely as creatures. In other words, things 
in so far as they are creatively thought by God possess these two properties: on the one hand 
their ontological clarity and self-revelation and, on the other hand, their inexhaustibleness; their 
                                                
69 De pot. 7.5 ad.14: “Hoc illud est ultimum cognitionis humanae de Deo quod sciat se Deum nescire.” Cf. 
§2.1.1 n.15. 
70 De ver. 5.2 ad.11: “. . . propter imbecillitatem intellectus nostri, qui nec totum hoc de Deo potest ex 
creaturis accipere quod creaturae manifestant de Deo.” Thomas offers a similar argument in ST 1a.1.5 ad.1 and 2, 
which we have already discussed (§2.3.3). Cf. Rocca, Speaking the Incomprehensible God, 41–7. 
71 Pieper, “The Negative Element,” 66–7. Thomas makes this point in ST 1a.84.5, where he says, “Tamen 
praeter lumen intellectuale in nobis, exiguntur species intelligibiles a rebus acceptae, ad scientiam de rebus 
materialibus habendam; ideo non per solam participationem rationum aeternarum de rebus materialibus notitiam 
habemus, sicut Platonici posuerunt quod sola idearum participatio sufficit ad scientiam habendam.” On this point, 
Levering remarks, “Aquinas wants to insist that the divine ideas (as God’s knowledge) have priority, since our 
intellectual light is ‘participated likeness of the uncreated light.’ However, he also wants to say that in the act of 
knowing, we do not directly know the eternal ideas. Instead, we gain knowledge by abstracting form particular 
material things” (Paul in the Summa Theologiae [Washington: The Catholic University of America Press, 2014], 226). 
Despite the lack of direct reference to the divine ideas in De ver. 5.2, the doctrine is again hinted at by the context of 
the discussion. First, this question addresses divine providence, and, as noted above (§3.1.2), the divine ideas and 
providence are intimately related to one another in the Summa as well as in De ver. 3. Second, in the body of 
Thomas’s response, he relates God’s providential activity to an archer who determines the motion of an arrow to its 
end, which recalls the same analogy he gives in De ver. 3.1 to explain the character of the divine ideas. Cf. Wippel, 
Metaphysical Thought, 412. 
72 Pieper, “The Negative Element,” 58–9.  
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knowability as well as their ‘unknowability,’”73 and, as he says later, “the common root” in this 
epistemological dialectic is the reality that the archetypal patterns for creation dwell in the mind 
of God.74 
In these two examples from De veritate, Pieper has argued that Thomas uses the doctrine 
of the divine ideas to give a voice to the incomprehensibility of the creational relation revealed in 
the distinction between God and the world. Although the voice may be hidden in rifts and hints 
that are latent in various arguments and propositions, it is, nonetheless, present in these places, 
where Thomas contemplates the truth and incomprehensibility of God and the world. Pieper 
therefore situates Thomas’s doctrine of the divine ideas in the dialectical harmony between 
theology and philosophy, which Edith Stein saliently describes as the only way “reality can be 
made intelligible in its ultimate reasons and causes.”75 To better understand how Thomas’s 
doctrine of the divine ideas contributes to this dialectical harmony in upholding the ontological 
asymmetry between God and the world, let us look more closely at Thomas’s use of the divine 
ideas in his exposition on creation’s twofold sense of truer existence. 
 
3.3 Divine Difference in Creational Imitation 
 At the beginning of this chapter, we noted the discomfort many have with divine ideas 
for reasons acutely registered in Adolf Harnack’s criticism of Thomas that, “[T]here are still to 
be found in him traces of the idea that creation is the actualizing of the divine ideas, that is, their 
passing into the creaturely form of subsistence,” and, he continues, “in this way the pantheistic 
acosmism is certainly not quite banished, while in the thesis of Thomas, that God necessarily 
conceived from eternity the idea of the world . . . the pancosmistic concept of God is not 
definitely excluded.”76 That this type of reading has deeply affected the interpretation of 
                                                
73 Pieper, “The Negative Element,” 69. Pieper continues: “Unless we go back to this basic position, we 
cannot, I submit, show how the ‘negative element’ in the thought of St. Thomas is safeguarded from agnosticism. 
Anyone who endeavors to pass this by runs the inevitable danger of interpreting St. Thomas as a Rationalist, and 
therefore of misunderstanding him ever more, as is illustrated by the example of some Neo-Scholastic authors who 
tried to reduce his teaching to a system.” 
74 Pieper, “Timeliness of Thomism,” 95–6. Jordan makes a similar point, when he notes, “In so far as the 
divine essence is known to itself in a manner which is in principle inaccessible to unaided human knowing, the 
divine Ideas explain intelligibility only to remove it from human power . . . The intelligibility is surely there, but not 
for human minds as naturally active” (“The Intelligibility of the World,” 29–30). 
75 Edith Stein, Finite and Eternal Being: An Attempt at an Ascent to the Meaning of Being, trans. Kurt F. Reinhardt 
(Washington: ICS Publications, 2002), 23; German original, Endliches und Ewiges Sein: Versuch eines Aufstiegs zum Sinn 
des Seins (Freiburg: Herder, 1950). 
76 Adolf Harnack, History of Dogma, trans. William M’Gilchrist, vol. 6 (London: Williams and Nogent, 1899), 
184–5. Translated from the third edition of Lehrbuch der Dogmengeschichte, 3 vols. (Freiburg-Leipzig: J. C. B. Mohr, 
1894-1898). See Bulgakov’s remarkably similar remarks in The Bride of the Lamb, 21–2. James Ross also criticizes the 
divine ideas along similar lines in “God, Creator of Kinds and Possibilities: Requiescant universalia ante res,” in 
Rationality, Religious Belief and Moral Commitment, ed. Robert Audi and William J. Wainwright (Ithaca and London: 
Cornell University Press, 1986), 316–9. Cf. Fergus Kerr, O.P., After Aquinas: Versions of Thomism (Oxford: Wiley-
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Thomas’s doctrine of the divine ideas is incontrovertible since the majority of studies dealing 
with his work on the divine ideas find it necessary to include an explanation of how he avoids 
such a pitfall in his doctrine of creation.77 With the persistence of this question about the 
theological consistency of divine ideas in mind, this section now examines how Thomas 
integrates the grammar of the divine ideas into his theological formulation of creation’s 
ontological dependence on God to clarify and uphold the divine difference not only in the 
world’s creational formation but also in its eschatological fulfillment. 
 
3.3.1 Creation’s Twofold Sense of Truer Existence 
 Perhaps the subject where Thomas most decidedly relates the grammar of the divine 
ideas to the question of the distinction between God and the world is that of creation’s twofold 
sense of existence.78 In ST 1a.18.4 ad.3, for example, Thomas responds to the objection that 
things without life in this world must have a truer existence in the mind of God than they do in 
their own natures since in the divine mind, they exist in God as life.79 The entire article is 
essentially an exegetical response to John 1.3-4, which is introduced in the sed contra of ST 1a.18.4, 
where it is said, “We have the words: That which was made, in him was life. But everything except 
God was made. Therefore in God all things are life.”80 Thomas opens his reply in ad.3 with the 
                                                                                                                                                  
Blackwell, 2002), 156; Katy Leamy, The Holy Trinity: Hans Urs Von Balthasar and His Sources (Eugene: Wipf and Stock 
Publishers, 2015), 23–5. 
77 See, for instance, the responses to this question in Vincent P. Branick, “The Unity of the Divine Ideas,” 
The New Scholasticism 42 (1968): 178; Gianni Baget-Bozzo, “La Teologia Delle Idee Divine in San Tommaso,” Rivista 
Di Filosofia Neo Scolastica 66 (1974): 310–1; Geiger, “Les Idées Divines,” 194–5; Clarke, “The Problem of Reality and 
Multiplicity,” 121–5; Mark D. Jordan, “The Intelligibility of the World and the Divine Ideas in Aquinas,” The Review 
of Metaphysics 38 (1984): 30–1; John F. Wippel, The Metaphysical Thought of Thomas Aquinas: From Finite Being to Uncreated 
Being (Washington: Catholic University of America Press, 2000), 116–7; Vivian Boland, Ideas in God According to Saint 
Thomas Aquinas: Sources and Synthesis, Studies in the History of Christian Thought 69 (Leiden: Brill, 1996), 272; 
Gregory T. Doolan, Aquinas on the Divine Ideas as Exemplar Causes (Washington: The Catholic University of America 
Press, 2008), 207 and 213; Hughes, “Creatio Ex Nihilo and the Divine Ideas,” 124–5 and 136–7. 
78 It may be worthwhile to reiterate (cf. §1.3) at this point that while we are focused on the role of the 
divine ideas in articulating, as Burrell says, “the distinction between God and the world in such a way as to respect 
the reality appropriate to each” (Knowing the Unknowable God, 17), the doctrine is only one piece of a much larger 
discussion in the Summa that embraces not only the revelation of the distinction in the doctrine of creatio ex nihilo, but 
also the exchange between, what Susannah Ticciati designates, the “articulation” and the “display” of the divine 
difference (A New Apophaticism: Augustine and the Redemption of Signs [Leiden: Brill, 2013], 43), which Thomas had 
begun to formulate prior to ST 1a.18.4 ad.3 in places such as ST 1a.13.7, cited in the introduction to this chapter, or 
ST 1a.8.4 where he argues, “Deus est in omnibus rebus, non quidem sicut pars essentiae, vel sicut accidens, sed sicut 
agens adest ei in quod agit.” On the display of the divine difference in the creational distinction between essence and 
existence, see Burrell, Knowing the Unknowable God, 19–34; and for the articulation, see Denys Turner, Faith, Reason 
and the Existence of God (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 158–62. 
79 Leget provides an overview of context for interpreting ST 1a.18.4 in Living with God, 41–6. 
80 ST 1a.18.4 s.c.: “Dicitur: quod factum est, in ipso vita erat. Sed omnia praeter Deum facta sunt. Ergo 
omnia in Deo sunt vita.” Despite the grammatical difficulties posed by the punctuation of this passage, it was a key 
text in the exchange between biblical exegesis and theological interpretation of the divine ideas in Patristic and 
Medieval hermeneutics. Thomas considers the possible punctuations of John 1.3-4 offered by Augustine, 
Chrysostom, Origen, Hilary of Poitiers, and John Scotus Eriugena in Lect. Ioan. 1, lect. 2. On Thomas’s 
interpretation of this passage, see Boland, Ideas in God, 243–5. It is notable that the punctuation of John 1.3-4 is still 
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observation that Plato’s theory of the Forms would essentially be true if form was the only facet 
in the ratio of natural things; however, as he continues:  
Since matter enters the ratio of natural things, we must say that absolutely 
speaking material things have a truer existence in the divine mind than they 
have in themselves; because in the divine mind they have an uncreated, but in 
themselves a created existence. But qua individual man or horse they have their 
individual existence more truly in themselves than in the divine mind; because 
the truth of man includes matter, which individual material things do not have 
in the divine mind.81 
In this response Thomas utilizes the precepts from the doctrine of the divine ideas to delineate a 
twofold sense of truer existence that distinguishes, without confusion, created and uncreated 
modes of existence. 
Both the transcendence and eminence of the divine life are displayed here with respect to 
the existence of individual things, which are shown to imitate the divine life in composite modes 
of existence that depend upon the uncreated forms or ideas (rationes) in the divine mind. Since 
the truth of natural things resides not in individual things (§3.2), but in, as Thomas had stated 
earlier, “a likeness to the types in the divine mind,”82 his remark in this reply that “the truth of 
man includes matter” (veritas hominis pertinet esse materiale) recalls his statement in ST 1a.15.3, noted 
at the end of §3.1.1, where he argues that God’s idea of matter is not distinct from the divine 
idea of, what he calls elsewhere, the forma totius, that is, as Gaven Kerr describes it, “the 
concretely existing thing as a whole.”83 Accordingly, a particular thing’s created mode of 
                                                                                                                                                  
a matter of debate. See Peter M. Phillips, The Prologue of the Fourth Gospel: A Sequential Reading (London: T & T Clark, 
2006), 164–6. 
81 ST 1a.18.4 ad.3: “Sed quia de ratione rerum naturalium est materia, dicendum quod res naturales verius 
esse habent simpliciter in mente divina, quam in seipsis, quia in mente divina habent esse increatum, in seipsis autem 
esse creatum. Sed esse hoc, utpote homo vel equus, verius habent in propria natura quam in mente divina, quia ad 
veritatem hominis pertinet esse materiale, quod non habent in mente divina.” In De ver. 4.6 Thomas argues along a 
similar distinction. He writes: “Cum ergo quaeritur utrum res verius sint in seipsis quam in verbo, distinguendum . . . 
Si designet veritatem rei, sic proculdubio maior est veritas rerum in verbo quam in seipsis. Si autem designetur 
veritas praedicationis, sic est e converso: verius enim praedicatur homo de re quae est in propria natura, quam de ea 
secundum quod est in verbo.” While in this passage Thomas distinguishes between veritas rei and veritas predicationis, 
in ST 1a.18.4 ad.3 the emphasis is on created and uncreated modes of existence, which Stone correctly identifies as 
the unspoken metaphysical basis for the distinction in De ver. 4.6 (“Foundation of Universal,” 260). Although he 
conflates the arguments in De ver. 4.6 and ST 1a.18.4 ad.3 into a single point, Stone also notes that the distinction 
between the modes of existence in ST 1a.18.4 ad.3 substantiates the distinction between God and the world (pp. 
262-4). Frost, in a similar way, conflates the arguments in De ver. 4.6 and ST 1a.18.4 ad.3, but she overlooks the 
ontological emphasis in ST 1a.18.4 ad.3 in her conclusion that in the Summa, “What Aquinas means in claiming that 
an actually existing creature is more properly a thing of its kind than God’s idea of that creature, is that the term that 
is used to signify creatures of a given kind applies more properly to material creatures of that kind than to the divine 
exemplar for that kind” (“Aquinas on Necessary Truths,” 154). It is notable, and unfortunate, that neither Boland 
nor Doolan substantively address, to my knowledge, ST 1a.18.4 ad.3 or De ver. 4.6 in their monographs on Thomas’s 
doctrine of the divine ideas. For their cursory references to these passages and their context, see Boland, Ideas in God, 
243-6; Doolan, Aquinas on the Divine Ideas, 37. 
82 ST 1a.16.1: “. . . similitudinem specierum quae sunt in mente divina.” 
83 Gaven Kerr, O.P., Aquinas’s Way to God: The Proof in De Ente et Essentia (New York: Oxford University 
Press, USA, 2015), 46. For Thomas’s description of composite being as forma totius, see De ente, c.2, BDT 5.2, and 
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existence depends entirely upon the exemplar form in the divine mind, but it is not ontologically 
equivalent to that form, as Thomas establishes in his reply just prior to ST 1a.18.4 ad.3, where he 
states, “Copies must be in conformity with the exemplar so far as concerns their intelligible form, 
not so far as concerns their mode of existence. Sometimes the form has one kind of existence in 
the exemplar and a different kind in the copy.”84 It cannot be said, then, that the divine ideas are 
the concrete reality of natural things, or, as Norris Clark prodigiously illustrates, “It is true that 
my intelligibility, the intelligible content of the divine idea of me, exists in a higher, more perfect 
way in God than in me; but this is still not my true being, my esse.”85 Instead, the divine ideas are 
the uncreated truth of God’s knowledge of himself as imitable in diverse ways, which is 
communicated in the divine act of creation as the formal cause of similarity according to which 
natural things imitate the divine life in the mode of existence determined by the divine mind.86  
Consequently, a composite being of matter and form is more perfect in its imitation of 
the simple divine essence of God by being embodied rather than in obtaining a form that 
resembles the uncreated existence of the divine ideas.87 Thomas provides a clear testament to 
this point in the Summa’s discussion on disembodied souls, where he says, for the soul “to be 
separated from the body is contrary to its nature . . . Hence, the soul is joined to the body in 
order to be and act in accordance with its nature,”88 to which could be added his argument from 
De potentia that, “The soul is more like God when united to the body than when separated from 
it, because its nature is then more perfect. For a thing is like God insofar as it is perfect, although 
God’s perfection is not of the same kind as a creature’s.”89 Despite entering, through death, a 
                                                                                                                                                  
Sent. Metaph. VII, lect. 9, n.1469. Cf. Armand Maurer, “Form and Essence in the Philosophy of St. Thomas,” 
Mediaeval Studies 13 (1951): 165–76; Wippel, Metaphysical Thought, 328–9; Doolan, Aquinas on the Divine Ideas, 164–5. 
84 ST 1a.18.4 ad.2: “exemplata oportet conformari exemplari secundum rationem formae, non autem 
secundum modum essendi. Nam alterius modi esse habet quandoque forma in exemplari et in exemplato.” Cf. 
David L. Greenstock, “Exemplar Causality and the Supernatural Order,” The Thomist 16 (1953): 16. 
85 Clarke, “The Problem of Reality and Multiplicity,” 123.  
86 Baget-Bozzo describes the doctrine of creation as, “la teologia della comunicazione e della similitudine” 
(“Le Teologia Delle Idee Divine,” 310), which captures the transcendence of God in the act of communication and 
his eminence expressed in the similarity of creation through the imitation of the divine ideas. On this point, also see 
Doolan, Aquinas on the Divine Ideas, 163. 
87 While the situation is certainly different with angels because they are not composite beings of matter and 
form but of actuality and potency (ST 1a.50.2 ad.3), the principle of this argument is still applicable to their unique 
form of existence. See Isabel Iribarren, “Angelic Individuality and the Possibility of a Better World: Durandus of St 
Pourçain’s Criticism of Thomas Aquinas,” in Angels in Medieval Philosophical Inquiry: Their Function and Significance, ed. 
Martin Lenz and Isabel Iribarren (Aldershot: Ashgate Publishing, 2008), 50. 
88 ST 1a.89.1: “. . . esse separatum a corpore est praeter rationem suae naturae . . . [I]deo ad hoc unitur 
corpori, ut sit et operetur secundum naturam suam.” For similar statements, see SCG Bk. 4, c.79; In 1 Cor. 15, lect. 2, 
no.924; Compend. Theol. 1.151; ST 1a.76.1 ad.6. Cf. Richard Heinzmann, “Anima Unica Forma Corporis: Thomas 
von Aquin Als Überwinder Des Platonisch-Neuplatonischen Dualismus,” Philosophisches Jahrbuch Der Görres-
Gesellschaft 93 (1986): 256. 
89 De pot. 5.10 ad.5: “Anima corpori unita plus assimilatur Deo quam a corpore separata, quia perfectius 
habet suam naturam. Intantum enim unumquodque Deo simile est, in quantum perfectum est, licet non sit unius 
modi perfectio Dei et perfectio creaturae.” On this point Peter Geach remarks, “[The] description of the life that 
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formal state of noetic existence closer to, albeit still incomprehensibly distant from, the simple 
divine essence (cf. ST 1a.75.1; 1a.89.2; 1a.93.3), disembodied souls, nevertheless, become less 
perfect imitations of the uncreated exemplar forms in the divine mind and, thereby, of the divine 
essence itself (ST 1a.15.1 ad.3). The outcome, then, of the priority Thomas gives in ST 1a.18.4 
ad.3 to the truer existence of the uncreated ideas in the divine mind is not the dissolution of the 
divine difference in creation’s participatory ascent toward God, but the ontological basis to speak 
of creation’s difference-in-continuity in the act of being (esse) that flows out (fluit) from God and 
terminates in the truer existence of natural things (ST 1a.58.6). Thus, the function of the formal 
distinctions derived from the doctrine of the divine ideas in Thomas’s notion of creation’s 
twofold sense of truer existence reinforces the divine difference by ensuring that the assimilation 
of a natural thing, which creationally proceeds, as all things do, from God, to the divine likeness 
eternally known by God is the actualization of a similarity-in-remoteness, which grounds the act 
of participatory imitation in the forma totius of created existence not only in this world, but also in 
the next, as the following section establishes.90   
 
3.3.2 Aquinas’s Eschatological Exemplarism: Creatura in Deo est creatrix essentia 
 In his commentary on John 1.3-4, where he refers his readers to the discussion in ST 
1a.18.4, Thomas again argues that because God’s understanding and life are the same as his act 
of existence (cf. ST 1a.18.3 ad.2), “whatever is in God is not only living, but is life itself, because 
whatever is in God is his essence.”91 Thomas proceeds to elaborate on the depth of this 
argument by adding the statement, “the creature in God is the creating essence” (creatura in Deo 
                                                                                                                                                  
would be possible for the disembodied soul is meager and unattractive; but why should it be otherwise” (Three 
Philosophers [Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1976], 100). 
90 Fran O’Rourke, Pseudo-Dionysius and the Metaphysics of Aquinas (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame 
Press, 2005), 235. Creation’s similarity-in-remoteness also has important implications for what Pieper calls, “earthly 
contemplation,” which he summarizes in his comments on what he describes as G. K. Chesterton’s “almost mystical 
conviction of the miracle in all that exists, and of the rapture dwelling essentially within all experience,” in which 
Pieper says, “lie three separate assertions: that everything holds and conceals at bottom a mark of its divine origin; 
that one who catches a glimpse of it ‘sees’ that this and all things are ‘good’ beyond all comprehension; and that 
seeing this, he is happy” (Happiness and Contemplation, trans. Richard Winston and Clara Winston [South Bend: St. 
Augustine’s Press, 1998], 88; German original, Glück Und Kontemplation Munich: Kösel-Verlag, 1979]). 
Contemplation of the divine ideas, then, occurs in this life for the one, as Pieper says earlier in this work, “whose 
gaze is directed toward the depths of things,” which is seen in the day-to-day when we behold the world before us 
(p.79). Lawrence Dewan makes a similar point about natural contemplation in his observation, “We find things 
‘interesting,’ not merely because they reveal a mind at work originating them, but because that mind at their origin 
produced them while contemplating himself, i.e, the fullness of being” (“Truth and Happiness,” Proceedings of the 
American Catholic Philosophical Association 67 [1993]: 14). Cf. Matthew Cuddeback, “Josef Pieper on the Truth of All 
Things and the World’s True Face,” in A Cosmopolitan Hermit: Modernity and Tradition in the Philosophy of Josef Pieper, ed. 
Bernard N. Schumacher (Washington: Catholic University Press of America, 2009), 247. 
91 Lect. Ioan. 1, lect. 2, no.91: “Quicquid est in Deo, non solum vivit sed est ipsa vita, quia quicquid est in 
Deo, est sua essentia.” 
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est creatrix essentia).92 Here Thomas delves further into the implications of his claim that the divine 
ideas are identical with God’s infinitely simple being (cf. §4.4), but to grasp the implications of 
this statement for the distinction between God and the world, we should consider his argument 
in ST 1a.18.3, where he concludes that life, defined as the substantial capacity for self-movement 
or operation (ST 1a.18.1), is predicated of God in the truest sense because his being (esse) is his 
knowledge (intelligere), which is, as Thomas states, “most perfect and always in the state of 
actuality.”93 This recourse to the description of God as actus purus, outlined in ST 1a.9.1 to 
establish God’s incomprehensibility by explaining how the sapiential motion of the divine life 
precludes any notion of potentiality or change (ST 1a.9.1 ad.2), grounds Thomas’s translation of 
God’s immanent operation of self-knowledge (§3.1.1) into the means for communicating God’s 
external act of creating since, as Thomas insists, “Creation is not a change,” or movement from 
potentiality to actuality, but the gracious gift of God’s immanent operations expressed in the 
intentional emanation of all things from him.94  
 Thomas’s argument that the archetypal forms in the divine mind are the creatrix essentia, 
therefore, integrates the doctrine of the divine ideas into how he speaks of God intentionally 
turning outward in the act of creation; thereby, identifying the divine ideas with God’s being of 
actus purus, which he confirms in his commentary on John 1.3-4 when he apophatically 
                                                
92 Thomas repeats this claim in Sent. I, d.36, q.1, a.3 ad.1; De ver. 8.16; and De pot. 3.5 ad.2. For more on the 
meaning, sources, and impact of this statement, see Ianuarius di Somma, “De naturali participatione divini luminis in 
mente humana secundum S. Augustinum et S. Thomam,” Gregorianum 7 (1926): 332; Armand Maurer, “St. Thomas 
and Eternal Truths,” Mediaeval Studies 32 (1970): 105 n.50; Baget-Bozzo, “La Teologia Delle Idee Divine in San 
Tommaso,” 308–11; John F. Wippel, “The Reality of Nonexisting Possibles According to Thomas Aquinas, Henry 
of Ghent, and Godfrey of Fontaines,” The Review of Metaphysics 34 (1981): 733–4; Gilles Emery, La trinité créatrice: 
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(Paris: J. Vrin, 1995), 63; Boland, Ideas in God, 206 n.57 and 243; Goris, Free Creatures of an Eternal God, 27 n.53; 
William Riordan, Divine Light: Theology of Denys the Areopagite (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 2008), 126–7; Stone, 
“Foundation of Universal,” 275. 
93 ST 1a.18.3: “. . . perfectissimus, et semper in actu.” Leget lucidly restates the basis for this argument in 
his comments on Thomas’s interpretation of John 17.3 (Lect. Ioan. 17, lect. 1, no.2186), on which he writes, “First 
[Thomas] explains that all activities to which one moves oneself can be called operations of life. The more actual 
and perfect these operations are, the more one speaks of ‘life.’ Because knowing (intelligere) is the highest of these 
operations, the act of knowing can be called ‘life’ in the best sense (operatio intellectus maxime est vita)” (“The Concept 
of ‘Life’ in the Commentary on St. John,” in Reading John with St. Thomas Aquinas: Theological Exegesis and Speculative 
Theology, ed. Michael Dauphinais and Matthew Levering [Washington: Catholic University Press of America, 2005], 
159–60). 
94 ST 1a.45.2 ad.2: “Creatio non est mutatio.” Cf. David B. Burrell, C.S.C., “God’s Eternity,” Faith and 
Philosophy 1 (1984): 389–406; Burrell, “The Act of Creation,” 43–4. Thomas’s use of emanation (emanatio) to describe 
the world’s creational procession from God has resulted in some confusion. Following his reading of Dionysius 
(DDN 4, lect. 1, no.271), Thomas’s use of emanation represents another instance of him theologically appropriating 
a philosophically born idea in which he finds a fitting, as Burrell says, “vehicle for introducing the creator as cause-
of-being” (“Aquinas’s Appropriation of Liber de Causis to Articulate the Creator as Cause-of-Being,” in 
Contemplating Aquinas: On the Varieties of Interpretation, ed. Fergus Kerr, O.P. [London: SCM Press, 2003], 76). 
However, as with the divine ideas, he reorders the doctrine to avoid the errors in the Platonic notion of necessary 
emanation (cf. ST 1a.32.1 ad.3; 1a.104.3). In addition to Burrell’s work, see Milbank and Pickstock’s discussion on 
Thomas’s theological appropriation of emanation in Truth in Aquinas, 45–50. On the question of compatibility 
between Thomas’s theory of emanation and his use of the analogy of artisan, see Velde, Participation and Substantiality, 
102–7. 
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deconstructs the analogy of the artisan.95 Because God’s simple divine being is pure actuality, for 
Thomas, as Burrell notes in his comments on ST 1a.104.1, “[T]here is no difference between 
God’s conserving activity and God’s creating, other than the proviso that creating presumes 
nothing at all to be already present. In other words, all of God’s activity partakes of creating: all 
that God can do is to create.”96 What Burrell pinpoints here is that the various works we 
attribute to God, e.g., creating, governing, and redeeming, are all, in reality, to use Hebert 
McCabe’s illustration, the external projection of God’s simple act of existence.97 Thus, when 
Thomas identifies the divine ideas with God’s creating essence, he allows us to catch a glimpse 
of what it means for creation to imitate the divine likenesses in the mind of God, since the divine 
operations of salvation and sustaining are not different from the work of creation. To put this 
another way, because the diverse activities we attribute to God are a reflection of what is united 
and simple in his immanent operations of knowing and loving (ST 1a.13.4), to say that the divine 
ideas are God’s knowledge of his essence as imitable extends the language of imitation beyond 
the existence granted to creatures in God’s work of creatio ex nihilo to the perfect actualization of 
this existence in creation’s multi-faceted operations, which imitate the diverse activities we 
ascribe to God’s simple divine life of actus purus. 
 Thomas discusses the progression from initial to dynamic actualization of imitating the 
divine likenesses in ST 1a.73.1, where he observes, “For any being there are two kinds of 
completeness, initial and evolved. The first is present when the thing has all that makes up its 
substance . . . The second kind of completeness, on the other hand, is the goal that the thing is 
to achieve. This goal is either an activity . . . or it is something achieved through activity.”98 It is, 
according to Thomas, this second kind of perfection that requires us to propose the existence of 
a plurality of ideas because, as he says, “[I]n every effect the ultimate end is specifically the object 
                                                
95 Cf. Bernard Lonergan, Verbum: Word and Idea in Aquinas, ed. Frederick E. Crowe and Robert M. Doran, 
vol. 2, The Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1997), 47. Thomas 
explains that while a thing conceived in the mind of an artisan has a type of existence, it does not enjoy a state of 
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case with God, as seen above (Lect. Ioan. 1, lect. 2, no.91). This apophatic deconstruction of the artisan analogy 
reminds us that all God-talk is derived from the world of senses (ST 1a.12.12), and, therefore, cannot 
comprehensibly describe God. 
96 Burrell, Freedom and Creation, 68. Cf. Sup. Ps. 32, no.8. 
97 Herbert McCabe, God Matters (Continuum Publishing, 1999), 48. McCabe uses this description to 
account for the immutability of God’s soteriological work. He writes, “The story of Jesus is nothing other than the 
triune life of God projected onto our history, or enacted sacramentally in our history . . . I use the word ‘projected’ 
in the sense that we project a film onto a screen . . . Now imagine a film projected not on a screen but on a rubbish 
dump. The story of Jesus – which in its full extent is the entire Bible – is the projection of the trinitarian life of God 
on the rubbish dump that we have made of the world.” I am grateful to Mark McIntosh for altering me to this 
passage.   
98 “Duplex est rei perfectio, prima, et secunda. Prima quidem perfectio est, secundum quod res in sua 
substantia est perfecta . . . Perfectio autem secunda est finis. Finis autem vel est operatio . . . vel est aliquid ad quod 
per operationem pervenitur.” 
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of the principal agent’s intention.”99 This goal or “ultimate perfection,” as Thomas describes it, 
which is, as stated in ST 1a.73.1, “the goal intended for the whole universe, is the perfect bliss of 
the blessed, and this will occur at the very end of the world.”100 In Thomas’s description of the 
divine ideas as God’s creative essence, we discover a way to speak of creation’s eschatological 
fulfillment as the perfect imitation of its creative principle in the divine mind.101  
Yet, Thomas insists that this eschatological actualization of creation’s perfect imitation 
does not diminish the distinction between God’s simple divine existence and creation’s 
composite reality, as he writes elsewhere in his discussion on the seven days of creation, “For the 
glory expected in the future reward is twofold – spiritual and corporeal – the second not only 
glorying human bodies but also making the entire universe new.”102 In his discussion on the 
eschatological persistence of filial fear, Thomas subtly relies on the divine ideas to reinforce this 
distinction between God and the world. The divine ideas enter his discussion on fear in his 
theological reflections on Ps. 110.10, which states, “The beginning of wisdom is the fear of the 
Lord.” Thomas insists that filial fear emerges in response to the work of wisdom, directing 
human life according to the divine ideas (ST 2a2ae.19.7).103 Consequently, when he later writes, 
“The defect implied in fear is rooted in the very nature of the creature, its infinite remoteness 
from God, and so is one that will continue in heaven,”104 the implication is that filial fear 
eschatologically persists because in humanity’s return to God through the perfect imitation of 
the divine likenesses, we do not become the divine ideas or obtain a mode of existence 
equivalent to them, but remain ontologically distinct in our participatory union with God. The 
doctrine of the divine ideas, then, supplies Thomas with a way to reinforce the ontological 
distinction between God and the world by establishing that the eschatological reditus of all things 
to God embraces creation’s similarity-in-remoteness. 
In these discussions on Thomas’s use of the formal distinctions derived from the 
doctrine of the divine ideas to establish creation’s twofold sense of existence, his theological 
assimilation of the doctrine offers a formulation of the divine ideas that is the very opposite of 
Bonhoeffer’s criticism that the doctrine muddles the distinction between God and the world. 
                                                
99 ST 1a.15.2: “[I]n quolibet effectu illud quod est ultimus finis proprie est intentum a principali agente.” 
100 “Ultima autem perfectio, quae est finis totius universi, est perfecta beatitudo sanctorum; quae erit in 
ultima consummatione saeculi.” 
101 In De ver. 4.8 Thomas even goes so far as to say, “Similitudo creaturae in verbo est productiva et motiva 
creaturae in propria natura existentis, quodammodo contingit ut creatura seipsam moveat, et ad esse producat, 
inquantum scilicet producitur in esse, et movetur a sua similitudine in verbo existente. Et ita similitudo creaturae in 
verbo est quodammodo creaturae vita.” 
102 ST 1a.66.3: “Expectatur enim in futura remuneratione duplex gloria, scilicet spiritualis, et corporalis, 
non solum in corporibus humanis glorificandis, sed etiam in toto mundo innovando.” 
103 For more on the presence of the divine ideas in this section of the Summa, see §6.3. 
104 ST 2a2ae.19.11 ad.3: “Timor importat defectum naturalem creaturae, secundum quod in infinitum distat 
a Deo, quod etiam in patria remanebit. Et ideo timor non evacuabitur totaliter.”  
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Rather than diminishing the value of creation, Thomas employs the grammar of the divine ideas 
to explain the ontological asymmetry of creation’s non-reciprocal dependence on God’s creative 
knowledge for existence. He uses the distinction between God and the world to direct his 
reader’s attention away from the cognitive and metaphysical pitfalls commonly associated with 
the divine ideas as well as embrace the world’s creational integrity as the intentional emanation of 
God’s immanent operations of knowing and loving turned outward. Furthermore, this chapter 
identified the traits in Thomas’s formal discussion on the divine ideas that exposed his efforts to 
theologically reposition the doctrine within the Summa’s pedagogical pattern of faith seeking 
understanding wherein he prepares his readers for the development and varied application of the 
doctrine encountered in places like ST 1a.18.4 ad.3 and Lect. Ioan. 1, lect. 2, n.91; however, as was 
observed in the section on Pieper’s claim that the createdness of the world is the unspoken 
assumption that directs Thomas’s thought, these developmental gestures often occur at the 
edges of arguments where there are rifts or jumps in Thomas’s reasoning. While this chapter has 
noted certain ways in which Thomas confirms the theological validity of the divine ideas, we 
now need a more robust engagement with the doctrine’s peripheral or subtle gestures elsewhere 
in the Summa. We begin this task in the following chapter on the trinitarian basis for the 
theological fittingness of the divine ideas. 
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4. The Grounds for a Trinitarian Rereading of the Divine Ideas 
 
Anyone who expressly and consistently denies that things originated from the Logos – i.e., who denies 
their verbal character – finds the substance of the real world itself slipping away between his fingers.1 
 
Introduction 
When Thomas addresses questions on the origin, multiplicity, and diversity of creation in 
the Summa, his responses directly and indirectly recall and supplement his formal discussion on 
the divine ideas and, subsequently, expose the underlying trinitarian dimension of the doctrine at 
work in his exposition on the Word of God’s causal relation to creation. How one interprets the 
relation between the Word of God and the divine ideas determines or, perhaps we could say, 
represents the theological meaning and value attributed to the doctrine, given that the revelation 
of God’s trinitarian life pedagogically defines his theological methodology (§2.1.2). At the end of 
his recent article on Thomas’s doctrine of the divine ideas, John Hughes writes, “For Aquinas, 
the divine ideas . . . understood according to the logic of the Trinity, are crucial to understanding 
creation as truly free and personal rather than proceeding from natural necessity, but also as in 
accordance with the intrinsic order of divine goodness and wisdom rather than simply formless, 
random, and arbitrary.”2 Hughes’s remarks here note that Thomas’s trinitarian doctrine of 
creation redefines the hermeneutical context for the divine ideas. Thomas alludes to the 
trinitarian adaptation of the doctrine in his discussion on the personal designation of the Father, 
where he says, “For just as we know that the word conceived mentally by the artisan issues from 
him before the artifact he fashions on the model of his idea, so too the Son proceeds from the 
Father before the creature does.”3  
He reiterates this point in his exegetical reflections on Hebrews 11.3 (“By faith we 
understand that the world was framed by the word of God: that from invisible things visible 
things might be made”), where, regarding God’s act of creation, Thomas argues, “Therefore, he 
[the author] says, by faith we understand that the world, i.e., the entire universe of creatures, was framed, 
i.e., fittingly corresponded, to the word, i.e., to God’s concept, as artifacts correspond to their art,” 
by which he means, “Visible things were produced from invisible ideal notions in the Word of 
God, by whom all things were made. These notions, even though they are the same reality, differ 
                                                
1 Josef Pieper, “What Does It Mean to Say ‘God Speaks,’” in Problems of Modern Faith: Essays and Addresses, 
trans. Jan van Heurck (Chicago: Franciscan Herald Press, 1985), 144; translated from the German, Über die 
Schwierigkeit Heute zu Glauben (Munich: Kösel-Verlag, 1974). 
2 John Hughes, “Creatio Ex Nihilo and the Divine Ideas in Aquinas: How Fair Is Bulgakov’s Critique?,” 
Modern Theology 29 (2013): 136–7. 
3 ST 1a.33.3 ad.1: “Sicut enim verbum conceptum in mente artificis, per prius intelligitur procedere ab 
artifice quam artificiatum, quod producitur ad similitudinem verbi concepti in mente; ita per prius procedit filius a 
patre quam creatura.” 
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in aspect by diverse relations connoted in respect to the creature.”4 It appears that here the 
notion of fittingness facilitates Thomas’s trinitarian reconfiguration of the doctrine through 
which he explicitly identifies the Word of God as the locus for the divine ideas. While others 
have discussed the hermeneutical importance of the connection between the divine ideas and the 
Word of God, Thomas’s rich sense of fittingness (convenientia) in theology and creation suggests 
that there is still more to be explored in this relation.5 The purpose of this chapter, then, is to 
locate in the pedagogical development of the Summa’s treatise on God grounds for a more robust 
trinitarian rereading of the divine ideas, based on Thomas’s methodological notion of fittingness. 
However, because our venture here, and in the following chapters, requires delving further into 
the peripheral or subtle gestures of the doctrine, it is necessary to begin with some additional 
thoughts on his grammar for the divine ideas, which will help us to identify references to the 
doctrine in other parts of the Summa.  
Thus, the first section considers the distinction between, what we will call, Thomas’s 
formal and applied grammars for the doctrine of the divine ideas. In addition to laying out this 
distinction, we identify here some of the cues that subtly indicate the presence of the divine ideas 
in different arguments throughout the Summa. The second section elaborates on our initial 
observations about the hermeneutical significance of Thomas’s arguments from fittingness, 
which were discussed in chapter one (§1.2). This section argues that the Summa’s entire treatise 
on God rests on the aesthetic logic of fittingness, and that this methodological framework 
provides a basis for grappling with the gestures of the divine ideas in Thomas’s exposition on the 
mystery of creation. In the third section, the unity of the Summa’s consideratio de Deo is considered 
along with the methodological framework of the divine ideas, which together secure the link 
                                                
4 In Heb. 11, lect. 2, no.564 and 565: “Ideo dicit intelligimus fide saecula, id est, totam universitatem creaturae, 
aptata, id est, convenienter respondentia, verbo, id est conceptui Dei, sicut artificiatum arti suae . . . Nos dicimus 
secundum modum praedictum, quod ex invisibilibus rationibus idealibus in Verbo Dei, per quod omnia facta sunt, 
res visibiles sunt productae. Quae rationes, et si realiter idem sunt, tamen per diversos respectus connotatos respectu 
creaturae differunt secundum rationem.”  
5 For other considerations of Thomas’s identification of the divine ideas with the Word of God, see Gianni 
Baget-Bozzo, “La Teologia Delle Idee Divine in San Tommaso,” Rivista Di Filosofia Neo Scolastica 66 (1974): 308–9; L. 
-B. Geiger, “Les Idées Divines Dans L’oeuvre de S. Thomas,” in St. Thomas Aquinas, 1274-1974: Commemorative 
Studies, vol. 1 (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 1974), 203; Mark D. Jordan, “The Intelligibility of 
the World and the Divine Ideas in Aquinas,” The Review of Metaphysics 38 (1984): 31–2; John Lee Farthing, “The 
Problem of Divine Exemplarity in St. Thomas,” The Thomist 49 (1985): 222; Alice Ramos, “The Divine Ideas and the 
Intelligibility of Creation: A Way Toward Universal Signification in Aquinas,” Doctor Communis 43 (1991): 264; Vivian 
Boland, O.P., Ideas in God According to Saint Thomas Aquinas: Sources and Synthesis, Studies in the History of Christian 
Thought 69 (Leiden: Brill, 1996), 235–48; James Stone, “The Foundation of Universal and Necessary Propositions 
in Select Writings of St Thomas Aquinas” (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Fordham University, 2008), 161–2; John 
F. Wippel, “Thomas Aquinas on the Divine Ideas,” in The Gilson Lectures on Thomas Aquinas, Etienne Gilson Series 
30 (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 2008), 143–7; Hughes, “Creatio Ex Nihilo and the Divine 
Ideas,” 136. There are basically three reasons these studies highlight the connection between the Word and the 
ideas: first, to clarify the Word of God’s causal relation to creation; second, to challenge claims that Thomas’s 
doctrine is fundamentally deistic or demiurgic; third, to establish, principally in the Summa contra Gentiles, the 
presence of the divine ideas where no direct reference is made to it.   
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between the divine ideas and the Word of God while also directing our attention to Thomas’s 
reflections on the trinitarian act of creation. Finally, the fourth section turns to the mystery of 
creation and Thomas’s application of the divine ideas to substantiate creation’s participation in 
the trinitarian life of God. Here we examine Thomas’s discussions on the procession of the 
Word of God and his argument that the eternal processions are the exemplar notions for 
creation.   
 
4.1 An Excursus on Thomas’s Formal and Applied Grammars for the Divine Ideas 
It appears to be a common assumption in studies on Thomas’s doctrine of the divine 
ideas that his formal or ex professo remarks on the doctrine offer encyclopedic codifications of the 
grammar for the divine ideas.6 The conclusion that the formal discussion on the divine ideas in, 
for example, ST 1a.15 gives fixed meanings is not unreasonable since a range of terms, including 
similitudo, ratio, exempla, forma, and species, are explicitly employed in this section with precise lexical 
connotations, which define and refine the doctrine of the divine ideas; however, the atomistic 
hermeneutic adopted by the majority of these studies is prone to overlooking the fluidity in the 
doctrine’s applied grammar found elsewhere in the Summa. Consequently, there is a, hopefully 
inadvertent, tendency to limit the range and meaning of the terms that fall within the 
grammatical domain of the doctrine. While in most instances Thomas’s application of the 
doctrine’s grammar adhere to the lexical descriptions given in the formal discussions on the 
divine ideas, there are, nevertheless, places in the Summa where this is not true, which leave us 
having to assume that Thomas is either being inconsistent or that the formal grammar for the 
divine ideas serves a purpose other than terminological codification.  
Certainly the most notable terminological distinction found in the Summa’s formal 
discussion on the divine ideas is the difference between ratio (notion) and exemplar (exemplar).  In 
ST 1a.15.3 Thomas gives a clear description of the distinction between these terms when he 
explains that for things which do not and never will exist “there is in God no idea in the sense of 
exemplar, but only in the sense of notion.”7 Both ratio and exemplar can therefore be described as 
ideas in the divine mind, and, as such, they contribute to the grammatical framework of the 
divine ideas in the Summa. While ratio, according to this passage, is reserved for ideas in God’s 
speculative knowledge, which may be called, as James Ross emphasizes, following De potentia Dei 
                                                
6 Perhaps the best example of this interpretive supposition is Doolan’s extensive systematic analysis of the 
evolution in Thomas’s terminology for the divine ideas in the various formal discussions on the doctrine from the 
Scriptum super libros Sententarum through the Summa Theologiae (Aquinas on the Divine Ideas, 4-21). 
7 ST 1a.15.3 ad.2: “. . . non est idea in Deo secundum quod idea significat exemplar, sed solum secundum 
quod significat rationem.” 
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1.5 ad.11 and De Veritate 3.6, “incomplete ideas” (indeterminata ideae),8 the meaning of exemplar is 
specifically limited to God’s practical knowledge of things that already do or will exist.9  
Yet, in ST 1a.44.3, Thomas asserts, regarding the created distinctiveness between things, 
“we should say that divine wisdom holds the originals (rationes) of all things, and these we have 
previously called the ideas, that is the exemplar forms (formas exemplares) existing in the divine 
mind.”10 Here ratio is identified with the formal meaning given to “exemplar” as the pattern that 
preexists in the divine mind for something that will be created, while in ST 1a2ae.93.1 there is a 
collation of exemplar and ratio that if interpreted as a reference to God’s actually practical 
knowledge (actu practica cognitio), would result in a theory of reprobation that resembles a form of 
double predestination that Thomas’s doctrine of the divine ideas will simply not permit (ST 
1a.15.3 ad.1; 1a.21.3; 1a.23.3).11 While this variation in the Summa’s use of exemplar is rare, there 
are many instances where ratio diverts from its formal classification in ST 1a.15. For example, in 
response to an objection that the forms of material things are derived from spiritual substances 
(spirituales substantiae), Thomas argues, “Forms participated in matter . . . are traceable . . . to ideas 
(rationes) in the divine mind, which endowed created things even with the seeds of forms that 
they might be brought to full realization through a process of movement.”12 Again, ratio shifts 
from being a term for God’s speculative knowledge of things that will never exist to an 
expression of the exemplarity after which actual things are patterned.13 
                                                
8 James F. Ross, “Aquinas’s Exemplarism; Aquinas’s Voluntarism,” American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly 
64 (1990): 178. Restricting the meaning, either explicitly or implicitly, of ratio to “notion,” or something similar, is 
common in codifications of Thomas’s grammar of the divine ideas. Cf. James F. Ross, “God Creator of Kinds and 
Possibilities,” in Rationality, Religious Belief and Moral Commitment, ed. Robert Audi (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 
1986), 315 fn.1; Bernard Lonergan, Verbum: Word and Idea in Aquinas, ed. Frederick E. Crowe and Robert M. Doran, 
vol. 2, The Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1997), 20; Gregory T. 
Doolan, Aquinas on the Divine Ideas as Exemplar Causes (Washington: The Catholic University of America Press, 2008), 
16; Stone, “Foundation of Universal,” 173–4. 
9 Cf. DDN V, lect. 3, no.665.  
10 “Oportet dicere quod in divina sapientia sunt rationes omnium rerum, quas supra diximus ideas, idest 
formas exemplares in mente divina existentes.” 
11 It is worth mentioning that the taxonomy of God’s actually practical knowledge derives from De ver. 3.3, 
where Thomas distinguishes between God’s actu practica cognitio, which is, “. . . ad opus actu ordinatur, sicut artifex 
praeconcepta forma proponit illam in materiam inducer,” and God’s habitu vel virtute practica cognitio, which reflects 
when, “artifex excogitat formam artificii, et scit modum operandi, non tamen operari intendit.” While this 
distinction can be mapped onto Thomas’s description of the divine ideas in the Summa (Doolan, Aquinas on the 
Divine Ideas, 11), I am using the category of God’s actually practical knowledge to emphasize the character of 
exemplar in ST 1a.15. For a discussion on the potential of this distinction to help answer various questions 
surrounding the doctrine of the divine ideas, see Aaron Martin, “Reckoning with Ross: Possibles, Divine Ideas, and 
Virtual Practical Knowledge,” Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association 78 (2005): 193–208.  
12 ST 1a.65.4 ad.2: “Formae participatae in materia reducuntur . . .  ad rationes intellectus divini, a quibus 
etiam formarum semina sunt rebus creatis indita, ut per motum in actum educi possint.” Similar uses of ratio can be 
found in, ST 1a.21.2; 1a.22.1; 1a.45.6; 1a.87.1; 1a.103.6. It is also notable that in many of these places, where 
Thomas is clearly referring to the doctrine of the divine ideas, he does not employ “ideae.” 
13 The fluidity with which Thomas uses ratio or rationes for the divine ideas of things that will never exist 
and for things that do or will exist also cautions us against rigidly separating the logical distinction between God’s 
speculative and practical knowledge, since the things God knows by way of his practical knowledge he knows the 
truth of according to his speculative intellect (ST 1a.14.16). Cf. Matthew Cuddeback, “Josef Pieper on the Truth of 
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These examples of Thomas’s flexibility with the formal grammar should alert us to the 
possibility that he may have a much larger network of words, concepts, and topical or analogical 
themes in the Summa that represent his doctrine of the divine ideas, which would suggest that 
locating references to the divine ideas is not simply a task of identifying places where he uses the 
terms ratio, exemplar, or idea. Thomas, however, does not leave the reader without clues to the 
presence of the divine ideas in places where the formal grammar is not used. Some of the more 
recognizable indicators are the analogies used to describe the divine ideas, such as the analogy of 
the artisan, noted in the previous chapter (§3.1.1), or the analogy of the archer identified in De ver. 
3.1 (§3.3.2, n.71), which also reappears in various places throughout the Summa, although the 
connection there is more oblique than with the references to the analogy of the artisan. In the 
Summa the link between the divine ideas and the analogy of the archer emerges through a series 
of subtle gestures associated with the larger network of Thomas’s doctrine of the divine ideas. 
For example, references to the analogy of the archer (ST 1a.19.4; 1a.23.1; 1a.103.1 ad.3; 1a.103.8) 
often occur in sections with citations from other works, such as Dionysius’s De divinis nominibus 
and Boethius’s Consolatio philosophiae III, which directly contribute to Thomas’s understanding of 
the doctrine. Moreover, Thomas’s practice of citing authoritative voices represents another way 
that he can make the presence of the divine ideas felt in an argument without directly appealing 
to the doctrine.14  
In addition to the works from Dionysius and Boethius, another work that Thomas 
makes clear is essential to his understanding of the divine ideas is Augustine’s discussion on the 
doctrine in question 46 of his De diversis quaestionibus octoginta tribus, which was, perhaps, the most 
influential treatise on the divine ideas in the medieval period.15 What is particularly noteworthy 
about this text for the current discussion is that, in the second section of the treatise, Augustine 
identifies formae, species, and rationes as acceptable references for the divine ideas because, as he 
states earlier, despite Plato having been the first to use the term ideae, the doctrine had been 
discussed by others using a variety of terms.16 Before he proceeds to his analysis of the divine 
                                                                                                                                                  
All Things and the World’s True Face,” in A Cosmopolitan Hermit: Modernity and Tradition in the Philosophy of Josef Pieper, 
ed. Bernard N. Schumacher (Washington: Catholic University Press of America, 2009), 241–3. 
14 On Thomas’s use of these works to develop his doctrine of the divine ideas, see Sent. I.36.1, aa.1-2; 
I.36.2, aa.1-3; I.38.1 aa.1-2; De Ver. q.3; DDN V, lect. 3; ST 1a.15.1 and 3; 1a.22.1; 1a.26.4; 1a.65.4 ad.1; 1a.93.2 ad.4; 
Quod. 4.1. For discussion on these texts and the place of these authors in the tradition of the divine ideas leading up 
to Thomas, see Boland, Ideas in God, 88–92 and 100–3; F. O’Rourke, Pseudo-Dionysius and the Metaphysics of Aquinas, 
New edition (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 2005), 7–13, 117–29 and 215–24. 
15 In the Summa Thomas explicitly refers to De div. quaest. 46 eleven times; however, only four of those 
citations are from ST 1a.15 and 1a.44. For more on this text and its significance for medieval theories of the divine 
ideas, see Hans Meyerhoff, “On the Platonism of St. Augustine’s Quaestio de Ideis,” The New Scholasticism 16 (1942): 
16–45; T. J. Kondoleon, “The Immutability of God: Some Recent Challenges,” The New Scholasticism 58, no. 3 
(1984): 293–315; Boland, Ideas in God, 37–47. 
16 De div. quaest. 46.1: “Ideas Plato primus appellasse perhibetur . . . sed alio fortassis atque alio nomine ab 
aliis atque aliis nuncupatae sunt.”  
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ideas, Augustine asserts, “Enough of the name! Let us see the thing which above all we must 
contemplate and come to know while leaving it in the power of each to call that thing which he 
knows by whatever name pleases him.”17 At the very center of the doctrinal tradition on the 
divine ideas that Thomas inherited, lies this claim from Augustine that the doctrine need not be 
bound to specific words because what matters is the belief, as Augustine says, “that all things are 
created on a rational plan . . . [that] must be thought to exist nowhere but in the very mind of the 
Creator.”18 It would seem, then, that the lexical flexibility we discover in Thomas’s applied 
grammar reflects his commitment to Augustine’s instruction on this point.  
There are at least two pedagogical advantages to the flexibility of Thomas’s grammar for 
the divine ideas. First, it allows him to make more subtle gestures with the doctrine, which he 
can use to direct the reader’s attention to the focal point of the discussions where these 
peripheral references are found. In a sense, then, the substantive contribution of the divine ideas 
to these inquires comes into focus only as one is led, by Christ (§2.4), ever closer to the vision of, 
what Mary Carruthers has aptly called, the “memory of heaven” through the maturation of the 
reader’s habit of theological thinking, which is existentially mirrored in the reader’s movement 
through the Summa.19 The second advantage is that by relying on a network of words, concepts, 
and themes to represent the divine ideas, Thomas can subtly introduce the doctrine at various 
points in the Summa where it might be considered unhelpful or distracting to explicitly discuss 
the divine ideas; however, once he has provided his readers with the tools to reimagine the 
doctrine, Thomas can draw on these allusions to create an a fortiori movement in the theological 
vision of the Summa, as we will see in our discussions on the fourth and fifth ways (§5.2 and §5.3). 
For now, however, this section has made us aware of the need to keep an eye out for gestures in 
the Summa where the interpretive relevance of the divine ideas must draw out in conversation 
with Thomas’s formal remarks on the doctrine in ST 1a.15, as we will attempt to demonstrate 
below. But before we proceed to that part of the analysis, let us clarify the logic of fittingness at 
                                                
17 De div. quaest. 46.1: “De nomine hactenus dictum sit. Rem videamus, quae maxime consideranda atque 
noscenda est, in potestate constitutes vocabulis, ut quod uolet quisque appellet rem quam cognouerit.” 
18 De div. quaest. 46.2: “Omnia ratione sint condita . . . [quod] arbitrandum est nisi in ipsa mente creatoris.” 
19 Carruthers discusses what is meant by the “memory of heaven” in The Craft of Thought: Meditation, Rhetoric, 
and the Making of Images, 400-1200 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 60–70. I must concur with Peter 
Candler that Carruthers does not “take seriously enough the theological character of memory” in Patristic and 
Medieval authors (Theology, Rhetoric, Manuduction, Or Reading Scripture Together on the Path to God [Grand Rapids: 
Eerdmans Publishing, 2006], 44 fn.7). Candler also makes the important observation about this movement toward 
the “memory of heaven” that, “Aquinas inverts the classical assumptions that memory is only of things past by 
asserting (with Augustine) that it recalls future destinies” (Theology, Rhetoric, Manuduction, 159). Cf. ST 3a.83.4, where 
Thomas comments on the celebration of the eucharist: “[A]nte celebrationem huius mysterii, primo quidem 
praemittitur praeparatio quaedam ad digne agenda ea quae sequuntur . . . Tertia pars commemorat caelestem gloriam, 
ad quam tendimus post praesentem miseriam, dicendo, gloria in excelsis Deo.” 
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work in Thomas’s thought, because it can help identify the progression of his pedagogical 
argumentation in relation to the divine ideas. 
 
4.2 The Logic of Theological Fittingness 
 Gilbert Narcisse notes, at the outset of his study on convenientia, that overtly rationalistic 
interpretations of Thomas tend to neglect or treat arguments from fittingness as though they 
were, what Thomas calls, “artificial fables” because they do not adhere to strict philosophical 
principles.20 Only recently, in fact, have Thomist scholars begun to show a serious interest in the 
hermeneutical implications of Thomas’s arguments from fittingness. However, the rather 
dismissive evaluation we encounter in Doolan’s response to Thomas’s insistence that “the Word 
[of God] is the art full of living patterns of all things,” suggests that the methodological 
significance of convenientia for the interpretation of Thomas’s arguments on the doctrine of the 
divine ideas needs closer analysis.21 Since it is Doolan’s contention that doctrine of the divine 
ideas signifies a distinctly philosophical dimension of Thomas’s thought,22 the explicit 
identification of the divine ideas with the Word of God represents, for him, a rather 
inconvenient theological turn in Thomas’s description of the doctrine.23 In his comments on In 
Heb. 11, lect. 2, Doolan acknowledges that “it is fitting to attribute [the divine ideas] to the Word 
of God,” but he only does so because he believes it will help him silence the theological 
inflection of Thomas’s doctrine of the divine ideas.24 Doolan maintains his commitment to a 
                                                
20 Gilbert Narcisse, O.P., Les Raisons de Dieu: Argument de Convenance et Esthétique Théologique Selon Saint 
Thomas d'Aquin et Hans Urs von Balthasar (Fribourg: Éditions Universitaires, 1997), xxi–xxiii.  
21 Lect. Ioan. 1, lect. 2, no.77: “Verbum est ars plena omnium rationum viventium.” Thomas is citing 
Augustine’s De Trin. 6.10, where it says, “[H]oc esse est unum omnia tamquam uerbum perfectum cui non desit 
aliquid et ars quaedam omnipotentis atque sapientis dei plena omnium rationum uiuentium incommutabilium, et 
omnes unum in ea sicut ipsa unum de uno cum quo unum.” 
22 Doolan, Aquinas on the Divine Ideas, xvii. For more on Doolan’s argument that Thomas’s doctrine of the 
divine ideas is principally philosophical, see §5.1.3. 
23 In addition to the passages cited from Lect. Ioan. 1, lect.2, no.77 and In Heb. 11, lect.2, no.564, there is 
also, for example, Thomas’s argument in ST 1a.93.8 ad.4, where he concludes that all temporal things will be seen as 
unchangeable in the beatific vision because “in ipso Verbo increato sunt rationes omnium creaturarum.” Cf. ST 
1a.33.3 ad.1; 1a.34.3; 1a.44.3; 1a.55.2 ad.1; 1a.58.7; 1a.65.4 ad.1; 1a.74.3 ad.1. For additional references linking the 
divine ideas and the Word of God, see Boland, Ideas in God, 235–48. 
24 Doolan, Aquinas on the Divine Ideas, 118. Doolan presents his discussion on the relation of the divine ideas 
to the Word of God as a response to the argument offered by Wippel and Geiger, for references, see n.5 above, that 
Thomas’s use of rationes in the Summa contra Gentiles implicitly identifies the divine ideas with the Word of God. He 
concedes that this connection does introduce a “theological note” to Thomas’s doctrine of the divine ideas; 
however, he quickly qualifies this admission by stating that the theological turn this connection represents “does not 
appear in any of [Thomas’s] other ex professo treatments of the divine ideas” (p.98), which is a conclusion debunked 
in the previous chapter (§3.1). It is also notable that, in his efforts to deconstruct this connection, Doolan 
emphasizes Augustine’s authority in Thomas’s commentaries on scripture, where the divine ideas are regularly 
identified with the Word of God (p.118), which suggests that he wants to shift the reason for this theological turn, 
at least in part, to Thomas’s theological inheritance. Yet, in doing so Doolan exposes the similarity in his approach 
to the very hermeneutical practices, discussed in §5.1.1 and §5.1.2, employed by Étienne Gilson, James Ross, and 
Mark Jordan in their studies on Thomas’s doctrine of the divine ideas, that he is attempting to distance himself from. 
Moreover, in his efforts to minimize the theological trajectory of Thomas’s discussions on the divine ideas, Doolan 
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philosophical reading of the doctrine by pressing the distinction between essential attributes and 
personal properties in Thomas’s delineation between idea and Verbum set up by ST 1a.39.7, 
where it says, “[Q]ualities of intellect are appropriated [by way of similitude] to the Son, who 
proceeds by way of intellect, as the Word.”25  
Regarding this delineation, Doolan highlights Thomas’s argument in De veritate that, “A 
word differs from an idea, for the latter means an exemplary cause and nothing else, but the 
Word in God of a creature means an exemplary form that is drawn from something else. Hence, 
a divine idea pertains to the essence, but the Word, to a person.”26 To this claim, Doolan adds 
Thomas’s remarks from ST 1a.34.3, where he says, “We employ the term ‘idea’ chiefly to indicate 
reference to creatures; this is why it is used in the plural about the divinity; nor is it a personal 
term. By the name ‘Word,’ however, we intend to indicate chiefly relationship to the one 
speaking it and then, in consequence, a relationship to the creature . . . For this reason in God 
there is but one single Word and it names a person.”27 Because of this conceptual distinction 
between Verbum and idea, Doolan determines that for Thomas there is no sense in which “the 
notions, or divine ideas, pertain uniquely to one of the Divine Persons rather than to the divine 
essence,” which he takes as sufficient ground for claiming that the doctrine is, at best, only 
tangentially related to Thomas’s theological vision; thereby, clearing the path for his 
philosophical reconstruction of the doctrine.28 While this conclusion may make Thomas’s 
doctrine of the divine ideas more manageable, it relies on an assumption that the logic of 
                                                                                                                                                  
ignores that the doctrine is regularly linked to the Word of God not only in Thomas’s biblical commentaries, but 
also in his systematic works. For example in Sent. I, d.36, q.2, a.1 s.c. 1 and De ver. 3.1 s.c.1, Thomas says, “Qui negat 
ideas esse, infidelis est, quia negat filium esse.” While Thomas attributes this quotation to De div. quaest. 46, it does 
not appear in Augustine’s corpus. Some suspect that he may have inherited the statement from Albert the Great, who 
cites De civ. dei 10 as the source. On the provenance of this citation, see Boland, Ideas in God, 7 fn.15; James A. 
Weisheipl, O.P., Friar Thomas D’Aquino: His Life, Thought, and Works (Washington: Catholic University of America 
Press, 1984), 73–4. Although this exact statement cannot be found in Augustine’s works, he does, nevertheless, 
explicitly identify the divine ideas with the Word of God, as the passage cited in n.21 above confirms.   
25 “Ea quae pertinent ad intellectum appropriantur [per viam similitudinis] Filio, qui procedit per modum 
intellectus ut Verbum.” Gilles Emery notes, in a comment on ST 1a.32.1 ad.2, “These ‘similitudes’ constitute 
arguments from congruity or fittingness,” which are, he says in a quotation from ST 2a2ae.1.5 ad.2, “non 
demonstrativae, sed persuasiones quaedam manifestantes non esse impossibile quod in fide proponitur” (The 
Trinitarian Theology of Saint Thomas Aquinas, trans. Francesca Aran Murphy [Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007], 
29–30; French original, La Théologie Trinitaire de Saint Thomas d’Aquin Paris: Éditions du Cerf, 2004]).  
26 De ver. 4.4 ad.4: “Verbum differt ab idea: idea enim nominat formam exemplarem absolute; sed verbum 
creaturae in Deo nominat formam exemplarem ab alio deductam; et ideo idea in Deo ad essentiam pertinet. Sed 
verbum ad personam.” 
27 ST 1a.34.3 ad.4: “Nomen ideae principaliter est impositum ad significandum respectum ad creaturam, et 
ideo pluraliter dicitur in divinis, neque est personale. Sed nomen verbi principaliter impositum est ad significandam 
relationem ad dicentem, et ex consequenti ad creaturas . . . Et propter hoc in divinis est unicum tantum verbum, et 
personaliter dictum.” 
28 Doolan, Aquinas on the Divine Ideas, 122. Boland argues, in his assessment of these same passages, that 
Thomas highlights the distinction between Verbum and idea not in order to delineate between talk about the divine 
essence and the three persons, but rather to bring “together discourse about the Persons in God and discourse 
about the divine essence.” He continues, “In stressing the divinity of the Word, Saint Thomas maintains a clear 
distinction between uncreated and created reality.” See, Boland, Ideas in God, 246–8. 
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fittingness is merely a notional convenience, which should, therefore, have little bearing on our 
interpretation of the doctrine, but this conclusion simply does not square with what Thomas 
actually says about arguments ex convenientia.  
Thomas’s clearest statements about the logic of fittingness are found in his responses to 
the questions on whether Christ’s incarnation and passion were necessary. On the necessity of 
the incarnation, he writes:  
We refer to something as necessary for an end in two senses. First, when the 
goal is simply unattainable without it, e.g. food for sustaining human life. 
Second, when it is required for a better and more expeditious attainment of the 
goal, e.g. a horse for a journey. In the first sense the Incarnation was not 
necessary for the restoration of human nature, since by his infinite power God 
had many other ways to accomplish this end. In the second sense, however, it 
was needed for the restoration of human nature.29 
Because there is, as Thomas subsequently restates in his discussion on the passion of Christ (ST 
3a.46.2 ad.3), no authority above God, the form of necessity predicated to the incarnation is one 
of fittingness determined by God’s knowledge and will (ST 1a.19.3). 
The relevance of this distinction between absolute necessity and the necessity of 
fittingness or supposition for Thomas’s theological methodology is specified in his reply to the 
objection that Christ’s passion was necessary because “faith cannot cling to what is false” (fidei 
non potest subesse falsum), to which he responds, “Human faith and even the Sacred Scriptures 
which instruct it rest upon the divine foreknowledge and plan. Hence the necessity which derives 
from the assertions of the faith and of Scripture is of the same nature as the necessity arising 
from divine foreknowledge and will.”30 Since the divine will is absolutely free from the necessity 
to will anything other than its own goodness (ST 1a.19.3), theological study, based on these 
remarks, may be aptly described as a spiritual exercise (spiritualia exercitia) in discerning the 
fittingness of God’s creative and redemptive activities.31 Since, however, God remains above 
                                                
29 ST 3a.1.2: “Dicendum quod ad finem aliquem dicitur aliquid esse necessarium dupliciter, uno modo, sine 
quo aliquid esse non potest, sicut cibus est necessarius ad conservationem humanae vitae; alio modo, per quod 
melius et convenientius pervenitur ad finem, sicut equus necessarius est ad iter. Primo modo Deum incarnari non 
fuit necessarium ad reparationem humanae naturae, Deus enim per suam omnipotentem virtutem poterat humanam 
naturam multis aliis modis reparare. Secundo autem modo necessarium fuit Deum incarnari ad humanae naturae 
reparationem.”  
30 ST 3a.46.2 ad.4: “Fides humana, et etiam Scripturae divinae, quibus fides instruitur, innituntur 
praescientiae et ordinationi divinae. Et ideo eadem ratio est de necessitate quae provenit ex suppositione eorum, et 
de necessitate quae provenit ex praescientia et voluntate divina.” If we recall Eugene Roger’s argument for the 
Summa’s “christoform structural arc,” discussed in Chapter Two (§2.4), the fact that this important methodological 
discussion occurs at the end of the Summa is not problematic since what one reads, at any point in the Summa, is 
structurally defined as much by what comes before as by its relation to the christological vision to which it leads. 
31 Cf. ST 2a2ae.186.3; 2a2ae.189.1; SCG Bk. 3, ch.132. Thomas Weinandy provides an insightful 
description of theological study that summarizes both what we are saying about the methodological function of 
theological fittingness and how it differs from the theological hermeneutics that emerged after the Enlightenment. 
He writes: “Many theologians today, having embraced the Enlightenment presuppositions and the scientific method 
that it fostered, approach theological issues as if they were scientific problems to be solved rather than mysteries to 
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humanity’s intellectual comprehension (ST 1a.12.1 ad.1), theological fittingness also entails an 
aesthetic reimagining of the things we do understand to clarify the truths discerned through the 
mysteries of faith (ST 1a.39.1 ad.1). Accordingly, the aesthetic reasoning of convenientia sits, as 
Narcisse says, “between, on the one hand, the logic of arguments from authority, and, on the 
other, the logic of arguments from reason” through which it harmonizes the scientia of sacra 
doctrina in, as Narcisse continues, a “perfect reciprocity” of metaphysics, theology, and the 
ecclesial tradition (§2.3.2 and §2.3.3), and “invites the contemplative, silent prolongation of 
mystery, the inchoate experience, distant but real, of what will be seen immediately and 
intuitively in the age to come.”32 
At this point it seems appropriate to recall the discussion in ST 1a.1.6 ad.3 (§2.3.3), 
where Thomas establishes that theological inquiry embodies a unique convergence between the 
intellectual virtue of wisdom (ST 1a2ae.57.2) and the Holy Spirit’s gift of wisdom (ST 2a2ae.45), 
such that the knowledge acquired through sacra doctrina “goes to God most personally as deepest 
origin and highest end.”33 Since the Summa is designed to be a sustained mediation on sacra 
doctrina, its purpose, to summarize our earlier discussion (§2.1), is to draw the reader into an 
actual encounter with the wisdom of God, or, as Anna Williams explains, “the Summa is to be 
                                                                                                                                                  
be discerned and clarified. However, the true goal of theological inquiry is not the resolution of theological problems, 
but the discernment of what the mystery of faith is” (Does God Suffer? [Edinburgh: T & T Clark, 2000], 32). On the 
homogenization of methodology in the Enlightenment and its impact on theological research, see Amos 
Funkenstein, Theology and the Scientific Imagination: From the Middle Ages to the Seventeenth Century (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1986); Andrew Louth, Discerning the Mystery: An Essay on the Nature of Theology (Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 1989). Cf. Nicholas M. Healy, Thomas Aquinas: Theologian of the Christian Life (Aldershot: Ashgate Publishing, 
2003), 37.  
32 Narcisse, Les Raisons de Dieu, 145 and 146. Cf. Frederick Christian Bauerschmidt, Thomas Aquinas: Faith, 
Reason, and Following Christ (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), 161 and 164–5. Narcisse argues that convenientia 
has, in Thomas’s thought, a type of threefold foundation. The first is the analogia entis, about which he writes, 
“L'analogie suppose un rapport, un accord, une proportion, une ressemblance, autant de thémes trés proches du 
concept de convenance” (p.89). Next is the analogia fidei, which, according to Narcisse, “Elle se développe à 
l'intérieur de la foi, considérant non plus l'unité de l'être créé, mais l'unité du dessein de Dieu” (pp.89-90), or, in the 
words of Aidan Nichols, “the interrelated unity of all themes in sacred doctrine” (Redeeming Beauty: Soundings in Sacral 
Aesthetics [Aldershot: Ashgate Publishing, 2007], 17). The third aspect is, Narcisse concludes, “L'incessante 
dialectique entre l'économie et la théologie épouse toutes les convenances harmonisées par le mouvement exitus-
reditus, lui-même surdéterminé par le mouvement christologique de la venue et du retour du Christ” (p.91). 
Particularly clear examples of convenientia’s hermeneutical significance can be found in Thomas’s refusal, as Adam 
Johnson notes, in ST 3a.46.5 ad.3, “to adopt a single theory which succinctly captures the essence or heart of the 
atonement” (“A Fuller Account: The Role of ‘Fittingness’ in Thomas Aquinas’ Development of the Doctrine of the 
Atonement,” International Journal of Systematic Theology 12 [2010]: 307), as well as his commentaries on scripture, where 
Thomas regularly draws upon many Church Fathers to help clarify the meaning of a passage while making little 
effort to reconcile or eliminate differences in their interpretations. On this point, see John F. Boyle, “Authorial 
Intention and the Divisio Textus,” in Reading John with St. Thomas Aquinas: Theological Exegesis and Speculative Theology, 
ed. Michael Dauphinais and Matthew Levering (Washington: The Catholic University of America Press, 2010), 6; 
and from the same collection of essays, Stephen F. Brown, “The Theological Role of the Fathers in Aquinas’s Super 
Evangelium S. Ioannis Lectura,” 9–20. 
33 ST 1a.1.6: “. . . propriisime determinant de Deo secundum quod est altissima causa.” Cf. Matthew 
Levering, Scripture and Metaphysics: Aquinas and the Renewal of Trinitarian Theology (Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, 2004), 33. 
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read as an act of contemplation whereby we are united to the mind of God.”34 It is, then, in the 
dialectic exchange between the gift and intellectual virtue of wisdom that the logic of fittingness, 
guided by the contemplative presence of God’s divine wisdom in sacra doctrina’s defense of faith’s 
intelligibility, constitutes a reordering of natural reasoning through the convergence of 
metaphysical, theological, and ecclesial principles. Thomas elaborates on this point in the Summa 
contra Gentiles when, speaking about those who have faith, he states, “they do not believe 
foolishly, as though ‘following artificial fables’ (2 Pet. 1.16). For these ‘secrets of divine Wisdom’ 
(Job 11.6) the divine Wisdom itself, which knows all things to the full, has deigned to reveal to 
men. It reveals its own presence, as well as the truth of its teaching and inspiration, by fitting 
arguments.”35 Far from arguments of fittingness being hermeneutically barren, they reflect, in the 
scientia of sacra doctrina, the perfect wisdom of God, thereby encouraging the reader to look for 
the harmony (§2.4) governing the knowledge acquired through the habit of thinking theologically. 
This includes even those places where this noetic unity may not initially appear to us, such as in 
the reception of the treatise on God, to which we now turn. 
 
4.3 Stick to the Plan: The Unity of the Summa’s Treatise on God  
 At the heart of Doolan’s argument that the fittingness of attributing the divine ideas to 
the Word of God minimizes the doctrine’s theological significance lies the assumption that 
Thomas’s doctrine of God can be effectively divided between a philosophical approach, which is 
concerned with the unity of the divine essence, and a theological approach, which deals with the 
personal properties of the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit.36 This assumption relies, at least to some 
degree, on the interpretive paradigm standardized by Théodore de Régnon, which claims that the 
Western/scholastic concept of God prioritizes the Hellenistic notion of the divine essence over 
theological reflection on the relational distinctions between the divine persons.37 According to 
                                                
34 A. N. Williams, “Mystical Theology Redux: The Pattern of Aquinas’ Summa Theologiae,” Modern Theology 
13 (1997): 59. 
35 SCG Bk. 1, ch.6: “[A]dhibentes non leviter credunt, quasi indoctas fabulas secuti (2 Pet. 1.16). Haec enim 
divinae sapientiae secreta ipsa divina sapientia, quae omnia plenissime novit, dignata est hominibus revelare: quae sui 
praesentiam et doctrinae et inspirationis veritatem, convenientibus argumentis ostendit.” In his reflections on this 
passage, Michael Waddell concludes, “Arguments from fittingness are the effect and testimony of the presence of 
Wisdom, Who dwells in the minds of men through the gift of wisdom . . . [A]rguments from fittingness are 
miraculous testimonies of the wisdom they convey: miraculous, that is, for those who have ears to hear. These 
arguments belong to the discourse of faith, not natural reason” (“Wisdom, Fittingness and the Relational 
Transcendentals,” in Was Ist Philosophie Im Mittelalter? Qu’est-Ce Que La Philosophie Au Moyen Âge? What Is Philosophy in 
the Middle Ages?, ed. Jan A. Aertsen and Andreas Speer, Miscellanea Mediaevalia 26 [Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1998], 
542). 
36 Cf. Jordan, “The Intelligibility of the World,” 19 fn.9. 
37 Théodore de Régnon introduces this argument in his massive four volume Études de Théologie Positive Sur 
La Sainte Trinité (Paris: Victor Retaux et Fils, 1982-1989). He deals with Thomas, primarily, in the second volume. 
The influence of de Régnon’s work on twentieth century theology is discussed by Michel René Barnes in “De 
Régnon Reconsidered,” Augustinian Studies 26 (1995): 51–79, which also offers a definitive deconstruction of de 
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Karl Rahner, Thomas was the first to systematically structure this separation by situating the so-
called non-trinitarian treatise De Deo uno before the theologically motivated treatise De Deo Trino, 
such that, as Rahner says, “[T]he first topic under study is not God the Father as the unoriginate 
origin of divinity and reality, but as the essence common to all three persons.”38 While the debate 
over the relation of the divine essence to the distinction of divine persons is, as Gilles Emery 
states, “among the foremost points of controversy in the interpretation” of Thomas’s trinitarian 
theology, Emery, in opposition to the crystallization of the dispute around the terms 
“essentialism” and “personalism,” which he notes predetermines “the kind of solution one can 
adopt,” argues, “The study of God as principle is not determined by the aspect of Unity or of 
Trinity, but rather is determined by the unique and entire reality of God (the three persons of 
one same essence).”39  
 For support of this argument, Emery turns to the outline of the prima pars given after ST 
1a.1, where we discover that the Summa’s consideratio de Deo is not two separate treatises, but 
instead a single treatise divided into three sections: “First, we shall consider those things that 
pertain to the divine essence (qq. 2-26); second, the distinction of the persons (qq. 27-43); third, 
the coming forth of creatures from him (qq. 44ff.).”40 That Thomas includes the economy of 
creation within his treatise on God recalls his response in ST 1a.1.7 where he establishes that the 
scientia of sacra doctrina is a knowledge of God and everything in relation to him (§2.3.2; SCG Bk. 
                                                                                                                                                  
Régnon’s argument. De Régnon’s work was also the catalyst for the opposition between Augustinian/western and 
Cappadocian/eastern formulations of the Trinity, which, unfortunately, shaped a great deal of twentieth century 
thought on the Trinity. Examples of de Régnon’s influence can be found in the works of Vladimir Lossky, Essai sur 
La Théologie Mystique de L’Église d’Orient (Paris: Aubier, 1944); Colin E. Gunton, The Promise of Trinitarian Theology 
(London: T& T Clark, 1991); T. F. Torrance, The Christian Doctrine of God: On Being Three Persons (Edinburgh: T.& 
T.Clark, 1996); Michel Corbin, La Trinité ou l’Excès de Dieu (Paris: Cerf, 1997). While some twentieth century scholars, 
such as Eric Mascall (The Triune God: An Ecumenical Study [London: Churchman Publishing, 1986], 24), were wary of 
de Régnon’s conclusions, it was not until Barnes’s article and Lewis Ayres’s prodigious monograph (Nicaea and Its 
Legacy: An Approach to Fourth-Century Trinitarian Theology [Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006]) that the opposition 
between Augustinian and Cappadocian formulations of the Trinity would be finally challenged.  
38 Karl Rahner, The Trinity, trans. Joseph Donceel (New York: Crossroad, 1998), 16; German original, “Der 
dreifaltige Gott als transzendeter Urgrund der Heilsgeschichte,” in Die Heilsgeschichte vor Christus, vol. 2, Mysterium 
Salutis, Grundriss heilsgeschichticher Dogmatik (Einsiedeln: Benziger Verlag, 1967). In an earlier study on the 
division between De Deo Uno and De Deo Trino, Rahner remarks, “If one begins with the basic notions of the 
Augustinian and western approach, a non-Trinitarian treatise De Deo Uno comes apparently automatically before De 
Deo Trino” (“Remarks on the Dogmatic Treatise De Trinitate,” in Theological Investigations, trans. Kevin Smyth, vol. 4 
[London: Darton, Longman, Todd, 1966], 83-4; German original, Karl Rahner, “Bemerkungen zum dogmatischen 
Traktat ‘De Trinitate,’” in Schriften zur Theologie, vol. 4 [Einsidelen: Benziger Verlat, 1960], 103–33). 
39 Gilles Emery, O.P., “Essentialism or Personalism in the Treatise on God in St. Thomas Aquinas?,” in 
Trinity in Aquinas, trans. Matthew Levering, 2nd ed. (Ann Arbor: Sapientia Press of Ave Maria University, 2006), 165 
and 176; French original, “Essentialisme Ou Personnalisme Dans Le Traité de Dieu Chez Saint Thomas d’Aquin?,” 
Revue Thomiste 98 (1998): 5–38. Cf. Hans Jorissen, “Zur Struktur des Traktates ‘De Deo’ in der Summa theologiae 
des Thomas von Aquin,” in Im Gespräch mit dem dreieinigen Gott: Elemente einer trinitarischen Theologie, ed. Michael 
Böhnke and Hanspeter Heinz (Düsseldorf: Patmos, 1985), 237. 
40 ST 1a.2, prol.: “Primo namque considerabimus ea quae ad essentiam divinam pertinent; secundo, ea quae 
pertinent ad distinctionem personarum; tertio, ea quae pertinent ad processum creaturarum ab ipso.” For a 
comparison of this paradigm with the structure of the treatises on God in Thomas’s other works, see Emery, The 
Trinitarian Theology, 36–9. Emery essentially argues that while many of Thomas’s other works do not repeat the same 
structure as the Summa, the tripartite paradigm is, nevertheless, maintained in each work. 
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2, ch.4), but, as the reader will come to learn (cf. §3.3.2), this reference to God’s creative activity 
also represents, as Emery says, the “general matter of divine action in the world; it extends to 
divine ‘government’ (the realization of providence), which also involves some aspects of the 
return of creatures to God.”41 By extending the Summa’s treatise on God to the divine operations 
of creation and salvation, Thomas reasserts that the formal object of sacra doctrina is rooted in 
God’s self-disclosure (ST 1a.1.1), and inversely establishes that the consideratio de Deo is a 
“structured unit,” wherein the mystery of God’s divine activities are expressed in the fittingness 
of, what Emery calls, “the redoublement of language,” by which he means, “In order to speak 
the Trinitarian mystery, it is necessary always to employ two words, two formulas, in a reflection 
in two modes that joins here the substantial (essential) aspect and the distinction of persons 
(relative properties).”42 Consequently, as Thomas indicates in the prologue to his discussion on 
the trinitarian processions, where he writes, “After discussing the unity of God’s nature it 
remains for us to discuss the trinity of persons in God,”43 the transition from what is common to 
what is distinct marks only a shift in his unified exposition on the nature of God, wherein both 
the essential and personal aspects belong to the same divine reality, that is the mystery of God’s 
trinitarian life, which is made known to us through revelation. 
 Now, the Summa’s pairing of what is common and proper to the three persons within a 
single exposition on the trinitarian mystery does not dismiss the distinction between things that 
are more readily known to us through natural reason and the truths known only through faith. 
As Thomas explains, “God’s essential attributes, rather than what is proper to the persons, are 
among the matters known on grounds of reason; from creatures, the source of our knowledge, 
we are able to arrive at knowledge of essential attributes with certainty, but not of the personal 
properties (cf. ST 1a.32.1 ad.1).”44 It does, however, indicate that the insights drawn from natural 
reason on the essential attributes are repositioned under the rubric of sacra doctrina’s theological 
response to the revelation of God since, according to ST 1a.1.1, what is revealed necessarily 
                                                
41 Emery, Trinitarian Theology, 40. Cf. §2.4, esp. fn.84. 
42 Emery, “Essentialism or Personalism,” 178. Emery adopts the argument for “the law of redoublement” 
from Ghislain Lafont’s Peut-on Connaître Dieu En Jésus-Christ? (Paris: Cerf, 1969), 130. For a summary of “the law of 
redoublement” in the interpretation of Thomas’s treatise on God, see Levering, Scripture and Metaphysics, 214–6. 
43 ST 1a.27 prol.: “Consideratis autem his quae ad divinae essentiae unitatem pertinent, restat considerare 
de his quae pertinent ad Trinitatem personarum in divinis.” Cf. Carl Sträter, “Le Point de Départ Du Traité 
Thomiste de La Trinité,” Sciences Ecclésiastiques 14 (1962): 83; Gilles Emery, O.P., “The Doctrine of the Trinity in St. 
Thomas Aquinas,” in Aquinas on Doctrine: A Critical Introduction, ed. Thomas Weinandy, O.F.M, Daniel A. Keating, 
and John Yocum (London: T & T Clark, 2004), 50. In In I Cor. 2, lect.1, no.85 Thomas states, “Quamvis enim 
omnis sapientia a Deo sit, ut dicitur (Sir. 1.1), tamen speciali quodam modo haec sapientia, quae est de Deo, est 
etiam a Deo per revelationem.” 
44 ST 1a.39.7: “Essentialia vero attributa sunt nobis magis manifesta secundum rationem, quam propria 
personarum, quia ex creaturis, ex quibus cognitionem accipimus, possumus per certitudinem devenire in 
cognitionem essentialium attributorum; non autem in cognitionem personalium proprietatum.” Cf. Sent. I, d.29, q.1, 
a.2, qc.2, arg.1; ST 1a.33.3 ad.1. 
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includes both forms of truth related to the knowledge of the divine being, or as Thomas phrases 
it in the Summa contra Gentiles, “[I]t is fitting that both of these truths be proposed to man divinely 
for belief.”45 In other words while the Summa’s discussion on God’s knowledge and will 
incorporates metaphysical claims, Thomas’s description of sacra doctrina (§2.1.1) establishes that 
the basis for attributing these immanent operations to God is not principally derived from 
philosophical reasoning, but from the revelation that these operations subsist in God as the 
Word and Holy Spirit (ST 1a.37.1 ad.2). 
Thomas’s decision to begin the Summa’s treatise on God with an exposition of the divine 
essence cannot, therefore, be reduced to a separate hermeneutical framework because the entire 
tripartite treatise is governed by the knowledge of sacra doctrina, which originates in the revelation 
of God’s creative and redemptive activities (§2.3.3). Instead, the structure represents his efforts 
to integrate the order of humanity’s knowledge into his exposition of the triune God through 
which he joins philosophical insights with the language of faith to theologically clarify the 
intelligibility of belief in the trinitarian mystery. The structure of the Summa’s treatise on God is, 
consequently, a pedagogically motivated epistemological arrangement, guided, as Emery 
concludes, “by an internal theological requirement which brings about the integration, distinct as 
they are, of philosophy and theology.”46 If we keep the Summa’s pedagogical paradigm in mind 
while reading the treatise on God, then the sequence of the sections reveals an order of 
intensification in which, as Emery writes, “each point of doctrine is situated in such a way that it 
draws on the preceding expositions and illuminates the subsequent scene.”47 Thus, the Summa’s 
section on the divine essence is not designed to be read in contradistinction to the exposition on 
the three persons or the trinitarian act of creation, but as a phase in Thomas’s mediation on the 
mystery of God’s trinitarian life.  
What this means for the interpretation of his doctrine of the divine ideas is that despite 
the philosophical tone in ST 1a.15, the divine ideas cannot be, as Doolan surmises, somehow 
extracted from the treatise’s theological trajectory since each scene in the treatise anticipates 
fuller expression in the following section (§2.1.1), with the goal being to instill in the reader the 
proper habit of thinking theologically about the triune creator (cf. ST 1a2ae.12.4 ad.2). 
Furthermore, since ST 1a.15 should not be read as a closed statement on the divine ideas (§3.1), 
                                                
45 SCG Bk. 1, ch.4: “. . . utraque convenienter divinitus homini credenda proponitur.” 
46 Emery, “The Doctrine of the Trinity,” 51.  
47 Emery, Trinitarian Theology, 50. Emery restates this point when he argues, “The order of concepts at work 
[in the treatise on God] takes on, indeed, a properly Trinitarian reason: The understanding of the divine person 
presupposes the knowledge of the essence because it integrates it (the proper does not have reality without the common). 
One cannot conceive of the person without the substance or without the nature belonging to the very ratio of the 
divine person,” which he notes is defined in De pot. 9.4 as, “distinctum subsistens in natura divina” (“Essentialism or 
Personalism,” 179). 
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the philosophical elements in the formal remarks on the doctrine do not operate autonomously 
within the Summa’s treatise on God, but are inductively appropriated to strengthen, as Frederick 
Bauerschmidt notes, the “deeper apprehension of the fittingness of . . . the ways in which the 
mysteries of faith interlock with each other and with our ordinary knowledge of the world.”48 
Each movement within the treatise on God should therefore be thought of as advancing the 
recursive pedagogical pattern of the Summa by providing a microcosmic vision of the theological 
fittingness unveiled in the contemplative journey of sacra doctrina, which would suggest that 
Thomas’s arguments defending the necessity of the divine ideas (ST 1a.15.1 and 2) do not stand 
in methodological abstraction from his insistence on the theological fittingness (ST 1a.32.1 ad.2) 
of locating the divine ideas in the Word of God, “who is the Art and Wisdom of the Father.”49 
Instead, the former remarks secure the fittingness of the divine ideas for theological discourse 
about God in response to the revelation that “the three persons are one and the same identical 
essence.”50  
The divine ideas, then, are properly attributed to the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit in the 
unity of the divine essence (cf. ST 1a.39.7 ad.2). However, in keeping with the progressive 
movement of the treatise toward the exposition on the mystery of creation, it is also fitting to 
emphasize, as Thomas does, the doctrine’s identification with the Word of God because he is, as 
it is stated in Col. 1.15, “The firstborn over all creation,” about which Thomas says, “With 
respect to this, we should note that the Platonists posited the existence of Ideas, and said that 
each thing came to be by participating in an Idea . . . Instead of these we have one, namely, the 
Son, the Word of God . . . and thus in him all things were created, as in an exemplar: he spoke, and 
they were made, because he created all things to come into existence in his eternal Word.”51 By 
contrasting the exemplarity of the Word with the Platonic theory of Forms, Thomas is not 
rejecting the doctrine of the divine ideas; rather, in the course of his exegetical work on the book 
                                                
48 Bauerschmidt, Thomas Aquinas, 162. Bauerschmidt subsequently argues that the “inductive seeing of 
fittingness” is characteristic of sacra doctrina’s scientia (p.164) because, as Thomas states, “. . . ita haec doctrina non 
argumentatur ad sua principia probanda, quae sunt articuli fidei; sed ex eis procedit ad aliquid aliud ostendendum” 
(ST 1a.1.8). Doolan notes that Thomas’s argument for the divine ideas in the ST 1a.15.1 is inductive, but he ignores 
that the inductive composition of the argument is in keeping with Thomas’s description of theological inquiry 
(Aquinas on the Divine Ideas, 58 fn.28). 
49 ST 3a.59.1 ad.2: “Qui est ars et sapientia Patris.” 
50 Emery, Trinitarian Theology, 144. That Thomas arrives at this conclusion in response to scripture is 
demonstrated in his exegesis of, for instance, Jn. 14.11, “I am in the Father, and the Father in me,” about which he 
says in Lect. Ioan 14, lect. 3, no.1981: “[I]n divinis essentia est idem personae secundum rem, et sic essentia patris est 
pater, et essentia filii, filius. Ubicumque ergo est essentia patris, est ipse pater; et ubicumque est essentia filii, est ipse 
filius. Essentia autem patris est in filio, et essentia filii est in patre. Ergo filius est in patre, et pater in filio.” Cf. Lect. 
Ioan. 16, lect. 7, no.2161; ST 1a.39.1 and 2. 
51 In Col. 1, lect. 4, no.37: “Circa quod sciendum est, quod Platonici ponebant ideas, dicentes, quod 
quaelibet res fiebat ex eo quod participabat ideam . . . Loco enim harum idearum nos habemus unum, scilicet filium, 
verbum Dei . . . et ideo omnia in ipso condita sunt, sicut in quodam exemplari: dixit, et facta sunt, quia in verbo suo 
aeterno creavit omnia ut fierent.” Cf. Boland, Ideas in God, 241.  
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of Colossians, he arranges his appropriation of the doctrine to ensure that it is interpreted in 
light of the Word’s relation to creation, as indicated by his subsequent remarks on Col. 2.3, 
where it is revealed that the treasures of divine wisdom and knowledge are hidden in Christ, to 
which Thomas adds, “[God’s] wisdom is a treasure where the ideas behind all his works are 
united together as one, that is, in the divine wisdom. And all such treasures are in Christ . . . Now 
whatever is in the wisdom of God is in his single Word, because he knows all things by one 
simple act of his intellect.”52 While the structure is reversed in the Summa, when Thomas draws 
upon the grammar of the divine ideas to argue that, “The causal plan of all God’s works is 
contained in the Word,”53 he is refining his appropriation of the doctrine in relation to the 
mystery of creation, which establishes that the doctrine of the divine ideas passes, as it does in 
his exegetical work, into the exposition on God’s trinitarian act of creating through the 
revelation of the Son’s causal relation to creation (ST 1a.34.3 ad.1; 1a.46.3). It seems reasonable 
to conclude, then, that Thomas’s identification of the divine ideas with the Word of God is a 
fitting extension of the doctrine within the unfolding unity of the Summa’s treatise on God, 
which culminates in the exposition on the mystery of creation, where, as we will see in the 
following section, Thomas offers further clarification of the trinitarian principles at work in his 
application of the doctrine. 
 
4.4 The Fittingness of Speaking about the Trinitarian Processions as Rationes 
 In the Summa’s second question on God’s creative activity, Thomas argues that the work 
of creation is a fitting (conveniens) expression of God’s absolute freedom to form the universe, in 
its unity and multiplicity, through his knowledge and love (ST 1a.45.6) by which he also vivifies 
and guides each thing to its fitting or proper (debitus) end in him (ST 1a.45.6 ad.2).54 Thus, while 
God is under no obligation to create (ST 1a.19.3), there is a fittingness found in both the act of 
creation and the diversity of things created “by reason of his existence, that is, his essence, which 
is,” Thomas adds, “common to the three Persons.”55 When he turns to the question of how a 
                                                
52 In Col. 2, lect. 1, no.81: “Et secundum hoc non habet rationem thesauri, sed secundum quod huiusmodi 
rationes uniuntur in uno, scilicet sapientia divina, et omnes huiusmodi thesauri sunt in Christo . . . Quicquid autem 
in sapienta Dei est, est in Verbo suo uno, quia uno simplici actu intellectus cognoscit Omnia.” 
53 ST 1a.34.3: “[I]n verbo importatur ratio factiva eorum quae Deus facit.” 
54 Debitus is one word among many, including competit, pertinet, congruit, expedit, and decet, that Thomas often 
employs as a synonym for conveniens, as seen in Sent. IV, d.33, q.1, a.1; ST 1a2ae.58.4; 1a2ae.91.2. Cf. Narcisse, Les 
Raisons de Dieu, 41. 
55 ST 1a.45.6: “. . . secundum suum esse, quod est eius essentia, quae est communis tribus personis.” 
Thomas had already established the essential fittingness of God’s will to create when he argued in ST 1a.19.2, “Sic 
igitur vult et se et alia, sed se ut finem, alia vero ut ad finem, inquantum condecet divinam bonitatem etiam alia 
ipsam participare.” He clarifies this argument in ST 1a.47.1, where he writes, “Produxit enim res in esse propter 
suam bonitatem communicandam creaturis, et per eas repraesentandam. Et quia per unam creaturam sufficienter 
repraesentari non potest, produxit multas creaturas et diversas, ut quod deest uni ad repraesentandam divinam 
bonitatem, suppleatur ex alia, nam bonitas quae in Deo est simpliciter et uniformiter, in creaturis est multipliciter et 
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variety of things could fittingly emanate from the triune creator without contradicting, what 
Burrell has aptly labeled, the “formal feature” of divine simplicity (§3.3.2), Thomas falls back on 
the line of reasoning he introduced in ST 1a.15.2 in order to make sense of God’s deliberate 
diversification of creation (§3.1.1).56 He writes, “[A] voluntary agent which acts through will, 
such as God is, as we have seen (1a.19.4), acts through a form as held in the mind. Since, 
therefore, it is not against God’s singleness and simplicity that he should understand many things, 
as we have also seen, the truth remains that although he is the One he can also make the 
many.”57 
                                                                                                                                                  
divisim.” On this point, Christopher Franks remarks, “Of course, just because God is Trinity, it is truly appropriate 
to God’s character to create, for God is Word and Love. God goes forth in self-communication among the three 
persons, and so it is perfectly fitting for such a God to seek, through creating and redeeming others, ‘to 
communicate by likeness its own good to others as much as it possible’ [ST 1a.19.2]” “The Simplicity of the Living 
God: Aquinas, Barth, and Some Philosophers,” Modern Theology 21 [2005]: 281). Cf. Matthew Levering, “Christ, the 
Trinity, and Predestination: McCormack and Aquinas,” in Trinity and Election in Contemporary Theology, ed. Michael T. 
Dempsey (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans Publishing Company, 2011), 263–4. 
56 Burrell describes simplicity not as a divine attribute, but as formal feature of divine existence, by which 
he means that it “defines the manner in which such properties [e.g. living, wise, and willing] might be attributed to 
God. When we say God is simple, we are speaking not about God directly but about God’s ontological constitution” 
(Knowing the Unknowable God: Ibn-Sina, Maimonides, Aquinas [Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1986], 46). 
Cf. David B. Burrell, C.S.C., “Distinguishing God from the World,” in Language, Meaning, and God, ed. Brian Davies 
(London: Geoffrey Chapman, 1987), 77. He first uses this terminology in Aquinas: God & Action (London: 
Routledge & Kegan, 1979), 15, where he acknowledges his indebtedness to the works of Ludwig Wittgenstein and 
Eddy Zemack (p.177 n.4). 
57 ST 1a.47.1 ad.1: “Agens voluntarium, quale est Deus, ut supra ostensum est, agit per formam intellectam. 
Cum igitur Deum multa intelligere non repugnet unitati et simplicitati ipsius, ut supra ostensum est, relinquitur quod, 
licet sit unus, possit multa facere.” Because others have examined the compatibility between divine simplicity and 
the divine ideas in great detail (§3.1.1, n.28), I have chosen to not single out Thomas’s discourse on their relation for 
further consideration in this study; nevertheless, Eleonore Stump is certainly correct when she remarks that 
simplicity is “perhaps the most difficult and controversial piece of medieval philosophical theology, but also one of 
the most important” (“God’s Simplicity,” in The Oxford Handbook of Aquinas, ed. Brian Davies and Eleonore Stump 
[Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012], 135). As such, Thomas’s formulation of the doctrine has garnered a 
considerable amount of attention from philosophers and theologians alike. For examples, see Brian Davies, 
“Classical Theism and the Doctrine of Divine Simplicity,” in Language, Meaning, and God: Essays in Honour of Herbert 
McCabe, ed. Brian Davies (London: Geoffrey Chapman, 1987), 51–74; Wayne J. Hankey, God in Himself: Aquinas’ 
Doctrine of God as Expounded in the Summa Theologiae (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1987), 70–9; R M. Burns, “The 
Divine Simplicity in St Thomas,” Religious Studies 25 (1989): 271–93; Christopher Hughes, On a Complex Theory of a 
Simple God: An Investigation in Aquinas’ Philosophical Theology (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1989); E. C. Sweeney, 
“Thomas Aquinas’ Double Metaphysics of Simplicity and Infinity,” International Philosophical Quarterly 33 (1993): 297–
317; Peter Weigel, Aquinas on Simplicity: An Investigation Into the Foundations of His Philosophical Theology (Peter Lang, 
2008); Brian Leftow, “Aquinas, Divine Simplicity and Divine Freedom,” in Metaphysics and God, ed. Kevin Timpe 
(London: Routledge, 2009), 21–38; Eleonore Stump, “Simplicity and Aquinas’s Quantum Metaphysics,” in The 
Reception of Aristotle’s Metaphysics in the Middle Ages, ed. Gerhard Krieger, Forthcoming. Consequently, it is worth 
mentioning here that many of the same objections raised against the divine ideas are also levied against the doctrine 
of divine simplicity. See, Nicholas Wolterstorff, Inquiring about God: Selected Essays, ed. Terence Cuneo (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2010), 108; R.T. Mullins, “Simply Impossible: A Case against Divine Simplicity,” Journal 
of Reformed Theology 7 (2013): 181–203. Analytic philosophers have also shown an increased interest, both positively 
and negatively, in Thomas’s doctrine of divine simplicity, as seen in, Alvin Plantinga, Does God Have a Nature?, 
Aquinas Lecture (Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 1980); William E. Mann, “Divine Simplicity,” Religious 
Studies 18 (1982): 451–71; Eleonore Stump and Norman Kretzmann, “Absolute Simplicity,” Faith and Philosophy 2 
(1985): 353–82; William F. Vallicella, “Divine Simplicity: A New Defense,” Faith and Philosophy 9 (1992): 508–25. 
The analytic approach, however, complicates the interpretation of Thomas’s doctrine because it tends to emphasize 
contemporary philosophical commitments, which ignore the theological structure of his thought, as outlined by 
Katherin Rogers, in her insightful article, “The Traditional Doctrine of Divine Simplicity,” Religious Studies 32 (1996): 
165–86. What is needed, then, are more studies that focus on Thomas’s theological reconfiguration of the doctrine, 
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 What becomes clear from Thomas’s recourse to the logic of the divine ideas here and 
elsewhere in the Summa’s exposition on the mystery of creation is that the doctrine supplies him 
with a grammar fit for describing God’s deliberate act of creating the world in all of its variety, 
such as when he notes, at the end of his reply to the objection that God’s effect must be one 
because he is one, that, “the plurality of things corresponds to a plurality of ideas in the divine 
mind.”58 Another succinct example of this grammatical fittingness is found in the Summa’s 
question on the origin of creation, where Thomas argues, “Granted that creatures are never so 
perfect as to be like God according to likeness of nature, namely to be of the same species as 
child and parents are, nevertheless, they touch his likeness in representing the exemplar 
understood by God, rather as does the house in bricks and mortar the house in the architect’s 
mind.”59 In these passages, as with all the references to the doctrine in the Summa, Thomas 
employs the grammar of the divine ideas to illuminate the mystery of creation, which is known 
only through God’s self-disclosure in scripture (ST 1a.46.2), by relying on the fitting 
correspondence between humanity’s natural knowledge of the world and the mysteries of faith, 
which is, in fact, guaranteed by this very revelation (ST 1a.4.2; 1a.13.2). Thomas, subsequently, 
makes use of this correspondence to elaborate on his trinitarian reconfiguration of the doctrine.  
 Since we have already established that Thomas intentionally leaves his formal remarks on 
the divine ideas in ST 1a.15 open for further development (§3.1; §4.3), it is not surprising to 
discover that he discreetly returns to the doctrine in his discussion on the trinitarian act of 
creation. In his answer to the question of whether creation is proper to any one divine Person, 
Thomas says: 
[T]he causality concerning the creation of things answers to the respective 
meaning of the coming forth each Person implies. For, as was shown when we 
were discussing God’s knowledge and willing, God is the cause of things 
through his mind and will, like an artist of works of art. An artist works 
through an idea conceived in his mind and through love in his will bent on 
something. In like manner God the Father wrought the creature through his 
Word, the Son, and through his Love, the Holy Ghost. And from this point of 
view the processions of the divine Persons can be seen as types [or exemplars] 
                                                                                                                                                  
like Franks does in his superb article, which takes aim at the joint work of Stump and Kretzmann by arguing that 
they “consider simplicity in abstraction from the ecclesial reflections on the Trinity and the Incarnation that are in 
fact determinative for how Thomas discusses simplicity” (“The Simplicity of the Living God,” 276). 
58 ST 1a.47.1 ad.2: “[P]luralitati rerum correspondet in mente divina pluralitas idearum.” Burrell makes a 
similar observation when he remarks, “[O]nce we speak of God freely creating, then ideas become a convenient way 
for us to articulate the fact that God creates deliberately” (Faith and Freedom: An Interfaith Perspective, Challenges in 
Contemporary Theology [Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 2004], 84). 
59 ST 1a.44.3 ad.1: “Licet creaturae non pertingant ad hoc quod sint similes Deo secundum suam naturam, 
similitudine speciei, ut homo genitus homini generanti; attingunt tamen ad eius similitudinem secundum 
repraesentationem rationis intellectae a Deo, ut domus quae est in materia, domui quae est in mente artificis.” Cf. De 
pot. 7.1 ad.8; SCG Bk. 2, ch.46; ST 1a.4.3. 
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for the production of creatures inasmuch as they include the essential 
attributes of knowledge and will.60 
While the formal parallel depicted here between the analogy of the artisan and the archetypal 
notions (rationes) for creation ensures the presence of the divine ideas (§4.2), to begin making 
sense of the doctrine’s peripheral gesture in this passage, it is necessary to first revisit a 
distinction alluded to in the first article of question 15, but, fortunately, spelled out in more detail 
elsewhere.61 
 In ST 1a.15.1 Thomas distinguishes between natural and intelligible likenesses (similitudes). 
Although this distinction is initially employed in question 15 to reinforce Thomas’s argument 
that an intelligible likeness of creation must exist in the divine mind, it also illustrates the twofold 
function of divine exemplarity. Thomas describes this twofold function in De potentia, where he 
writes that there are two types of likenesses between God and creatures:  
This is true in one way forasmuch as creatures reproduce, in their own way, the 
idea of the divine mind, as the work of a craftsman is an imitation of the form 
in his mind. In another way it is true in that creatures are somewhat likened to 
the very nature of God, forasmuch as they derive their being from the first 
being, their goodness from the sovereign good, and so on.62 
Here Thomas employs the very distinction facilitated by the grammar of the divine ideas to 
affirm that all creatures have a likeness not only to the nature of God but also to an ideal notion 
in the divine mind. Insofar as creatures share in a perfection of God’s being, they imitate, albeit 
deficiently, the perfection of the divine essence; however, according to each creature’s particular 
mode of being, they imitate the exemplar form in the divine mind.63 
 With this distinction in mind, it should now be easier to breakdown the complexity of 
Thomas’s argument in ST 1a.45.6. Thomas opens this passage with references to ST 1a.14.8 and 
1a.19.4, where he explains that the cause of creation is God’s act of knowing and willing the 
                                                
60 ST 1a.45.6: “[D]ivinae Personae secundum rationem suae processionis habent causalitatem respectu 
creationis rerum. Ut enim supra ostensum est, cum de Dei scientia et voluntate ageretur, Deus est causa rerum per 
suum intellectum et voluntatem, sicut artifex rerum artificiatarum. Artifex autem per verbum in intellectu 
conceptum et per amorem suae voluntatis ad aliquid relatum operatur. Unde et Deus Pater operatus est creaturam 
per suum Verbum, quod est Filius, et per suum Amorem, qui est Spiritus Sanctus. Et secundum hoc processiones 
Personarum sunt rationes productionis creaturarum, inquantum includunt essentialia attributa, quae sunt scientia et 
voluntas.” 
61 That Thomas has the divine ideas in mind here is also confirmed by his remarks in DDN II, lect. 1, 
where he elaborates on the trinitarian cause of creation in his comments on the passage from Dionysius cited in the 
sed contra of this article, about which he says, “[S]ed prout secundum Platonicos totalitas quaedam dicitur ante partes, 
quae est ante totalitatem quae est ex partibus; utpote si dicamus quod domus, quae est in materia, est totum ex 
partibus et quae praeexistit in arte aedificatoris, est totum ante partes. Et in hunc modum tota rerum universitas, 
quae est sicut totum ex partibus, praeexistit sicut in primordiali causa in ipsa deitate; ut sic, ipsa deitas patris et filii et 
spiritus sancti, dicatur tota, quasi praehabens in se universa.” 
62 De pot. 3.4 ad.9: “Uno modo in quantum res creatae imitantur suo modo ideam divinae mentis, sicut 
artificiata formam quae est in mente artificis. Alio modo secundum quod res creatae ipsi naturae divinae 
quodammodo similantur, prout a primo ente alia sunt entia, et a bono bona, et sic de aliis.” 
63 Cf. Te Velde, Participation and Substantiality in Thomas Aquinas, 111; Doolan, Aquinas on the Divine Ideas, 150. 
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existence of each creature. Thus, to the degree that a creature acts through intellect and will, it 
shares in the perfection of God’s being, since the divine acts of knowing and willing are the 
divine essence (ST 1a.45.7). In this way, the first form of God’s exemplarity is represented as 
creatures imitate the perfection of the divine essence; however, God’s act of knowing and willing 
are also shown to converge in the representation of God as the artisan who creates not from 
knowledge alone, but from the unified reality of his knowledge and love. The exemplar forms are, 
therefore, not imposed on God as God, but are intentional similitudes that express in creation the 
concurrence of God’s single act of knowing and loving (ST 1a.93.6).64 From the first half of this 
passage, we can see that Thomas defends God’s causal relation to creation by situating the 
ontological and noetic dimensions of divine exemplarity alongside each other; however, this 
initial framework builds to a subtle shift in the flow of the argument, which directly relates to the 
trinitarian reality of the divine ideas.65 
 In a single breath, Thomas seamlessly transitions from the exemplarity of God’s 
knowledge and love in the act of creation to the claim that the eternal processions are themselves 
the proper notions or exemplars (rationes) for all created things. Before we consider the 
mechanics at work in this statement, let us take note of the distinctly trinitarian bent this 
proposition places on Thomas’s doctrine of the divine ideas. For Thomas, it appears, the 
revelation of God’s trinitarian act of creation extends to the formal cause of each thing in that 
the exemplar notions for creation can be traced back to the eternal processions, which are 
realized in each creature as a particular instance of God’s knowledge and love. It follows, then, 
that when Thomas asserts that God revealed himself so that human beings could know him as 
their beginning and final end (ST 1a.2.prol), which is ultimately union with God (ST 3a.1.5 ad.3), 
his insistence, at the end of the Summa, that “the blessed are united to God in knowing and 
loving” inversely announces that human beings are finally united to God through the same 
trinitarian reality after which they are patterned (ST 1a.45.7).66 To unravel how Thomas arrives at 
such a bold application of the divine ideas, we must revisit his discussion on the Word of God. 
 After concluding that the Son proceeds from the Father as “an inner word so proceeds 
from the one uttering it that it remains within him,” Thomas considers what is spoken by God in 
                                                
64 In his discussion on the divine ideas in thirteenth-century scholasticism, Clarke remarks, “The die is cast. 
The divine ideas are no longer the very forms, the true being, of creatures, but their intentional similitudes, whose 
only being is that of the one divine act of knowing” (“The Problem of Reality and Multiplicity,” 122). 
65 Te Velde observes, in a comment on Thomas’s understanding of God’s twofold exemplarity, 
“Apparently the distinction does not have a principal character in his eyes since he often mentions the two aspects 
together” (Participation and Substantiality, 111). For examples in addition to De pot. 3.4 ad.9, see Sent I, d.2, q.1, a.2; II, 
d.16, q.1, a.2 ad.2; De pot. 7.1 ad.8; 7.7 ad.6; ST 1a.44.3. While Thomas’s various joint references to the two aspects 
of likeness cannot settle the debate over the relation of the plurality of ideas to the unity of God’s ontological 
exemplarity, they do undermine attempts to methodologically distinguish his inclusion of both, as will be discussed 
in §5.1.  
66 ST 3a.2.10: “Unio sanctorum ad Deum per cognitionem et amorem.” 
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his Word.67 He says, “For the Father in knowing himself and the Son and the Holy Spirit and all 
else included in his knowledge, conceives the Word in such a way that the whole Trinity and 
even all creation are spoken in the Word.”68 Now, the Word of God alone is spoken as one 
uttered; however, it belongs to the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit to be spoken in the Word, as 
Thomas concludes, “in the way a reality understood in a word is uttered.”69 What is spoken by 
God does not, however, differ from what is known by him (ST 1a.27.1 ad.2), and since “God’s 
act of knowledge is his substance,”70 the Father, it may be said, contemplates the fullness of 
divine being, that is the reality of God’s trinitarian life, in his Word (ST 1a.34.1 ad.2), which 
necessarily includes all the ways in which the trinitarian relations are knowable (ST 1a.14.6). Yet, 
we must be careful to avoid the conclusion that the trinitarian shift in the language of the divine 
ideas eschews the formal argument on the doctrine in ST 1a.15.2 that the plurality of ideas 
expresses God’s knowledge of the diverse ways the divine essence is imitable, as Thomas himself 
instructs the reader, “Without denying the essential causality proper to the divine nature, the 
comings forth of the divine Persons are modulating causes and intelligible exemplars of 
creation.”71 
 Instead, the trinitarian turn in Thomas’s gestures with the grammar of the divine ideas 
represents a fitting theological extension of the general principle, “Effects proceed from an 
efficient cause because they pre-exist there; every agent enacts its like. Now effects pre-exist in a 
cause according to its mode of being. Since, then, God’s being is his actual understanding, 
creatures pre-exist there as held in his mind, and so, as being comprehended, do they proceed 
from him.”72 This extension is, however, only realized, for Thomas, in the Son of God, who, as 
                                                
67 ST 1a.34.1 ad.1: “Nam verbum interius sic a dicente procedit quod in ipso manet.” Harm Goris outlines 
the development of Thomas’s understanding of the inner word in “Theology and Theory of the Word in Aquinas: 
Understanding Augustine by Innovating Aristotle,” in Aquinas the Augustinian, ed. Michael Dauphinais, Barry David, 
and Matthew Levering (Washington: The Catholic University of America Press, 2007), 62–78. Also consider the 
discussion on the general notion of “inner word,” in Lonergan, Verbum, 13–24. 
68 ST 1a.34.1 ad.3: “Pater enim, intelligendo se et filium et spiritum sanctum, et omnia alia quae eius 
scientia continentur, concipit verbum, ut sic tota Trinitas verbo dicatur, et etiam omnis creatura.” 
69 ST 1a.34.1 ad.3: “. . . eo vero modo quo dicitur res in verbo intellecta, cuilibet personae convenit dici.” It 
should be noted here that this is also how Thomas speaks about the divine ideas, as he makes abundantly clear in ST 
1a.28.4 ad.3: “Respectus ideales sunt ut intellecti a Deo. Unde ex eorum pluralitate non sequitur quod sint plures 
relationes in Deo, sed quod Deus cognoscat plures relations.” Consequently, the Father does not utter himself 
through each divine idea, but through his one Word utters himself and all that he knows. Thomas is, then, 
undoubtedly referring to the same reality when he talks about the divine ideas and the utterance of the Trinity in the 
Word as things understood by God, although one pertains to God’s inter-trinitarian self-communication and the 
other to the diverse ways things can imitate the divine being.  
70 ST 1a.14.4: “intelligere Dei est ejus substantia.”  
71 ST 1a.45.7 ad.3: “Etiam processiones personarum sunt causa et ratio creationis aliquo modo.” Although 
the first part of the quotation does not appear in the Latin, the translator’s inclusion of it clarifies the force of 
Thomas’s response. 
72 ST 1a.19.4: “Secundum hoc enim effectus procedunt a causa agente, secundum quod praeexistunt in ea, 
quia omne agens agit sibi simile. Praeexistunt autem effectus in causa secundum modum causae. Unde, cum esse 
divinum sit ipsum eius intelligere, praeexistunt in eo effectus eius secundum modum intelligibilem. Unde et per 
modum intelligibilem procedunt ab eo.” Cf. De ver. 2.3; De pot. 7.1 ad.8; SCG Bk. 2, ch.46; ST 1a.4.2; 1a.42.1 ad.3. 
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the inner word (verbum interius) of the Father, “has an image of the vocal word,” or, in other 
words, creation, within himself.73 Thomas says as much when he notes, in his exegetical remarks 
on 1 Cor. 11, “[E]ven a natural agent, begin superior, makes the things it acts on similar to itself. 
Now the primordial principle of the production of things is the Son of God: all things were made 
through him (Jn. 1.3). He is, therefore, the primordial exemplar, which all creatures imitate as the 
true and perfect Image of the Father.”74 Edith Stein is, therefore, certainly correct when she 
remarks that the Word of God, according to Thomas, “shows, as it were, a double countenance, 
the one mirroring the one and simple divine nature, the other mirroring the manifold of finite 
existents. The Logos is the divine nature (as object of divine knowledge), and it is the manifold 
of meaningful existence of created things as encompassed by the divine intellect and as reflecting 
the divine nature in images and likenesses.”75 
 As exemplar causes, then, the divine ideas are uniquely attributed to the Son of God 
through whom the whole of creation is uttered in imitation of the Father’s knowledge spoken in 
his Word (Lect. Ioan. 1, lect. 2, no.77). Furthermore, by distinguishing between the referents for 
Verbum and idea in De ver. 4.4 and ST 1a.34.3 (§4.2), Thomas lays the ground work for the 
peripheral gestures of the divine ideas in his exposition on creation in order to specify that the 
origin, multiplicity, and diversity of creation represent the vocal expression of the Father’s 
eternal contemplation in his Word of the trinitarian processions as rationes for the manifold ways 
the divine essence can be imitated.76 Thus, much like we saw in the previous chapter (§3.1.2), 
Thomas utilizes the grammar of the divine ideas to locate the deep ontological structure for 
                                                                                                                                                  
For further discussion on this principle in general and in relation to the divine ideas, see Vincent P. Branick, “The 
Unity of the Divine Ideas,” The New Scholasticism 42 (1968): 174; John F. Wippel, “Thomas Aquinas on Our 
Knowledge of God and the Axiom That Every Agent Produces Something Like Itself,” Proceedings of the American 
Catholic Philosophical Association 74 (2000): 81–101; Bauerschmidt, Thomas Aquinas, 221. On the relation of this 
principle to Thomas’s trinitarian metaphysics, see Philipp Rosemann lengthy discussion in Omne Agens Agit Sibi 
Simile: A “Repetition” of Scholastic Metaphysics (Leuven University Press, 1996), 341–51. 
73 De ver. 4.1: “. . . habet imaginem vocis.” In this same article, Thomas models the threefold character of 
“word” on the analogy of the craftsman. He writes, “Et ideo, sicut in artifice tria consideramus, scilicet finem 
artificii, et exemplar ipsius, et ipsum artificium iam productum, ita et in loquente triplex verbum invenitur: scilicet id 
quod per intellectum concipitur, ad quod significandum verbum exterius profertur.” 
74 In 1 Cor. 11, lect.1, no.583: “Etiam naturale agens tamquam superius assimilat sibi patiens. Primordiale 
autem principium totius processionis rerum est filius Dei, secundum illud Io. I, 3: omnia per ipsum facta sunt. Et 
ipse ideo est primordiale exemplar, quod omnes creaturae imitantur tamquam veram et perfectam imaginem patris.” 
75 Edith Stein, Finite and Eternal Being: An Attempt at an Ascent to the Meaning of Being, trans. Kurt F. 
Reinhardt (Washington: ICS Publications, 2002), 119. Thomas reiterates this point in Lect. Ioan. 1, lect. 1, no.32, 
where he discusses the Vulgate’s translation of Jn. 1.1, about which he says, “Quod Graece ‘Logos’ dicitur, Latine et 
rationem et verbum significat; sed hoc melius verbum interpretatur, ut significetur non solum ad patrem respectus, 
sed ad illa etiam quae per verbum facta sunt operativa potentia. Ratio autem, etsi nihil per eam fiat, recte ratio 
dicitur.” 
76 It is this creational dimension of the relation between the divine ideas and the Word of God that Doolan 
fails to consider in his interpretation (§4.2); however, as Burrell notes in his criticism of Doolan on this point, 
“Showing how the effective context for the ‘divine ideas’ is that of creation will offer us a better chance of adopting 
Aquinas’s presumptions in reading him, and save us from importing our own” (“Book Review of Gregory Doolan’s 
Aquinas on the Divine Ideas as Exemplar Causes,” Nova et Vetera (English) 7 [2009]: 752). 
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creation in God’s eternal self-knowledge, but through the course of the Summa’s pedagogical 
evolution, he reveals that the whole of creation, in all of its multiplicity and variety, fittingly 
corresponds to God’s eternal self-reflection on the trinitarian life secured in the Word of God 
and illuminated by the grammar of the divine ideas.  
 
4.5 Conclusion 
 While a great deal more could be said about Thomas’s trinitarian reformulation of the 
divine ideas in his doctrine of creation, we have identified, through the pedagogical development 
of the Summa, the grounds for a more robust trinitarian rereading of the doctrine. As we have 
seen, Thomas’s argument that, “God makes nothing except though the conception of his 
intellect, which is an eternally conceived wisdom, that is, the Word of God, and the Son of 
God,”77 does not make the divine ideas redundant, as Boland also observes,78 but, instead, 
exposes the way he employs the grammar of the doctrine to fittingly delineate between God’s 
inter-trinitarian self-communication and the Father’s knowledge of the different ways the eternal 
trinitarian relations can be imitated, such that he can claim, “In all creatures we find a likeness of 
the Trinity by way of trace in that there is something in all of them that has to be taken back to 
the divine Persons as its cause.”79 There is, consequently, as Vincent Branick argues, “[A] 
structure of reality which precedes our intellection and which forces us to consider God in a 
multiplicity of ideas.”80 This structure is rooted in the Father’s intimate knowledge of the order 
between the three persons of the Trinity (ST 1a.36.2), and drawn out by Thomas in his 
discussion on the trinitarian act of creation, where he uses the grammar of the divine ideas to 
identify the eternal processions as exemplar notions for creation. Attempts, then, to separate 
Thomas’s doctrine of the divine ideas from the Summa’s pedagogical efforts to instill the proper 
habit of thinking theologically about God ultimately divorce the doctrine from the very premise 
that ensures its fittingness for discourse about God, as the following chapter demonstrates.   
 
                                                
77 Lect. Ioan. 1, lect. 2, n.77: “Sic ergo Deus nihil facit nisi per conceptum sui intellectus, qui est sapientia ab 
aeterno concepta, scilicet Dei verbum, et Dei filius aeterno concepta, scilicet Dei verbum, et Dei filius.” Cf. Boland, 
Ideas in God, 248. 
78 Boland, Ideas in God, 248. 
79 ST 1a.45.7: “In creaturis omnibus invenitur repraesentatio Trinitatis per modum vestigii, inquantum in 
qualibet creatura inveniuntur aliqua quae necesse est reducere in divinas Personas sicut in causam.” Cf. ST 1a.93.2 
ad.4. 
80 Branick, “The Unity of the Divine Ideas,” 171 n.1. Branick is commenting on Sent. I, d.2, q.1, a.3, where 
Thomas claims, “Et ideo pluralitati istarum rationum respondet aliquid in re quae Deus est: non quidem pluralitas 
rei, sed plena perfectio, ex qua contingit ut omnes istae conceptiones ei aptentur.” This argument is echoed in 
Thomas’s reply to the objection in ST 1a.13.4 ad.2 that it is pointless to predicate multiple things to the simple 
divine being: “Rationes plures horum nominum non sunt cassae et vanae, quia omnibus eis respondet unum quid 
simplex, per omnia huiusmodi multipliciter et imperfecte repraesentatum.” 
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5. Peripheral Preface: A Metaphysical Prefix to  
Thomas’s Doctrine of the Divine Ideas 
 
 The guiding principle of a theologically founded worldliness . . . patently includes the acceptance, for  
example, of all the findings of natural reason . . . on the one hand; and on the other hand, the principle  
calls for an allegiance to the standards of a superhuman and supernatural truth.1 
 
Introduction 
 
In his monumental study on Thomas’s metaphysics, John Wippel argues: 
 [W]e may find a running series of philosophical discussions joined together as 
succeeding questions or chapters in works such as the Summa theologiae . . . We 
may easily remove such discussions from the general theological context of the 
writings in which they appear and from the references to Scripture and the 
Fathers contained in some of their videturs or sed contras and use them as 
important sources in reconstructing Thomas’s metaphysical thought.2  
Wippel concludes that we may do this, “because in these cases Thomas has developed his 
philosophical thinking on these points as part of his philosophical enterprise, by relying on 
unaided human reason.”3 It is, however, this type of hermeneutical dissection that perpetuates 
the notion that the “authentic spirit of Thomism” is, as Fergus Kerr notes in his comments on 
Hans urs von Balthasar’s early interpretation of Thomas, “that philosophy and theology should 
divide and go their separate ways.”4 
As we saw in the previous chapter, Gregory Doolan preserves his mentor’s 
hermeneutical approach when he concludes that the doctrine of the divine ideas serves primarily 
as a metaphysical precept in Thomas’s philosophy that may be divorced from its theological arc 
(§4.2).5 Although the doctrine of the divine ideas certainly retains its philosophical contours 
                                                
1 Josef Pieper, Guide to Thomas Aquinas, trans. Richard Winston and Clara Winston (San Francisco: Ignatius 
Press, 1991), 133–4. 
2 John F. Wippel, The Metaphysical Thought of Thomas Aquinas: From Finite Being to Uncreated Being (Washington: 
Catholic University of America Press, 2000), xxi. In response to this claim, Matthew Levering asserts, “[I]ndeed it 
would be a grave theological mistake to treat these references to Scripture and the Fathers as mere decorations. 
Rather, without conflating philosophy and theology, theologians must seek to understand the interplay of Scripture 
and metaphysics that constitutes the fabric of Aquinas’s theology” (Matthew Levering, Scripture and Metaphysics: 
Aquinas and the Renewal of Trinitarian Theology [Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, 2004], 48 n.3). 
3 Wippel, Metaphysical Thought, xxi n.20. 
4 Fergus Kerr, O.P., “The Varieties of Interpreting Aquinas,” in Contemplating Aquinas: On the Varieties of 
Interpretation, ed. Fergus Kerr, O.P. (London: SCM Press, 2003), 32. Kerr is commenting on, Hans urs von Balthasar, 
The Theology of Karl Barth: Exposition and Interpretation, trans. Edward T. Oakes, S.J. (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 
1992), 263–6. 
5 For Doolan, then, references to Scripture and the Church Fathers in Thomas's discussions on divine 
ideas function, at best, as theological modifiers that can be stripped from his descriptions of the doctrine to reveal 
his metaphysical vision for the doctrine, as we saw in his deconstruction of the connection between the Word of 
God and divine ideas (§4.2, esp. n.24). Yet, this type of interpretive dissection of Thomas's thought has been, to 
reiterate, adamantly opposed by recent developments in Thomist studies. Cf. Eugene F. Rogers, Thomas Aquinas and 
Karl Barth: Sacred Doctrine and the Natural Knowledge of God, New edition (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame 
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throughout his works, we have already noted that Thomas’s pedagogical design of the Summa 
suggests that he intentionally integrates the doctrine’s metaphysical insights into his vision of 
sacra doctrina in order to elaborate on truths about God and creation latent in the confession of 
faith (§2.1).6 To put this another way, Thomas’s doctrine of the divine ideas mirrors, as the 
previous two chapters have adumbrated, his paradigm for theological discourse in the Summa, or, 
in the words of Marie-Dominique Chenu, the doctrine “simultaneously combines a rational 
explanation of things, which is drawn precisely from their natures, with a religious explanation 
since these natures in themselves and in their destiny are the realization of a divine idea.”7  
Nevertheless, the hermeneutical practices Wippel and Doolan adopt remain common in 
the interpretation of Thomas’s doctrine of the divine ideas and, thus, demand closer scrutiny. 
Fortunately, Thomas’s allusion to the divine ideas in the fourth and fifth proofs for the existence 
of God (ST 1a.2.3) provide us with a type of peripheral preface to his doctrine of the divine ideas 
through which we can examine the validity of this interpretive bias in the evaluation of the 
doctrine’s meaning and contribution. The intimations to the divine ideas in these proofs also 
offer us an excellent example of the dialectical exchange between philosophy and theology in, 
what Matthew Levering calls, Thomas’s “theocentric metaphysics,” since the groundwork 
completed in the so-called ‘five ways’ for proving the existence of God functions like a 
                                                                                                                                                  
Press, 1999), 5–7; Fergus Kerr, O.P., After Aquinas: Versions of Thomism (Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, 2002), 64; Mark D. 
Jordan, Rewritten Theology: Aquinas After His Readers (Oxford: Blackwell, 2005), 154 n.1.  
6 Cf. Matthew Levering, Paul in the Summa Theologiae (Washington: The Catholic University of America 
Press, 2014), 17 and 145. 
7 M.-D. Chenu, Toward Understanding Saint Thomas, trans. M.-D. Landry, O.P. and D. Hughes, O.P. 
(Chicago: Henry Regnery, 1964), 312. The specific context for this citation is quoted in §1.2. Chenu's somewhat 
ambiguous proposal here that the divine ideas represent the “home of theology” because they provide both a 
rational and a religious account of things, can be clarified with the help of Kieran Conley's observation that, for 
Thomas, “Theology is the child of faith and reason, supernatural truth, received in faith and developed by reason, is 
given birth as the divine-human knowledge called theology . . . In constructing conceptually its work of theological 
architecture human intelligence must keep the desired end ever in view, an understanding of the truths of faith” (A 
Theology Of Wisdom: A Study in St. Thomas [Dubuque: The Priory Press, 1963], 67). Theological reflection, therefore, 
arises from a dialogue between faith and philosophical reasoning; however, contrary to Wippel and Doolan, who 
propose that the theological layer of this dialogue can be easily peeled off to reveal the substantive philosophical 
content beneath, Conley's comment emphasizes that for Thomas the exchange between faith and philosophical 
reasoning in theological reflection is always a dynamic interplay leading to theological wisdom. Consequently, as 
Mark Jordan says, "[A]ny philosophy 'in' the Summa must be approached through theology if it is to be approached 
within the book's structure” (Rewritten Theology: Aquinas After His Readers [Oxford: Blackwell, 2005, 154), which is the 
type of modus operandi this study has attempted to maintain. With Chenu’s proposition in mind, the parallels between 
the doctrine of the divine ideas and the notion of theological fittingness, outlined in §4.2, should also be more 
obvious. On the paradigmatic form of the doctrine, Vincent Branick makes a similar observation about the divine 
ideas; when commenting on humanity’s knowledge of divine simplicity, he concludes, “The judgment of unity was 
in fact already made . . . before any consideration of the multiplicity of the divine ideas. But the judgment had to be 
seen as in some way developing out of the terms used for the very multiplicity of the ideas. Since this intellectual 
process is the method of all theologizing, the concern for the multiplicity and unity of the divine ideas becomes a 
sort of paradigm of all theological discourse” (“The Unity of the Divine Ideas,” The New Scholasticism 42 [1968]: 171–
2). 
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metaphysical prefix to his theological reformulation of the doctrine later in the Summa.8 
Consequently, the majority of this chapter is devoted to identifying the function, presence, and 
anticipation of the divine ideas in the fourth and fifth ways in relation to the pedagogical pattern 
of the Summa. However, because our argument here is largely a response to the pattern of 
hermeneutical bifurcation between theology and philosophy, to settle questions over the 
doctrine’s relevance for Thomas, it will be beneficial to first confirm the persistence of this 
practice in the evaluation of his thought on the divine ideas.  
The first section, therefore, identifies and examines the recourse to separating Thomas’s 
theological and philosophical interests in various studies dealing with the dual claims that God 
alone is the exemplar for all creation (ST 1a.44.3) and that there must be a plurality of ideas in 
the mind of God after which creatures are patterned (ST 1a.15.2). In the next section, the 
contribution of the five ways to Thomas’s pedagogical vision for the Summa is considered. Here 
we examine the allusions to the divine ideas in the fourth and fifth proofs, which confirm that 
Thomas is indirectly referring to the doctrine in the construction of these arguments. This 
section also extrapolates on what the doctrine of the divine ideas would look like, according to 
Thomas, if he had limited his account to a strictly philosophical perspective. The final section 
briefly elaborates on the theological turn in Thomas’s application of the divine ideas anticipated 
by his intimations to the doctrine in the fourth and fifth ways. 
 
5.1 Worlds Apart: The Curious Practice of Bifurcating Theology and Philosophy  
 
In the debate over how to handle the apparent tension in Thomas’s dual claims that the 
divine essence is the exemplar cause (exemplariter) of all things (ST 1a.3.8 ad.1) and that all the 
exemplars (omnes rationes) for things preexist in the mind of God (ST 1a.105.3), many studies have 
sought refuge in the distinction between the scientiae of philosophy and theology; however, these 
studies often turn this distinction into a rigid separation, which, according to Fergus Kerr, the 
last sixty years of Thomist scholarship has, by and large, aspired to overturn.9 David Burrell is 
                                                
8 Levering, Scripture and Metaphysics, 2004, 36. Levering writes, “Theocentric metaphysics belongs to the 
pedagogical intention of theological wisdom.” 
9 Kerr, O.P., “The Varieties of Interpreting Aquinas,” 30. Kerr, along with many others, traces the 
institutionalization of this bifurcation in Thomist studies to Pope Leo XIII’s 1879 encyclical Aeterni Patris, which 
called for Catholic scholars to answer the challenge of Enlightenment philosophy by returning to the works of 
Thomas; however, in an unfortunate turn of events, what emerged from this directive was an interpretive praxis that, 
in Kerr’s words, “kept to very much the same canons of rationality as we find in the Enlightenment” (Twentieth-
Century Catholic Theologians: From Neoscholasticism to Nuptial Mysticism [Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, 2007], 2). Cf. Alasdair 
MacIntyre, Three Rival Versions of Moral Enquiry: Encyclopaedia, Genealogy and Tradition (Notre Dame: University of 
Notre Dame Press, 1990), 65–75; Thomas F O’Meara, Thomas Aquinas Theologian (Notre Dame: University of Notre 
Dame Press, 1997), 171. For more on the events surrounding these developments in Thomist scholarship, see 
Gerald A. McCool, The Neo-Thomists (Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 1994), 25–39; Vivian Boland, O.P., St. 
Thomas Aquinas (London: Bloomsbury, 2007), 112–9. On Kerr’s assessment of these events, see Paul D. Murray, 
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one Thomist scholar who has worked diligently on many fronts to show that there is no “neat 
division between ‘philosophy’ and ‘theology’ which had indeed fuelled the Thomist revival 
during the twentieth century . . . We are misled, then, only when we fail to recognize that 
Aquinas’s project is explicitly theological, and doubly misled if we expect philosophy to do more 
than he himself demanded of it.”10 Yet, it appears that this reorientation in Thomist studies has 
not quite found its way into the analysis of Thomas’s arguments for the divine ideas, as indicated 
by Burrell’s recent review of Gregory Doolan’s book on Thomas’s doctrine of the divine ideas, 
in which he critiques Doolan for perpetuating this division.11 It is therefore the purpose of this 
section to identify the reoccurring hermeneutical bifurcation of Thomas’s theology and 
philosophy in studies dealing with his doctrine of divine exemplarism, and the place to begin is 
with the work of Étienne Gilson, since many of the questions found in later English studies on 
the doctrine first appear in his works.12 
 
5.1.1 Sweeping away Theological Tradition in favor of a Thomist Philosophy  
Gilson’s work on Thomas, which was largely intended to challenge the Leonine 
Thomism that emerged in the late nineteenth century, has had a significant impact on English 
Thomist studies, and his work Le Thomisme has been described as, “the most influential 
exposition of Thomas’s thought,” so it seems reasonable to assume that his treatment of 
Thomas’s doctrine of the divine ideas has probably shaped, either directly or indirectly, its 
reception in later generations.13 In Le thomisme Gilson insists that “exemplarism is one of the 
essential elements of Thomism,” but he quickly qualifies this claim by asserting that Thomas 
                                                                                                                                                  
“Discerning the Dynamics of Doctrinal Development: A Post-Foundationalist Perspective,” in Faithful Reading: New 
Essays in Theology in Honour of Fergus Kerr, OP, ed. Simon Oliver, Karen Kilby, and Thomas O’Loughlin (London: 
Bloomsbury, 2012), 196–8. William Abraham develops an exquisite argument to help contemporary theologians 
reorient their methods of reception and interpretation in Crossing the Threshold of Divine Revelation (Grand Rapids: 
Eerdmans Publishing, 2006), 1–57. 
10 David B. Burrell, C.S.C., “Religious Life and Understanding: Grammar Exercised in Practice,” in 
Grammar and Grace: Reformulation in Aquinas and Wittgenstein, ed. Jeffrey Stout and Robert MacSwain (London: SCM 
Press, 2004), 125. Cf. Burrell, “Religious Life and Understanding,” The Review of Metaphysics 22 (1969): 683; Burrell, 
“Theology and Philosophy,” in The Blackwell Companion to Modern Theology (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 2004), 34–
46; Burrell, “Creation in Super Evangelium S. Joannis Lectura,” in Reading John with St. Thomas Aquinas: Theological Exegesis 
and Speculative Theology, ed. Michael Dauphinais and Matthew Levering (Washington: The Catholic University of 
America Press, 2010), 116. 
11 David B. Burrell, C.S.C., “Book Review of Gregory Doolan’s Aquinas on the Divine Ideas as Exemplar 
Causes,” Nova et Vetera (English) 7 (2009): 751–2. 
12 It should be noted that this bifurcation between theology and philosophy is not necessarily characteristic 
of each author’s broader reception of Thomas’s works, but representative of the way each one responds to his 
doctrine of the divine ideas. 
13 Kerr, O.P., After Aquinas, 80. Francesca Aran Murphy provides a thoughtful discussion on Gilson’s 
presence throughout contemporary English theology in Art and Intellect in the Philosophy of Etienne Gilson (University of 
Missouri Press, 2004), 331–42. Also see Wayne J. Hankey, “From Metaphysics to History, From Exodus to 
Neoplatonism, From Scholasticism to Pluralism: The Fate of Gilsonian Thomism in English-Speaking North 
America,” Dionysius 16 (1998): 157–88. 
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intentionally distances himself from the doctrine’s Platonic/Augustinian foundation.14 Gilson 
returns to Thomas’s doctrine of the divine ideas later in the work and, after reviewing Thomas’s 
statements in ST 1a.15 and De ver. 3, he concludes, “The most important result of all these 
considerations is to show us how vague and inadequate was our first attempt to define the 
creative act . . . It leaves totally unexplained the first origin of things.”15 Here we encounter the 
first signs of Gilson’s dissatisfaction with the doctrine of the divine ideas, which anticipate his 
more direct answer in Introduction à la philosophie chrétienne to the question why Thomas even 
includes the doctrine within the pages of his canon. 
Armand Maurer aptly summarizes Gilson’s thought on the divine ideas in this latter work 
when he writes that, for Gilson, “Thomas’s new conception of God as ipsum esse subsistens would 
logically lead him to dispense with divine ideas . . . as though they were superfluous.”16 
According to Gilson, Thomas says all that he needs to in ST 1a.14 based on his argument for 
God being ipsum esse subsistens.17 He then boldly argues, “It is hardly an exaggeration to say that at 
bottom everything St. Thomas said about the Ideas was in his view one more concession made 
to the language of a philosophy that was not really his own.”18 In this remark Gilson makes his 
final assessment of the divine ideas known, and concludes that Thomas adopted a philosophical 
perspective that no longer needed the doctrine of the divine ideas because it could sufficiently 
attribute creation to a single divine exemplar – the divine essence.19 So, Gilson asks, why does 
Thomas include arguments for the plurality of ideas? He answers that it was out of deference to 
the authority of Augustine in theology. Accordingly, for Gilson, when Thomas is discussing the 
plurality of ideas, as he says, “Clearly, we are in theology, where Augustine wields great 
authority.”20 As we can see, Gilson concludes that Thomas’s motivation for including the 
doctrine of divine ideas is not his constructive philosophical endeavors, but his theological 
                                                
14 Étienne Gilson, Thomism: The Philosophy of Thomas Aquinas, trans. Laurence K. Shook and Armand Maurer 
(Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 2002), 72. This is a translation of Le Thomisme: Introduction À La 
Philosophie de Saint Thomas d’Aquin, 6th ed., Etudes de Philosophie Médiévale (Paris: J. Vrin, 1965 [Original: Strasburg, 
1919]). 
15 Gilson, Thomism, 133. He also argues here that one of the “consequences of this doctrine is to de-
existentialize completely the notion of creation” (p.149).  
16 Armand A. Maurer, “James Ross on the Divine Ideas: A Reply,” American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly 
65 (1991): 217. Cf. Wayne J. Hankey, “Denys and Aquinas: Antimodern Cold and Postmodern Hot,” in Christian 
Origins: Theology, Rhetoric and Community, ed. Lewis Ayres and Gareth Jones (London: Routledge, 1998), 146. Thomas 
describes God as ipsum esse subsistens in ST 1a.3.4, 1a.4.1, 1a.7.1, and 1a.12.4. For more on this Thomist notion of 
God, see Rudi A. te Velde, Participation and Substantiality in Thomas Aquinas, Studien Und Texte Zur Geistesgeschichte 
Des Mittelalters 46 (Leiden: Brill, 1995), 119–25. 
17 Étienne Gilson, Christian Philosophy: An Introduction, trans. Armand A. Maurer (Toronto: Pontifical 
Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 1993), 104 and 107; French original, Gilson, Introduction à La Philosophie Chrétienne. 
18 Gilson, Christian Philosophy, 103–4. 
19 Gilson, Christian Philosophy, 109. 
20 Gilson, Christian Philosophy, 108. It should be noted that Gilson is not arguing that the divine ideas serve a 
theological purpose in Thomas’s thought, but that Thomas’s theology of tradition will not allow him to exclude a 
doctrine from his writings that Augustine endorsed. 
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respect for tradition; however, this type of argument only works if Thomas’s theological and 
philosophical commitments can, generally speaking, diverge from one another. 
 Following in Gilson’s footsteps, although initially unknowingly, is James Ross, whose 
pivotal essay on Thomas’s doctrine of the divine ideas, “Aquinas’s Exemplarism; Aquinas’s 
Voluntarism,” has received more sustained attention than any other work on this topic.21 What 
prompted Ross to write this article was a study published by John Wippel on the reality of 
nonexisting possibles.22 In response to Wippel, Ross raises a number of valid concerns about the 
implications of the doctrine of the divine ideas for questions about possible worlds and the 
nature of creation, which he addresses more fully in other works.23 Ross is determined, in this 
article, to challenge, what he calls, “a photo exemplarist” reading of the divine ideas, which he 
asserts “holds that God has ideas, like photographs or blueprints, ‘for each thing and each kind, 
                                                
21 American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly 64 (1990): 171–98. Ross’s article is the subject of two responses: 
Lawrence Dewan, “St. Thomas, James Ross, and Exemplarism: A Reply,” American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly 65 
(1991): 221–34; Maurer, “James Ross on the Divine Ideas.” He replies to these to articles in, James F. Ross, 
“Response to Maurer and Dewan,” American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly 65 (1991): 235–43. Ross’s article is also the 
focus of discussion in David B. Burrell, C.S.C., Freedom and Creation in Three Traditions (Notre Dame: University of 
Notre Dame Press, 1993), 111–8; Aaron Martin, “Reckoning with Ross: Possibles, Divine Ideas, and Virtual 
Practical Knowledge,” Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association 78 (2005): 193–208; Doolan, Aquinas 
on the Divine Ideas, 112–3 and 139. There were a number of studies on Thomas’s doctrine of the divine ideas 
completed after Gilson’s initial publication of Le Thomisme and before Ross’s essay, which include Marie-Charles 
Perret, “La Notion d’Exemplarité,” Revue Thomiste 41 (1936); Timotheus Sparks, De divisione causae exemplaris apud S. 
Thomam (River Forest, Ill.: Dominican House of Studies, 1936); David L. Greenstock, “Exemplar Causality and the 
Supernatural Order,” The Thomist 16 (1953): 1–31; Theodore J. Kondoleon, “Exemplary Causality in the Philosophy 
of St. Thomas Aquinas” (Dissertation, The Catholic University of America, 1967); Branick, “The Unity of the 
Divine Ideas”; Armand Maurer, “St. Thomas and Eternal Truths,” Mediaeval Studies 32 (1970): 91–107; Lawrence 
Dewan, “St. Thomas and the Possibles,” The New Scholasticism 53 (1979): 76–85; Lawrence Dewan, “St. Thomas, 
Ideas, and Immediate Knowledge,” Dialogue 18 (1979): 392–404; W. Norris Clarke, “The Problem of the Reality and 
Multiplicity of Divine Ideas in Christian Neoplatonism,” in Neoplatonism and Christian Thought, ed. Dominic J. 
O’Meara (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1982), 109–27. However, despite some of these studies 
attempting to challenge, in various ways, the pattern of bifurcation in the reception of Thomas’s doctrine of divine 
ideas, they accomplished very little in actually deterring the interpretive division between theology and philosophy, 
as indicated by the absence of any pressure on Ross to defend his practice of relegating Thomas’s statements about 
the plurality of ideas to his theological inheritance.  
22 The article that Ross is responding to is John F. Wippel, “The Reality of Nonexisting Possibles 
According to Thomas Aquinas, Henry of Ghent, and Godfrey of Fontaines,” The Review of Metaphysics 34 (1981): 
729–58. Later republished as chapter 7 in Metaphysical Themes in Thomas Aquinas (Washington: The Catholic 
University of America Press, 1984), 163–90. 
23 See, for instance, James F. Ross, “Creation,” The Journal of Philosophy 77 (October 1, 1980): 614–29; James 
F. Ross, “God, Creator of Kinds and Possibilities: Requiescant Universalia Ante Res,” in Rationality, Religious Belief 
and Moral Commitment, ed. Robert Audi and William J. Wainwright (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 
1986), 315–34; James Ross, “Eschatological Pragmatism,” in Philosophy and the Christian Faith, ed. Thomas V. Morris 
(Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1988), 279–300; James F. Ross, “The Crash of Modal Metaphysics,” 
The Review of Metaphysics 43 (December 1, 1989): 251–79. Among scholars indebted to analytical philosophy, there is 
a growing interest in the divine ideas for many of the same reasons that Ross opposes the doctrine. For examples, 
see Jay Wesley Richards, The Untamed God: A Philosophical Exploration of Divine Perfection, Immutability, and Simplicity 
(Colorado Springs: InterVarsity Press, 2003), 242–50; Greg Welty, “Truth as Divine Ideas: A Theistic Theory of the 
Property ‘Truth,’” Southwestern Journal of Theology 47 (Fall 2004): 55–68; Greg Welty, “Theistic Conceptual Realism: 
The Case for Interpreting Abstract Objects as Divine Ideas” (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Oxford, 
2006); James N. Anderson and Greg Welty, “The Lord of Non-Contradiction: An Argument for God from Logic,” 
Philosophia Christi 13 (2011): 321–38. 
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both actual and possible.’”24 Although Gilson leaves a number of hints to his position on 
Thomas’s doctrine of the divine ideas scattered throughout a number of his works, Ross initially 
identifies him, along with Maurer and Wippel, as a representative of the photo exemplarist 
interpretation. However, Ross was, at the time, unaware of Gilson’s Introduction à la philosophie 
chrétienne, and in his reply to Maurer’s review of his article, he admits, “Had I been familiar with 
that book, I would have claimed Gilson as an ally.”25  
Similar to Gilson’s interpretation, then, Ross insists that Thomas’s commitment to 
Aristotelian metaphysics leaves room for “only one divine idea, the same no matter what God 
does.”26 Ross ultimately concludes that in Thomas’s statements on the doctrine of the divine 
ideas “there is little left of Augustine’s doctrine, except for the words.”27 This claim essentially 
leaves Thomas’s formal remarks of the doctrine devoid of any substantive contribution to his 
works. Again, much like Gilson, Ross reasons that Thomas only includes the doctrine of the 
divine ideas because he is “constrained by various formulae that have great theological authority 
(e.g., formulae from Augustine and from Pseudo-Dionysus).”28 Thus, as with Gilson, Ross’s 
interpretation of Thomas’s doctrine of the divine ideas relies on the possibility that Thomas’s 
theological and philosophical commitments can operate at cross-purposes.29 While the works of 
both Gilson and Ross have greatly enriched our understanding of Thomist metaphysics, their 
interpretations of Thomas’s doctrine of the divine ideas cannot be sustained without the 
assumption that his theological principles can be swept away to expose a revolutionary 
philosophical theory of divine exemplarism.30 Consequently, despite arriving at a radically 
different interpretation of the doctrine than Wippel, one cannot help but notice the similarities 
between the approaches of Gilson and Ross and that of Wippel outlined in the introduction to 
this chapter.  
 
                                                
24 Ross, “Aquinas’s Exemplarism,” 173. 
25 Ross, “Response to Maurer and Dewan,” 235. 
26 Ross, “Aquinas’s Exemplarism,” 174. 
27 Ross, “Response to Maurer and Dewan,” 235. 
28 Ross, “Aquinas’s Exemplarism,” 239. 
29 Ross’s initial misunderstanding of Gilson’s position is notable because it exposes a common interpretive 
assumption on the relation between Thomas’s theology and philosophy, which enables them both to reach similar 
conclusions about how to deal with Thomas’s statements on the plurality of ideas. For fuller descriptions of Ross’s 
initial misreading of Gilson, see Maurer, “James Ross on the Divine Ideas,” 219–20; Ross, “Response to Maurer and 
Dewan,” 235–7.  
30 Ross says as much when he remarks, in his response to Dewan, “Our disagreement is not, in general at 
least, about what Aquinas is trying to achieve . . . but about how he achieves the objects, and perhaps, whether he is 
framing a revolutionary reinterpretation of the divine ideas and the divine power within accepted theological 
discourse, or is adopting that discourse and the underlying Augustinian exemplarism. I opt for the revolution” 
(“Response to Maurer and Dewan,” 238). 
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5.1.2 Exchanging a Philosophy of the Many for a Theology of the One  
 The next work to be considered is Mark Jordan’s exceptional article on Thomas’s 
doctrine of the divine ideas. This was published some years prior to Ross’s study, but offers a 
different interpretive trajectory for the bifurcation between theology and philosophy.31 Jordan 
explains that he intends to follow the lines of Thomas’s thought on the divine ideas “as a means 
of showing how an account of creation at once clarifies and inverts the analysis of natural 
intelligibility.”32 He is certain, much like Gilson and Ross, that Thomas’s assessment of the 
divine ideas arises largely out of respect for the voices of authority in his thought (i.e. Augustine, 
Pseudo-Dionysius, and Albert the Great).33 Unlike Gilson and Ross, however, who worry that 
the doctrine’s Neoplatonic origins threaten to obscure, according to their readings, the 
consistency of Thomas’s metaphysics, Jordan insists that from the time Thomas first interacts 
with the doctrine in his Scriptum super Sententiis,  “the balance of Platonic to Aristotelian claims 
and the ambivalent relation of philosophy to faith [colors his] whole discussion of the Ideas.”34 
By situating Thomas’s doctrine of the divine ideas within the context of philosophy’s relation to 
faith, Jordan exhibits an incredible sensitivity to the various philosophical and theological issues 
at work in Thomas’s discussions on the divine ideas. 
One example of this sensitivity is Jordan’s rather deft parsing of the interplay between 
Platonic and Aristotelian concepts in Thomas’s discussions on the doctrine, which he asserts are 
essential to his interpretation because it is through the exchange between them that Thomas 
distances himself from both.35 Yet, in distancing himself from both Platonism and 
Aristotelianism, Jordan claims, “Thomas argues from the common opinion of philosophy to the 
specific tenets of the Christian teaching about creation.”36 There is a reversal here in the location 
of Thomas’s reflections on the divine ideas from that seen in the arguments of Gilson and Ross 
since Jordan is arguing that Thomas’s discussions on the doctrine belong to the first stage in a 
larger transition from a philosophical to a theological perspective.37 While, as Jordan 
acknowledges, the majority of Thomas’s expositions on the plurality of ideas adhere to the 
arguments of his authorities, he asserts that when “the qualifications and the authorities have 
                                                
31 Mark D. Jordan, “The Intelligibility of the World and the Divine Ideas in Aquinas,” The Review of 
Metaphysics 38 (1984): 17–32. 
32 Jordan, “The Intelligibility of the World,” 17. 
33 Jordan, “The Intelligibility of the World,” 21–2, 24, 29. 
34 Jordan, “The Intelligibility of the World,” 20. On the unease Gilson and Ross have with the Neoplatonic 
origin of the divine ideas, see Gilson, Thomism, 148–52; Gilson, Christian Philosophy, 14 and 113; Ross, “God, Creator 
of Kinds,” 315–6; Ross, “The Crash of Modal Metaphysics,” 276–9; Ross, “Aquinas’s Exemplarism,” 174–7. 
35 Jordan, “The Intelligibility of the World,” 20, 24–5. 
36 Jordan, “The Intelligibility of the World,” 20. 
37 Jordan, “The Intelligibility of the World,” 32: “For Thomas, as the doctrine of Ideas makes clear, 
philosophy may know nature adequately without being able to reach the ground of natural intelligibility at all.” 
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dropped away; what remains is the bare teaching that the divine essence is the sufficient and 
direct exemplar of all created being as particular and particularly disposed.”38  
Jordan finds support for his argument in Thomas’s discussions on the nature of divine 
exemplarism in the Summa contra Gentiles and the Lectura super Ioannem as well as in Quodlibet 4, 
where the divine essence is explicitly identified as the proper idea for every creature.39 He 
concludes, then, that “there is no longer much need to speak of exemplars or Ideas. In the direct 
imitation of God by creatures, Ideas are otiose . . . There is no need for a middle step.”40 
Consequently, whereas Gilson and Ross align Thomas’s statements about the plurality of ideas 
with his theological commitments in order to maintain his philosophical consistency, Jordan flips 
the arrangement by identifying the plurality of ideas with a set of philosophical precepts left 
behind in the wake of Thomas’s theological claim that there is only one divine exemplar – the 
divine essence – expressed in the act of creation through the Word of God. In both cases, 
however, the arguments rely on the possibility of bifurcating Thomas’s thought along some 
point of division between his theological and philosophical reflections.41  
 
5.1.3 Leaving Theology Behind 
The final work to be examined here is Doolan’s book on the divine ideas, which regularly 
regards itself as a response to the interpretive practice of dismissing the relevance of the divine 
ideas exemplified in readings of Gilson and Ross.42 Doolan summarizes his response to Gilson 
                                                
38 Jordan, “The Intelligibility of the World,” 29. 
39 SCG IV, c.13: “Fecit igitur Deus omnia per verbum suum, quod est ratio rerum factarum ab ipso.” Lect. 
Ioan. 1, lect. 2, no.77: “Sic ergo Deus nihil facit nisi per conceptum sui intellectus, qui est sapientia ab aeterno 
concepta, scilicet Dei verbum, et Dei filius: et ideo impossibile est quod aliquid faciat nisi per filium.” Quod. 4, q.1, 
a.1: “Licet enim omnes res, in quantum sunt, divinam essentiam imitentur, non tamen uno et eodem modo omnia 
imitantur ipsam, sed diversimode, et secundum diversos gradus. Sic ergo divina essentia, secundum quod est 
imitabilis hoc modo ab hac creatura, est propria ratio et idea huiusmodi creaturae.” For a rebuttal of Jordan’s 
interpretation of Quodlibet 4, see Doolan, Aquinas on the Divine Ideas, 105–6. 
40 Jordan, “The Intelligibility of the World,” 29. Jordan’s conclusion here is reminiscent of Ross’s 
description of the divine ideas as a “fifth wheel” in “The Crash of Modal Metaphysics,” 277.  
41 Robert Henle also offers an interpretive approach to Thomas’s doctrine of the divine ideas that is similar 
to the one found in Gilson and Ross. See Robert John Henle, Saint Thomas and Platonism. A Study of the Plato and 
Platonici Texts in the Writings of Saint Thomas (The Hague: M. Nijhoff, 1956), 351–9. For examples of the persistence of 
this division in more recent discussions on Thomas’s doctrine of the divine ideas, see Gloria Ruth Frost, “Thomas 
Aquinas on Necessary Truths about Contingent Beings” (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Notre Dame, 
2009), 124 and 136–54; K. Scott Oliphint, God with Us: Divine Condescension and the Attributes of God (Wheaton: 
Crossway, 2011), 238–40. 
42 Wippel’s studies on Thomas’s doctrine of the divine ideas also maintain this hermeneutical pattern of 
bifurcation; however, since Doolan’s work is principally an elaboration and extension of his mentor’s argument, 
Wippel’s position is faithfully represented in the interpretive trajectory of the division between theology and 
philosophy found in Doolan’s answer to the question of how to reconcile Thomas’s arguments for both a plurality 
of ideas and the existence of one divine exemplar. For those interested in reviewing Wippel’s arguments, see “The 
Reality of Nonexisting Possibles,” 730–40; Thomas Aquinas on the Divine Ideas, The Étienne Gilson Series 16 
(Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 1993). This latter work was recently republished in The Gilson 
Lectures on Thomas Aquinas, Etienne Gilson Series 30 (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 2008), 125–
62.  
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and Ross in his defense of Thomas’s arguments for the existence of a plurality of ideas. He 
writes:  
Gilson, and Ross are quite right that ontologically, there is but one exemplar of 
all things, which is God. As the fullness of being (esse), the divine essence is 
imitable in diverse ways. Still, when Thomas addresses the subject of divine 
ideas, it is not simply to this imitability that he is referring. Rather, for him a 
divine idea consists in God’s knowing his essence as imitable in these diverse 
ways. It is this knowledge that constitutes an idea. Since these ways are 
themselves diverse, so too is God’s knowledge and, hence, his ideas.43 
Here Doolan, unlike Gilson and Ross, quite correctly holds Thomas’s statements about the 
plurality of ideas and the unity of divine exemplarity together, but what is notable about 
Doolan’s argument is how he reaches this conclusion. 
 Shortly after making this argument, Doolan unabashedly asserts in opposition to Gilson 
that the doctrine of the divine ideas “is not even principally a theological doctrine. Rather, it is a 
philosophical one that plays a key role in Thomas’s metaphysical thought.”44 Thus, contrary to the 
formulations discussed above, Doolan attempts to resolve the apparent tension in Thomas’s dual 
claims by shifting the entire discussion away from Thomas’s theological vision. Although Doolan 
arrives at a clear answer to the question about how to interpret Thomas’s affirmations that a 
plurality of divine ideas exist, he does so in a way that relies on the same bifurcation between 
theology and philosophy found in the arguments he is attempting to overturn. By ignoring 
Thomas’s understanding of sacra doctrina (§2.1), Doolan’s approach offers a reading that is 
inconsistent with Thomas’s stated agenda in the Summa. While the problems with attempting to 
extract the doctrine of the divine ideas from Thomas’s theological project are discussed in 
greater detail below (§5.2.1 and §5.2.2), one clue to Doolan’s misstep is, as we have already seen 
(§4.2), the effort he puts into severing the explicit theological gestures of divine ideas from the 
interpretation of the doctrine itself. For the moment, we have established that there is a clear 
pattern of hermeneutical bifurcation in the reception and interpretation of Thomas’s doctrine of 
the divine ideas that runs counter to his understanding of sacra doctrina, but to continue the 
process of reevaluating the interpretive context for the divine ideas, it is necessary to examine 
more carefully the role of philosophical argumentation in the Summa.45  
 
                                                
43 Doolan, Aquinas on the Divine Ideas, 116. 
44 Doolan, Aquinas on the Divine Ideas, 122 (italics his). 
45 For those that may be wondering, Boland’s work was not examined here because, by and large, his study 
offers a rare, although not exclusive, exception to this hermeneutical pattern of bifurcation. His interest in how 
Thomas theologically appropriates the philosophical notion of the divine ideas through a synthesis of the work on 
the doctrine by Augustine, Dionysius, and others results in an interpretive framework where Thomas elevates the 
doctrine’s philosophical precepts into theological discourse through revelation. The general difference, then, 
between Boland’s study and this one is, perhaps, simply that of emphasis. See Boland, Ideas in God, 1–8. 
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5.2 Overture to the Intelligibility of God 
 
 Despite the fact that Thomas devotes only one article in the Summa (1a.2.3) to the five 
ways, it is undoubtedly the most well-known and often discussed portion of his whole corpus, 
which makes the discussion on ST 1a.2.3 a rather tumultuous conversation to enter; however, to 
avoid a truncated interpretation of the divine exemplarism introduced in the five ways, it is 
necessary to examine the inferences to the divine ideas in the fourth and fifth ways in light of the 
general function and purpose of the proofs within the Summa.46 How one reads the five ways 
deeply influences or, better yet, exposes one’s understanding of other important themes in 
Thomas’s thought, such as the relation between faith and reason, grace and nature, and theology 
and philosophy.47 At one time the standard reading of the quinque viae was rooted in Neo- or 
Paleo- Thomist interpretations of the Summa that envisioned ST 1a.2.3 as Thomas’s preliminary 
remarks on the capacity of reason alone to provide rational justification for belief in God.48 Over 
the past few decades, however, there has been a growing opposition to the distinctly modernist 
concerns in this, once standard, interpretation of the five ways. The scholarly reaction to this 
                                                
46 Although, as John Wippel has persuasively argued, the five ways do not have an “overriding logical plan” 
that would require interpreting them collectively, various readings of the fourth and fifth ways have created some 
precedent for reading them together (The Metaphysical Thought of Thomas Aquinas: From Finite Being to Uncreated Being 
[Washington: Catholic University of America Press, 2000], 499; Cf. David Twetten, “To Which ‘God’ Must a Proof 
of God’s Existence Conclude for Aquinas?,” in Laudemus Viros Gloriosos: Essays in Honor of Armand Maurer, CSB, ed. 
R. E. Houser [Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 2007], 146–83). For reasons to read the fourth and 
fifth ways together, see John I. Jenkins, Knowledge and Faith in Thomas Aquinas (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1997), 134–41; Daniel D. De Haan, “Why the Five Ways? Aquinas’s Avicennian Insight into the Problem of 
Unity in the Aristotelian Metaphysics and Sacra Doctrina,” Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association 
86 (2013): 147–9; Jason A. Mitchell, L.C., “The Method of Resolutio and the Structure of the Five Ways,” Alpha 
Omega 15 (2012): 370–8; Anastasia Wendlinder, Speaking of God in Thomas Aquinas and Meister Eckhart: Beyond Analogy 
(Surrey: Ashgate Publishing, 2014), 116–21, 144. Since our primary interest in this section is identifying the 
intimations to the divine ideas in the fourth and fifth ways, there are many details about and in these proofs that will 
not be directly addressed; however, laying out the purpose and function of the five ways within the Summa should 
provide a sufficient context for our analysis of the arguments. 
47 There is perhaps more written on Thomas’s five ways than any other topic in his body of work; however, 
within this vast range of literature, there are three common positions: first, the interpretation that the five ways 
succeed at proving the existence of God; second, the interpretation that they fail to prove the existence of God; 
third, the interpretation that they do not represent attempts to prove the existence of God, but serve a different 
purpose in the Summa altogether, which is the position that I adopt. For a helpful survey of the most prominent 
interpretations, see Kerr, After Aquinas, 52–72. 
48 For discussions on the rise and development of Leonine or Neo-Thomist readings of Aquinas, see 
McCool, The Neo-Thomists; Fergus Kerr, O.P., “A Different World: Neoscholasticism and Its Discontents,” 
International Journal of Systematic Theology 8 (April 1, 2006): 128–48; Kerr, O.P., Twentieth-Century Catholic Theologians, 1–
16. One of the more prominent examples of this earlier approach is Reginald Garrigou-Lagrange, Dieu, Son Existence 
et Sa Nature. Solution Thomiste Des Antinomies Agnostiques, First edition (Paris, 1915). Following its original publication, 
this work went through eighteen editions in three decades. There are still many scholars today that maintain 
Thomas’s purpose in the five ways is to highlight some aspect of reason’s autonomy; for examples, see Leo Elders, 
The Philosophical Theology of St. Thomas Aquinas (Leiden: Brill Archive, 1990), 83–139; Denys Turner, Faith, Reason and 
the Existence of God (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004). Turner provides a helpful summary of his book 
in “Faith, Reason, and the Eucharist: Music as Model for Their Harmony,” in Redeeming Truth: Considering Faith in 
Reason, ed. Laurence Paul Hemming and Susan Frank Parsons (London: SMC, 2007), 15–33. Cf. Dogmatic Constitution 
on the Catholic Faith, in Norman P. Tanner (ed.), Decrees of the Ecumenical Councils II, Trent to Vatican II (London: Sheed 
& Ward, 1990), 806–8. 
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reading has lead to a series of sophisticated reformulations in the understanding of the purpose 
and function of the proofs within the Summa.49  
 While there are, as one would expect, variations in the interpretive implications of these 
reformulations, they have shown that the proofs are not designed to provide an independent 
metaphysical basis for belief in God’s existence. Instead, the philosophical arguments introduced 
in the five ways participate in a series of pedagogical exercises rooted in the articles of faith, 
which, as we may recall (§2.1.3), rely on the disclosure of God’s self-knowledge in scripture as 
the foundation for humanity’s knowledge of God.50 Thomas’s appeal to Exodus 3.14, where 
God reveals that he is being itself (ipsum esse; ST 1a.13.11), in the sed contra of ST 1a.2.3 firmly 
establishes in the premise to the proofs that God is existent. The proofs, accordingly, are not 
logical precursors to sacra doctrina, nor should they be read as attempts to offer epistemic 
justification for belief in God’s existence. 
 Furthermore, even though q.2 clearly acknowledges philosophy’s competence to arrive at 
a knowledge of divine things, it is not, for Thomas, the prowess of natural reasoning that 
justifies this claim, but Romans 1.19-20, where God reveals that he has also disclosed himself in 
creation.51 Consequently, the inclusion of five ways in the Summa is a response to God’s 
revelation (ST 1a.1.8) that certain truths about him may be known through creation; yet, as he 
somewhat notoriously remarks, these truths “would have appeared only to few, and even so after 
                                                
49 For a sample of studies that have offered creative reformulations of the five ways, see Victor Preller, 
Divine Science and The Science of God: A Reformulation of Thomas Aquinas. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1967), 
108–78; David B. Burrell, C.S.C., Exercises in Religious Understanding (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 
1974), 82–176; David B. Burrell, C.S.C., Aquinas God & Action (Routledge & Kegan, London, 1979), pt. 1; Eugene F. 
Rogers, Thomas Aquinas and Karl Barth: Sacred Doctrine and the Natural Knowledge of God, New edition (Notre Dame: 
University of Notre Dame Press, 1999), 58–72; Stanley Hauerwas, With the Grain of the Universe: The Church’s Witness 
and Natural Theology (Grand Rapids: Baker Academic, 2001), 26–31; John Milbank and Catherine Pickstock, Truth in 
Aquinas, Radical Orthodoxy (London: Routledge, 2001), 24–36; Te Velde, Aquinas on God, 37–60; Kevin W. Hector, 
“Apophaticism in Thomas Aquinas: A Re-Reformulation and Recommendation,” Scottish Journal of Theology 60, no. 4 
(2007): 377–93; Lydia Schumacher, Divine Illumination: The History and Future of Augustine’s Theory of Knowledge (Oxford: 
Wiley-Blackwell, 2011), 168–73. 
50 On ST 1a.2.3 being an exercise that serves the pedagogical aims of the Summa, see Preller, Divine Science 
and the Science of God, 266–71; Burrell, Exercises in Religious Understanding, 6. Cf. Jenkins, Knowledge and Faith, 225; Rudi 
A. te Velde, “Understanding the Scientia of Faith: Reason and Faith in Aquinas’s Summa Theologiae,” in 
Contemplating Aquinas: On the Varieties of Interpretation, ed. Fergus Kerr, O.P. (London: SCM Press, 2003), 55–74; 
Levering, Scripture and Metaphysics, 2004, 39. This is not to suggest that the five ways are something other than 
philosophical arguments; rather, I am noting that Thomas’s motivation for including the proofs in the Summa is 
theological, and that this context is important for understanding the purpose and function of philosophical 
argumentation in the work. Cf. §2.1.3; ST 1a.46.2. 
51 Cf. §4.3. I am indebted to the work of Eugene Rogers on the interpretive significance of Thomas’s 
reference to Romans 1.19-20 in ST 1a.2 for understanding the function of the five ways, see Eugene F. Rogers, 
“Thomas and Barth in Convergence on Romans 1?,” Modern Theology 12 (1996): 57–84; Rogers, Thomas Aquinas and 
Karl Barth. There are still a number of Thomists who maintain that the five ways represent Thomas’s vision of pre-
theological proofs for the existence of God. For a discussion on those philosophers and theologians that continue 
to offer this interpretation of the five ways, see Kerr, O.P., “The Varieties of Interpreting Aquinas,” 28–40.  
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a long time and mixed with many mistakes.”52 With this passage in mind, Thomas’s comment in 
ST 2a2ae.2.2 ad.3 becomes very telling about the limitations of the five ways. He writes, “Belief 
in God as descriptive of the act of faith is not attributable to unbelievers. In their belief God’s 
existence does not have the same meaning as it does in faith.”53 Thus, while the five ways 
represent humanity’s metaphysical assent to a nominal notion of that which may be called God 
(ST 1a.2.2 ad.2), this philosophical taxonomy does not carry the same meaning as its homonymic 
counterpart in the confession of faith.54 The substantive discrepancy here between the 
affirmations of God’s existence in philosophy (ST 1a.2.2 ad.1) and in the articles of faith (ST 
2a2ae.1.7) expose the basic inability of natural reasoning to breach the infinite gulf that 
distinguishes God from the world.55  
Yet, this limitation does not deter Thomas from utilizing the five ways in his effort to 
guide the readers of the Summa to the contemplative vision of God. To understand where the 
proofs fit on that journey, we must return to Thomas’s discussion on the distinction between 
philosophy and sacra doctrina described in the closing lines of ST 1a.1.1, where he dismisses the 
claim that sacra doctrina is unnecessary because the philosophical disciplinae are sufficient for the 
study of God. He replies, “There is nothing to stop the same things from being treated by the 
philosophical sciences when they can be looked at in the light of natural reason and by another 
science when they are looked at in the light of divine revelation. Consequently, the theology of 
sacra doctrina differs in kind from that theology which is ranked as a part of philosophy.”56 In a 
subsequent article (ST 1a.1.3), Thomas clarifies the nature of this distinction between theology 
and philosophy when he notes that it is the formal object or subject that defines each scientia. 
Accordingly, as Thomas details in his commentary on Boethius’s De Trinitate:  
There are two kinds of theology or divine science. There is one that treats of 
divine things, not as the subject of the science but as the principles of the 
subject. This is the kind of theology pursued by the philosophers and that is 
also called metaphysics. There is another theology, however, that investigates 
                                                
52 ST 1a.1.1: “(Quia veritas de Deo per rationem investiata) a paucis, et per longum tempus, et cum 
admixtione multorum errorum homini proveniret.” Cf. Compend. Theol. 1.36. 
53 “Credere Deum non convenit infidelibus sub ea ratione qua ponitur actus fidei. Non enim credunt 
Deum esse sub his conditionibus quas fides determinat.” It seems worth mentioning that, as Kerr observes (After 
Aquinas, 67), in this passage, Thomas is not referring to the existential dimension of the philosophical conclusion 
that God exists, but to the meaning of the proposition itself. 
54 For a thorough discussion on the importance of Thomas’s notion of a nominal definition of God, see 
Preller, Divine Science and the Science of God, 135–76. 
55 ST 1a.8.1; 1a.10.2; De ver. 2.3 ad16; 3.1 ad.7. Cf. Compend. Theol. 2.246. 
56 ST1a.1.1 ad.2: “Unde nihil prohibit de eisdem rebus de quibus philosophicae disciplinae tractant 
secundum quod sunt cognoscibilia lumine naturalis rationis, etiam aliam scientiam tractare secundum quod 
cognoscuntur lumine divinae revelationis. Unde theologia quae ad sacram doctrinam pertinent differ secundum 
genus ab illa theologia quae pars philosophiae ponitus.” 
  
105 
divine things for their own sakes as the subject of the science. This is the 
theology taught in sacred scripture.57 
It may be said, then, as Victor Preller observes, that for Thomas, “God is extrinsic to the proper 
subject of ‘first philosophy,’ but intrinsic to that of the Science of God.”58 
 Earlier in this section from his commentary on Boethius’s De Trinitate, Thomas explains 
that the principle subject of metaphysical inquiry is “being-in-general” (ens commune), or, as he 
says, metaphysics is “the science that investigates what is common to all beings, which has for its 
subject being as being.”59 Since God is, according to Thomas, the fullness of being or, as noted 
above (§5.1.1), “being itself subsisting through itself,” philosophy’s concentration on the 
intelligibility of being offers a clear point of intersection between metaphysics and theology.60 As 
Rudi te Velde argues, “The philosophical science of metaphysics treats divine matters from the 
viewpoint of what is common to all things. In this sense the knowledge of God (or of the First 
Being) is said to be the goal of the consideration of metaphysics.”61 From this perspective, it may 
be argued that the goal of metaphysical inquiry reflects, what Gilson once described as, “the 
natural vocation of the intellect to a vision of God” (ST 1a.6.3; 1a.62.1; 1a2ae.1.8). However, 
because God is not a being (ens) or the being that is common to all things (SCG Bk. 1, ch. 26), 
this goal is one that humanity is, as Gilson concludes, “naturally incapable” of reaching (ST 
3a.1.3 ad.2).62 Therein lies the danger of assuming that the five ways are intended to demonstrate 
the existence of God according to the standards of reason alone. 
 Preller elaborates on this danger when he states, “we cannot derive from them [the five 
ways] any ‘first cause’ or ‘God’ who is not univocally tied into the causal chain or system of 
perfection of which he is supposedly the intelligible explanation.”63 It would appear, then, that if 
the five ways are interpreted as proofs for the existence of God outside the domain of faith, they 
inject a notion of univocity into Thomas’s doctrine of God that resembles a dangerous form of 
                                                
57 BDT 5.4: “Sic igitur theologia, sive scientia divina, est duplex. Una, in qua considerantur res divinae non 
tanquam subjectum scientiae, sed tanquam principium subjecti, et talis est theologia, quam philosophi prosequuntur, 
quae alio nomine metaphysica dicitur. Alia vero quae ipsas res divinas considerat propter seipsas ut subjectum 
scientiae, et haec est theologia, quae sacra scriptura dicitur.” 
58 Preller, Divine Science and the Science of God, 228. 
59 BDT 5.4: “[Scientia] in qua ponuntur ea quae sunt communia omnibus entibus, quae habet subjectum 
ens in quantum est ens.” 
60 ST 1a.4.2: “ipsum esse per se subsistens” 
61 Te Velde, Aquinas on God, 53. Cf. Jan A. Aertsen, Medieval Philosophy as Transcendental Thought: From Philip 
the Chancellor (ca. 1225) to Francisco Suárez (Leiden: Brill, 2012), 231–5. 
62 Gilson to de Lubac, June 19, 1965, in Henri de Lubac, ed., Letters of Étienne Gilson to Henri de Lubac, trans. 
Mary Emily Hamilton (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 1988), 181–2; French original published in, Lettres de M. Étienne 
Gilson Adressées Au P. Henri de Lubac et Commentées Par Celui-Ci (Paris: Éditions du Cerf, 1986). 
63 Preller, Divine Science and the Science of God, 135. More on this problem, as it relates to the fourth way, is 
presented below. 
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ontotheology, which most Thomists today would deny he supports.64 Stephen Long is, however, 
correct to ask whether, for Thomas, such a domain even exists, and he is also right to insist that 
this question is, in fact, christological in nature since the Summa’s christoform arc (§2.1.4), 
introduced in the prologue to ST 1a.2 and culminating in the Tertia Pars, transposes the proofs 
into the service of sacra doctrina, where both faith and reason are conditioned by Christ.65 
Accordingly, the proofs mimic the Father’s demonstratio (1a.42.6 ad.2), which is Christ, “who, as a 
man, is the way (via) that has been stretched out for us to God.”66   
In their imitation of the Father’s demonstration, it is sacra doctrina that determines, in 
Eugene Roger’s terms, the “serviceability” of the proofs, which te Velde keenly identifies with 
philosophy’s inquiry into the intelligibility of being (ens et verum convertuntur).67 Te Velde explains 
that the question of God’s existence is, for Thomas, “first and foremost a matter of finding an 
access (via) to the intelligibility of God.”68 Since, as we have just seen, Christ is the realization of 
this access, Thomas’s christological recontextualization of the five ways reconfigures the proofs 
to serve the pedagogical aims of the Summa (ST 1a.1.5 ad.2), and in this way they become 
serviceable as mediatory markers to help readers begin the pilgrimage of faith seeking 
understanding.69 Thus, Thomas’s work of theological appropriation redemptively embraces the 
five ways in order to elevate them into, as Rogers insightfully states, “the realm of revelabilia, in 
which, through God-bestowed faith, they are joined with the first truth they cannot otherwise 
reach. The five ways are caused to assert the unGod-forsakenness of nature.”70 With this basic 
outline of the purpose and function of the five ways in the Summa, we may now proceed to 
identifying the intimations to divine exemplarity in the fourth way. 
 
                                                
64 Cf. D. Stephen Long, Speaking of God: Theology, Language, and Truth (Grand Rapids: Wm. B. Eerdmans 
Publishing, 2009), 211. 
65 Long, Speaking of God, 212. On this point Rogers remarks, “Because (Thomas) thinks more like a 
mathematician and less like an after-dinner speaker: the christological presupposition can very well go without 
saying when Thomas programmatically announces it, like a negative sign before a parenthesis, and therefore 
constantly implies it” (Thomas Aquinas and Karl Barth, 18). 
66 ST 1a.2.prol.: “. . . qui secundum quod homo via est nobis tendendi in Deum.” Cf. Rogers, “Thomas and 
Barth in Convergence,” 66. Cf. §2.2.2. 
67 Rogers, “Thomas and Barth in Convergence,” 66. 
68 Te Velde, Aquinas on God, 38. 
69 Te Velde, Aquinas on God, 40. Cf. Henri De Lubac, The Discovery of God, trans. Mark Sebanc and Cassian 
Fulsom, O.S.B. (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans Publishing, 1996), 88. 
70 Rogers, “Thomas and Barth in Convergence,” 66. Contrary to Norman Kretzmann’s claim that ST 
1a.2.3 represents an unnecessary philosophical digression from the Summa’s theological project, the christological arc 
of the Summa indicates that the inclusion of the five ways conforms to the soteriological praxis of sacra doctrina (The 
Metaphysics of Theism: Aquinas’s Natural Theology in Summa Contra Gentiles I, vol. 1 [Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2001], 56, 
n.75). Cf. Bruce D. Marshall, “Quod Scit Una Uetula: Aquinas on the Nature of Theology,” in The Theology of Thomas 
Aquinas, ed. Rik Van Nieuwenhove and Joseph Wawrykow (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 2005), 
3–7. 
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5.2.1 Reading between the Lines: The Fourth Way on a Plurality of Extrinsic Exemplars 
 The fourth way structurally integrates exemplar and efficient causalities into a two-stage 
argument that proceeds from humanity’s experience of hierarchical variation in the intensity of 
characteristics such as being, goodness, and truth in the world to the existence of a separate 
maximal being (maxime ens) that perfectly possess these properties.71 Although the rhetoric of the 
argument is rather straight forward, the proof, nevertheless, contains a number of interpretive 
challenges, including the question of its reference to the divine ideas since the fourth way never 
explicitly uses the formal grammar of the doctrine.72 It might appear at first glance, as Gregory 
Doolan has, in fact, argued, that the structural composition of the proof does not depend on a 
notion of the divine ideas because it is designed to demonstrate that humanity’s experience of 
perfections such as being, goodness, and truth to a greater or lesser (magis et minus) degree 
provides the speculative space for the intelligibility of a maximal being that is the normative 
standard for this gradation.73 The objective of the fourth way is, therefore, to argue for the 
existence of a first exemplar cause that each thing approximates by participation in it as the 
efficient cause of all things;74 yet, as Thomas clarifies elsewhere, the proof’s central theme of ex 
                                                
71 ST 1a.2.3: “Quarta via sumitur ex gradibus qui in rebus inveniuntur. Invenitur enim in rebus aliquid 
magis et minus bonum, et verum, et nobile, et sic de aliis huiusmodi. Sed magis et minus dicuntur de diversis 
secundum quod appropinquant diversimode ad aliquid quod maxime est, sicut magis calidum est, quod magis 
appropinquat maxime calido. Est igitur aliquid quod est verissimum, et optimum, et nobilissimum, et per 
consequens maxime ens; nam quae sunt maxime vera sunt maxime entia, ut dicitur II Metaph. Quod autem dicitur 
maxime in aliquo genere est causa omnium quae sunt illius generis, sicut ignis qui est maxime calidus est causa omnium calidorum, ut 
in eodem libro dicitur. Ergo est aliquid quod est causa esse et bonitatis et cujuslibet perfectionis in omnibus rebus, et 
hoc dicimus Deum.”  
72 Chief among these difficulties is also the question of how exemplar and efficient causality are related to 
one another in the proof. There is considerable debate over whether the first half of the argument includes both 
exemplar and efficient causality or if it argues solely from exemplar causality. According to the latter position, it is 
only in the second half of the argument that efficient causality is introduced while the former posits that it blends 
both forms of causality throughout the proof. Regardless of the position one adopts, both maintain that Thomas 
introduces a form of exemplarism in the first half of the proof. For examples favoring the argument that the first 
half of the proof concerns only exemplar causality, see Fernand Van Steenberghen, Le problème de l’existence de Dieu 
dans les écrits de S. Thomas d’Aquin, Philosophes Médiévaux 23 (Louvain-La-Neuve: Éditions de l’Institut supérieur de 
philosophie, 1980), 241; Marion Wagner, Die Philosophischen Implikate Der “Quarta Via.” Eine Untersuchung Zum Vierten 
Gottesbeweis Bei Thomas von Aquin (S. Th. I, 2, 3c) (Leiden: Brill, 1989), 29–37; Wippel, Metaphysical Thought, 473; De 
Haan, “Why the Five ways? Aquinas’s Avicennian Insight into the Problem of Unity in the Aristotelian Metaphysics 
and Sacra Doctrina,” 150–2. For examples of the other position, see Maurice Corvez, “La Quatrième Voie Vers 
L’existence de Dieu Selon Saint Thomas,” in Quinque Sunt Viae, ed. Leo Elders (Vatican City, 1980), 75–83; Jason A. 
Mitchell, L.C., “Resolutio Secundum Rem, the Dionysian Triplex via and Thomistic Philosophical Theology,” in 
Proceedings Metaphysics 2009 (Madrid: Editorial Dykinson, 2011), 402; Mitchell, “The Method of Resolutio,” 371–2. 
Good summaries of both positions may be found in, Joseph Bobik, “Aquinas’ Fourth Way and the Approximating 
Relation,” The Thomist 51 (1987): 17–36; Doolan, Aquinas on the Divine Ideas, 70–3. 
73 Doolan, Aquinas on the Divine Ideas, 75–6. Cf. Arthur Little, S.J., The Platonic Heritage of Thomism (Dublin: 
Golden Eagle Books, 1949), 103; Charles A. Hart, “Participation and the Thomistic Five ways,” New Scholasticism 26 
(1952): 270. 
74 Lect. Ioan. prol., no.5. Cf. Van Steenberghen, Le problème de l’existence de Dieu, 225; A. Contat, “La Quarta 
via Di San Tommaso d’Aquino E Le Prove Di Dio Di Sant’ Anselmo Di Aosta Secondo Le Tre Configurazioni Dell’ 
Ente Tomistico,” in Sant’ Anselmo D’ Aosta “Doctor Magnificus”. A 900 Anni Della Morte, ed. C. Pandolfi and J. 
Villagrasa (Rome: IF Press, 2011), 150. 
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gradibus leads to a concept of extrinsic exemplarity that falls within the domain of the divine 
ideas.75 
 In his commentary on the Liber de Causis, Thomas’s elaborates on the metaphysical basis 
for the gradation of perfection in the world. He explains that the maxime ens or the primum ens, as 
it is described in the commentary, “in each genus is the measure of that genus insofar as, by 
approaching it or receding from it, something is known to be more perfect or less perfect in that 
genus . . . The first being is the measure of all beings because it has created all beings with the due measure 
appropriate to each thing according to the mode of its nature.”76 The metaphysical connection in 
this passage between the magis et minus of perfection and the concept of measure reveals that the 
first stage of the proof is arguing for the intelligibility of a maximal being that is the first formal 
cause because it measures all other things; however, in his reflections on Aristotle’s Nicomachean 
Ethics, Thomas explains that this notion of measure, which has deep (Neo-)Platonic roots,77 
necessarily encompasses the existence of a plurality of extrinsic exemplars. There Thomas 
concurs with Aristotle’s criticism of the Platonic theory that all things participate in a single idea 
of the good because there would be, in effect, no basis, according to Thomas, for the gradation 
of goodness, and, by extension, being, truth, and the like, that we experience in the world around 
us.78  
Thus, while the principle objective of the fourth way is to show that the maximal being is 
the first efficient and exemplar cause of all things because it is the principle and end of all being, 
goodness, and truth, to make this point, the proof assumes in its argument ex gradibus that there 
are intrinsic formal causes, or substantial forms, which, according to Thomas, indicate that there 
is also a plurality of extrinsic exemplar causes.79 As Jason Mitchell observes, in his reflections on 
                                                
75 In addition to the sources cited in n.72, also see Little, The Platonic Heritage of Thomism, 62–80; Theodore J. 
Kondoleon, “Exemplary Causality in the Philosophy of St. Thomas Aquinas” (Dissertation, The Catholic University 
of America, 1967), 162–3; Jules M. Brady, “Note on the Fourth Way,” The New Scholasticism 48 (1974): 219–32; 
Wippel, Metaphysical Thought, 473.  
76 SDC prop. 16 “In quolibet genere est mensura illius generis, in quantum, per accessum ad ipsum vel 
recessum ab ipso, cognoscitur aliquid esse perfectius vel minus perfectum in genere illo . . . Ens 
primum esse mensuram omnium entium, quia creavit omnia entia cum debita mensuraquae convenit unicuique rei 
secundum modum suae naturae.” Cf. In I Sent. d. 8, q.4, a.1. Various scholars have noted that parallels between the 
passage from lecture 16, as well as others, in the Super librum De Causis and the fourth way demonstrate the general 
Neoplatonic character of the proof. See, Henle, Saint Thomas and Platonism, 356; Fernand Van Steenberghen, 
“Prolégomènes á La ‘Quarata via,’” Rivista Di Filosofia Neo-Scolastica 70 (1978): 99–112; Jan A. Aertsen, Nature and 
Creature: Thomas Aquinas’s Way of Thought (Leiden: Brill, 1988), 175–7; Jason A. Mitchell, L.C., “Aquinas on the 
Ontological and Theological Foundation of the Transcendentals,” Alpha Omega 16 (2013): 57. 
77 Cf. James M. McEvoy, “The Divine as the Measure of Being in Platonic and Scholastic Thought,” in 
Studies in Medieval Philosophy, ed. John Wippel (Washington: The Catholic University of America Press, 1986), 85–116. 
78 SLE 1, lect. 6, no.81: “Manifestum est ergo, quod non est aliquod unum bonum commune, quod scilicet 
sit idea, vel ratio communis omnium bonorum: alioquin oporteret, quod bonum non inveniretur in omnibus 
praedicamentis, sed in uno solo.” Cf. Vivian Boland, O.P., “Thinking About Good—Thomas Aquinas on 
Nicomachean Ethics I, Divine Names IV-V and de Ebdomadibus,” New Blackfriars 83 (2002): 392–3. 
79 SLE 1, lect. 7, no.96; De ver. 3.3; SCG Bk. 1, ch. 26. Cf. De Haan, “Why the Five ways? Aquinas’s 
Avicennian Insight into the Problem of Unity in the Aristotelian Metaphysics and Sacra Doctrina,” 150–1. 
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the fourth way, “Proper to all formal (or exemplar) causality is the notion of ‘measure.’ Measure, 
though, has its foundation in similitude. Thus, as an extrinsic formal cause, the exemplar idea 
measures the effect the agent produces by way of imitation.”80 In clarifying the mechanics of the 
proof, then, we discover that for the gradation of perfections in the world to be intelligible there 
must not only be a maximal being, but also a plurality of extrinsic exemplar causes that 
metaphysically substantiate the ground for the measured approximation to the first cause that all 
things express to the degree that they are perfect in their substantial forms (SLE Bk. 1, lect. 7, 
n.93). 
Although Thomas will use the same type of logical gestures found in the proof’s 
argument ex gradibus to explain the plurality of divine ideas (cf. ST 1a.47.1 ad.2; De Ver. 3.2), it 
would be a mistake to interpret the philosophical notion of measure at work in the fourth way as 
providing something more than conceptual space for the intelligibility of a plurality of extrinsic 
exemplars. If we follow the argument of the fourth way through to its conclusion, then we will 
begin to see how, on its own, it threatens to subvert the distinction between God and the world. 
At the center of the proof’s argument stands a seemingly innocuous analogy between heat and 
goodness, which is adapted from Aristotle’s Metaphysics, but, as Preller explains, “[The fourth 
way] seems to imply, through its parallel between heat and goodness, that the transcendental 
perfections are instances of generic characteristics.”81 Consequently, as Preller observes, “this 
back and forth between Plato and Aristotle . . . [suggests that] the substantial efficient cause of 
the generation of a formal characteristic in another being may be the highest in the genus, but it is 
univocally in the genus. If Aquinas accepted all of the terms of the fourth way, he would have to 
assert that God is supreme in the ‘genera’ of existence, goodness, truth, and nobility.”82 
According to this reading of the fourth way, if the internal gestures of the proof are 
strictly adhered to, the relation depicted between the hierarchy of limited perfections in the 
world and the generic characteristics of being, goodness, truth and the like is one of, in Lloyd 
Gerson’s terms, “gradable univocity,” which encompasses the primum ens, the domain of extrinsic 
exemplars, and the measured perfection of all things.83 Van Steenberghen and Doolan, however, 
                                                
80 Mitchell, “Resolutio Secundum Rem,” 402. Cf. François-Xavier Maquart, Elementa Philosophiae, vol. 3, pt. 
2 (Pris: Andreas Blot, 1938), 315: “Siquidem in priori parte argumenti mens transit formaliter de mensurato ad mensuram, 
sed causa mensurans mensuratum non est nisi causa exemplaris.”  
81 Preller, Divine Science and the Science of God, 132. Doolan demonstrates the seemingly harmless nature of 
the reference by simply glancing over its interpretive implications (Aquinas on the Divine Ideas, 66-67). For more on 
Thomas’s use of this text elsewhere in his corpus, see Vincent de Couesnongle, “La Causalité Du Maximum: 
L’utilisation Par S. Thomas D’un Passage d’Aristote,” Revue Des Sciences Philosophiques et Théologiques 38 (1954): 433–
44; Vincent de Couesnongle, “La Causalité Du Maximum: Pourquoi Saint Thomas a-T-Il Mal Cité Aristote?,” Revue 
Des Sciences Philosophiques et Théologiques 38 (1954): 658–80. 
82 Preller, Divine Science and the Science of God, 133 (emphasis his). Thomas confirms in Sent. Metaph. II, 
nn.292-3 that this text should be interpreted as implying univocal predication.  
83 Lloyd P. Gerson, Aristotle and Other Platonists (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2006), 183. 
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oppose this conclusion because Thomas uniformly rejects the claim that the transcendental 
perfections are generic characteristics (ST 1a.4.3) that are univocally applicable (ST 1a.13.5) to 
both God and creatures as explained in De Potentia 7.7 ad.2, where, as Preller summarizes, 
Thomas says, “God is not related to the perfections of his creatures as ‘more perfect’—in the 
way that fire is ‘hotter’ than heated water—but as the nonunivocal principle or cause of their 
perfections.”84  
Even though Van Steenberghen and Doolan are certainly correct in their assertion that 
Thomas denies this idea of univocal similitude between God and the world, they reject this 
reading of the fourth way in a misdirected effort to save Thomas from contradiction based on 
their assumptions about the philosophical character of the Summa. Van Steenberghen’s generally 
Neo-Thomist approach to the Summa prompts him to search for the philosophical continuity 
between the form of exemplarism offered in the fourth way and Thomas’s related discussions on 
the doctrine.85 What he, along with Doolan, fails to consider is that while it is true that the 
proof’s underlying concept of extrinsic exemplars does not belong to Thomas’s doctrine of the 
divine ideas, it does, nevertheless, conform to his understanding of one way that both (Neo-) 
Platonist and Aristotelian philosophers have defined the doctrine.86 This ambiguity in the 
philosophical patronage of the proof’s intimation of extrinsic exemplars is, broadly speaking, 
attributable to the fourth way’s concise integration of Platonist and Aristotelian precepts and the 
absence of any specific claims in the argument about the actual origin of the observable universe. 
Regardless, then, of whether the Platonist or the Aristotelian elements in the proof are 
emphasized, the fourth way’s depiction of an ascending univocal relation between the world’s 
limited perfections and the existence of a maximum ens encompasses a doctrine of exemplary 
forms that is, for Thomas, compatible with a reading of the proof in terms of necessary 
participatory emanation or eternal motion.87  
Thomas’s subsequent dismissal of univocal similitude in fact confirms that the proof’s 
philosophical premise results in an expression of exemplar causality that must be, at least, 
formally incongruent with the Summa’s discussions on the nature of creation since humanity’s 
                                                
84 Preller, Divine Science and the Science of God, 134. See, Fernand Van Steenberghen, Le problème de l’existence de 
Dieu dans les écrits de S. Thomas d’Aquin, Philosophes Médiévaux 23 (Louvain-La-Neuve: Éditions de l’Institut 
supérieur de philosophie, 1980), 209; Doolan, Aquinas on the Divine Ideas, 76. 
85 Fernand Van Steenberghen, Ontology, trans. Martin J. Flynn (New York: Joseph F. Wagner, Inc., 1952), 
97–8; Van Steenberghen, “Prolégomènes á La ‘Quarata via,’” 112. Cf. Bobik, “Aquinas’ Fourth Way,” 27–33; 
Murphy, Art and Intellect in the Philosophy of Etienne Gilson, 103–4. 
86 Cf. ST 1a.18.4 ad.3; 1a.44.3; 1a.65.4 ad.2; 1a.103.2 ad.3; De ver. 3.1 ad.5; SCG Bk. 3, ch.69; Lect. Ioan. 1, 
lect. 1, no.65. Also see In I Sent. d.36, q.2, a.1 ad.1 and SLE 1, lect. 6, no.79, where, in addition to Lect. Ioan. 1, lect. 1, 
no.65, Thomas argues that Aristotle did not intend to reject but simply modified Plato’s theory of the Forms. 
87 Lect. Ioan. prol. no.5; SDC props. 4, 10, and 20; BDH lect. 2, no.24; Sent. Phys. II, lect. 14, no.258 and 
VIII, lect. 2, no.971-90; Sent. Metaph. XII, lect. 8, no.2536-61 and lect. 11, no.2600-63. Cf. Augustine, De civ. dei 10.31 
and 11.4. 
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knowledge of God’s creational activity belongs solely to the mystery of creation revealed in 
scripture (§4.4). Doolan picks up on this inconsistency in the opposing methodological 
paradigms that shape the doctrines of exemplarism conveyed in the fourth way and Thomas’s 
later reflections on creation (ST 1a.44-49); however, he insists that this incongruity proves that 
the fourth way does not include a notion of exemplar forms.88 The basic problem with Doolan’s 
interpretation is that he ignores the overarching theological framework of the Summa, because he 
assumes that Thomas’ doctrine of the divine ideas is exclusively philosophical.89 He therefore 
overlooks, as outlined above (§5.1), the distinct function of the proofs within the context of sacra 
doctrina (ST 1a.1.1). Nevertheless, the incongruity of the fourth way with Thomas’s doctrine of 
God, as established elsewhere in question 1, does not render the insights offered in the proof 
theologically useless for directing the readers of the Summa on the journey to God (ST 1a.1.5 ad. 
1 & 2), but before we proceed to some further reflections on Thomas’s theological appropriation 
of the gestures to the divine ideas in the proof’s argument ex gradibus, let us consider the claim 
that the fifth way also implicitly supports a doctrine of the divine ideas.  
 
5.2.2 The Fifth Way: An Overlooked Allusion to the Divine Ideas?  
 Despite the various problems with his approach to, and assessment of, the fourth way, 
Doolan offers a brief but persuasive argument for the fifth way supporting an understanding of 
the divine ideas as types of “predefinitions” (praediffinitiones).90 Much like the fourth way, the fifth 
never explicitly refers to the divine ideas, but, as the previous section demonstrated, this silence 
does not negate the possibility that the proof embraces a theory of exemplary forms. In order to 
quickly determine if this proof also implicitly relies on a theory of the divine ideas, it will be 
                                                
88 Doolan, Aquinas on the Divine Ideas, 75–7. Doolan observes that while the fourth way’s concept of 
exemplarism is deduced from the limited perfections found in the world, Thomas’s formal arguments for the divine 
ideas justify the existence of intellectual exemplars from God’s nature. He asserts that this methodological 
discrepancy demonstrates that the proof does not convey a notion of the divine ideas. He subsequently argues that 
instead of representing Thomas’s doctrine of the divine ideas, the fourth way supports Thomas’s understanding of 
natural exemplarity (§4.4); however, according to the logic of Doolan’s argument, Thomas’s defense of natural 
exemplarism elsewhere in the Summa should follow the same methodology as the proof, but this is simply not the 
case. In his descriptions of what, in Doolan’s terms, would be called natural exemplarity, Thomas’s arguments 
follow the same pattern as his support for the doctrine of the divine ideas (Cf. ST 1a.4.1 and 2; 1a.44.3; 1a.93.5 ad.4; 
1a.103.6). Consequently, Doolan undermines his own position in his argument against the fourth way encompassing 
a doctrine of exemplar forms.   
89 Doolan, Aquinas on the Divine Ideas, 122. For a brief but insightful summary of the problems in Doolan’s 
interpretive approach, see Burrell, “Book Review of Gregory Doolan,” 751–55. 
90 Doolan, Aquinas on the Divine Ideas, 79–80. It is important to take note of the difference between this 
concept of the divine ideas and the fourth way’s gesture toward a notion of extrinsic exemplars for a couple of 
reasons. First, it demonstrates that Thomas is aware that there are different philosophical formulations of the 
doctrine (Boland, Ideas in God, 9–12). Second, as the other chapters in this study have attempted to demonstrate, 
Thomas casts a wide net in his theological appropriation of the divine ideas tradition, which includes both of these 
formulations.  
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worthwhile to present the argument in its entirety. Thus, having finished his description of the 
argument for God’s existence ex gradibus in the fourth way, Thomas writes: 
The Fifth Way is based on the governance of nature.  An orderedness of action 
to an end is observed in all bodies obeying natural laws, even when they lack 
awareness. For their behavior hardly ever varies, and will practically always turn 
out well; which shows that they truly tend to a goal, and do not merely hit it by 
accident. Nothing however that lacks awareness tends to a goal, except under 
the direction of someone with awareness and with understanding; the arrow, 
for example, requires an archer. Everything in nature, therefore, is directed to 
its goal by someone with intelligence, and this we call “God.”91 
With the argument laid out above, we may now say that it is somewhat stunning that the parallels 
between this proof and Thomas’s doctrine of the divine ideas have gone generally unnoticed 
since, unlike the Fourth’s more enigmatic reference to the exemplar forms, the fifth way includes 
references to a number of themes that Thomas often makes use of in his formal discussions on 
the divine ideas.92 
The fifth way’s argument ex gubernatione rerum is rooted in a teleological premise that 
proceeds from the world’s observable order to the existence of a divine governor that guides the 
emergent operation of non-intelligent beings to their proper end.93 To support this claim, the 
proof introduces concepts of divine intelligence, providential ordering, and natural law, which 
are themes not only related to Thomas’s doctrine of the divine ideas but also crucial to its 
framework and theological development.94 Doolan also observes that the proof’s principle 
contention that the “directedness of natural bodies points to the need for a governor who 
provides them with their intention toward an end” resembles some of Thomas’s thoughts about 
the divine ideas in De Veritate.95 There Thomas says, “An operation of a nature which is for a 
definite end presupposes an intellect that has pre-established the end of the nature and ordered it 
                                                
91 ST 1a.2.3: “Quinta via sumitur ex gubernatione rerum. Videmus enim quod aliqua quae cognitione 
carent, scilicet corpora naturalia, operantur propter finem, quod apparet ex hoc quod semper aut frequentius eodem 
modo operantur, ut consequantur id quod est optimum; unde patet quod non a casu, sed ex intentione perveniunt 
ad finem. Ea autem quae non habent cognitionem, non tendunt in finem nisi directa ab aliquo cognoscente et 
intelligente, sicut sagitta a sagittante. Ergo est aliquid intelligens, a quo omnes res naturales ordinantur ad finem, et 
hoc dicimus Deum.” 
92 In one of his discussions on the fifth way, Van Steenberghen alludes to this connection by citing ST 
1a.15.2 on the ordered nature of the universe (Le problème de l’existence de Dieu, 231). Mitchell also indirectly picks up 
on it in his argument that the fifth way’s “ratio of providence” presupposes the notion of exemplar causality 
presented in the fourth way, which he links directly to the divine ideas (“The Method of Resolutio,” 373 and 376). 
93 Aertsen, Nature and Creature, 343; A. Contat, “Esse, Essentia, Ordo. Verso Una Metafísica Della 
Partecipazione Operativa,” Espíritu: Cuadernos Del Instituto Filosófico de Balmesiana 61 (2012): 9–71. 
94 For a sample of the places in the Summa where these themes are associated with Thomas’s doctrine of 
the divine ideas, see: on ST 1a.15; 1a.21.2; 1a.22; 1a.23; 1a.44.3 s.c.; 1a.55.3; 1a.103.6; 1a.2ae.93; 2a2ae.1.8 ad.2. The 
parallels between the argument of the fifth way and Thomas’s doctrine of the divine ideas are further substantiated 
by his discussion on the doctrine in De Veritate, where even the image of the archer (§4.1) is employed in much the 
same way as it is in the proof (De Ver. 3.1). 
95 Doolan, Aquinas on the Divine Ideas, 80. Cf. Cornelio Fabro, “Sviluppo, Significato E Valore Della IV Via,” 
Doctor Communis 7 (1954): 74; Mitchell, “The Method of Resolutio, 375.  
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to that end. For this reason, every work of nature is said to be a work of intelligence . . . This, 
therefore, seems to constitute the character of an idea . . . [that it] has, in some sense, the nature 
of an end.”96 These conceptual and grammatical similarities reveal, as Doolan establishes, that 
even though the fifth way does not directly refer to the divine ideas, the argument for the 
providential ordering of natural beings to their final end implicitly relies on a theory of the divine 
ideas.97  
 Given the level of continuity between the logical gestures made in the argument of the 
fifth way and many of Thomas’s latter reflections on the divine ideas, perhaps the biggest 
challenge we face here is maintaining our initial claim that the five ways do not represent his 
attempt to reach God through reason alone, which, if true, would support Doolan’s claim that 
Thomas’s subsequent discussions on the divine ideas are exclusively philosophical rather than 
theological. Even Preller acknowledges, in contrast to the other proofs, that “the Fifth Way may 
not be finally incompatible with Aquinas’s doctrine of God.”98 With the apparent absence of any 
glaring incongruities in these two areas of the Summa, it seems perfectly reasonable to suspect 
that the continuity between them reflects Thomas’s effort to use the philosophical intelligibility 
of the divine ideas represented in the fifth way to lead his readers to a knowledge of God 
through natural reasoning; however, if we remain attentive to the Summa’s premise for the five 
ways, the problems with this type of reading begin to surface. 
 In his discussion on the fifth way, Preller notes that the compatibility between the proof 
and Thomas’s teachings of God lies in his emphasis on providence. However, as the previous 
chapter demonstrated (§2.1.3), for Thomas, as he asserts in De Veritate, the confession of God’s 
“providence over all things” made in the articles of faith “cannot be proved.”99 Since divine 
providence is, according to Thomas, always related to the unity of God’s volition and knowledge 
(ST 1a.22.prol.),100 the reference in the proof to intelligence without mention of divine volition 
could serve as a marker for the point of divergence between the fifth way and Thomas’s 
subsequent reflections on divine providence in his doctrine of God; however, for our purposes, 
Thomas’s insistence that the doctrine of providence belongs to the theological province of faith 
is sufficient to establish this distinction. This proof, nevertheless, offers clearer signs of 
                                                
96 De Ver. 3.1: “Operatio naturae, quae est ad determinatum finem, praesupponit intellectum, 
praestituentem finem naturae, et ordinantem ad finem illum naturam, ratione cuius omne opus naturae dicitur esse 
opus intelligentiae . . . Haec ergo videtur esse ratio ideae . . . [ista] habet quodammodo rationem finis.” Cf. ST 
1a.15.2.  
97 It is a bit peculiar that Doolan actually acknowledges this conceptual congruity between the fifth way 
and Thomas’s doctrine of the divine ideas since he explicitly rejects the connection that divine providence is the 
same thing as divine exemplarism (Aquinas on the Divine Ideas, 159). 
98 Preller, Divine Science and the Science of God, 134. 
99 De Ver. 14.9 ad.8: “omnium providentia . . . probari non [potest].”  
100 Michael Anthony Hoonhout, “The Systematic Understanding of Divine Providence in the "Summa 
Theologiae’’” (Unpublished Ph.D. Dissertation, Boston College, 1998), 66–7. 
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compatibility with Thomas’s doctrine of God because it is more restrained than, for example, the 
fourth way in its assertions about God. Beyond ascribing intelligence to God, the fifth way 
avoids making any statements that parallel the fourth way’s univocal predication of perfections, 
and in doing so this proof reinforces our claim that the function of the five ways is to establish 
the speculative space for the intelligibility of faith’s beliefs about God.  
 Unlike the fourth way, which fills in the metaphysical space it creates for the intelligibility 
of God with univocal connotations for the divine being that must be deconstructed in the 
process of theological appropriation, the fifth way simply lays the groundwork for the 
intelligibility of the confession in the articles of faith that all things are governed by God’s 
providence. The fifth way establishes the metaphysical space for the intelligibility of God as the 
one who has determined the observable orderliness in the actions of non-intelligent beings, and 
the underlying intimation to the divine ideas serves as a buttress to the philosophical insight of 
the proof that God’s providential ordering of creation is not unintelligible to the rational mind. 
Thomas’s work of theologically appropriating the argument of the fifth way is, therefore, far less 
invasive than with the fourth because he can simply begin filling in the space created by the 
proof with a theological account of divine providence and his own theologically reconfigured 
doctrine of the divine ideas.101 Both of these proofs, nevertheless, can assist the readers of the 
Summa on their journey to the vision of God, and their underlying intimations to the divine ideas 
provide insight into the subtle gestures that characterize Thomas’s use of the doctrine. 
 
5.3 Theological Appropriation of the Divine Ideas in the Doctrine of Divine Providence 
 
Although the fourth and fifth ways were not intended to prove the existence of the 
divine ideas, if sacra doctrina determines, as we have argued above (§5.2), the suitableness of the 
arguments included within the five ways for facilitating access to the theological intelligibility of 
God, then the underlying presence of the divine ideas in both of these proofs reveals a great deal 
about the function of the doctrine within the Summa.102 In the first place, despite not referring 
                                                
101 The connection between providence and the divine ideas here and later in the Summa actually confirms 
our earlier claim (§3.1.2) that Thomas’s doctrine of the divine ideas undergoes a theological reconfiguration because 
the contrast between the philosophical notion of providence introduced in the proof and Thomas’s theological 
elaboration on the meaning of divine providence places the connection between the doctrines of providence and the 
divine ideas later in the Summa within a distinctly theological context. Cf. Michael A Hoonhout, “Grounding 
Providence in the Theology of the Creator: The Exemplarity of Thomas Aquinas,” The Heythrop Journal 43 (2002): 1–
19. 
102 While the arguments offered in the five ways have a long tradition handed down to Thomas from 
ancient philosophers, Church Fathers, and other medieval writers, their historical linage does not negate the claim 
that Thomas intentionally makes subtle gestures to the divine ideas in the fourth and fifth ways. In fact, to the 
contrary, it reinforces our argument because it demonstrates that Thomas had repeatedly seen these same gestures 
being made by others; thus, the discreet hints to the divine ideas made in the fourth and fifth ways reflect the much 
  
115 
directly to the doctrine of the divine ideas in either proof, Thomas’s discussions elsewhere on 
the arguments from the gradation of perfections and the order of non-intelligent beings reveal 
that the mechanics supporting these proofs rely on the existence of extrinsic exemplars, and the 
intimations to the divine ideas through the language of ‘measure’ and the notion of order 
confirm the presence of the doctrine in Thomas’s articulation of both proofs. Thus, for the 
fourth way, the existence of a plurality of extrinsic exemplars clarifies how there can be both one 
being that is the first exemplar cause of all other things and, for example, degrees of goodness in 
the world. As for the fifth way, a notion of extrinsic exemplars is needed to explain the 
teleological directedness we see in the multitude of non-intelligent beings within creation.103 
Accordingly, since the purpose of these proofs is to establish the intelligibility of God, Thomas’s 
allusions to the doctrine in two of the five ways suggest that the divine ideas play an important 
role in making sense of God’s intelligibility in relation to the multitude of things that exist, and 
his awareness of Aristotelian and (Neo-) Platonist philosophical arguments for the plurality of 
extrinsic exemplars ensures that the notion of a plurality of divine ideas is not unintelligible to 
the rational mind.104 
The distinctly philosophical form of argumentation in ST 1a.2.3, however, also entails 
that without, as it were, opening up space for the theological adaptation and extension of these 
arguments, the subtle gestures of the doctrine of divine ideas at work in the fourth and fifth ways 
could not carry the reader any further than metaphysical insight into the nature of being-in-
general.105 In other words if we read Thomas’s thought on the divine ideas in the Summa along 
strictly philosophical lines, as Doolan proposes (§5.1.3), the doctrine cannot escape the univocal 
connotations that prompt the criticisms of Sergei Bulgakov and Dietrich Bonhoeffer, which we 
                                                                                                                                                  
larger tradition behind Thomas’s reception of the arguments. For more on the genealogies of the fourth and fifth 
ways, see Elders, The Philosophical Theology of St. Thomas Aquinas, 117–8 and 124; Kerr, After Aquinas, 71. 
103 For further discussion on this point, see Boland, Ideas in God, 261–4. 
104 See, BDT 4.1; De sub. sep. c. 10; SDC prop. 1; Sent. Metaph. X, lect.4. Cf. John F. Wippel, “Thomas 
Aquinas on the Distinction and Derivation of the Many from the One: A Dialectic between Being and Nonbeing,” 
The Review of Metaphysics 38, no. 3 (1985): 563–90; Velde, Participation and Substantiality, 242–4. 
105 Kevin Hector offers an interesting perspective in his observation that, for Thomas, “Being is something 
that God can have in common with creatures precisely because being is not a genus – creatures can resemble God 
insofar as they are, just as God is, without violating the rule that God is not a member of any genus. Because ‘being’ 
is not a genus, it provides Thomas with a basis for connecting God and creatures” (“Apophaticism in Thomas 
Aquinas,” 387). To reinforce this claim, he then adds, “Note the role played by the analogia entis: ‘being’ is indeed a 
common term between God and creatures, but because ‘being’ is not a predicate, it does not warrant an 
anthropological stating-point for theological statements. Rather, Thomas deploys the analogia entis precisely as a way 
of affirming the meaningfulness of the Gospel’s claims about God . . . Thomas is engaged in ‘faith seeking 
understanding,’ not natural theology” (n.20). These remarks summarize Hector’s rather compelling argument, based 
on ST 1a.3.5 and 1a.4.3, that one way Thomas opens up space for theological adaptation and extension of 
philosophical arguments is by unshackling ‘being’ from the category of genus.  
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have discussed previously.106 This interpretive conundrum, however, brings us to the second 
point of our discussion on what the peripheral placement of the divine ideas in the fourth and 
fifth ways tells us about the function of the doctrine within the Summa. For Thomas the doctrine 
of the divine ideas plays, as we have been arguing throughout this study (§1.3), a supporting role 
in the pedagogical program of the Summa, and the peripheral engagements with the divine ideas 
in the fourth and fifth ways reinforce this claim. Yet, the explicitly philosophical shape of the 
arguments in the five ways demonstrates that, if they are read on their own, the meaning of the 
doctrine shifts in relation to the focal point of the proofs. Much like the relation between an 
artist’s focal point and use of foreground or background in a painting, the substantive meaning 
of the doctrine of the divine ideas is determined by the focal point of the argument being made. 
On the one hand, then, the interpretation of the divine ideas is quite pliable, as the variegated 
history of the doctrine confirms, while, on the other hand, Thomas’s subsequent theological 
appropriation of the subtle gestures in the fourth and fifth ways instructs the reader on the 
process of reorienting the focal point for the divine ideas to the vision of God obtained through 
sacra doctrina.107 
One topic where the allusions to the doctrine of the divine ideas in both the fourth and 
fifth ways converge is Thomas’s exposition on the doctrine of divine providence, where we find 
the theological extension of both the argument ex gradibus and the argument ex gubernatione rerum. 
Thomas describes the nature of providence when he observes, “Since God is the cause of things 
through his mind, and, as we have already made clear (1a.15.2), the idea of each and every effect 
must pre-exist in him, the divine mind must preconceive the whole pattern of things moving to 
their end . . . Therefore the very exemplar itself in God of the plan of things to their end is called 
his Providence.”108 Here Thomas firmly establishes the link between the divine ideas and the 
                                                
106 For the criticisms of Bulgakov and Bonhoeffer, see the introductions to Chapters Two and Three. Cf. 
John Hughes, “Creatio Ex Nihilo and the Divine Ideas in Aquinas: How Fair Is Bulgakov’s Critique?,” Modern 
Theology 29 (2013): 124–37. 
107 Given the flexibility in the interpretation of the divine ideas, Thomas’s more tempered interaction with 
the doctrine is understandable. For more on the various forms the doctrine of the divine ideas has taken throughout 
its tangled history, see Rega Wood, “Distinct Ideas and Perfect Solicitude: Alexander of Hales, Richard Rufus, and 
Odo Rigaldus,” Franciscan Studies 53 (1993): 7–31; Vivian Boland, O.P., Ideas in God According to Saint Thomas Aquinas: 
Sources and Synthesis, Studies in the History of Christian Thought 69 (Leiden: Brill, 1996), pt. 1; Robert Aurelien, 
“Idées Humaines, Idées Divine: Ockham Lecteur d’Augustin,” Revue Thomiste 103 (2003): 479–93; Stephen Lahey, 
“Of Divine Ideas and Insolubles: Wyclif’s Explanation of God’s Understanding of Sin,” The Modern Schoolman 86 
(2008/2009): 211–32; Wendy Petersen Boring, “Revising Our Approach to ‘Augustinian Illumination’: A 
Reconsideration of Bonaventure’s Quaestiones Disputatae de Scientia Christi IV, Aquinas’s Summa Theologiae Ia.84, 1-8, 
and Henry of Ghent’s, Summa Quaestionum Ordinarum, Q. 2, Art. 1, 2,” Franciscan Studies 68 (2010): 39–81; Benjamin 
DeSpain, “Seeing One’s Own Face in the Face of God: The Doctrine of the Divine Ideas in the Mystical Theologies 
of Dionysius the Areopagite and Nicholas of Cusa,” in Christian Mysticism and Incarnational Theology: Between 
Transcendence and Immanence, ed. Louise Nelstrop and Simon D. Podmore (Surrey: Ashgate Publishing, 2013), 29–46. 
108 ST 1a.22.1: “Cum autem Deus sit causa rerum per suum intellectum, et sic cuiuslibet sui effectus 
oportet rationem in ipso praeexistere, ut ex superioribus patet; necesse est quod ratio ordinis rerum in finem in 
mente divina praeexistat . . . Ipsa igitur ratio ordinis rerum in finem, providentia in Deo nominatur.” 
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doctrine of divine providence anticipated by his comments at the end of ST 1a.15.3 ad.4 (§3.1.1 
and §3.1.2). There is, however, a subtle distinction from Thomas’s formal discussion on divine 
ideas that is introduced at the end of this citation, which demonstrates his continued elaboration 
on and extension of the doctrine as he proceeds through the Summa. He clarifies this distinction 
in De veritate, where he explains:  
There is a twofold order to be found in things. First, there is that order 
according to which things come from their principles. Second, there is the 
order according to which they are directed to an end. Now, the divine 
disposing pertains to that order according to which things proceed from their 
principles; for things are said to be disposed inasmuch as they are established 
on diverse grades by God, who is like an artist arranging the different parts of 
his work in different ways. Consequently, disposition seems to pertain to art. 
Providence, however, implies the ordering which directs to an end; for this 
reason it differs from the divine art and disposition. For divine art is so called 
because of its relation to the production of things . . . Providence, however, 
implies ordering to the end.109 
While Thomas’s formal remarks compare the divine ideas to, what would be called here, the 
artist’s proper judgment about what to make, his explanation of divine providence in ST 1a.22.1 
suggests that the divine ideas relate not only to the origin of created things but to their entire 
existence as things ordered to an end (§3.3.2), which brings us to the theological adaptation of 
the arguments ex gradibus and ex gubernatione rerum in the Summa’s doctrine of divine providence.  
 In his answer to a question on the work of providence, Thomas states, “It pertains to 
divine Providence to produce every degree of being (esse).”110 Thus, the hierarchical gradation of 
being in the world is determined by God, as initially indicated in the fourth way (§5.2.1); however, 
embedded in this comment are the principles for Thomas’s theological extension of the 
arguments from the gradation of things and their government, which he identifies in response to 
the biblical revelation, cited in ST 1a.22.2, that divine wisdom “reaches mightily from one end of 
the earth to the other, and she orders all things well” (Wis. 8.1).111 Concerning the implications 
of this passage, Thomas explains, in contrast to various philosophical perspectives, that the 
                                                
109 De ver. 5.1 ad.9: “Quod in rebus potest considerari duplex ordo: unus secundum quod egrediuntur a 
principio; alius secundum quod ordinantur ad finem. Dispositio ergo pertinet ad illum ordinem quo res 
progrediuntur a principio: dicuntur enim aliqua disponi secundum quod in diversis gradibus collocantur a Deo, sicut 
artifex diversimode collocat partes sui artificii; unde dispositio ad artem pertinere videtur. Sed providentia importat 
illum ordinem qui est ad finem. Et sic providentia differt ab arte divina et dispositione, quia ars divina dicitur 
respectu productionis rerum . . . providentia autem dicit ordinem in finem.” The distinction here follows Aristotle’s 
division between the operations of art (ars) and prudence (prudentia), or, in other words, the difference between right 
judgment about things to be made (faciendorum) and things to be done (agendorum). Cf. SLE VI, lect. 3, no.1153-1160; 
ST 1a2ae.57. Alice Ramos’s discussion on this point is also of tremendous value. See, Dynamic Transcendentals: Truth, 
Goodness and Beauty from a Thomistic Perspective (Washington: The Catholic University of America Press, 2012), 79. 
110 ST 1a.22.4: “Ad divinam providentiam pertinet omnes gradus entium producere.” 
111 Cf. Sent. IV, d.49, q.1, a.3, qc.1; SCG BK. 3, ch.97; De ver. 22.1; In Rom. 9, lect. 3, no.773; ST 1a.109.2; 
2a2ae.165.1; 3a.60.4. 
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revelation of God’s providential care for creation means, “We are bound to profess that divine 
Providence rules all things, not only in their general natures, but also as individuals” because, he 
continues, “his Providence is naught else than the idea whereby all things are planned to an 
end.”112 Thomas initially prepares the reader for this theological adaptation of the arguments ex 
gradibus and ex gubernatione rerum in his discussion on divine knowledge, where he concludes, 
“God’s knowledge is the measure of things . . . because it measures the essence and the truth of 
a thing. For every thing possesses the truth of its own nature in the measure in which it imitates 
the divine knowledge.”113 The development of this principle in the doctrine of divine providence 
is, however, transmitted within the Summa, as the passages cited above demonstrate, through the 
formal remarks on the divine ideas in ST 1a.15.2 and 3, where Thomas takes additional steps to 
ensure that the reader understands that the measure of created things in the divine mind extends 
to each particular thing as an individual. Far from rendering the formal discussion on the divine 
ideas redundant, then, as Gilson supposes (§5.1.1), the doctrine of the divine ideas provides 
Thomas with the grammar he will utilize to extend the claims of question 14 into his theological 
exposition on God’s providential care for every individual thing within creation. 
 Thomas’s theological extension of the divine ideas in his reflections on God’s intentional 
gradation of creation does not end there. In the passages cited above, Thomas’s references to 
God’s providential oversight of the effects within creation allude to a unique qualification in his 
doctrine of the divine ideas, which is finally spelled out in the discussion on the eternal law in 
question 93 of the prima secundae. There, he writes:  
Just as in every artist’s mind there pre-exists an exemplar of the things he 
makes by his art, so too does an exemplar of the ordered actions to be done by 
those subject to a governor pre-exist in his mind . . . And so, as being the 
principle through which the universe is created, divine wisdom means art, or 
exemplar, or idea, and likewise it also means law, as moving all things to their 
                                                
112 ST 1a.22.2: “Necesse est dicere omnia divinae providentiae subiacere, non in universali tantum, sed 
etiam in singulari . . . Cum nihil aliud sit Dei providentia quam ratio ordinis rerum in finem.” Following this final 
remark, Thomas writes: “Similiter etiam supra ostensum est quod Deus omnia cognoscit, et universalia et 
particularia. Et cum cognitio eius comparetur ad res sicut cognitio artis ad artificiata, ut supra dictum est, necesse est 
quod omnia supponantur suo ordini, sicut omnia artificiata subduntur ordini artis.” Here we have a more specific 
example of Thomas embracing a theological reconfiguration of the craftsman analogy initiated through an 
interpretive interplay between scripture and Hellenistic philosophy, which he uses to elaborate on the biblical 
imagery of God’s creational activity as governor over all things. For more on the use of the craftsman analogy in the 
interpretation of scripture, see Jean Daniélou, Gospel Message and Hellenistic Culture (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 
1973), 107–10. Boland provides a helpful discussion on the transmission of this analogy into Western theology 
through Cicero and Seneca. See, Ideas in God, 23–8. Since Thomas’s use of the craftsman analogy is largely indebted 
to Augustine, for a detailed discussion on his reception and application of the analogy, see Carol Harrison, Beauty and 
Revelation in the Thought of Saint Augustine (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992), 97–139. 
113 ST 1a.14.12 ad.3: “Scientia Dei est mensura rerum . . . quia mensurat essentiam et veritatem rei. 
Unumquodque enim intantum habet de veritate suae naturae, inquantum imitatur Dei scientiam.” 
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due ends. Accordingly the Eternal Law is nothing other than the exemplar of 
divine wisdom as directing the motions and acts of everything.114 
Put more simply, as Thomas does in his comments on Jn. 12.49, “Just as the patterns of all 
things pass from the Father to the Son, who is the Wisdom of the Father, so also the patterns of 
all things to be done.”115 
 For Thomas, then, as Alice Ramos notes, “[T]he exemplar is not only the measure of a 
thing in being, but also its measure in activity and thus in its process of finalization or 
perfectioning.”116 Boland is certainly correct when he concludes that this argument “puts the 
traditional understanding of the ideas under great pressure.”117 Nevertheless, it does represent a 
fitting extension of the doctrine in response to the revelation that God has ordered the whole of 
creation in such a way that through it he guides each creature to its eschatological realization in 
him as a particular imitation of the pure actuality that is the divine essence (ST 1a.14.1 ad.1). By 
identifying the divine ideas with God’s knowledge of the ways his own pure actuality can be 
imitated through, what we called earlier (§3.3.2), the dynamic actualization of each creature, 
Thomas broadens the grammar of the doctrine to embrace both the creational formation of each 
creature as well as each one’s eschatological fulfillment in God. Although the reader of the 
Summa may not immediately realize the broader implications of his doctrine of the divine ideas, 
Thomas’s subtle engagements with the doctrine, beginning in the fourth and fifth ways, 
pedagogically prepare the reader to theologically reimagine the divine ideas. Consequently, what 
we see Thomas doing in his exposition on divine providence is theologically appropriating the 
allusions to the divine ideas in the fourth and fifth ways to secure the unique telos of every 
creature in God, as indicated in ST 1a.44.3, where he argues that all things reach after 
(consequuntur) determinate forms located in the wisdom of God, which rational creatures do, as 
the next chapter demonstrates, through the virtue of hope. 
 
 
 
                                                
114 ST 1a2ae.93.1: “sicut in quolibet artifice praeexistit ratio eorum quae constituuntur per artem, ita etiam 
in quolibet gubernante oportet quod praeexistat ratio ordinis eorum quae agenda sunt per eos qui gubernationi 
subduntur . . . Unde sicut ratio divinae sapientiae inquantum per eam cuncta sunt creata, rationem habet artis vel 
exemplaris vel ideae; ita ratio divinae sapientiae moventis omnia ad debitum finem, obtinet rationem legis. Et 
secundum hoc, lex aeterna nihil aliud est quam ratio divinae sapientiae, secundum quod est directiva omnium 
actuum et motionum.” 
115 Lect. Ioan. 12, lect. 8, no.1723: “Sicut ergo a patre derivantur in filium, qui est sapientia patris, rationes 
omnium rerum, ita et rationes omnium agendorum.” 
116 Ramos, Dynamic Transcendentals, 80. 
117 Boland, Ideas in God, 327. 
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6. The Theological Metaphysics of Hope (and Spiritual Despair) 
 
This hope, which is identical with our very being itself . . . finds its ultimate fulfillment on the other side 
of death, “after” the here-and-now. In a word, the object of existential hope bursts the bounds of “this” 
world.1 
 
Introduction 
One locus where the doctrinal gestures of the divine ideas quietly resurface in order to 
reinforce Thomas’s account of God’s eternal plan for humanity’s eschatological realization (§5.3) 
is the immeasurably rich topic of hope. The general reception of Thomas’s thought on this 
theological virtue has, unfortunately, been maligned on a number of fronts by critical 
interpretations offered by leading contemporary theologians, chief among them being Jürgen 
Moltmann.2 In a characteristic passage from an essay published in 1985, Moltmann critically 
remarks of Thomas that, “His ‘theology of hope’ is in truth not the theology of a biblical ‘hope’ 
but the anthropology of the natural desire (appetitus naturalis) of the inner self-transcendence of 
human beings which finds its answer in the metaphysical theology of the supreme good (summum 
bonum).”3 Although this essay and the position it represents have been robustly challenged by 
Thomist scholars like Jean-Pierre Torrell, who remarks on Moltmann’s interpretation, “Only a 
deep misunderstanding based on a very narrow consultation of the works has allowed some to 
suspect that Thomas ‘liquidated’ Biblical eschatology in favor of a simply transcendental desire,”4 
it continues to exhibit considerable influence over the general reception of Thomas’s theological 
reflections on hope.5  
At the heart of Moltmann’s argument is the contention that, as he says, “Thomas 
replaces the biblical history of the promise with a finalistic metaphysic,” or, in other words, 
“Taking the place of the eschatological promise of the ‘new heaven and the new earth’ – ‘Behold, 
                                                
1 Josef Pieper, Hope and History: Five Salzburg Lectures, trans. David Kipp (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 
1994), 107; German original, Hoffnung Und Geschichte: Fünf Salzburger Vorlesungen (Munich: Kösel-Verlag, 1967). 
2 For summaries of these critical evaluations, including Moltmann’s, see Dominic Doyle, The Promise of 
Christian Humanism: Thomas Aquinas on Hope (New York: Crossroad Publishing, 2011), 43–8. Cf. Zachary Hayes, A 
Vision of the Future: A Study of Christian Eschatology (Collegeville: Liturgical Press, 1990), 126–53. 
3 Jürgen Moltmann, “Christian Hope: Messianic or Transcendent? A Theological Discussion with Joachim 
of Fiore and Thomas Aquinas,” Horizons 12 (1985): 333; German original, “Christliche Hoffnung: Messianisch Oder 
Transzendental? Ein Theologisches Gespräch Mit Joachim von Fiore Und Thomas von Aquin,” Münchner 
Theologische Zeitschrift 33 (1982): 241–60. 
4 Torrell, Spiritual Master, 327 n.54. Cf. Doyle, The Promise of Christian Humanism, 142–4. For a brief but 
insightful criticism of Moltmann’s theology of hope, see Josef Pieper, “Pastless Future, Groundless Hope,” in 
Problems of Modern Faith: Essays and Addresses, trans. Jan van Heurk (Chicago: Franciscan Herald Press, 1985), 157–73. 
5 For examples of contemporary works written from various theological and philosophical perspectives 
that positively cite or address the influence of this essay’s assessment of Thomas, see Michael S. Horton, Covenant 
and Eschatology: The Divine Drama (Louisville: Westminster John Knox Press, 2002), 38 and 228 n.88; Rowena A. 
Pecchenino, “Abandon Hope All Ye Who Enter Here?,” Revue de Philosophie économique 12 (2012): 5; Timothy Harvie, 
“Jürgen Moltmann and Catholic Theology: Disputes on the Intersections of Ontology and Ethics,” The Heythrop 
Journal 55 (2014): 370–2; J. Richard Middleton, A New Heaven and a New Earth: Reclaiming Biblical Eschatology (Grand 
Rapids: Baker Academic, 2014), 295. 
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I make all things new’ (Rev. 21.5) – is the visio Dei beatifica in patria, that is, in heaven, the bliss of 
the pure spirits in the hereafter.”6 Contrary to this opposition between metaphysics and biblical 
history, the newfound appreciation for Thomas’s commentaries on scripture, the hitherto 
“forgotten corpus of the Angelic Doctor,”7 has exposed, as Anselm Min observes, that, 
“Aquinas’s theology is historical but not historicist in that it . . . locates change in the context of 
a trinitarian history of salvation with hope in the enduring identity of the substance of inherited 
faith.”8 Thus, when Thomas argues, in his evaluation of Rom. 5.2, that through grace those who 
believe in God have been promised, as he says, “the glory that God has in himself,” and, 
accordingly, “Our hope for this has been given to us by Christ: we have been born anew to a living 
hope through the resurrection of Jesus Christ from the dead and to an inheritance which is incorruptible (1 Pet 
1.3),” he reveals that his metaphysical reflections on the beatific vision are not divorced from his 
understanding of God’s work of redemptive recreation, but rather rooted in the eschatological 
anticipation of the work already fulfilled by Christ.9  
Now, it is possible that Moltmann’s misreading of Thomas is attributable to a much 
larger, longstanding oversight in Thomist studies, which has been identified by Anna Williams in 
her observation that, “Accounts of Thomistic eschatology have tended to stress beatific vision 
alone.”10 Regardless of the reasons for Moltmann’s misunderstanding, his critique has an all-too-
familiar ring to it, since it essentially duplicates the same basic argument seen in Bulgakov’s 
condemnation of Thomas’s doctrine of the divine ideas, discussed in the introduction to Chapter 
Two, which is that he trades the truth of God’s revelation for a metaphysic grounded in 
Aristotelian and Platonic principles. Consequently, tracing the subtle gestures of the divine ideas 
                                                
6 Moltmann, “Christian Hope,” 333. 
7 Thomas G. Weinandy, Daniel A. Keating, and John Yocum, eds., Aquinas on Scripture: A Critical 
Introduction to His Commentaries (London: T.& T. Clark, 2005), ix. 
8 Anselm K. Min, Paths to the Triune God: An Encounter Between Aquinas and Recent Theologies (Notre Dame: 
University of Notre Dame Press, 2005), 4. Cf. Armand Maurer’s study St. Thomas and Historicity (Milwaukee: 
Marquette University Press, 1979), 33, which was notably published before Moltmann’s essay, and argues for a 
reading of Thomas that is similar to the one represented here by Min. Matthew Levering exposes the false 
dichotomy in Moltmann’s opposition between biblical history and Thomas’s metaphysical inquires when he argues 
that it is not an imposition on scripture to suggest that it addresses metaphysical concerns “once,” as he says, “one 
recognizes that ‘metaphysics’ is intellectual judgment about ultimate questions regarding the nature of God and 
creatures” (Scripture and Metaphysics: Aquinas and the Renewal of Trinitarian Theology [Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, 2004], 41). 
9 In Rom. 5, lect. 1, no.385: “Gloria quam Deus habet in seipso . . . Et huiusmodi spes indita est nobis per 
Christum. I Petr. I, 3 s.: regeneravit nos in spem vivam, per resurrectionem Iesu Christi ex mortuis in haereditatem 
incorruptibilem.” Cf. SCG Bk. 3, ch.153; Compend. Theol. 2.4; In Gal. 5, lect. 2; In Eph. 1, lect. 6; In Heb. 9, lect. 1; Lect. 
Ioan. 3, lect. 2. Johnstone’s argument, discussed earlier (§2.4), that the Summa should be approached in reverse 
further undermines Moltmann’s reading of Thomas since, in the tertia pars, Thomas explicitly grounds the beginning 
and end of hope in the death (3a.25.4 s.c.) and resurrection (3a.53.1; 3a.57.1 and 6) of Christ. Thomas’s metaphysical 
reflections on the nature of hope found earlier in the Summa could then be read as his theological exposition of what 
a person experiences in the virtue of hope, which has been secured in Christ.  
10 A. N. Williams, The Ground of Union: Deification in Aquinas and Palamas (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1999), 46. Williams proceeds to demonstrate in her study that, for Thomas, as she says in the same place, 
“Deiformity necessarily accompanies the vision of God.” 
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within Thomas’s reflections on the theological virtue of hope provides us with a unique 
opportunity to challenge the formulaic dichotomy between metaphysics and theology repeatedly 
projected into Thomas’s thought, since his discussions on hope offer what Williams calls, “a 
microcosmic version of the Summa Theologiae itself.”11 While an explicit connection between the 
divine ideas and the theological virtues is made in ST 1a2ae.62.1, where Thomas explains, in his 
reply to the second objection, that the theological virtues are copies or imitations (exemplatae) of 
the exemplar virtues (exemplares virtutes) which “pre-exist in God, just as in him pre-exist the 
patterns of all things,” this is not the link we are interested in at the moment.12 Instead, the 
purpose of this chapter is to identify, in particular, how the gesture of the doctrine, which 
establishes that the true meaning of each person is located within the eternal mind of God (ST 
1a.18.4 ad.3; §3.3.1), peripherally functions within Thomas’s descriptions of the volitional 
movements of hope and despair to and away from God (ST 2a2ae.17.1), but to do so we must 
first establish some parameters for this discussion by considering Thomas’s reflections on the 
passion of hope and the eschatological reality that hope anticipates.  
The first section, then, examines Thomas’s discussions on the irascible appetites of hope 
and despair, which offer not only a general context for interpreting his expositions on the 
theological virtue of hope and the vice of spiritual despair but also an example of the relation 
between nature and grace in his theological vision. In the second section, Thomas’s argument for 
humanity’s creational disposition to eschatological fulfillment in the beatific vision is analyzed. 
Specifically, we consider here Thomas’s insistence that while humanity’s perfection is only 
realized in the beatific vision, it relates to each person in a unique way. Following this discussion 
on humanity’s eschatological fulfillment, we consider, in the third section, the relation of hope, 
as a theological virtue, to Thomas’s account of humanity’s eternal beatitude. There we argue that 
Thomas’s description of hope’s movement to God includes certain peripheral gestures to the 
doctrine of the divine ideas, which indicate that this movement is also a stretching out for the 
creational actualization of God’s eternal idea of the individual. The final section of this chapter 
continues this line of inquiry into the pattern of Thomas’s subtle allusions to the divine ideas by 
examining his exposition on the nature of spiritual despair, where we discover that Thomas 
speaks of this vice as not only a withdrawing from God but also a rejection of God’s revelation 
that each person is intentionally created after a likeness in the divine mind. 
 
 
                                                
11 Williams, The Ground of Union, 35. 
12 ST 1a2ae.61.5: “Oportet igitur quod exemplar humanae virtutis in Deo praeexistat, sicut et in eo 
praeexistunt omnium rerum rationes.” 
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6.1 Supernatural Complement to a Natural Capacity: Some Background Notes 
  
 Thomas’s discussion on the virtue of hope in his Compendium theologiae includes the 
incisive remark that “hope presupposes desire.”13 This comment notably reveals that Thomas 
thinks of the theological virtue of hope as a supernatural complement (ST 1a2ae.62.2 ad.1) to 
humanity’s natural longing for what is good (ST 1a2ae.23.4). Desire, which belongs to the 
concupiscible passions, is, however, not the same as the irascible appetite of hope, as Thomas 
makes abundantly clear in ST 1a2ae.40.1, where he explains that, unlike desire, the object of 
hope is a good that is both distant and difficult to attain. Thus, while the virtue of hope 
presupposes humanity’s natural capacity for desiring good, it is the stretching out (extensio) of the 
appetite of hope (ST 1a2ae.40.2) that is transformed, through the gift of grace (ST 1a2ae.106.1 
ad.2), into the virtuous striving of hope for God.14 In addition to the object of hope being a 
future good that is difficult to attain, it must, nevertheless, be possible, according to Thomas, to 
reach, which is what ultimately separates hope from despair (ST 1a2ae.50.1). There is, then, a 
notable symmetry in these irascible appetites, as Kevin White explains, one “may either approach 
a promising difficult good as good, in hope, or fall away from it as unreachable, in despair,” 
which reappears in Thomas’s discussions on the virtue of hope and the vice of despair (ST 
2a2ae.17.1).15 Despite these parallels, the irascible appetite is incapable of ascending to the 
heights of the virtue of hope or falling to the depths of spiritual despair (ST 2a2ae.17.1) since the 
virtuous ascent of hope and the sinful withdrawing of despair directly manifest one’s relation to 
humanity’s metaphysical aspiration for fulfillment (ST 1a2ae.63.3 ad.1). The natural dispositions 
of hope and despair, nevertheless, tell us not only about the nature of the movements in their 
religious counterparts, but also about humanity’s creationally constituted metaphysical 
orientation to eschatological culmination.16 
 First, the irascible appetites of hope and despair uniquely express the status viatoris of 
humanity’s temporal existence because they designate, in the words of Josef Pieper, “the 
                                                
13 Compend. Theol. 2.7: “Spes desiderium praesupponit.” This phrase also appears in Sent. III, d.26, q.2, a.3, 
qc.2 and ST 1a2ae.40.1, but unlike these instances, where Thomas is discussing the irascible passion of hope, the 
context of the discussion in the Compendium is the virtue of hope.  
14 To avoid confusion here, I am not suggesting that the natural perfection of the passion of hope is the 
theological virtue of hope since Thomas is quite clear elsewhere in the Summa that the moral virtue of magnanimity 
is the natural fulfillment of this irascible appetite (ST 2a2ae.17.5 ad.4; 2a2ae.129.1 ad.2). Instead, grace elevates the 
natural movements of our will to reach out for an end that lies beyond our natural appetites. See, Robert Miner, 
Thomas Aquinas on the Passions: A Study of Summa Theologiae, 1a2ae 22-48 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2009), 227–9. 
15 Kevin White, “The Passions of the Soul,” in Essays on Aquinas’s Ethics, ed. Stephen J. Pope (Washington: 
Georgetown University Press, 2002), 109. 
16 The use of “religious” here reflects the broader sense of the word identified in ST 2a2ae.81, where 
Thomas says that it “denotes properly a relation to God” (proprie importat ordinem ad Deum), rather than its more 
narrow use for the monastic or celibate life discussed in ST 2a2ae.184-189. 
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innermost structure of created nature . . . the inherent ‘not yet’ of the finite being.”17 Clearly, 
then, these natural dispositions carry metaphysical connotations, but, according to Torrell, this is 
because, “In Thomas’s eyes, no creature in the universe is what it ought to be from the start; it 
does not reach fulfillment except at the end of an evolution and it ‘desires’ this expansion of its 
whole being.”18 As Thomas explains, in his reflections on the seventh day of creation, which we 
have already seen (§3.3.2), “For any being there are two kinds of completeness, initial and 
evolved . . . The second kind of completeness is the goal that the thing is to achieve,” and, he 
argues, “this consummation pre-existed causally, on the side of nature, at the first forming of 
things.”19 Far from creating a simple ontology of desire that is detached from the biblical 
narrative, as Moltmann argues, Thomas situates his understanding of the “not yet,” which 
characterizes the appetitive movements of hope and despair, at the very beginning of biblical 
history (ST 1a.95.3). Second, we also learn from Thomas’s descriptions of hope and despair that 
while the passion of hope cannot unite us to God, humanity’s natural capacity for it ensures that 
we are oriented to God, since he is the source of all that is good (ST 1a.6.1 ad.1), in such a way 
that what we experience in the theological virtue of hope is divinely adapted from our natural 
powers (ST 1a2ae.62.3).20 Although much more could be said about the metaphysical 
implications of Thomas’s thought on the irascible appetites of hope and despair, these notes on 
what their distinct traits reveal about humanity’s creational constitution should be sufficient for 
our purposes.21 In order, however, to avoid confusion here, it is worth saying a little more about 
the distinction between the passion and the virtue of hope since, as we will see below (§6.3 and 
                                                
17 Josef Pieper, Faith, Hope, Love, trans. Richard Winston, Clara Winston, and Mary Frances McCarthy, 
S.N.D. (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 1997), 93. Cf. Pieper, “The Negative Element,” 69; Charles Pinches, “On 
Hope,” in Virtues and Their Vices, ed. Kevin Timpe and Craig A. Boyd (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), 351. 
18 Torrell, Spiritual Master, 327. 
19 ST 1a.73.1: “Quod duplex est rei perfectio, prima et secunda . . . Perfectio autem secunda est finis.” ST 
1a.73.1 ad.1: “Ista consummatio praecessit causaliter, quantum ad naturam quidem, in prima rerum institutione.” 
20 In ST 3a.1.3 ad.2 Thomas insists that “Ad perfectionem etiam universi sufficit quod naturali modo 
creatura ordinetur sic in Deum sicut in finem. Hoc autem excedit limites perfectionis naturae ut creatura uniatur 
Deo in persona.” Cf. Pieper, Faith, Hope, Love, 99. It is also worth noting that at this point we have wandered into 
the territory of the highly contentious topic of Thomas’s position on the hypothetical state of pure nature. I will 
leave the relation of this topic to our current discussion for a future project since to properly delve into it here 
would significantly alter the path we are on. Those familiar with the debate, however, should be able to discern my 
stance. For overviews of this topic from both sides of the debate, see Steven A. Long, “On the Possibility of a 
Purely Natural End for Man,” The Thomist 64 (2000): 211–37; John Milbank, The Suspended Middle: Henri de Lubac and 
the Debate Concerning the Supernatural (London: SCM Press, 2005); David Braine, “The Debate between Henri de 
Lubac and His Critics,” Nova et Vetera (English) 6 (2008): 543–89; Nicholas J. Healy III, “Henri de Lubac on Nature 
and Grace: A Note on Some Recent Contributions to the Debate,” Communio 35 (2008): 535–64; Reinhard Hütter, 
Dust Bound for Heaven: Explorations in the Theology of Thomas Aquinas (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans Publishing Company, 
2012), 129–247. 
21 For further discussion on the passions of hope and despair specifically, see Miner, Aquinas on the Passions, 
215–27; Diana Fritz Cates, Aquinas on the Emotions: A Religious-Ethical Inquiry (Washington: Georgetown University 
Press, 2010), 149–51. 
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§6.4), the theological virtue of hope and the vice of spiritual despair are defined by the same 
characteristics as their irascible counterparts. 
 According to Thomas, both the concupiscible and the irascible passions are movements 
within the sensitive appetite (ST 1a2ae.22.3), which represents humanity’s basic inclination to 
pursue or avoid objects apprehended through the senses (ST 1a.81.2; 1a2ae.23.1).22 Thomas 
insists that the varied responses of the irascible appetites to these objects “display no elements of 
repose, only those of movement”; however, since, as Thomas notes, “all movement is directed 
towards some ultimate point of rest,” the irascible appetites find their end in the repose of the 
concupiscible passions.23 Thus, the passion of hope comes to rest in the concupiscible passion of 
joy (ST 1a2ae.25.1) while despair terminates in sorrow (ST 1a2ae.25.3).24 Strictly speaking, then, 
the irascible passions of hope and despair are movements that remain within humanity’s 
sensitive appetite. In contrast, Thomas argues that “because the virtue of hope is concerned with 
the divine good as its proper object rather than with any good on the level of sense, its act 
cannot engage the sensitive appetite. Its subject, then, is rather the superior appetite called the 
will and not the inferior appetite where the irascible belongs.”25 This identification of the rational 
appetite as the seat of the theological virtue of hope follows Thomas’s reflections in ST 
1a2ae.56.6, where he concludes, “If what confronts a man’s will is a good which exceeds its 
capability, whether of the whole human race, such as the divine good, which transcends the 
limits of human nature, or of the individual, such as the good of one’s neighbour, there the will 
                                                
22 Thomas defines the sensitive appetite in ST 1a.81.2, where he says: “Quia appetitus sensitivus est 
inclinatio consequens apprehensionem sensitivam, necesse est quod in parte sensitiva sint duae appetitivae potentiae. 
Una, per quam anima simpliciter inclinatur ad prosequendum ea quae sunt convenientia secundum sensum, et ad 
refugiendum nociva, et haec dicitur concupiscibilis. Alia vero, per quam animal resistit impugnantibus, quae 
convenientia impugnant et nocumenta inferunt, et haec vis vocatur irascibilis. Unde dicitur quod eius obiectum est 
arduum, quia scilicet tendit ad hoc quod superet contraria, et superemineat eis.” Cf. De ver. 25.1; ST 1a2ae.23.1. For a 
detailed discussion on Thomas’s understanding of the sensitive appetite, see Miner, Aquinas on the Passions, 13–28. 
23 ST 1a2ae.25.1: “In passionibus irascibilis non invenitur aliquid pertinens ad quietem, sed solum pertinens 
ad motum . . . Quies autem, cum sit finis motus.” Thomas concludes his argument in this article with the remark: 
“Passiones irascibilis et principium habent a passionibus concupiscibilis, et in passiones concupiscibilis terminantur.” 
Cf. Sent. III, d.27, q.1, a.2; De ver. 35.2; 26.5; Sent. de Anima 3.14. Accordingly, the irascible appetites, for Thomas, 
shape humanity’s fundamental psychological responses to the concupiscible passions. For more on Thomas’s 
general assessments of the irascible appetites and their separation from the concupiscible passions, see Robert 
Pasnau, Thomas Aquinas on Human Nature: A Philosophical Study of Summa Theologiae, 1a 75-89 (Cambridge University 
Press, 2001), 240–3; Simo Knuuttila, Emotions in Ancient and Medieval Philosophy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2004), 239–55; Miner, Aquinas on the Passions, 213ff.; Nicholas E. Lombardo, The Logic of Desire: Aquinas on Emotion 
(Washington: The Catholic University of America Press, 2010), 50–4 and 62–74. 
24 For an excellent diagram that outlines the movements of hope and despair to their respective ends in the 
concupiscible passions of joy and sorrow, see Miner, Aquinas on the Passions, 86. 
25 ST 2a2ae.18.1: “Actus autem virtutis spei non potest pertinere ad appetitum sensitivum, quia bonum 
quod est obiectum principale huius virtutis non est aliquod bonum sensibile, sed bonum divinum. Et ideo spes est in 
appetitu superiori, qui dicitur voluntas, sicut in subiecto, non autem in appetitu inferiori, ad quem pertinet irascibilis.” 
The vice of spiritual despair is also principally located in the rational appetite, or will, since it is a habit or a principle 
of movement away from God (ST 1a2ae.59.1 ad.2; 2a2ae.20.3).   
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needs a virtue.”26 The virtue of hope and the vice of despair are, therefore, habits of the will (ST 
1a2ae.55.1) characterized by either a virtuous ascent to or sinful withdrawing from the 
eschatological promise of participation in the divine life, and, to reiterate, it is the goal of this 
chapter to identify how Thomas’s peripheral application of the divine ideas in his reflections on 
humanity’s movements to or away from God can help his readers make sense of the 
metaphysical mechanics at work in their personal experiences of hope and despair. Yet, before 
proceeding to our discussion on the virtue of hope itself, it would be beneficial to look more 
carefully at Thomas thought on the nature of humanity’s ultimate fulfillment because the virtue 
of hope actually enables humanity to strive for this end.  
 
6.2 Eschatological Fulfillment: Humanity’s Happy Ending 
 
  Regardless of the structural motif one favors (§2.4), nearly every formulation of the 
Summa’s structure includes the idea that the progression of the work parallels, in some way, the 
journey of human life to its ultimate fulfillment in the beatific vision.27 The convergence of the 
Summa’s developmental ascent with the journey of human life is, however, not surprising since, 
for Thomas, there is a direct correlation between, what could be called, the theotic spiral of sacra 
doctrina’s pedagogical praxis and the eschatological anticipation of humanity’s creational 
formation after the image of God.28 As beings created after the image of God, we are all, 
                                                
26 “Si quod bonum immineat homini volendum, quod excedat proportionem volentis; sive quantum ad 
totam speciem humanam, sicut bonum divinum, quod transcendit limites humanae naturae, sive quantum ad 
individuum, sicut bonum proximi; ibi voluntas indiget virtute.”  
27 Cf. A. N. Williams, “Mystical Theology Redux: The Pattern of Aquinas’ Summa Theologiae,” Modern 
Theology 13 (1997): 59. Torrell’s remarks on the record kept by Bartholomew of Capua of the transformation 
Thomas underwent at Mass on December 6 1273, which resulted in him ceasing work on the Summa in the middle 
of the tertia pars, suggest that the angelic doctor’s own life bears witness to this intersection. Thomas is reported to 
have said after that Mass, “I cannot do any more. Everything I have written seems to me as straw in comparison 
with what I have seen” (cited in Jean-Pierre Torrell, O.P., Saint Thomas Aquinas: The Person and His Work, trans. R. 
Royal, Revised edition, vol. 1 [Washington: The Catholic University of America Press, 1996], 289; French original, 
L’Initiation à Saint Thomas d’Aquin: sa personne et son oeuvre [Paris: Editions du Cerf, 1993]). Concerning this comment, 
Torrell states, “Straw is a stock expression used to distinguish, by giving it proper weight, the grain of reality within 
the chaff of the words; the words are not the reality, but they designate it and they lead to it. Having arrived at 
reality itself, Thomas had a certain right to feel himself detached with respect to the words, but this does not at all 
signify that he considers his work as without value. Simply put, he had gone beyond it” (Torrell, The Person and His 
Work, 293). Thus, Thomas’s work gave way to the very vision of God that the Summa was pedagogically designed to 
guide its readers toward. On the epideictic nature of this report and the hermeneutical significance of this event, see 
Marjorie O’Rourke Boyle, “Chaff: Thomas Aquinas’s Repudiation of His Opera Omnia,” New Literary History 28 
(1997): 383–99; Peter A. Kwasniewski, “Golden Straw: St. Thomas and the Ecstatic Practice of Theology,” Nova et 
Vetera (English) 2 (2004): 61–90.  
28 For the formation of this correlation across the Summa, cf. 1a.93.2; 1a.93.4; 1a.93.7; 1a.103.6; 
2a2ae.180.6; 2a2ae.188.6; 3a.9.2 ad.2. This argument is developed with tremendous precision by Eugene Rogers in 
“Thomas Aquinas on Knowing and Coming to Know: The Beatific Vision and Learning from Contingency,” in 
Creation and the God of Abraham, ed. David B. Burrell, C.S.C. et al. (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 
238–58, esp. 240–2. Vivian Boland also offers an excellent account of this position in “Truth, Knowledge and 
Communication: Thomas Aquinas on the Mystery of Teaching,” Studies in Christian Ethics 19 (2006): 287–304. To 
date the definitive study on Thomas’s doctrine of deification is Anna Williams’s The Ground of Union, 34–101. Also 
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according to Thomas, providentially oriented (ST 1a.22.1) to pursue happiness as the end or goal 
of life “for it signifies,” as he says, “perfect goodness”;29 yet, the end of this pursuit, and 
consequently, the end for which each person was created, is only reached in the beatific vision 
(ST 1a.94.1), where God, who is goodness itself (ST 1a.19.1 ad.1), is seen “face to face” (1 Cor. 
13.12). As noted earlier (§2.3), this is not possible in this life since we will only “see him as he is” 
(1 Jn. 3.2) when, as Thomas states, “we are made deiform, that is, like to God.”30 Thus, 
humanity’s creational disposition to seek the good is a universal reality (ST 1a2ae.1.2 ad.3) that is 
rooted in God’s providential work of guiding everyone toward, what Thomas calls, the “likeness 
of glory” (similitudo gloriae) in ST 1a.93.5.31  
Thomas elaborates on the nature of this likeness in his reply to an objection that 
humanity’s perfection is established in being created after the image of God. He writes, “Since 
God’s substance is his activity, the highest likeness of man to God relates to some operation. 
Consequently, happiness or beatitude, by which a man is made most perfectly conformed to 
God, and which is the fulfillment of human life, is an activity.”32 While Thomas clearly attributes 
this activity to the intellectual contemplation of the beatific vision (ST 1a2ae.3.4; Lect. Ioan. 17, 
lect. 1, no.2186), it is not a vision of God, contrary to Moltmann, devoid of our bodily nature. 
Rather, according to Thomas, for the beatitude of the beatific vision to be complete (omnibus 
modis perfectam) it “requires the well-being of the body, both before and during its activity,” which 
occurs only after the resurrection when our “bodies will be called enspirited” because “In perfect 
bliss the whole man is fulfilled, his lower levels by the higher brimming over.”33 The pursuit of 
                                                                                                                                                  
see, Matthew Levering, “Friendship and Trinitarian Theology: Response to Karen Kilby,” International Journal of 
Systematic Theology 9 (2007): 48–50. For a brief but insightful description of Thomas’s doctrine of the imago dei, see 
Gilles Emery, O.P., “Trinitarian Theology as Spiritual Exercise in Augustine and Aquinas,” in Aquinas the Augustinian, 
ed. Michael Dauphinais, Barry David, and Matthew Levering, trans. John Baptist Ku, O.P. (Washington: Catholic 
University of America Press, 2007), 5–10. 
29 ST 1a2ae.5.8: “Ratio autem beatitudinis communis est ut sit bonum perfectum.” 
30 ST 1a.12.5: “. . . efficiuntur deiformes, id est, Deo similes.” In order to avoid some common 
misconceptions about the doctrine of deification, it is worth noting that in ST 1a.4.3, 1a.42.1 ad.3, and many other 
places Thomas expressly denies the notion that any creature is or can become ontologically like God. For helpful 
introductions to the historical and doctrinal developments of deification in both Eastern and Western theological 
traditions, see the essays in Michael Christensen and Jeffery Wittung, eds., Partakers of the Divine Nature: The History 
and Development of Deification in the Christian Traditions (Grand Rapids: Baker Academic, 2007). 
31 Cf. SCG Bk. 4, ch. 55. Carlo Leget, Living with God: Thomas Aquinas on the Relation between Life on Earth and 
“Life” after Death (Louvain: Peeters, 1997), 127–8. 
32 ST 1a2ae.55.2 ad.3: “cum Dei substantia sit eius actio, summa assimilatio hominis ad Deum est 
secundum aliquam operationem. Unde, sicut supra dictum est, felicitas sive beatitudo, per quam homo maxime Deo 
conformatur, quae est finis humanae vitae, in operatione consistit.” Some questions later (ST 1a2ae.61.5), Thomas 
declares that the activity of the cardinal virtues (prudence, temperance, courage, and justice) characterize humanity’s 
movement toward this likeness of God, which culminate in the virtues of the blessed, who have “already achieved 
divine likeness” (assequentium divinam similitudinem). Cf. ST 3a.7.2 where Christ is said to posses these virtues of the 
purgati animi. On this point, see István P. Bejczy, The Cardinal Virtues in the Middle Ages: A Study in Moral Thought from 
the Fourth to the Fourteenth Century (Leiden: Brill, 2011), 216–8. 
33 ST 1a2ae.4.6: “[Beatitudo] . . . requiritur perfecta dispositio corporis et antecedenter et consequenter.” 
ST 1a.97.4: “[Nostri] corpora spiritualia dicentur.” ST 1a2ae.3.3 ad.3: “In perfecta beatitudine perficitur totus homo, 
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likeness to God in his glory is therefore one of ascending actualization (ST 1a2ae.1.6) in the totus 
homo, whereby one moves from being only potentially active (potentia operans) to active (operatio) by 
imitating the trinitarian life of God in a dyadic motion of reception and relational impartation of 
goodness (ST 1a.103.4).34 
Although the goal in this pursuit is the same for everyone (ST 1a2ae.3.1), Thomas argues, 
“The mind that has a greater share in the light of glory will see God more perfectly . . . and will 
be more blessed.”35 There is, then, for Thomas, a gradation in the enjoyment of the beatific 
vision (ST 1a.12.4); yet, this gradation does not imply that those who have a smaller share in the 
light of glory remain, in the final state, somehow imperfect since, according to Thomas, “Each 
thing is perfect inasmuch as it is actual, for what is potential is still imperfect. Happiness, 
therefore, must go with man’s culminating actuality.”36 Accordingly, complete actualization is the 
eschatological realization of one’s ultimate likeness to God, but only to the degree determined by 
God’s ordination, which Thomas reiterates in his rather candid remark, “The way along which 
each rational creature is led to ultimate bliss is a way that ends, according to God’s design, in this 
or that degree of bliss. And this once attained, there is no going further.”37 
Thomas’s conclusion that God intentionally gradates humanity’s eschatological 
perfection also emphasizes the individual diversification of this culminating beatitude in his claim, 
“Each and every creature stretches out to its own completion, which is a resemblance of divine 
                                                                                                                                                  
sed in inferiori parte per redundantiam a superiori.” This notion of enspirited body derives from 1 Cor. 15.44 (cf. In 
ad 1 Cor. 15, lect. 7, no.989-1000), where Paul writes, “Seminatur corpus animale surgit corpus spiritale si est corpus 
animale est et spiritale spiritale.” Thomas’s interpretation of this text (cf. In ad 1 Cor. 15, lect. 7, no.989-1000) largely 
parallels Augustine’s discussion on the distinction between the ensouled body (corpus animale) and the enspirited 
body (corpus spiritale) in De Gen. litt. VI, 30-39. 
34 In this twofold motion of reception and impartation, creation analogously imitates the perichoretic life 
of the Trinity since the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit share with one another the knowledge and love of the divine 
essence (ST 1a.42.5), which the Son and Holy Spirit eternally receive as a gift from the Father (ST 1a.27.2 ad.4). Cf. 
W. Norris Clarke, “To Be Is to Be Substance-in-Relation,” in Explorations in Metaphysics: Being, God, and Person (Notre 
Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1994), 119–20. On the importance of humanity relationally imparting 
goodness to others, Michael Hoonhout observes, “Aquinas takes this participation on the part of creatures so 
seriously that the vast majority of the discussion of divine government — more than three fourths of the questions 
— is dedicated to explaining the contributive role of creatures in the unfolding and execution of divine providence” 
(“Grounding Providence in the Theology of the Creator: The Exemplarity of Thomas Aquinas,” The Heythrop Journal 
43 [2002], 5). 
35 ST 1a.12.6: “Intellectus plus participans de lumine gloriae perfectius Deum videbit . . . et beatior erit.” 
The various points we have been dealing with here are drawn together in the sed contra to this article where Thomas 
writes, “Vita aeterna in visione Dei consistit, secundum illud Ioan. (17.3), haec est vita aeterna ut cognoscant te solum Deum. 
Ergo, si omnes aequaliter Dei essentiam vident, in vita aeterna omnes erunt aequales. Cuius contrarium dicit 
apostolus (I Cor. 15.41) stella differt a stella in claritate.” Cf. ST 1a.113.2 ad.3. 
36 ST 1a2ae.3.2: “Unumquodque autem intantum perfectum est inquantum est actu; nam potentia since 
actu imperfecta est. Oportet ergo beatitudinem in ultimo acut hominis consistere.” Cf. ST 1a.12.1; 1a.62.1; 1a2ae.5.2 
ad.3. Also see the discussions in, Te Velde, Participation and Substantiality, 52 and 252; Matthew Levering, Paul in the 
Summa Theologiae (Washington: The Catholic University of America Press, 2014), 11–2. 
37 ST 1a.62.9: “Unaquaeque creatura rationalis a Deo perducitur ad finem beatitudinis, ut etiam ad 
determinatum gradum beatitudinis perducatur ex praedestinatione Dei. Unde consecuto illo gradu, ad altiorem 
transire non potest.” 
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fullness and excellence.”38 Consequently, when Thomas asserts, “Men are called blessed in this 
life either because of their hope of gaining happiness in the future life – By hope we are saved (Rom. 
8.24) – or because of some participation of happiness anticipating our joy in the supreme good,” 
his insistence on the divinely ordained gradation of this end excludes the idea that the essence of 
this happiness is a generic eschatological reality.39 Instead, Thomas affirms that the essence is a 
creaturely reality relative to the individual, as noted in ST 1a2ae.5.2 where he comments on Jn. 
14.2 (“In my Father’s house there are many dwelling places”) that, “The many mansions signify 
the diversity of happiness with regard to the various degrees of enjoyment in its subjects.”40 
What all of these gestures amount to is a pattern in the Summa’s discussions on 
humanity’s eschatological transformation into “partakers of the divine nature” (2 Pet. 1.4) in 
which the promise of eternal life elevates the life of the wayfarer toward a vision of God that is 
both universal and particular.41 Following the pattern that emerges from the texts cited above, 
this promise is depicted as an eschatological anticipation of a participatory likeness to God not 
yet actualized in the individual, but, nonetheless, suited to each person’s created measure of 
eternal beatitude as both a personal and an ontological union with God (ST. 1a2ae.110.3; 
2a2ae.23.1, 23.2 ad.1). The theological dynamics at work in Thomas’s reflections on the 
intersection between humanity’s pilgrimage toward eternal beatitude and its fulfillment translate 
the “not yet” of this life into the eschatological anticipation of sacra doctrina “inherent,” as Carlo 
Leget argues, “in the consideration of every theme that is questioned with respect to God (sub 
ratione Dei),” and, subsequently, “the horizon of our reflection and the theological expression of 
the object of our hope.”42 With a sense of the eschatological horizon in the Summa’s theological 
discourse before us, it is now possible to begin examining the point on the crest where Thomas 
quietly situates the doctrine of the divine ideas in order to give a theological voice to the personal 
experience of being drawn into the fullness of dynamic union with God. 
 
                                                
38 ST 1a.44.4: “Unaquaeque creatura intendit consequi suam perfectionem, quae est similitudo perfections 
et bonitatis divinae.” 
39 ST 1a2ae.5.3 ad.1: “Beati dicuntur aliqui in hac vita, vel propter spem beatitudinis adipiscendae in futura 
vita, secundum illud Rom. (8.24), spe salvi facti sumus, vel propter aliquam participationem beatitudinis, secundum 
aliqualem summi boni fruitionem.” 
40 ST 1a2ae.5.2 ad.1: “Diversitas mansionum significant diversitatem beatitudinis secundum diversum 
gradum fruitionis.” Thomas further comments on the implications of this passage in Lect. Ioan. 14, lect. 1, no.1852-
1862 and In 2 Cor. 5, lect. 1, no.153-156. 
41 This passage from 2 Peter is a key text in Patristic and Medieval soteriologies of deification, and while 
Thomas only cites it a handful of times throughout the Summa, he does so at pivotal points within the work’s 
development. For more on the theological significance of this text for Thomas, see Williams, The Ground of Union, 
34; Kerr, After Aquinas, 153–5; Brian Davies, “Happiness,” in The Oxford Handbook of Aquinas, ed. Brian Davies and 
Eleonore Stump (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), 233.  
42 Carlo Leget, “Eschatology,” in The Theology of Thomas Aquinas, ed. Rik Van Nieuwenhove and Joseph 
Wawrykow (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 2005), 370 and 381. 
  
130 
6.3 Motus Spei: Incedens Deo et Divinae Ideae Sui Ipsius 
 
 While there is a scattering of references to the virtue of hope throughout the Summa, 
including Thomas’s introduction to the theological virtues in ST 1a2ae.62, the treatise on the 
virtue begins in question 17 of the secunda secundae. In the first article of question 17, Thomas 
differentiates the motion of the virtue from the passion of hope. Citing Aristotle for support, 
Thomas explains that a virtue is something that causes its possessor to be good and to perform 
well, which hope accomplishes, according to Thomas, because “In as much as we hope for 
something as possible to us through divine help, our hope reaches God himself, upon whose 
help it relies.”43 Hope, then, brings about, what for Thomas is, “a personal relationship with God 
as the source whence other good things come our way,” because it is, as he subsequently states, 
“a cleaving to God as source of absolute goodness, since hope is reliance on God’s help to bring 
us to beatitude.”44 Thomas’s account of hope’s dependence on God for attaining its goal 
expresses two aspects of the virtue’s character. First, despite the goal being distant and difficult 
to reach, hope’s reliance on God ensures that it will attain the beatitude it strives for (Lect. Ioan. 3, 
lect. 2, no.471; 6, lect. 6, no.950). Second, by emphasizing the need for God’s help, Thomas 
reinforces the point noted in our discussion on the passion of hope (§6.1) that the virtue and its 
goal exceed humanity’s natural powers (ST 2a2ae.17.5 ad.4).  
 Although there are no explicit appeals to the doctrine of the divine ideas in Thomas’s 
descriptions of these two characteristic features of the virtue, the doctrine does emerge through 
various subtle gestures that follow from them, which are perhaps intended to be understood only 
after one is immersed in the habit of thinking theologically that the Summa is pedagogically 
designed to instill in the reader. There are, however, some more obvious indicators of the 
doctrine located within his treatise on hope worth noting because they confirm that Thomas, at 
least, has the doctrine in mind while composing this section of the Summa. For instance, in 
question 19, on the gift of fear, Thomas states, “Chaste or filial fear is the beginning of wisdom 
(knowledge of divine things), as the first manifestation of wisdom. For it is the work of wisdom 
to regulate human life according to divine norms (rationes divinas), and the first indications of this 
is that man’s reverence for God and subjection to him, with the result that in all things a person 
will be ruled by God.”45 The virtue of hope and gift of fear are united, by Thomas, as mutually 
                                                
43 ST 2a2ae.17.1: “Inquantum speramus aliquid ut possibile nobis per divinum auxilium, spes nostra attingit 
ad ipsum Deum, cuius auxilio innititur.” Thomas cites Aristotle’s Nic. Eth. II, 6. 1106a15. 
44 ST 2a2ae.17.6: “[Spes facit] hominem inhaerere Deo sicut cuidam principio ex quo aliqua nobis 
proveniunt . . . Spes facit Deo adhaerere prout est nobis principium perfectae bonitatis, inquantum scilicet per spem 
divino auxilio innitimur ad beatitudinem obtinendam.” 
45 ST 2a2ae.19.7: “Timor autem castus vel filialis est initium sapientiae (cognitio divinorum) sicut primus 
sapientiae effectus. Cum enim ad sapientiam pertineat quod humana vita reguletur secundum rationes divinas, hinc 
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reinforcing dispositions (ST 2a2ae.19.9 ad.1) in humanity’s pursuit of beatitude because they 
both revere and depend on God as the source of the good (ST 2a2ae.141.1 ad.3), but while hope 
relies on God to fulfill the promise of eternal life, filial fear serves as a sober reminder of 
creation’s contingency, which eradicates the presumption of equality with God (ST 2a2ae.19.10 
ad.3).46 What is of particular interest to us here, however, are Thomas’s references to “divine 
norms” (rationes divinas) and the description of wisdom as “the knowledge of divine things” 
(divinorum) in ST 2a2ae.19.7, because in other places these terms are identified with the divine 
ideas. For example in ST 2a2ae.45.3, Thomas cites a passage from Augustine’s De Trinitate where 
Augustine proposes, “The mind of man does not remain the image of God except in the part 
which adheres to the eternal ideas to contemplate or consult them.”47 Thomas proceeds to 
equate Augustine’s reference to the divine ideas with the contemplatio divinorum and the rationes 
divinas, thereby confirming that the discussion in ST 2a2ae.19.7 falls within the scope of 
Thomas’s understanding of the divine ideas.48 
 A second reference to the doctrine of the divine ideas is located in Thomas’s discussion 
on the sin of presumption in ST 2a2ae.21.1, which Thomas describes as “a groundless hope that 
God will bestow something unfitting to his own nature.”49 Presumption opposes genuine hope 
because it disregards the fear that recognizes the precariousness that characterizes the 
potentiality of humanity’s existence (ST 2a2ae.130.2 ad.1) and instead claims an equality with 
God that assumes the fulfillment of salvation is somehow accessible in this life (ST 2a2ae.21.4). 
Thomas concludes that presumption is, then, “tantamount to a person being turned away from 
                                                                                                                                                  
oportet sumere principium, ut homo Deum revereatur et se ei subiiciat, sic enim consequenter in omnibus 
secundum Deum regulabitur.” 
46 On the relation between hope and fear, see Luc-Thomas Somme, “L’amour Parfait Chasse-t-il Toute 
Crainte? Le Rôle Joué Par L’expression Timor Filialis Dans L’œuvre de Saint Thomas d’Aquin,” in Ordo Sapientiae et 
Amoris: Image et Message de Saint Thomas d’Aquin a Travers Les Recentes Etudes Historiques, Hermeneutiques et Doctrinales, ed. 
Carlos-Josaphat Pinto de Oliveira (Fribourg: Editions Universitaires, 1993), 303–20; Josef Pieper, Faith, Hope, Love 
(San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 1997), 129; Lombardo, The Logic of Desire, 157. 
47 Augustine, De Trin. XII.12: “Non maneat imago dei nisi ex qua parte mens hominis aeternis rationibus 
conspiciendis uel consulendis adhaerescit.” Cf. ST 1a.79.9 and 1a2ae.74.7. Augustine prefers to speak of the divine 
ideas as God’s eternal reasons (aeternae rationes). See, Vivian Boland, O.P., Ideas in God According to Saint Thomas 
Aquinas: Sources and Synthesis, Studies in the History of Christian Thought 69 (Leiden: Brill, 1996), 39; Wendy 
Petersen Boring, “Revising Our Approach to ‘Augustinian Illumination’: A Reconsideration of Bonaventure’s 
Quaestiones Disputatae de Scientia Christi IV, Aquinas’s Summa Theologiae Ia.84, 1-8, and Henry of Ghent’s, 
Summa Quaestionum Ordinarum, Q. 2, Art. 1, 2,” Franciscan Studies 68 (2010): 50. It is worth noting that Thomas 
also references this section of Augustine’s De Trinitate in the passage cited from ST 2a2ae.19.7. 
48 For those that might object to this reading of ST 2a2ae.19.7 because Thomas’s use of ratio and divinus (cf. 
§4.1) is not limited to the connection presented in ST 2a2ae.45.3, there are two points to consider. First, the 
references to wisdom in ST 2a2ae19.7 clearly prefigure Thomas’s discussion in ST 2a2ae.45, where the relation 
between the divine ideas and divine wisdom is prominently featured. Second, filial fear concerns the relation of 
creation’s contingency to God, which is the space in which Thomas theologically situates the doctrine of the divine 
ideas, as his reply to De Veritate 3.2 obj.2 confirms: “Sed idea de suo principali intellectu habet aliquid aliud praeter 
essentiam, scilicet ipsam proportionem creaturae ad essentiam.” Cf. John F. Wippel, “Thomas Aquinas on the 
Divine Ideas,” in The Gilson Lectures on Thomas Aquinas, Etienne Gilson Series 30 (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of 
Mediaeval Studies, 2008), 140. 
49 ST 2a2ae.21.2 ad.2: “sed ex hoc quod sperat de Deo aliquid quod Deo non convenit.” 
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divine truth.”50 Divine truth is, for Thomas, a broad notion that encompasses what God is, 
knows and reveals, including the divine ideas (ST 1a.84.5 s.c.; 1a.87.1), and since presumption is 
specifically a rejection of the fear that belongs to the knowledge of divine things (divinorum), it is 
certain that this reference in ST 2a2ae.21.1 includes the divine ideas. Another clear indication 
that Thomas has the doctrine of the divine ideas in mind while writing the treatise on hope is the 
reference to the divine law in ST 2a2ae.22.1. Since hope is a movement of the will toward God 
(ST 2a2ae.18.1), it must, Thomas explains, “rely upon the assurance found in the divine law.”51 
Now, in his reply to the question on what the eternal or divine law is, Thomas emphatically 
states, as we saw in the previous chapter (§5.3), “The eternal law is nothing other than the 
exemplar of divine wisdom as directing the motions and actions of everything.”52 While these 
three instances from the Summa’s treatise on hope confirm that the doctrine of the divine ideas is 
present in Thomas’s thought on the infused virtue, to clarify the doctrine’s role in his theological 
exposition on the movement of hope, we must take a closer look at his reflections on the object 
of hope. 
 Thomas’s insistence that the goal toward which the virtue of hope moves is both 
attainable and transcendent is rooted in his understanding of the very object after which it strives. 
He identifies this object with greater clarity in ST 2a2ae.17.2, where he writes, “[W]e should hope 
for nothing less from God than his very self; his goodness, by which he confers good upon 
creaturely things, is nothing less than his own being. And so the proper and principal object of 
hope is indeed eternal blessedness.”53 Since there is no potentiality in God (ST 1a.3.4), Thomas’s 
argument here suggests that the reality upon which hope rests is not the possibility of beatitude, 
but the promise that it is already secured in God, which is, according to Thomas, guaranteed by 
Christ, who has fixed our hope beyond the veil of this life (In Heb. 6, lect. 4, no.325). Hope, 
consequently, may be described as humanity’s volitional act of stretching out for eschatological 
fulfillment in the beatific vision; however, because this final end is related to each person in a 
unique way (§6.2), the virtue of hope, as Thomas explains, “is directly set upon personal well-
being.”54 Because the object of hope is, as Thomas argues, both secured in God and unique to 
every individual, there must be, then, a particular reality or actuality in the divine mind that 
corresponds to the movement of hope in each person (ST 1a2ae.62.1; 2a2ae.18.4). While 
Thomas avoids delving into the theocentric metaphysical mechanics at work in the Summa’s 
                                                
50 ST 2a2ae.21.1 ad.3: “Hoc enim avertitur homo a veritate divina.” 
51 ST 2a2ae.22.1 ad.1: “Induci auctoriate legis divinae.” 
52 ST 1a2a3.93.1: “Hoc lex aeterna nihil aliud est quam ratio divinae sapientiae, secundum quod est 
directiva omnium actuum et motionum.” Cf. Lect. Ioan. 1, lect. 4, n.118; 12, lect. 8, n.1723. 
53 “Non enim minus aliquid ab eo sperandum est quam sit ipse, cum non sit minor eius bonitas, per quam 
bona creaturae communicat, quam eius essentia. Et ideo proprium et principale obiectum spei est beatitudo aeterna.” 
54 ST 2a2ae.17.3: “Spes directe respicit proprium bonum.” 
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treatise on hope, his remark in the first article of the exposition that, “all things are subject to 
regulation and measure, their being good is reckoned on the basis of their reaching the rule 
proper to them,”55 acts as a subtle gesture to remind the reader that the framework for 
discerning the intelligibility of his reflections on this virtue has already been given in the doctrine 
of the divine ideas (§5.2.1). We may therefore conclude that because the intentional similitudes 
for all things and all activities are identical to the divine essence (ST 1a.15.1 ad.3), the movement 
of hope toward God himself is also a movement toward the realization or creational 
actualization of God’s eternal idea for the individual.56  
It would perhaps be helpful to note, or, at least, reiterate within the current context, that 
hope, being rooted in the knowledge of faith (ST 2a2ae.4.1), does not pierce the veil of God’s 
incomprehensibility (§2.3.3); thus, like the ascent of faith, the movement of hope in each person 
approaches God and the creational actualization of one’s divine idea in eternal beatitude through 
the veiled mirror of the incarnation (In Col. 2, lect. 1, no.82).57 While the christological 
orientation in Thomas’s understanding of the theological virtues (ST 3a.1.2) recalls our 
discussion on the christoform arc in the structure of the Summa (§2.4), it also directs our 
attention to another instance where Thomas employs the doctrine of the divine ideas to codify a 
theological grammar for the beliefs implicit in the language of faith. In his response to the 
question of whether it was most fitting (conveniens) for the Son of God to assume human nature 
(cf. §4.2), Thomas writes:  
It was most fitting for the Son of God to become incarnate . . . Now the 
Person of the Son, who is the Word of God, has a general affinity with all 
creatures because the craftsman’s mental word, i.e., his idea, is a pattern for 
whatever he fashions; so too the Word, God’s eternal conception, is the 
exemplar for all creation. Creatures are first established, though changeably, in 
their proper kinds by a sharing in that likeness; similarly, it is fitting that 
creatures be restored to their eternal and changeless perfection through the 
Word’s being united, not participatively, but in person with the creature. The 
                                                
55 ST 2a2ae.17.1: “Omnibus [sunt] regulatis et mensuratis bonum consideratur per hoc quod aliquid 
propriam regulam attingit.” This passage reiterates Thomas’s claim in ST 2a2ae.8.3 ad.3, where he says, “Regula 
humanorum actuum est et ratio humana et lex aeterna, ut supra dictum est. Lex autem aeterna excedit naturalem 
rationem. Et ideo cognitio humanorum actuum secundum quod regulantur a lege aeterna, excedit rationem 
naturalem, et indiget supernaturali lumine doni spiritus sancti.” Cf. ST 1a2ae.62.1. Also see John I. Jenkins, Knowledge 
and Faith in Thomas Aquinas (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 159. 
56 In a similar fashion, Sarah Borden Sharkey notes, in a comment on her observation, “[T]he act of 
existence is given shape by being an orientation towards a particular kind of fullness,” that, “Articulated this way, 
the divine ideas act strikingly like Whiteheadean ‘lures’ for the development of actual entities” (“How Can Being Be 
Limited?: W. Norris Clarke on Thomas’s ‘Limitation of Act by Potency,’” The Saint Anselm Journal 7 [2009]: 17 n.20). 
57 On the cognitive dimension of hope in relation to faith, see Pieper, Faith, Hope, Love, 128; Lombardo, 
The Logic of Desire, 156. 
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craftsman repairs his own work when it has been damaged on the same mental 
model he used in making it.58 
God’s work of redemptive recreation is fittingly executed, according to this passage, through the 
Son because, as we have already seen (§4.4), the Father contemplates the exemplars for all 
creation in his Word.59 Consequently, even though the object of hope surpasses our natural 
capacities, the fullness of God, including the exemplar ideas for every individual, are hidden in 
Christ (In Col. 2, lect. 1, no.81; §4.3); therefore, the soteriological expression of hope (spe enim 
salvi facti sumus) is, for Thomas, existentially realized by turning towards Christ, in whom the 
eternal essence of God and the ideas for all creation, while veiled, shine brightly (Lect. Ioan. 1, lect. 
3, no.105). With this notion that the movement of hope is a turning in Christ toward God and 
his eternal idea of the individual, it is now time for us to consider briefly what one withdraws 
from in despair. 
 
6.4 Spiritual Despair: Denying One’s True Meaning 
 
 The formidable and destructive nature of spiritual despair was a prominent topic in 
patristic and medieval works on the spiritual life. For example, John Cassian, whose works both 
directly and indirectly shaped much of Western monasticism, wrote of despair, in contrast with 
what may be called an ascetic or godly sadness, “There is another kind of sadness, which is more 
detestable. It inspires in the wrongdoer not amendment of life or correction of vice but the most 
pernicious despair of the soul. It did not cause Cain to repent after his brother’s murder or Judas 
to hasten to healing and reparation after the betrayal; instead it drew him to hang himself with a 
noose in his despair,”60 and it is on this type of sadness or spiritual despair that Thomas reflects 
in ST 2a2ae.20. Although it could easily go unnoticed in the Summa, Thomas’s abiding concern 
for the disastrous effects of despair on the spiritual life are clearly on display in his biblical 
                                                
58 ST 3a.3.8: “Convenientissimum fuit personam filii incarnari . . . Ipsius autem personae filii, qui est 
verbum Dei, attenditur, uno quidem modo, communis convenientia ad totam creaturam. Quia verbum artificis, idest 
conceptus eius, est similitudo exemplaris eorum quae ab artifice fiunt. Unde verbum Dei, quod est aeternus 
conceptus eius, est similitudo exemplaris totius creaturae. Et ideo, sicut per participationem huius similitudinis 
creaturae sunt in propriis speciebus institutae, sed mobiliter; ita per unionem verbi ad creaturam non participativam 
sed personalem, conveniens fuit reparari creaturam in ordine ad aeternam et immobilem perfectionem, nam et 
artifex per formam artis conceptam qua artificiatum condidit, ipsum, si collapsum fuerit, restaurat.” On the basis of 
this passage, Romanus Cessario notes, “Thus one point remains sure: each adopted son or daughter participates in 
the unique sonship of the natural Son. As a result, each child of God, to the extent he or she remains united with 
Jesus, can manifest the goodness of the whole Trinity in creation” (The Godly Image: Christ and Salvation in Catholic 
Thought from St. Anselm to Aquinas [Petersham: St Bede’s Publications, 1990], 176). Cf. In 1 Cor.11, lect.1, no.583. 
59 Cf. Doyle, The Promise of Christian Humanism, 142–4. 
60 Cassian, Inst. 9.9: “Est etiam aliud detestabilius tristitiae genus, quod non correctionem uitae nec 
emendationem uitiorum, sed perniciosissimam desperationem animae inicit delinquenti: quod nec Cain fecit post 
fratricidium paenitere nec Iudam post proditionem ad satisfactionis remedia festinare, sed ad suspendium laquei sua 
desperatione pertraxit.” For more on patristic reflections on these two types of sadness, see Douglas Burton-
Christie, “Evagrius on Sadness,” Cistercian Studies Quarterly 44 (2009): 400–4. 
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commentaries, where, for instance, he notes, in his remarks on Eph. 4.19, that despair leads to an 
alienation from life itself and abandonment to rebellion against God (In Eph. 4, lect.6, no.235-
236).61 
 Spiritual despair, as with its emotional counterpart (§6.1), only differs from hope in the 
object’s final characteristic, which is concerned with the ability to attain the end after which one 
strives. Consequently, someone suffering from despair can still claim that eternal life is good, 
that it is in the future, and that it would be difficult to attain; however, unlike the virtue of hope, 
despair abandons the pursuit of this end (ST 2a2ae.17.1) because, as Charles Pinches observes, it 
“regards the possible to be impossible; it gives up on the future.”62 The details for the distinction 
between the virtue of hope and the vice of despair are given in Thomas’s response to the first 
question on the sinful nature of despair, where he says, “Now, the mind’s true appraisal about 
God acknowledges that he grants pardon to sinners and brings men to salvation . . . Contrariwise, 
false opinion envisions God as denying pardon to the repentant sinner . . . And so . . . despair, 
reflecting as it does a false view of God, is vicious and sinful.”63 Thomas then proceeds to 
explain that if despair is compared with the sins associated with other vices, there is “in terms of 
the effect upon us, then a greater danger discernible in despair” because, he continues, “the loss 
of hope has as its consequence that men plunge into evil without restraint and abandon their 
efforts to do good.”64 Accordingly, in a discussion on the virtue of hope, Romanus Cessario 
aptly summarizes the nature of despair when he remarks, “[D]espair acts directly against the 
formal motivating object (quo) of theological hope.”65 
  Since hope is, for Thomas, bent on personal well-being (§6.3), the destructive force of 
despair must also relate directly to the individual, as noted in his comments on the danger of this 
vice: “[D]espair is rather a case of ceasing to expect a personal share in the divine goodness,”66 
which occurs, according to Thomas, because one’s “judgment about particular applications is 
distorted.”67 Although, like in his exposition on hope, Thomas makes no direct appeals to the 
doctrine of the divine ideas in his assessment of despair, these remarks about the personal 
dimension of the object it rejects bear the mark of the doctrine’s subtle gestures, which we can 
see more clearly if we return to his earlier discussions on God’s intentional ordering of creation 
                                                
61 Cf. In Eph. 5, lect.3, no.283; In Rom. 5, lect.6, no.466; In Col. 3, lect.1, no.148. 
62 Pinches, “On Hope,” 352. 
63 ST 2a2ae.20.1: “Circa Deum autem vera existimatio intellectus est quod ex ipso provenit hominum salus, 
et venia peccatoribus datur . . . Falsa autem opinio est quod peccatori poenitenti veniam deneget . . .  Et ideo motus 
desperationis, qui se habet conformiter existimationi falsae de Deo, est vitiosus et peccatum.” 
64 ST 2a2ae.30.3: “. . . ex parte nostra, sic desperatio est periculosior, quia per spem . . . et ideo, sublata spe, 
irrefrenate homines labuntur in vitia, et a bonis laboribus retrahuntur.” 
65 Romanus Cessario, O.P., “The Theological Virtue of Hope (IIa IIae, Qq. 17-22),” in Essays on Aquinas’s 
Ethics, ed. Stephen J. Pope (Washington: Georgetown University Press, 2002), 240. 
66 ST 2a2ae.20.3: “[D]esperatio autem ex hoc quod homo non sperat se bonitatem Dei participare.” 
67 ST 2a2ae.20.2: “. . . corrupta aestimatione eius circa particulare.” 
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(§5.3). Well before raising a question about the pernicious character of despair, Thomas 
established that the whole of creation was creatively thought by God (§3.2.1) in such a way that 
each creature was intentionally designed to participate in a likeness of the divine goodness (ST 
1a.47.1), which for the rational creature is only realized in the rest or happiness of the beatific 
vision (ST 2a2ae.2.3). Now, as Pieper once remarked, “Genuine rest and leisure are possible only 
under the precondition that man accepts his own true meaning.”68 Despair, then, is the rejection 
of this true meaning, which is paramount to a denial that each creature is intentionally patterned 
after a likeness of the divine goodness. Consequently, we may say, that, for Thomas, what one 
approaches in hope or withdraws from in despair is the eternal idea of the self residing in the 
mind of God. 
 
6.5 Conclusion 
 
 In a lecture on Thomas’s soteriology, Otto Pesch poignantly remarks, “For Christian 
existence is nothing else than to live out the unity of faith, hope, and love, and that means to 
understand God’s truth for the world and for human beings . . . That is the way human beings 
proceed from God and go home to him,” which is, he says, “the basic and final purpose of 
theological understanding.”69 What Pesch’s observation here highlights is that hope, along with 
faith and love, characterize the christian life, and that discerning the intelligibility of these things 
not only defines the pursuit of theological inquiry but also represents the contemplative journey 
of humanity’s return to God. Thomas’s subtle references to the doctrine of the divine ideas in 
his expositions on hope and despair reveal that the doctrine contributes to his understanding of 
humanity’s existential encounter with God. To put this another way, for Thomas, the very fact 
that human beings can experience both the virtue of hope and the vice of despair ensures that 
the true meaning of each person is eternally conceived in the mind of God, which, revealed 
through Christ, stands as a promise of eternal life for every individual. The presence of the 
divine ideas in Thomas’s treatise on hope further demonstrates that the doctrine is not restricted 
to his philosophical ruminations or even to his theological inquiry into the issues of divine 
simplicity and the multiplicity of creation, but instead it spreads throughout the Summa to help 
guide his readers to a better understanding of the truth revealed by God. Yet, the peripheral 
placement of the divine ideas within these expositions pedagogically leaves room for the reader 
that has matured in the habit of theological thinking to expand on what Thomas has said by 
taking these subtle gestures and applying them in new and different ways (§3.1). There are, 
                                                
68 Pieper, Faith, Hope, Love, 119. 
69 Otto-Hermann Pesch, “Christian Existence according to Thomas Aquinas,” in The Gilson Lectures on 
Thomas Aquinas (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 2008), 206.  
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however, certain challenges we face in continuing this process centuries after the Summa was 
completed, which the next and final chapter of the study will discuss.70  
 
                                                
70 I would like to extend my gratitude to the participants at the January 2014 meeting of the Northumbrian 
Triangle who graciously offered their thoughts on an earlier draft of this section.  
  
138 
7. Conclusion 
 
 Stillness . . . means the soul’s power, as real, of responding to the real – a co-respondence, eternally 
established in nature – has not yet descended into words.1 
 
Introduction 
In his book on Thomas’s ethics, John Bowlin shrewdly remarks that, “unless we have 
antiquarian motives,” we largely read Thomas today “because we hope to uncover points of view 
that will challenge our settled habits of thought.”2 The question at the beginning of this study, on 
how Thomas’s doctrine of the divine ideas should be read today, implicitly reminds us that there 
are “settled habits” present in the various interpretations of the doctrine offered in 
contemporary scholarship. While these habits manifest along a spectrum of responses to the 
doctrine of the divine ideas, which include more positive engagements as well as the simple 
uneasiness many scholars express over the compatibility of the doctrine with theological inquiry, 
the contemporary reception of the divine ideas is indelibly marked by the severely critical 
readings of the doctrine that emerged in the post-Enlightenment theological tradition. For 
example, Wolfhart Pannenberg suggests that the doctrine presents “a static cosmos of ideas” 
that fails to address “the contingency and historicity of reality that results from God’s creative 
action.”3 Robert Jenson asserts that the doctrine of the divine ideas “displaces Christ from his 
New Testament role in creation.”4 Finally, Carl Braaten argues that this doctrine represents the 
intrusion of a “pantheistic way of thinking” into Christian theology.5 These readings represent a 
tradition on the divine ideas that has entered the identity of contemporary theology, but which 
clearly deviates from the premodern heritage Thomas received and transmitted.  
Given that many contemporary theologians and philosophers consider the doctrine of 
the divine ideas to be more or less antiquated, it would perhaps have been less complicated to 
portray this study on Thomas’s doctrine of the divine ideas as an exercise in historical 
conservation; however, the very assumption that the divine ideas are conceptually obsolete 
suggests that the doctrine may be examined, instead, for insights that will unsettle some of the 
fixed habits in contemporary theological discourse. While those that believe the doctrine’s 
                                                
1 Josef Pieper, Leisure: The Basis of Culture, trans. Gerald Malsbary (South Bend: St. Augustine’s Press, 1998), 
50; German original, Musse Und Kult (Munich: Kösel-Verlag, 1948). 
2 John Bowlin, Contingency and Fortune in Aquinas’s Ethics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 16. 
3 Wolfhart Pannenberg, Systematic Theology, trans. Geoffrey W. Bromiley, vol. 2 (London: T & T Clark, 
1994), 27–8. 
4 Robert W. Jenson, Systematic Theology: The Works of God, vol. 2 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), 7. 
Michael Horton concurs with Jenson's criticism of the divine ideas in his, The Christian Faith: A Systematic Theology for 
Pilgrims on the Way (Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 2011), 333. 
5 Carl E. Braaten and Robert W. Jenson, eds., Christian Dogmatics, vol. 1 (Minneapolis: First Fortress Press, 
2011), 34. 
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philosophical baggage in someway makes it theologically inoperable have attempted to purge the 
divine ideas from theological discourse, Thomas’s peripheral engagements with the doctrine, in 
its broader grammatical locutions and subtle gestures, expose ways the grammar of the divine 
ideas can still unconsciously linger in reflections on topics such as creation, salvation, 
epistemology, and ethics. Now, one could, even in a quasi-Thomist sense, effectively replace the 
doctrine of the divine ideas in theological discourse, if an alternative grammar emerged that was 
better suited to communicate the truth of the world’s createdness; however, this endeavor 
inevitably risks, as Pieper says, “the error of removing from the Christian consciousness the 
reality of creation itself.”6 Fortunately, there are better ways to answer the question of what to do 
with the divine ideas than claiming historical redundancy or arguing for contemporary 
elimination. 
One solution is to continue Thomas’s work of theologically expanding and reordering 
the doctrine’s horizon by renewing our understanding of his pedagogical commitments to train 
his readers in the habit of thinking theologically, through which we can rediscover the nature of 
theological inquiry as a spiritual exercise in discerning the mysteries of faith. The Summa’s entire 
discourse is fundamentally a theological exposition rooted in a recursive pattern of faith seeking 
understanding, which imitates the soteriological journey, textually inverted but existentially 
advancing from the revelation of Christ to the contemplative vision of God (Chapter Two). 
Thus, Thomas’s doctrine of the divine ideas surfaces in the Summa not as a philosophical 
excursus but as an integral expression of his pedagogical commitments to provide his reader’s 
with a theologically fitting (conveniens) exposition of God’s self-disclosure in creation and 
salvation such that the doctrine’s very intelligibility depends on approaching his formal 
discussion on the divine ideas in ST 1a.15 as an isomorphic reflection of his theological vision 
designed to instill in his readers the wisdom of sacra doctrina (Chapters Three and Four). This 
formal treatment of the divine ideas also provides Thomas with a means to pedagogically 
reconfigure peripheral gestures he makes with the doctrine through the network of grammatical 
and analogical themes he develops to represent the divine ideas in the Summa’s dialectic exchange 
between philosophy and theology (Chapters Five and Six). Finally, Thomas completes the 
theological integration of the divine ideas into his theological vision when the gestures of the 
doctrine serve to clarify for his readers the metaphysical mechanics in the existential reality of the 
soteriological journey to the eschatological vision of God (Chapter Six). 
In short, then, this study has taken steps, guided by Thomas, to improve the groundwork 
necessary for a theological rehabilitation of the doctrine of the divine ideas. Although we have 
                                                
6 Josef Pieper, “On Thomas Aquinas,” in The Silence of St. Thomas: Three Essays, trans. John Murray, S.J. and 
Daniel O’Connor, 3rd Revised ed. (South Bend: St. Augustine’s Press, 1999), 33. 
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not, necessarily, attempted to settle some of the more notorious questions related to the 
interpretation of the divine ideas, we have worked to outline a different approach to Thomas’s 
doctrine of the divine ideas by following the development of his pedagogical vision in the Summa, 
which will hopefully provide future studies on the divine ideas with new angles of approach to 
the perennial questions about the doctrine. Throughout the chapters of this study, we have also 
attempted to identify areas in Thomas’s thought where the subtle references to the divine ideas 
create space for the readers, including contemporary theologians and scholars, to elaborate on 
the doctrine’s relevance for theological discourse. There are, however, certain challenges we face 
in attempting to recover the doctrine of the divine ideas that we should be aware of prior to 
venturing out on the path of theological ressourcement. Thus, before bringing this study to a 
close with a final plea for the theological importance of reclaiming the doctrine of the divine 
ideas, we will consider some of the positive and negative implications of inquiries into 
intellectual history.  
 
7.1 Ressourcement’s Double-Edged Sword   
On the nature of received traditions, as Stephen Toulmin remarks, “[T]he existence of a 
consensus is one thing: the soundness of this view, the reliability of the historical assumptions on 
which it depends, are something else.”7 He proceeds to argue that if the historical assumptions 
“are sufficiently open to doubt,” then we must look “more closely at the actual credentials, and 
the historical basis, of the standard account.”8 If we follow Toulmin’s advice here and consider 
the history of the doctrine of the divine ideas, we find that it undergoes a significant 
transformation at some point during the Enlightenment. Herman Bavinck noted at the end of 
the nineteenth century that this once prominent, possibly even essential, doctrine all but vanishes, 
for some unknown reason, from theological discourse.9 The doctrine’s perceived disappearance 
radically alters its received tradition as it passes into post-Enlightenment generations. What 
remains unclear, however, is precisely why or when in the Enlightenment era this transition 
actually occurs.10 This uncertainty in the historical development of the doctrine’s modern 
                                                
7 Stephen Edelston Toulmin, Cosmopolis: The Hidden Agenda of Modernity (Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press, 1990), 13. 
8 Toulmin, Cosmopolis, 13. 
9 Reformed Dogmatics: God and Creation, ed. John Bolt, trans. John Vriend, vol. 2 (Grand Rapids: Baker 
Academic, 2004), 206; Dutch original, Gereformeerde Dogmatiek, vol. 2 (Kampen: J. H. Bos., 1897). 
10 Despite the impression that the doctrine disappears during the Enlightenment, a number of studies 
demonstrate various ways the doctrine continues to exert influence in modernity; however, the notion that the 
doctrine is abandoned still negatively informs the latter reception of the doctrine and increases the likelihood that 
places where the divine ideas do appear, albeit sometimes in less direct ways, will be overlooked. See Steven Nadler, 
Malebranche and Ideas (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992); Marc A. Hight, Idea and Ontology: An Essay in Early 
Modern Metaphysics of Ideas (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 2008); Gary Dorrien, Kantian Reason 
and Hegelian Spirit: The Idealistic Logic of Modern Theology (Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, 2012). 
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tradition calls into question the basis for the critical readings of the divine ideas in contemporary 
thought, but it also exposes inherent tensions in the efforts of theological ressourcement.11 
The ressourcement movement was initiated by a group of Roman Catholic scholars and 
theologians. Interest, however, in theological ressourcement now extends well beyond ecclesial 
distinctions and has become a prominent fixture in contemporary theological discourse.12 
Charles Péguy coined the term “ressourcement” in 1904, by which he meant, “[T]he appeal 
made by a less perfect tradition to one more perfect; the appeal made by a shallower tradition to 
one more profound; the withdrawal of tradition to reach a new depth, to carry out research at a 
deeper level; a return to the source, in the literal sense,” but it was not until Jean Daniélou’s 1946 
essay on the state of theology in modernity that the outline for the movement, which came to be 
known as the nouvelle théologie, was first sketched.13 The movement represents a type of ad fontes 
renewal and advancement of theological discourse through a return to the original sources in 
theological tradition. But this call for a return to the sources in theological ressourcement gives 
rise to a persistent tension present in the process itself. Denys Turner insightfully identifies the 
predicament that resourcement faces because of what he calls its two-sided character. He writes, 
“On the one hand, the ‘cleaning-up’ operation can leave us with a more ‘authentic’ text 
resituated more transparently in its own culture and context: on the other, may it not also, for 
that very reason, distance that text from our own culture and context.”14 What Turner has 
pinpointed here is that interpretive accuracy and constructive accessibility in the ressourcement 
movement do not always, as he says, “sit easily with one another.”15 
 In the case of the divine ideas, this tension is poignantly confronted in the efforts to 
reclaim the doctrine in contemporary theological discourse. The recent surge of interest in the 
doctrine of the divine ideas in the thought of ancient and medieval authors has exposed the 
doctrine’s general ubiquity in premodern theology, but these studies have also tended to be 
restricted to atomistic readings of the doctrine’s ontological and epistemological classifications.16 
Following the insights gained from these studies, contemporary scholars have become more 
                                                
11 Much of what follows in this section is indebted to Denys Turner’s article, “How to Read the pseudo-
Denys Today?,” International Journal of Systematic Theology 7 (2005): 428–440, which helped me to identify and clarify 
my own angst with the question of how we should read Thomas’s doctrine of the divine ideas today.  
12 For insightful discussions on the history and development of ressourcement theology in Catholic 
theology, as well as other ecclesial traditions, see the excellent essays in Gabriel Flynn and Paul D. Murray, eds., 
Ressourcement: A Movement for Renewal in Twentieth-Century Catholic Theology (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011). 
13 From the preface to Les Cathiers De La Quinzaine, 1904. Cited in Yves Congar, O.P., The Meaning of 
Tradition, trans. A. N. Woodrow (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 2004), 6. Jean Daniélou, “Les Orientations Présentes 
de La Pensée Religieuse,” Études 249 (1946): 5–21. On the contribution of this essay to the formation of the nouvelle 
théologie’s identity, see Hans Boersma, Nouvelle Théologie and Sacramental Ontology: A Return to Mystery (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2009), 1–4. 
14 Turner, “How to Read,” 433. 
15 Turner, “How to Read,” 433.  
16 For a list of these works, see Ch. 1, notes 4 and 10.  
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aware of the doctrine’s meaning in its premodern historical contexts and cultures; however, the 
modern loss of a constructive view of the divine ideas conversely means that the clarity gained in 
these studies inversely imposes a conceptual remoteness on the use of the doctrine, which makes 
it appear even more irrelevant and obscure to many forms of contemporary thought. This is not 
to suggest that what ancient and medieval authors meant in their discussions on the doctrine is 
unimportant, since understanding any historically conditioned text must begin with what the 
authors actually say. Rather, because we no longer have a fully developed doctrine of the divine 
ideas, it is difficult to grasp the reach of the divine ideas into other doctrines and areas of 
thought that shaped the way ancient and medieval figures understood or communicated various 
aspects of their theological and philosophical commitments. Without this broader framework for 
the doctrine, scholars will continue to be haunted by the uncertainties around what the doctrine 
ever provided theology.17 
 Another challenge to the contemporary recovery of divine ideas is our formation in the 
identity of contemporary theology. Hans Gadamer describes this issue when he observes: 
At the beginning of all historical hermeneutics, then, the abstract antithesis 
between tradition and historical research, between history and the knowledge 
of it, must be discarded. The effect of a living tradition and the effect of 
historical study must constitute a unity of effect, the analysis of which would 
reveal only a texture of reciprocal effects. Hence we would do well not to 
regard historical consciousness as something radically new—as it seems at 
first—but as a new element in what has always constituted the human relation 
to the past. In other words, we have to recognize the element of tradition in 
historical research and inquire into its hermeneutic productivity.18 
The particular difficulty our historical position poses in relation to our received tradition is 
expertly identified in a comment made by Turner in a reflection on the nature of personal 
identity. He writes, “Our identities are constituted as much by our forgetting as they are by our 
active remembering, by what we forbid entry to our recalling as by what we allow into it. Now 
every act of remembering changes the past it remembers. As I change necessarily my past 
changes, I necessarily rewrite my story.”19  
Thus, the disappearance of the divine ideas in theological discourse constitutes an act of 
forgetting that redefines the theological identity that contemporary scholars have inherited, and it 
colors our understanding of the past. We have already seen the examples of this active forgetting 
in the critical tradition of the divine ideas. The doctrine’s once positive contribution to 
                                                
17 Sarah Coakley emphasized this point to me in a private conversation on 5 Dec. 2012.   
18 Hans-Georg Gadamer, Truth and Method, trans. Joel Weinsheimer and Donald G. Marshall, Second, 
Revised Edition (London: Continuum, 2006), 283–4; German original, Wahrheit Und Methode: Grundzüge Einer 
Philosophischen Hermeneutik (Tübingen: Mohr, 1960). 
19 Turner, “How to Read,” 435. 
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theological discourse was rewritten during the formation of the contemporary theological 
identity that now governs, for better or worse, our reception of texts from epochs far removed 
from our own. Consequently, establishing the doctrine’s constructive theological value will 
require rewriting, at least in part, the story that created this identity. This task, however, is not 
easy, since it requires us to challenge our own theological and intellectual commitments, and it 
can often lead to unsettling realizations. One way to actively engage in rewriting this narrative is 
by reconsidering theological discussions where the divine ideas once held a prominent place, but 
now appear to have all but vanished from the discourse.20 Another option is to search for places 
in the works of authors like Thomas where glimpses of the doctrine are given in subtle or 
passing references, because these places may help us identify areas where the grammar of the 
divine ideas may be meaningfully recovered in rewriting the narrative of our theological identity.  
 
7.2 The End is Silence:  A Final Plea for Reclaiming the Doctrine of the Divine Ideas 
 In taking up the task of constructively reclaiming the doctrine of the divine ideas, the 
goal, it should be noted, is not simply to repeat what Thomas said, but to venture beyond his 
own extensions and applications of the doctrine, just as he intended in the pedagogical design of 
the Summa (§3.1), although this is certainly a case where it is easier said than done. While some 
may oppose the reading of the Summa offered in this study because it does not search for a 
definitive systematic account of Thomas’s doctrine of the divine ideas, but instead follows a 
pattern in his application of the doctrine to instruct readers in the habit of thinking theologically, 
Pieper’s observation that, “[E]very attempt to produce an absolutely tight system runs counter to 
the real life situation of the finite spirit, of man’s creaturehood,”21 reminds us that what the 
Summa offers is not a stable philosophical or even theological system but a path to the vision of 
God rooted in the revelation of humanity’s createdness (§2.1.1). To this observation, we may add 
Denys Turner’s astute remark that, “[T]heological speech is at once incarnated and apophatic 
speech, speech rooted in our common material condition and yet revelatory of that utterly 
unknowable reality which sustains that condition as created.”22 
 
                                                
20 For some examples of studies that have already begun this process, see John Milbank and Catherine 
Pickstock, Truth in Aquinas, Radical Orthodoxy (London: Routledge, 2001), 1–59; Conor Cunningham, Genealogy of 
Nihilism (London: Routledge, 2002), 189–97; Mark McIntosh, “The Maker’s Meaning: Divine Ideas and Salvation,” 
Modern Theology 28 (2012): 365–84.  
21 Josef Pieper, No One Could Have Known: An Autobiography, The Early Years, 1904-1945, trans. Graham 
Harrison (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 1987), 68; German original, Noch Wusste Es Niemand. Autobiographische 
Aufzeichnungen 1904-1945 (Munich: Kösel-Verlag, 1979). 
22 Denys Turner, “Apophaticism, Idolatry and the Claims of Reason,” in Silence and the Word: Negative 
Theology and Incarnation, ed. Oliver Davies and Denys Turner (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 33. 
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Consequently, the pursuit of theological wisdom occurs in the space between the known 
and the unknown (ST 2a2ae.45.1 ad.2), and for that reason it must exhaust the full range of 
human knowledge in the articulation of sacra doctrina. As Matthew Levering notes, “In theological 
reflection, then, metaphysical knowledge gained by the intellectual virtue of wisdom is taken up 
into the sacra doctrina and illumined within it . . . This unity of sacra doctrina ensures that 
metaphysical and scriptural modes of divine naming are profoundly integrated by Aquinas.”23 
But in doing so theological inquiry stretches the limits of human language in order to expose the 
incomprehensible reality of God. There is, then, a tension in all theological discourse, as noted in 
Turner’s argument that, “it is in and through the very excess, the proliferation, of discourse 
about God that we discover its failure as a whole.”24 Yet the breakdown of language before the 
face of God is precisely why constructively reclaiming the doctrine of the divine ideas is 
theologically important. Theologians today must continue the work of exhausting every avenue 
of speech about God, so that the last word of our journey is, as it was for Thomas, not one of 
speech but one of silence.25 
 
 
 
  
                                                
23 Matthew Levering, Scripture and Metaphysics: Aquinas and the Renewal of Trinitarian Theology (Oxford: Wiley-
Blackwell, 2004), 32. Cf. Kieran Conley, O.S.B, A Theology of Wisdom: A Study in St. Thomas (Dubuque: The Priory 
Press, 1963), 20; Paul Morrissey, “The Sapiential Dimension of Theology according to St. Thomas,” New Blackfriars 
92 (2011): 3. 
24 Turner, “Apophaticism, Idolatry and the Claims of Reason,” 16. 
25 Pieper, “The Negative Element,” 38. 
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